

CONTEMPORARY EUROPE AND OVERSEAS

1898-1920

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PERIOD IX

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PREFACE

THE series of volumes, called *Periods of European History*, under the general editorship of the late Arthur Hassall, student of Christ Church, began with Sir Charles Oman's *Dark Ages* in 1890. The last volume was Professor Alison Phillips' *Modern Europe*, which brought the story of Europe and the study of international relations down to the year 1899.

As the *Periods* have now for long been regarded as a standard series of works, for the purposes of the upper forms of schools and of undergraduate study, it has been felt that another volume should be added, to include the momentous period of the early twentieth century and the Great War. In former periods, the history of Europe was relatively simple; the inventions of science, improved transport and communications, had not yet made the whole world one. To-day the world has shrunk; Europe can no longer be considered by itself, nor even be regarded as the exclusive centre of world affairs. It has therefore been deemed advisable to comprehend within this new volume of the *Periods*, some account of the contemporary political development of Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Far East, and the United States. This volume was, as a matter of fact, written in two hemispheres, partly in England, partly in the United States. Its modest aim is to narrate and explain the solidarity of modern history in a world which, amid

national and economic divisions, is nevertheless most assuredly one.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge obligations to friends who have helped with the work ; to Mr. W. R. Smale of Radley College, who read the proof ; to Mr. P. H. Billingham of Clifton College, who, in addition to reading the proof, is the author of the Chronological Table ; and to Miss E. E. Butcher of the University of Bristol, who has given assistance at every stage.

R. B. M.

March 1931.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

1898-1920

1898

- Feb. 15. U.S. warship *Maine* blown up in Havana harbour;
Spanish-American War.
- March 6. Germany gained Kiaochow.
- „ 16. Russian occupation of Port Arthur.
- „ 31. Great Britain gained lease of Wei-hai-wei.
- April. Settlement of the Cretan question.
- „ First German Fleet Law.
- July 10. Fashoda incident.
- „ 28. Death of Bismarck.
- „ Imperial Penny Postage established.
- August. Queen Wilhelmina of Holland attained majority.
- „ 24. Tsar Nicholas II.'s rescript for a Hague Conference.
- „ 30. First Anglo-German agreement about Portuguese African colonies.
- Sept. 2. Battle of Omdurman.
- „ 10. Assassination of Empress Elizabeth of Austria at Geneva.
- October. Kaiser William II. visited Constantinople and Palestine.
- Nov. 14. Great Britain renounced rights over Samoa.
- Dec. 10. Spanish-American War ended.

1899

- February. Loubet French President.
- March. Petition of Transvaal Uitlanders to Queen Victoria.
- May 18. First Hague Peace Conference opened.
- June. Waldeck-Rousseau French Premier.
- „ Pelloux Ministry in Italy.
- „ Murder of German and Japanese ministers by Boxers.
- July. Hague Convention.
- Sept. 6. John Hay's 'Open Door' note to China.
- Oct. 9. Boer Ultimatum.
- „ 11. Opening of the Boer War.

- Oct. 14. Windsor Treaty confirming Anglo-Portuguese alliance.
" 20. British reverse at Talana Hill.
" 21. British reverse at Elandslaagte.
" 29. Battles round Ladysmith.
Nov. 28-29. Methuen forced the Modder River.
Dec. 10. Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg.
" 11. Methuen defeated at Magersfontein.
" 15. Battle of Colenso.

1900

- Jan. 10. Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief, landed at Cape Town.
" 24. British reverse at Spion Kop.
Feb. 15. Relief of Kimberley.
" 27. Labour Party founded in England.
" 28. Relief of Ladysmith.
" 29. Cronje's surrender at Paardeberg.
March 3. Russian proposal for a Continental bloc.
" 13. Roberts entered Bloemfontein.
May 17. Relief of Mafeking.
June. Second German Fleet Law.
" 5. Roberts entered Pretoria.
" 12. Tirpitz doubled German Navy Bill owing to Boer War.
" 24. Saracco Ministry in Italy.
July 27. German force sent to China; Kaiser's 'no quarter' speech.
" 29. King Humbert of Italy assassinated at Monza; accession of Victor Emmanuel III.
Aug. International force at Tientsin.
" 14. Relief of Legations in Peking.
Sept. 1. Annexation of the Boer Republics.
" 17. Success of Botha on Natal frontier.
October. Bülow German Chancellor.
November. Lord Lansdowne Foreign Secretary.

1901

- January. • Kitchener's blockhouses in South Africa.
" Smuts active in the Transvaal.
" Kaiser William II. visited England.
" 22. Death of Queen Victoria. Accession of Edward VII.
February. Zanardelli Ministry in Italy.
" Queen Wilhelmina of Holland married Prince Henry of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

- Feb. 11. Death of ex-King Milan of Serbia.
- March. McKinley second time President of U.S.A.
- Sept. 6. McKinley assassinated. Roosevelt President of U.S.A.
- „ 7. Boxer Protocol.
- October. Swedes adopted conscription.
- Nov. 18. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty about Panama Canal.
- December. Failure of plan for Anglo-German alliance.

1902

- Jan. 30. Alliance of Great Britain and Japan.
- March. De la Rey captured Methuen.
- „ 26. Death of Cecil Rhodes.
- April. Russian promise to evacuate Manchuria.
- May 31. Peace of Vereeniging ended Boer War.
- June. Secret agreements between Italy and France about Morocco and Tripoli (Prinetti-Barrès negotiations).
- July. A. J. Balfour English Prime Minister.
- August. Imperial Conference arranged by Chamberlain.
- November. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa.

1903

- Jan. 22. John Hay's Treaty with Colombia (unratified).
- April. Russian refusal to complete evacuation of Manchuria brought on war.
- „ Failure of Lord Lansdowne's agreement over the Bagdad railway.
- May. Edward VII. visited Paris.
- „ 15. Chamberlain adopted Tariff Reform.
- June 10. Revolution in Serbia. Murder of Alexander I. and his wife. Accession of Peter I.
- July. President Loubet and M. Delcassé visited England.
- „ 20. Death of Pope Leo XIII.
- Aug. 4. Election of Pius X.
- October. Second Giolitti ministry in Italy.
- „ 2. Settlement of the question of Macedonian reform.
- „ 20. Arbitral award about Alaskan boundary.
- Nov. 3. Revolution in Panama.
- „ 18. Canal zone leased in perpetuity to U.S.A.

1904

- February. Completion of Trans-Siberian Railway.
- „ 5. Outbreak of Russo-Japanese War.
- „ 9. Admiral Togo's success before Port Arthur.

- March 16. Kaiser visited Alfonso XIII. at Vigo. (The Vigo Declaration.)
 April 8. Entente of France and Great Britain.
 May 1. Japanese victory at Yalu River.
 „ 14. Beginning of siege of Port Arthur (7 months).
 June-Aug. Japanese advance checked.
 Aug. 24. Beginning of battle of Liao-yang.
 September. General strike in Italy.
 Oct. 21. Dogger Bank incident.

1905

- January 2. Capitulation of Port Arthur to the Japanese.
 „ Russians compensated England for Dogger Bank incident.
 Feb. 3. Arthur Lee's naval speech at Edinburgh.
 „ 22. Beginning of Battle of Moukden.
 March. Retirement of Giolitti.
 „ 31. Kaiser at Tangier.
 May 27. Russian fleet defeated at Tsushima.
 June 6. Fall of M. Delcassé.
 „ 7. Bülow made a prince.
 July. Revolution in Russia.
 „ 25. Treaty of Björkö.
 Aug. 12. Anglo-Japanese alliance renewed.
 „ 19. Tsar's consent to a Duma.
 Sept. 1. Franco-Spanish agreement.
 „ 5. Treaty of Portsmouth ended Russo-Japanese War.
 Scope of Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 extended to include India.
 „ 23. Separation of Norway and Sweden by Treaty of Carlstad. Accession of Haakon VII. of Norway.
 Oct. 10. Great strike in Russia.
 „ 14. Lenin and Trotsky formed a soviet.
 „ 30. Witte Russian Prime Minister.
 November. Balfour resigned. End of Unionist ministry in Great Britain.

1906

- January. Liberal Government of Campbell-Bannerman in Great Britain.
 „ President Loubet retired.
 „ 29. Death of Christian IX. of Denmark. Accession of Frederick VIII.
 March. Third German Fleet Law.
 „ 5. First Russian Duma assembled.

- April 7. Final Act of Algeciras Conference on Morocco.
 „ Resignation of Baron von Holstein.
 May. Giolitti's Third Ministry.
 „ 31. Alphonso XIII. married Princess Victoria Eugénie
 of Battenberg.
 July. Stolypin Prime Minister in Russia.
 „ 22. First Duma dissolved.
 „ Orange Free State received responsible government.
 Dec. 12. Transvaal received responsible government.

1907

- March. Second Duma convened.
 June 15. Opening of Second Hague Conference.
 July. Third Duma convened.
 Aug. 31. Russo-British convention signed at St. Petersburg.
 Oct. 18. Hague Conference closed.
 Dec. 8. Death of Oscar II. of Sweden. Accession of
 Gustavus V.

1908

- Feb. 1. Assassination of Carlos of Portugal and his son
 Luiz at Lisbon. Accession of Manoel.
 April 6. Campbell-Bannerman resigned. H. H. Asquith
 British Premier.
 June. Edward VII. and Alexandra visited Russia.
 „ 25. Bülow's refusal to stop naval construction.
 Fourth German Fleet Law.
 July 23. Sultan Abdul Hamid II. accepted restoration of
 Turkish constitution.
 August. Edward VII. visited the Kaiser at Kronberg.
 „ 31. Russo-British Entente.
 Oct. 5. Bulgarian independence proclaimed.
 „ 8. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina.
 Nov. 15. Congo Free State annexed by Belgium.

1909

- March. Hague Tribunal decision on Casablanca incident.
 April. Sultan Abdul Hamid II. deposed. Accession of
 Mohammed V.
 „ 29. Struggle in English Parliament between the two
 Houses.
 May. Morley-Minto scheme for the government of India.
 July. Bethmann-Hollweg German Chancellor. Kider-
 len-Wächter Foreign Secretary.

- October. Victor Emmanuel III. and Tsar Nicholas II. made agreement at Racconigi about Balkans and Dardanelles.
 November. Taft President of U.S.A.
 Dec. 17. Death of Leopold II. of the Belgians. Accession of Albert I.

1910

- Jan. 10. Dissolution of English Parliament on the Land Tax question.
 May 6. Death of Edward VII. Accession of George V.
 „ 31. Union of South Africa established.
 August. M. Venizelos Prime Minister of Greece.
 „ 28. Nicholas of Montenegro took the title of King.
 Oct. 3. King Manoel of Portugal forced to abdicate. Portugal a republic.

1911

- May 4. President Diaz of Mexico compelled to resign during revolution.
 July 1. German warship *Panther* at Agadir.
 „ George V. visited Ireland and Wales.
 „ 3. Investiture of Edward Prince of Wales at Carnarvon Castle.
 „ Kitchener Consul-General in Egypt.
 August. Kaiser's 'place in the sun' speech at Hamburg.
 Sept. 14. Stolypin assassinated at Kiev.
 „ Outbreak of Tripoli war between Italy and Tripoli.
 Nov. 4. Germany recognised French protectorate of Morocco, receiving in return part of French Congo.
 „ 8. Bonar Law succeeded Balfour as leader of the Conservative party in England.
 Dec. 12. Coronation 'Durbar' at Delhi.

1912

- February. Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin.
 „ 12. Manchu dynasty overthrown in China. China a republic.
 March 13. Alliance of Serbia and Bulgaria.
 „ 18. Churchill's speech proposing 'holiday' for naval construction.
 April. Irish Home Rule Bill introduced.
 May. Fifth German Fleet Law.

- May 29. Alliance of Bulgaria and Greece [Balkan League completed].
- July 15. National Health Insurance Act became operative in Great Britain.
- September. Churchill announced plan for Franco-British naval co-operation.
- October. Lord Roberts's prophecy of war between Germany and Great Britain.
- „ 8. First Balkan War began.
- „ 18. Treaty of Lausanne ended Tripoli war.
- Dec. 3. Armistice in the First Balkan War.

1913

- Feb. 3. Balkan War resumed.
- Feb. 16-May 6. Lord Roberts's 'campaign' for compulsory military service.
- Mar.-April. Balkan League's successes against Turkey.
- March 3. Woodrow Wilson American President.
- May. King George and Queen Mary visited Berlin.
- „ 30. Conference of London, marking end of First Balkan War.
- June 29. Outbreak of Second Balkan War.
- Aug. 10. Second Balkan War ended by Treaty of Bucharest.
- Sept. 28. Illegal organisation of a provisional government in Ulster.
- „ Strikes in Great Britain.
- Dec. 2. Zabern incident.

1914

- Feb. 15. Franco-German agreement about Bagdad railway.
- April. Wilson occupied Vera Cruz.
- June. President Wilson's agreement with Great Britain about the Panama Canal.
- „ Second Anglo-German Convention about Portuguese African colonies.
- „ 28. Assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo.
- July 6. Germany's telegram of encouragement to Austria.
- „ 21-24. Conference on the Irish situation.
- „ 23. Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.
- „ 26. Lord Grey's proposal for an international conference.
- „ 26. German High Seas Fleet recalled.

- July 27. Germany's refusal of a Conference.
- „ 28. Austria at war with Serbia.
- „ 29. Tsar's proposal for a reference to the Hague Tribunal.
- „ 30. Russian mobilisation.
- Aug. 1. German ultimatum to Russia.
- „ Germany at war with Russia.
- „ 3. Germany declared war on France and crossed Belgian frontier.
- „ Lord Grey's speech in the House of Commons announcing British policy of defending Channel ports of France.
- „ 4. Great Britain declared war on Germany.
- „ 7-15. Siege of Liège.
- „ 20. Germans occupied Brussels.
- „ 21-23. Joffre's attack at Charleroi.
- „ 23. Germans under Von Kluck attacked British at Mons.
- „ 24. British retreat from Mons.
- „ 24-Sept. 5. Allies in retreat.
- „ 26. Germans captured Namur.
- „ 26. Smith-Dorrien's stand at Le Cateau.
- „ 28. Samsonoff's defeat by Hindenburg at Tannenberg.
- „ 28. Three German cruisers sunk in Heligoland Bight.
- Sept. 3. Von Kluck's swerve.
- „ 5. Pact of London by Allies to refuse any but a general peace.
- „ 6-10. First Battle of the Marne began.
- „ 7. Germans captured Maubeuge.
- „ 13. Allied defence of the Aisne.
- „ 28. *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy* sunk by German submarines.
- Oct. 5. British expedition to Antwerp.
- „ 7-10. Belgian army extricated itself from Antwerp.
- „ 13. Germans captured Lille.
- „ 15. Hindenburg's invasion of Poland.
- „ 20-24. Battle of Arras.
- „ 20-25. Battle of the Yser.
- „ 21-31. First battle of Ypres.
- „ 29. Turkey joined the Central Powers.
- Nov. 1. Admiral Cradock defeated at Coronel.
- „ 10. *Emden* sunk.
- „ 22. Indian force landed at Basra.
- Dec. 3. Serbian victory at Valievo.
- „ 8. German fleet defeated at Falkland Islands.

1915

- Jan. 23. The *Dacia* sails from New York.
 Feb. 18. Germany declared British waters a 'war-zone.'
 March 10. Battle of Neuve Chapelle.
 „ 18. British and French naval attack on the Dardanelles.
 „ 22. Russian capture of Przemyśl.
 April 22. Second Battle of Ypres began.
 „ 25. Beginning of the Dardanelles campaign.
 „ 28. Mackensen's attack on the Dunajec.
 May 7. *Lusitania* torpedoed.
 „ 23. Italy joined the Allies.
 Aug. 4. Germans captured Warsaw.
 „ 6. Landing at Suvla Bay.
 Oct. 5. Franco-British force landed at Salonika.
 „ 12. Bulgaria joined the Central Powers.
 „ 12. Execution of Nurse Cavell in Brussels.
 „ 15. Lord Milner advised abandonment of the Dardanelles expedition.
 Nov. 12. Townshend's victory over the Turks at Ctesiphon.
 Dec. 18-19. Evacuation of Suvla and Anzac.

1916

- Jan. 7-8. Evacuation of Cape Helles.
 „ 10. Austrian conquest of Montenegro.
 Feb. 21. Beginning of German attacks on Verdun.
 April 20. Britain declared cotton contraband.
 „ 29. Townshend's surrender at Kut-el-Amara.
 May 31. Battle of Jutland.
 July 1. Beginning of the First Battle of the Somme.
 „ 28. Captain Fryatt shot.
 Aug. 27. Roumania joined the Allies. Defeated by Von Falkenhayn by Dec. 6.
 Sept. 15. Tanks first used on the Somme.
 Oct. 24. French stormed Fort Douaumont.
 Nov. 21. Death of Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria.
 Accession of Emperor Charles I.
 Dec. 13. Joffre retired.
 „ 29. Murder of Rasputin.

1917

- Jan. 31. German declaration of unrestricted blockade.
 Feb. 3. American steamer *Housatonic* sunk.
 March 11. Maude captured Bagdad.

- March 15. Abdication of the Tsar ; a Liberal Government in power.
April 5. United States of America joined the Allies.
" 9. Byng captured Vimy Ridge.
" 16. Nivelle's failure on the Aisne.
" Lenin arrived in Russia.
May 4. Lloyd George's visit to France.
" 13. Socialist Government of Kerensky in Russia.
June 11. Allies' demand for abdication of King Constantine of Greece.
" 29. Kornilov's offensive in Galicia.
July-Nov. 6. Battles of Passchendaele.
Oct. 24. Italian defeat at Caporetto.
Nov. 7. Bolshevik revolution in Russia.
" 18. Death of Maude in Mesopotamia.
" 20. Byng's success at Cambrai.
Dec. 11. Allenby entered Jerusalem.

1918

- Jan. 8. President Wilson's Fourteen Points.
March 3. Russia made peace by Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
" 21. Second Battle of the Somme began.
" 26. Allies adopt united control on Western Front under Foch.
April 11. Haig's ' Backs to the Wall ' order.
" 22-23. Naval attack on Zeebrugge.
May-June. Large American reinforcements arriving in Europe.
May 7. Austria made peace with Roumania by Treaty of Bucharest.
June 18. Second Battle of the Marne began.
" 31. Germans retreating from the Marne.
Sept. 12. American capture of St. Mihiel.
" 25. Bulgarian request for an Armistice.
Oct. 25. Italian offensive resulted in crossing of the Piave.
" 25. Austrian request for an Armistice.
" 25. • Allenby captured Aleppo.
" 28. Turkish surrender to Marshall at Kalat Shergat.
" 30. Surrender of Turkey.
" 30. Armistice granted to Bulgaria.
Nov. 5. Allied Governments accepted the Fourteen Points as a peace basis.
" 10. Foch met the German deputies at Rethondes.

- Nov. 10. Flight of the Kaiser to Holland.
„ 11. The Armistice signed, 5 A.M.

1919

- June 28. Peace Treaty of Versailles between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Germany.
Sept. 10. Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain between Allied and
Associated Powers and Austria.

1920

- June 4. Treaty of the Trianon between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Hungary.

CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION IN 1898

THE year 1898 is suitable for starting the history of a period of European history. The last vestiges of the once great overseas empire of Spain disappeared in the Spanish-American War. By reason of this con- The New Era. test, the United States, which hitherto had held itself aloof from Europe, stepped forth as a 'world-power,' and has never been able to go back into isolation, nor perhaps has it definitely desired to do so.

In this year the Tsar Nicolas II. sent out a proposal for an international conference, a step in the powerful, although not yet completed, movement for securing peace Peace and War. by international co-operation. The British Government was already engaged in a serious dispute with the South African Republic (or Transvaal); before another year was over, this dispute had involved the two countries in the Anglo-Boer War. In China anti-foreign feeling was coming to a head, fomented by the widely spread secret society of Boxers. This, two years later, brought about the expedition of an international force of European states, Japan and the United States, with lasting and unforeseen results upon the subsequent development of China.

In 1898 Great Britain and France nearly came to blows over the occupation of Fashoda. A joint Anglo-Egyptian army conquered or reconquered the Sudan, and established a 'condominium' of the two states—the one a Great European Power, the other an Oriental Turkish province—over that vast African country. What some geographers and historians have called 'the Scramble for Africa' was nearly finished.

The international situation was not particularly dangerous or menacing in 1898, on the threshold of the new century which was to see the greatest war in history. Europe was composed of some twenty-six sovereign states, none of which acknowledged any master. Inside every state the rule of law—'Municipal Law' as it is called—prevailed; but between states there was no law which nations in the last resort felt bound to obey. It was accepted as a matter of course that every citizen should obey law; but it was equally accepted as a matter of course that a sovereign state, because it was sovereign, need not obey any law. Europe was in a condition of international anarchy.

Moreover, the people of each state were armed to the teeth. In the circumstances of a Europe of completely sovereign states, this arming was absolutely inevitable. If one state improved its weapons or increased its soldiery, other states, by force of competition and from fear of attack, felt themselves compelled to do likewise. Thus every state was continually increasing its armaments to the utmost limit of its resources; and Europe lived in an 'armed peace,' under the shadow of the most numerous and most destructive armaments that the world had ever seen.

There were many conditions and circumstances in Europe making it only too likely that those armaments would be used in war. It is true that since the Franco-German War of 1870-71, Europe (except in the Balkan region) had been at peace. But the Franco-German War had been badly ended. If the victors, the Germans, had merely taken an indemnity, however large, from France, and so recouped themselves for the cost of the war, France and Germany might have settled down into harmony. By annexing Alsace and Lorraine, however, the German Government did something which it knew that France would neither forget nor forgive. Therefore in holding Alsace-Lorraine, the Germans felt that at any moment they might have to defend this. Accordingly they main-

tained a huge army—the ‘nation in arms.’ With a big German army on one side of the frontier, France had to have a huge army too; and the question of Alsace-Lorraine continued to poison the relations between them. There was espionage and counter-espionage on the frontier, and occasional ‘incidents’ which inflamed feeling and fanned the war-spirit.

There were other things besides armaments which prevented the ‘peace-spirit’ from overcoming the persistent ‘war-spirit’ that seems to lurk at the base of so much of human nature. The population of most of the nations of Europe (although not the population of France) was increasing; the cost of living was rising; there was a feeling of ‘struggle for existence’ in the air. Every nation was on the look-out for new markets, new avenues for disposing of the surplus manufactures which, since the ‘Industrial Revolution,’ they were continually producing. The Russians were pressing into the Chinese province of Manchuria, in which the Japanese through ‘territorial propinquity’ claimed to have the greater interest. The Germans were gaining powerful commercial (and also political) influence in Turkey, and in the Turkish provinces of Asia. A great German navy was being created. There was the danger that competition for markets in international trade, the subdued but persistent pressure of increasing population against increasing population, might gradually inflame feeling until some chance episode should result in some outburst of uncontrollable excitement or nervousness, and so produce war.

It is true that there was international law and also international concert. The ‘Law of Nations’ or International Law is a body of regulations which are normally recognised by civilised nations. These rules have come into existence in three ways: by the growth of custom, by the negotiation of treaties, and by the sayings or writings of learned men. Certain customs—for instance the sanctity of the persons of ambassadors—have been

The Industrial and Economic Factors.

International Law.

observed so long that nobody would think of denying them. In the same way, a dispute settled by arbitration is a precedent which makes settlement of the next case easier ; so that from precedent to precedent, a rule is built up which the public opinion of the world will recognise and demand to be enforced. Also, treaties, defining in general or particular terms the attitude of the contracting states towards each other, are made from time to time, for longer or for shorter periods. These treaties become a part of International Law while they are in force ; and even after they have lapsed or otherwise come to an end, the principles on which they were based go on influencing the development, the accepted *formulae*, of the Law of Nations. Finally, the statements of recognised legal authorities, such as Grotius, Vattel, Lord Stowell, John Marshall,¹ naturally have great weight, enter into the public consciousness, and help to determine the conduct of governments towards each other.

It is obvious that International Law, if it were obeyed and enforced to the same degree as Municipal Law, would make the relations between states as peaceable and as smoothly working as relations between citizens of the same state. And, indeed, in normal times, this is so ; civilised states do, as a rule, in time of peace, conduct their relations with each other according to the principles of the Law of Nations. That they have not done this continuously is due to the fact that the Law of Nations, as a regulating code between states, comes up against the doctrine—the ‘damnable’ doctrine, as an American public man has called it—of state-sovereignty, the doctrine or claim that a state has no superior and can in the last resort decide for itself how it should act. Until states abandon this doctrine of absolutism, this claim of omnipotence or omnicompetence (which they deny to their

¹ Grotius of Holland (1583-1645), author of *Concerning the Law of War and Peace* ; Vattel of Switzerland (1714-67) ; Stowell of Great Britain (1745-1836) ; Marshall of the United States (1755-1835).

citizens without exception), the Law of Nations cannot enter into full force. Indeed, so far has International Law itself recognised its helplessness in the last resort to settle disputes between states determined to settle them in their own way, that it has admitted the lawfulness of war.¹ Private war, which is prohibited between citizens, was recognised by the Law of Nations down to 1928 as permissible between states; and International Law concerning the conduct of war had grown up and was—in theory at least—accepted, alongside of the system of International Law for the conduct of peace. International Law,² when the nineteenth century was ending, had two objects: one, to prevent war; the second, to mitigate the horrors of war when it occurred. These were the two objects of the International Conference of the Hague, which was proposed at the opening of this period (1898), and which actually met and enacted important additions to the Law of Peace and War in 1899.³

The Concert of Europe was the second of the two things (the Law of Nations being the other) which helped to keep the sovereign states of Europe in harmony with each other. This Concert was not so much a political body as a political understanding. It was a tacit recognition among the Great Powers that they could, if in agreement, preserve the peace of Europe in any crisis, and that they had a moral obligation to act in this way. This idea arose, or at any rate was first definitely accepted by the Powers, at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, when the

¹ By the Pact of Paris, August 27, 1928 (sometimes called the Kellogg Pact, after Frank B. Kellogg, United States Secretary of State at that time), the signing states have renounced and condemned all resort to war 'for the solution of international controversies' or 'as an instrument of policy.' Aggressive war is therefore now no longer admissible under the Law of Nations which is recognised by the great majority of civilised states.

² i.e. *Public International Law* which deals with the relations between states, as distinct from *Private International Law* which deals with the relations between citizens of different states, or between citizens of one state and the Government of another.

³ See below, pp. 99 ff.

statesmen of Europe met together to settle the public affairs of the Continent at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The Main Treaty (or Final Act) of Vienna of June 9, 1815 made a general settlement, a 'Statute,' concerning Europe which obviously should only have been altered or amended subsequently with the consent of the states which had made and signed it. Changes in the Act of Vienna were made from time to time, after meetings or conferences of the signing states, or of the states which claimed an interest in the matter; and thus the principle of acting 'in concert' became established (not without exception, for it was often disregarded) for the states of Europe. There was, however, no standing organisation for calling the Concert together when a crisis occurred; unless some individual statesman proposed it, or public opinion (this seldom happened) demanded it, the Concert would not be called into action, and a crisis which had occurred might be inflamed into a war, because a Conference did not take place. Sometimes, also, a Great Power, or certain Great Powers (like Prussia in her quarrel with Austria in 1866 and with France in 1870), simply refused to go to a Conference, and insisted upon settling a crisis by their own force of arms. Therefore it is clear that the Concert of Europe was not a powerful institution, yet it had life in it, and had on occasion functioned (for instance, Congress of Berlin, 1878, concerning Turkey; Conference of Berlin, 1885, concerning Africa; Conference of Brussels, 1890, concerning Industry) in the twenty years previous to 1898. In the following years, down to the Great War, the Concert Powers met in Conference or Congress,¹ with noteworthy results, four times. The reality, however, of the Concert must not be judged simply by the number of times that it met in conference; the

¹ There is really no difference between a Congress and a Conference. When the great responsible statesmen meet, in solemn conclave, it is called a Congress; when officials rather than statesmen meet, it is called a Conference. Nevertheless the meeting of the great responsible statesmen to settle the peace of 1919 is called the *Conference of Paris*.

Great Powers might, by exchanging notes on a particular question, agree to a common line of policy, and act in concert with each other. Frequently, too, the ambassadors or ministers of the Powers at a particular capital (for instance at Peking or Constantinople) would meet, almost as a regular custom, in conference, either to adjust their common interests, or to make a collective step, a common representation, in the interest of peace. Such a collective step was taken at Washington in 1898, before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, when the ambassadors of the Powers accredited to the United States presented a joint note to President McKinley, expressing their hopes for peace.

The international situation at the end of 1898 was considered, in the *Times* review of the year, to The Times show both that difficulties had been surmounted, Survey. and that there was some promise of better things in the future :

‘ All over the world the year which ends to-day has been crowded with memorable events. It has witnessed the death of the two foremost European statesmen, Bismarck and Gladstone, and in two opposite quarters of the globe it has seen two questions, each of vital importance to the world, settled by the swift arbitrament of war. By the battle of Omdurman, the Anglo-Egyptian army rescued the Sudan from a blighting and barbarous tyranny, and gave notice to all the world that the valley of the upper Nile was once more to be opened up to civilisation and commerce under the auspices of Great Britain. The United States, yielding to considerable provocation, declared war upon Spain, and in three months succeeded in destroying the Spanish colonial empire. If at home the year has been marked by no such stirring and picturesque events as the Jubilee, it has, on the other hand, seen the whole Empire knitted together under the stress of grave foreign dangers ; it has witnessed a healthy revival of sympathetic feeling between England and the United States, and the growth of a practical understanding between England and Ger-

many ;¹ and in the realm of legislation, it has witnessed a "new departure" which may have far-reaching effects upon the social pacification of Ireland,² and therefore upon the interests of the Empire at large. In France it has been a year of unrest ; the miserable Dreyfus Case is still far from a settlement ; three Ministries have held office ; the antagonism between the higher ranks of the army and that portion of the civilian population which thinks and feels is more acute than ever ; and at the moment the Government have had to choose between a painful withdrawal from Fashoda and an open rupture with England. Germany has seen, perhaps, the most surprising adventure as yet undertaken by her surprising Emperor—his visit in extraordinary state to Constantinople and Palestine. Italy has been forced to suppress at the cost of several hundred lives and of much social bitterness, a number of revolutionary riots. Austria has had little joy in celebrating the Jubilee of the honoured Emperor, for she had lost her Empress, murdered by an anarchist, and the antagonism between the various nationalities of the empire had become accentuated during the year. In Russia a famine has caused severe distress over wide provinces ; and meantime the world has been perplexed by a contradictory spectacle—the young Emperor seriously proposing a general plan of gradual disarmament, while at the same time his agents in the Far East have been bringing an influence to bear upon the Government of China which seriously threatens the interests of other Powers, and especially of England. But as some set-off to these elements of disquiet, the difficult and dangerous Cretan question has been settled by the disappearance of the Turkish garrisons and the appointment of Prince George of Greece to govern the autonomous island as High Commissioner of the Powers. And, as a peaceful reform that may well have an important influence upon the

¹ In 1898 the British and German Governments came to an agreement for the division of the African territories of Portugal, in case Portugal should have to give them up.

² The 'new departure' in Ireland was a Local Government Act, passed by the Conservative Government of Lord Salisbury, establishing Rural District Councils.

future of the British Empire, we may mention among the conspicuous events of the year the establishment of a uniform Imperial Penny Postage throughout the greater part of the Queen's dominions.'

Since 1871 the peace which existed among the Great Powers had been maintained only through extreme vigilance. In order to ensure their safety in case of attack, the Powers had adopted a policy which probably was conducive to the maintenance of the general peace: they had formed defensive alliances and, by the year 1898, they comprised two diplomatic groups. One group ^{Alliances.} was formed by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, made in 1882 and since renewed. In addition, Germany and Austria were further bound closely together, by their alliance-treaty of 1879. The other 'diplomatic grouping' in Europe was the Franco-Russian alliance, made in 1894. Great Britain was not in any group, although Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister in 1898, had always felt well disposed towards the Triple Alliance.

It would not be true to say that Europe was divided into hostile camps by these alliances. If one Power were attacked, its allies would come to its help. The relations, however, between the Powers within the alliance-groups were not particularly cordial, and none had any desire or intention of backing the other in an aggressive military adventure. The alliances contributed to the ^{The Balance} Balance of Power which was considered essential ^{of Power.} to the maintenance of European peace. Indeed, probably the Balance of Power was essential. In the absence of any general regulative body like the League of Nations, each Great Power, in order to be safe, had to ensure that no one state should become so big and strong as to dominate the rest. At the end of the nineteenth century, Europe was in a condition which on the whole suited it. The Great Powers were each, roughly, of the same degree of strength; and, on the Continent, they were in groups of, roughly, the

same strength. It was recognised that war between these groups would be costly and destructive beyond all previous wars, and perhaps inconclusive and fruitless. Therefore no responsible people wished to break the peace. As a whole, Europe was satisfied with the existing Balance of Power, which would therefore go on so long as Governments remained cool and took no rash step.

The 'Balance of Power' was not, and could not be, a mathematically accurate thing. States are somewhat imponderable entities, and increase or decrease in influence and resources rather mysteriously. It is possible for one Power to become a leading, if not a dominant influence, without the Balance of Power being thereby necessarily upset. In the thirty or forty years after 1871 the leading, almost the dominant state, was the German Empire. Lord Beaconsfield recognised this as early as the year 1875 and pointed it out in one of his letters (to Lady Bradford, August 6, 1875).¹ Germany was the predominating Power, because of the might of her army, because of her growing wealth, and because of the combination of science and discipline which was a characteristic of her people. Among the states of Europe Germany was respected and a little feared. Bismarck, the great architect of the Empire of 1871, refused to admit that the state had any duty towards Europe. Germany had to defend her own interests, and this was her sole duty. 'It is necessary,' wrote Bismarck in an official Memorandum in 1876, 'for us earnestly to hold far from us this charlatanism with regard to Europe.' His directions to the German Foreign Office were quite explicit: 'We return a refusal of European interests and duties.'²

Thus the Power which could exert the most pressure in international affairs, unfortunately had no idea of using this capacity for the common good of Europe. Germany was not normally aggressive nor did she desire war; but she

¹ Buckle, *Life of Disraeli* (1920), vi. 13.

² *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, ii. 92.

based her policy upon state-egoism, and regarded Europe as a mass of competing units. Therefore her influence on international relations was not so wholesome as, considering her intellectual, physical, and moral resources, it could easily have been.

CHAPTER II

TENDENCIES IN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT

§ I. *Politics*

THE twenty-six states of Europe were usually grouped in the public mind as Great Powers, Secondary and Minor States. The conception of Great Powers probably arose in the last months of the war with Napoleon I. (January-March 1814) and at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15. During these times Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia had inevitably assumed not merely the chief burden of warfare, but also the task of making the Peace. In the seven or eight years following the Congress of Vienna the same Powers met from time to time in conferences in the person of their monarchs or chief ministers. France, the enemy with whom peace had been made in 1814-15, was admitted to the 'Concert,' by being received as a friendly Power in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. Although after 1822 the habit of the Powers meeting frequently in general congress was abandoned, the idea of 'Great Powers' as trustees for the peace of Europe was not lost, but appears again prominently in occasional congresses or conferences throughout especially the latter half of the nineteenth century. Italy, united into one strong state in 1870, was recognised as a Great Power, at any rate from the moment when she raised her Legations at the capitals of the Great Powers to Embassies in 1875. Prussia, a Great Power since 1814, was, after 1870, identified as a Great Power with the German Empire.

The Secondary States were Spain, Sweden, with which

Norway was united in a personal union, and Turkey, which, however, was only a European state in respect of one portion of its territory. Each of these Secondary States. states was sufficiently strong to make its alliance or hostility a matter of moment for the Great Powers, but they made no claim to be guardians of the general interests of Europe. The minor states were Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Balkan States Small States. (including Rumania, although this is not actually in the Balkan area). None of them, outside the Balkan group, had any pretensions to military strength, or ever claimed in the late nineteenth century to exert any influence except moral influence. The most that they could hope to do by their physical strength was to defend themselves, and for this, except perhaps in the case of Switzerland and the Balkan States, their forces were, owing to unfavourable geographical situation, quite inadequate.

The frontiers of the states were the result of a long course of history, and did not correspond altogether with the necessities of modern life. They were in many places the result of the feudalism of the Middle Frontiers.

Ages and of the lust for territory, which was the particular motive of state-action in the eighteenth century. The main motive which stimulated people to redraw boundaries in the nineteenth century was national or racial. On the Continent Liberalism was the predominating school of political thought. The Liberals were all Nationalist in their outlook, and believed that each people ought to be a complete racial whole within its own boundaries. Thus, a Liberal-National movement impelled the The Liberal National Movement. Italians, the Germans, the Poles, and the Czechs

to demand racial union, and boundaries corresponding to the distribution of race. The Italian and German national movements were successful in the nineteenth century, and brought about dramatic changes of frontier. The political boundary of the Germans was extended or re-extended westwards of the Rhine to include Alsace and

a large part of Lorraine. The Austrian political boundary was pushed back by the Italians into the Alps. These changes, effected by wars in 1859, 1866, and 1870, did not really satisfy the victors, and were not considered as permanent by the vanquished. Yet Germany and Italy had approached fairly closely to a correct racial frontier. The Habsburg Empire, on the other hand, contained many races or parts of races; the Russian Empire was also composite. Christian races still were under the yoke of the Turk. The lack of correspondence between racial and political frontiers in Europe was not only a cause of international irritation, but of domestic instability.

The most 'satisfying' frontiers were the Franco-Spanish and Franco-Italian, which were formed by high mountain barriers (the Pyrenees and the Alps). The people on either side of high mountain barriers tend to develop different racial features; this certainly is the case with the French and Spaniards, the French and the Italians. Elsewhere races spilled over political frontiers—for instance on the Austro-Serbian, the Russo-Prussian, the Rumanian-Hungarian frontiers. From the economic point of view this need not have mattered, for all people have a natural and strong desire to trade with each other, irrespective of political boundaries. To some extent artificial tariff barriers, corresponding to political barriers, interfered with trade between peoples; but in 1898 tariff walls had not become so high as seriously to check trade across the frontiers; Europe was much nearer to being an economic unit than a political unit. 'Through railway' routes had been arranged across most frontiers, and 'through transportation' without break of journey was ensured for goods as well as passengers in most parts of Europe; Russia and Spain were the only large states of which the railway-gauge did not correspond with the gauges of their neighbours.

It was not inconceivable, indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century, that Europe would gradually and at some

not very distant date become a single tariff union, within which there would be free trade, like the United States of America. For such a tariff union Europe (comprising the Continent and the British Isles) is peculiarly suitable. There are no impassable barriers, and no deserts making transportation difficult or costly. Navigable rivers are numerous, and in the course of the nineteenth century had been, to a large extent, linked together by a series of canals. There was an active inland trade between the Seine, Rhône, Rhine, Ems, and Weser. The Danube was a great shipping river. Trade on the Vistula was at any rate capable of being developed over a course of some five hundred miles from Cracow to Danzig. A good road system extended alongside and beyond most of the waterways, and everywhere, except perhaps in Russia, there was abundance of suitable stone for the road-bed. Coastal traffic around the Continent and between the Continent and the adjacent isles was facilitated by the numerous ports and natural harbours, and two thousand years of seafaring experience, and by the large coastal populations whose main source of livelihood came from the sea. In addition to the facilities for inland and coastal water-transport, and to a hard-road system that led everywhere, railways had, in the nineteenth century, been constructed with a profusion without parallel in any other part of the world. Inter-state and inter-company agreements had brought into existence the 'Great European Expresses,' such as the Orient Express from Paris to Constantinople, and the Paris-Berlin-Warsaw-Petersburg train. The International Postal Union (established in 1875), which had its headquarters at Berne, made Europe (as well as a great part of the rest of the world) almost a unit for purposes of written correspondence. The electric telegraph had reduced the time-rate of correspondence between the most distant parts of Europe to an hour or two—soon to be reduced by 'wireless' to a few minutes. Improvement of the telephone was soon to make conversation with the human voice possible between practically all

Routes.

the great European business centres. It is true that differences of language and nationality kept the peoples of Europe apart from each other politically, but language and race, which make political intercourse so hard, almost fade away before the desire (and indeed necessity) of men to exchange the products of their labour and ingenuity with each other.

The means by which Europe was tending towards some sort of customs-union or common economic system was

<p>The Most-Favoured-Nation Treaty.</p>	<p>through the principle of the 'most-favoured-nation' treaty. This is a treaty in which, among other subjects, there is a condition that if one of two signatory states allows any concession or relaxation regarding custom-tariffs to a third party, the other signatory state will automatically acquire the same privilege. Most-favoured-nation treaties are obviously bound to have, as a general result, a levelling tendency in regard to the international tariff barriers. They do not depend upon the negotiation of a general 'multilateral' tariff-treaty between many states (a very difficult thing to bring about), but upon ordinary bilateral treaties, such as are being made somewhere almost every month of the year. And if one state had ten treaties in force which included the most-favoured-nation clause, any fresh concession granted to one of the signatory states became a concession to the whole ten. In the period 1898-1914 Great Britain had most-favoured treaties in force with many countries. It is true that as Great Britain was already a country of free trade, her most-favoured-nation treaties were not of much assistance in regard to tariffs to any country except herself. Some of the Continental states, however, had concluded such treaties among themselves, and the number tended to increase. Moreover, all the Great Powers except Russia, and most of the other European states, had abandoned the practice of requiring passports from private travellers. The Great War, however, checked this wholesome process (both in regard to passports</p>
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and most-favoured-nation treaties) ; and the rise of suppressed nations (like the Czechs and Poles) into new states brought with it an increase of tariff barriers. In fairness to the new states, however, it must be said that it was not they who erected the highest tariff barriers of the years after the War, but certain old-established Powers.

Economically then, in the first part of the twentieth century, Europe was progressing towards unity. Politically, the tendency was not towards union, but ^{European} towards a common type of government— ^{Unity.} Constitutional Government—in each state. This process, like the most-favoured-nation tendency, was also arrested, during the War and Post-War period.

Constitutional Government is the system according to which the citizens, through their elected representatives, control the executive authorities of their state. ^{Constitu-} Whether the state is a monarchy or a republic, ^{tional} it is Constitutional if the Ministers or Cabinet ^{Government.} are responsible not to the head (monarch or president), but to the Parliament or legislative assembly. In 1898 this system of government prevailed in Great Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Italy among large states ; and in Norway and Sweden, and in most of the smaller states of Europe. In all these countries, except in Great Britain, it was a privilege or acquisition granted in the course of the nineteenth century. Among Great Powers only the German and Russian Empires still, in 1898, repudiated Constitutional Government, but the demand for it in both countries was strong, and some progress towards it in the next few years seemed almost certain. Such a tendency was strictly in accordance with the Liberal tradition which, on the whole, was the predominant tradition in the politics of the nineteenth century. The books of de Lolme and Bagehot on the English Constitution were well known on the continent of Europe.

The antithesis in the minds of people between Monarchy and Republicanism had in the course of the century become

almost insignificant, if it had not altogether disappeared. The monarch, in countries possessing Constitutional Government, was regarded as a public official, with hereditary tenure, but not in other respects different from an elected head. The tendency, therefore, in every Constitutional state at the end of the nineteenth century was for keeping whatever sort of head it had at the time, whether monarchical or presidential. There was probably (except perhaps in Spain) no 'Republican Question.' The method of popular control of the executive through the system of Constitutional Government had settled that question. The efforts made from time to time to destroy monarchs were the work of anarchists, who, as a 'School,' were theoretically opposed to all governments; they flung their bombs or directed their daggers chiefly, but not exclusively, against princes. The Tsar Alexander of Russia had been assassinated in 1881; President Carnot of France in 1894; Elizabeth, the wife of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, in 1898; King Humbert of Italy in 1900; President McKinley of the United States in 1901; King Carlos of Portugal in 1908. After this, political assassination stopped or was prevented until 1913.

Although the issue between Monarchy and Republicanism was almost dead, there was a Socialist party in every state. Socialists, inevitably, have a certain distaste for the hereditary system which tends to set up privilege and social inequality. Their principles, however, are not incompatible with monarchy. In Germany the majority of the Social Democratic party (founded 1869), and in England of the Labour party (actually founded in 1900, but in process of development since 1893), were loyal to their respective sovereigns, and were ready, in certain conditions, to take office under them. Within five years after the opening of the twentieth century, the Socialist party in Sweden combined with the Liberals to form a Cabinet under the King, Oscar II. (1905).

Monarchy
and Repub-
licanism.

Socialism.

The object for which the Socialists strove to have political power was in order that they might be able to nationalise the means, or chief means, of production and distribution. The Governments and municipalities were to become the chief, if not the sole, employers, and the sole landowners. In principle, they only differed in degree from the Conservative or Liberal parties who, in 1898, were in power in every European state. These older parties believed in national ownership or control of certain services (for instance, Post Office). The state of Prussia owned and directly exploited through its own officials a considerable number of important mines and forests; it also owned and exploited all the railways in the state. In Italy, where the Governments were always Liberal, railways were monopolised and operated by the state after the year 1905. The Socialist party, however, claimed to go much further in the 'socialising' of industry than did the Conservatives or Liberals; it aimed at the complete control by the state of the sources of production and distribution. It also aimed at the abolition of all ranks and privileges, and at the establishing of social equality. Differing thus widely (at any rate in degree, if not in principle) from the older political parties, the Socialists nevertheless were themselves in every state, where opinion was free, a regular political party. As a party, it recognised existing constitutions, worked under them, and strove to obtain its objects through constitutional means. Jaurès in France and Bebel in Germany, both prominent and respected politicians, were the leaders of the Continental Socialists at the opening of the twentieth century.

Far otherwise were the aims and methods of the Communists. They aimed at the complete abolition of private property, and they openly advocated the 'Class-War' as the means of obtaining their ends. Basing themselves upon the Communist Manifesto, ^{Communism.} drafted by Karl Marx in 1847, and on Marx's later work, *Das Kapital* (1867), the Communists were frankly revolu-

tionary, and wanted nothing less than the destruction of the existing organisation of society. They could therefore not be considered a regular political party, and their leaders were frequently in prison or in exile. The revolution at which they aimed was international. The Russian Communists, of whom Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (1870-1924), better known as Lenin, was the chief, and the German Communists, of whom Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826-1900), his son Karl (1871-1919), and Rosa Luxemburg (1870-1919) were the leaders, worked in association with each other, and aimed at world-revolution. The organ of the Communists was the First International Working Men's Association, founded in 1864, and dissolved in 1876, and the Third International, of Moscow, founded in 1919. The Second International, founded in 1889, is still active, but is not revolutionary.

In general, political power in the states of the Continent at the end of the nineteenth century was in the hands of either the Conservatives or the Liberals, or of both these schools. The terms 'Conservative' or 'Liberal,' as applied on the Continent, must be carefully distinguished from the same terms as applied in Great Britain. Here Conservatives and Liberals were the two great historic parties which had guided British political life since the Revolution of 1688. Both these parties upheld the system of government through a Parliament controlling the executive ministry; that is to say, the British Conservative and Liberal parties were equally—in the Continental sense of the word—'liberal.' They differed in other ways, but they did not differ in their views on Parliamentary Government; they were all alike democratic.

On the Continent, on the other hand, the Conservatives were those who still adhered to the principles of the *ancien régime*. They were spiritually descended from the men who had fought the French Revolution—from Metternich and Hardenberg and their school. The Continental Con-

servatives were never democrats; they would admit representative institutions, but not responsible government. In France they were Monarchists in principle, although in practice they acquiesced in the Republic, and sometimes accepted seats in the Chamber. In Germany the Conservatives—chiefly the Prussian Junkers or landowners—frankly disliked (although they permitted) representative government, and preferred government by an autocratic monarch acting through a strong bureaucracy and army. The Junkers, by reason of their ability as much as by their privileges, were always able to have all the good posts in this controlling bureaucracy and army. In Russia the Conservatives were absolutely bureaucratic and anti-parliamentary. Everywhere on the Continent they were sharply distinguished from the Liberals whose continual aim since 1815 had been Constitutional Government on the English model.

In no Continental state would it have been correct at any time during the nineteenth century to speak of a Conservative or Liberal *party*. Conservatism or Liberalism was a way of looking at things, a mental attitude, a school of political thought. Thus, on the Continent it would have been true to say (as W. S. Gilbert wrongly said of the English in *Iolanthe*):

That every boy and every gal
That 's born into this world alive,
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.

But in England many people never know whether they really agree more with one or other party; and such people tend to join the Conservatives or the Liberals, just as they join a Club, not because they think it the only true Club, but because somehow it comes conveniently to them, probably because they have parents or friends in it, or because they like the name, the officials, or the situation. On the Continent, on the other hand, Conservatism or


Liberalism being a type of mind, most people are Conservatives or Liberals from early youth, if not from birth. There are very few people who change their fundamental political outlook after the age of twenty-one.

Political parties were represented on the Continent not by the broad divisions of Conservatives and Liberals but by large numbers of 'Groups.' No Continental The Group System. people ever evolved the 'Two-Party System,' and it existed nowhere in 1898 except in the British Empire, the United States, and Japan. The Two-Party System can only exist among peoples who are intellectually tolerant, and also perhaps not very thoughtful. For it requires much tolerance and a certain lack of logic if a whole nation can put itself into two broad political parties and no more. The variations in man's political outlook and personal loyalties are much more numerous than two. In Continental states this fact is recognised and every nation is divided politically into numerous 'Groups,' which either represent different shades of opinion or attachments to different leaders. Accordingly, it is impossible to consider any Continental chamber as neatly divided into two parties who alternately form the Government. Instead of this, the members of each chamber, who sit in a semicircle, theatrewise, facing the President of the Chamber, are distinguished according as the Group to which they belong is nearer to or further from the Right. The Group actually on the Right of the President is always the most conservative or the most reactionary; from here the Groups shade off, becoming less conservative until the Centre is reached, where the Group of moderation, or middling views, sits. From the Centre towards the left there sit the Liberal Groups, becoming Radical farther to the left; next, Socialist, and finally, on the extreme Left, Communist, if any Communists have succeeded in being elected. The terms Right, Centre, Left are regularly used to designate the political opinions of the Groups.

In France the Groups were apt to be dissolved and re-

formed with the fall or rise of leading personalities. Every Cabinet necessarily represented a coalition of Groups, in sufficient number to command a majority of the Chamber, but unstable, as the secession of just one or two Groups might convert its majority into a minority. The German *Reichstag* was not split into as many Groups as was the French *Chambre des Députés*; but as the *Reichstag* did not control the Imperial

A Con-
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Chamber.



A TYPICAL CONTINENTAL CHAMBER

Chancellor (who was responsible only to the Emperor), the number of the Groups was of no significance, for they could have no effect upon the duration of a Ministry.

Politics, according to Disraeli's remark in *Vivian Grey*, is the most fascinating and also the most dangerous study on which a young man's mind can embark. The great attraction of Liberalism to youth on the Continent was not simply because Liberalism invited its adherents to have trust in human nature and to give each man his just value; it was because it invited everybody to take part in the actual governing of his country, if only by

The Duty of
Politics.

having definite views about policy and by casting his vote. It was only through becoming an adherent of a party or group that the citizen could actively engage in legitimate politics; only through a political party or group could he exercise any dynamic power. Therefore the study of these political units, the political groups of the Continental states, is of the highest significance for the understanding of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A discriminating observer, shortly before the nineteenth century closed, wrote :

The State has been represented at sundry times under different figures. In the frontispiece to Hobbes' *Leviathan*, in the edition of 1651, it is given the form of a gigantic prince whose body is composed of minute human beings of every kind. A more common symbol is that of a ship sailing the trackless ocean, with a venerable pilot at the helm, steering by the light of the everlasting stars. To the writer the State sometimes presents itself under the figure of a stage-coach with the horses running away. On the front a number of eager men are urging the most contrary advice on the driver, whose chief object is to keep his seat, while at the back a couple of old gentlemen with spy-glasses are carefully surveying the road already traversed. Now, useful as all these persons undoubtedly are, there ought to be room also for the quiet observers, who watch the movements of the horses, and note the strain on the wheels, axles, and bolts; who listen to the hubbub on the front seat, and the grave conversation at the rear. To drop the simile and speak directly, there is a real need to-day of a thorough examination into the actual working of modern governments, and in one direction at least that need is still imperfectly satisfied. I refer to the activities of parties, which furnish the main motive power in public life.¹

¹ Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe* (1896), Preface.

§ 2. *Culture*

From the very earliest days of recorded history the Mediterranean had been the centre of civilisation. From the Egyptian side early civilisation had shifted to the opposite shores, to Greece and Italy ; and from there it was diffused northward and westward. Thus Western and Central Europe became the centre of the chief, if not the only, civilisation of the world ; and with the passage of time its cultural ascendancy over the rest of the world has steadily increased, so that there is now no organised state in the world which has not adopted, to a greater or less extent, European civilisation. At the end of the nineteenth century this cultural ascendancy of Europe was as great as ever it had been, and had every sign of continuing and increasing.

European culture depended upon the ' Classical Tradition,' that is, on the stream of learning—literary and scientific—of Greece and Rome. This stream of learning, somewhat obscured during the Middle Ages, had renewed its vigour at the time of the Renaissance ; and ever since had been maintained and increased, century after century. The task of maintaining, amplifying, and adapting the Classical Tradition lay with the body of European scholars who for the most part have worked in organised societies, known as schools, universities, and academies. The schools for young people spread learning and the desire for learning ; the universities spread learning among persons of somewhat more mature years, and also increased it, through original research ; the academies confined themselves to recognising and rewarding merit, and to publishing the work of scholars.

The nineteenth century made one of its greatest achievements by promoting juvenile education. In the eighteenth and previous centuries juvenile education had been given

to only a small proportion of the populations, but before the year 1898 it had become almost universal in every part of Europe except the Balkans and Russia. In England secondary education, of children over the age of thirteen or fourteen, had been taken in hand by the old public schools and grammar schools. On the Continent of Europe the pioneers of secondary education were the Jesuit Order ; but in the course of the nineteenth century most of the schools in the countries of the Continent were secularised, that is, were taken over or superseded by the state or municipal authorities. The pioneer of primary education, of children under thirteen or fourteen years of age, was Pestalozzi, the Swiss teacher of Zurich, whose long life of activity in this cause came to an end in 1825. By the end of the nineteenth century there were in all the Central and Western European states magnificent schools of which the French *Lycée* and the German *Gymnasium* were the type and the model. The Lycées are large buildings, placed not in the countryside but in towns, with boarding accommodation for pupils who come from a distance. The teachers are trained in state institutions called Normal Schools (*Ecoles Normales*), large training colleges (not part of the universities) with their own staffs and their own curriculum. A similar system of normal schools had been introduced successfully into the British Isles, and excellent Training Colleges for teachers existed by the year 1898 in every county and in nearly every large town. The British Training Colleges, however, are only for those persons who intend to be teachers in primary (elementary) schools. Secondary school teachers are graduates of the universities. In Germany the *Gymnasium* teachers have usually passed through a university. In France only the superior teachers of the Lycées are university graduates, the rest having been trained at normal schools.

Continental school-education is efficient and thorough, and, within every state, strictly uniform. The curriculum

and even the method of teaching are carefully prescribed by the Minister of Education in each state. As a means of raising the general level of culture of the whole people of a state, this system of a uniform and exacting curriculum and method is extremely effective. English education is partly state-maintained and state-controlled, partly free and conducted in the private and in the 'Public Schools,'¹ which maintain and govern themselves.

The university system of Europe had its origin in the Middle Ages, when groups of teachers or groups of scholars came together and formed societies (or 'corporations'—Latin, *universitates*) for teaching or for learning. Since the close of the Middle Ages the universities had had a chequered existence; some disappeared; some new universities were made; some, which had died, were refounded. Everywhere in Europe, except in the British Isles, the universities had been taken under the wing of the State and under the Minister of Education, but had been allowed a far greater degree of freedom than the schools. The great universities of France and Germany, such as Paris, Berlin, Bonn, Heidelberg, are free (within certain wide limits) to teach and to learn what they please, although the professors are appointed by the State. The Spanish and Italian universities have been, perhaps, not quite so free. The Russian universities were still more carefully supervised by the State. In 1898 the University of Berlin was pre-eminent among Continental universities. In regard to the great and growing study of Roman antiquities and inscriptions, all scholars looked for guidance to Mommsen (1817-1903), who edited the great *Corpus* of Latin inscriptions for the Berlin Academy. In theology

¹ In Great Britain the term Public School means a school which is not maintained or governed by the state or by municipal authorities, and which is admitted as a member of the voluntary body known as the Public School Head Masters' Conference. In Canada and the United States Public School means a school maintained by the municipal authorities.

the Berlin professor Harnack (born 1851) was at the head of the European confraternity.

The world of learning was, indeed, a confraternity ; more frequent and more regular visits were exchanged in the period 1898-1914 between the learned men of The 'Learned World.' universities than between the members of any other kind of societies. The people of this world of learning knew each other better than did those of the world of commerce or of politics. The men of learning worked in the libraries of neighbouring or distant states, and formed often life-long friendships with scholars of 'alien' universities. They discussed each other's work in the learned periodicals, exchanged views and compliments, crossed swords.

Closely connected with the university-world, indeed part of it, were the Academies. These are associations of scholars and men of letters ; the object of their Academies. unions is partly in order to honour each other, but chiefly to encourage each other to pursue their special researches or line of work, and to make the results of these researches public. Nearly every academy accordingly publishes 'Transactions' or 'Proceedings.'

In 1898 the premier learned society of Europe was the *Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Academy of the Sciences, at Berlin, divided into the four classes or branches of Physics, Mathematics, Philosophy, History and Philology. It was founded in 1700 by King Frederick I., at the suggestion of Leibniz, who became its first president. The Transactions (*Mitteilungen*) of the Berlin Academy, often splendidly illustrated, are a magnificent series of volumes, dealing with all sides of learning.

The *Accademia de' Lincei* of Rome was founded in 1609. The English *Royal Society*, which is concerned with research in the sciences, was founded at Oxford in 1648, but since 1660 has had its seat in London. The *Real Academia Española* was founded in 1713. The famous Society of the Sciences of Göttingen (*Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*), founded in

1752, and the Academy of Munich (1752), were at the opening of the twentieth century still among the most famous and productive of European learned societies. Russia had a very active Imperial Academy of St. Petersburg, founded in 1728. The British Academy of Learning did not exist until the twentieth century, 1902. The Royal Irish Academy of Sciences was founded in 1782. The United States has had the *American Academy of Arts and Sciences* at Boston since 1780; like all the European Academies of Learning, it has foreign associates or corresponding members.

France had five academies, grouped together into the *Institut*. This was established and organised during the French Revolution by the Directory Government in 1795. The Institute has the following academies—the *Académie française*, the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, the *Académie des Sciences*, *Académie des Beaux Arts*, *Académie des Sciences morales et politiques*. Of these, the *Académie française*, which was itself founded by the statesman, Cardinal Richelieu, in 1635, is the premier in France, and indeed the premier of its kind in Europe. It is devoted chiefly to 'polite letters,' and contains forty members, sometimes alluded to as the 'forty immortals.' Unlike the other academies of the Institute, and the academies of other countries, the *Académie française* has no foreign associates or 'corresponding members'—it is purely French and national. It is the ambition of every man of letters of France to be able to write *de l'Académie française* after his name; but Molière and Balzac failed to obtain membership. In 1898 among the members were Emile Ollivier, Premier in the Liberal Cabinet of Napoleon III. in 1870, and author of *L'Empire Libéral*; the Duc de Broglie, ^{The Forty} historian; Gaston Boissier, classical scholar; ^{Immortals.} Victorien Sardou, dramatist; Sully-Prudhomme, François Coppée and José Maria de Heredia, poets; Halévy, Anatole France, Paul Bourget, novelists; Sorel, Vandal, Lavissee, historians; Charles Louis de Freycinet, statesman; Gabriel

Hanotaux, statesman and historian ; Ferdinand Brunetière, literary critic.

If not a collection of literary and intellectual giants of the type of Victor Hugo and Sainte-Beuve, the Academy of 1898 comprised men of high eminence, and was still the most distinguished body of its kind in Europe.

CHAPTER III

THE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN STATES: GERMANY AND FRANCE

THE German Empire, the leading European state at the end of the nineteenth century, was attracting the attention everywhere of travellers, students, writers, The New observers and the European public in general. Germany. Since the foundation of the Empire in 1871, Germany had increased enormously in physical well-being. A journalist, part Englishman, part Frenchman, who visited the country a few years after 1871, and who wrote a book, *Berlin under the New Empire*, noticed the remarkable change which had taken place. Not merely were grand buildings rising in all the cities—public offices, barracks, and the magnificent railway stations, which strike every visitor with admiration—but social life was expanding and growing more splendid. The old simple ways which the middle classes of the Bund—the Germanic Confederation of 1815-66—had maintained, were now fast disappearing. Salaries were larger now; everybody spent more, lived more spaciouly; the thrifty, somewhat meagre households of the middle classes, described by Freytag in *Soll und Haben*, were expanding into ambitious upper middle-class families, with sons anxious to become officers in the Army, or to figure as great bankers and industrialists. Society still organised itself on a 'caste' system. 'Every council or board of officials—and such boards are countless—clings together. Its members and their families interchange a prescribed number of visits, and issue an orthodox series of invitations.' Military circles still kept exclusively to themselves. By the year 1898,

however, the influence of wealth, which was being spread around among the upper middle classes through the expansion of industry and banking, was tending to break down the barriers of caste. The Emperor William II. was beginning to take notice of important bankers, shipowners, and producers of iron and coal.

Even the external appearance of Germany had changed. Before 1870 the journey up the Rhine was made past quiet little towns or villages, distinguished by ruined castles and

The Industrial Revolution. the quaint spires of ancient churches. In 1898 the castles and spires remained, but many of the towns had expanded into great cities, and huge

factory chimneys in many places dominated the horizon. The valley of the Ruhr, a tributary of the Rhine, had become a veritable 'black country,' largely owing to the energy and wealth of the great firm of Krupp. The lower Rhineland was productive of steel and coal. The upper Rhineland, especially in the neighbourhood of Mannheim and Ludwigshafen, was becoming the greatest European centre of the heavy chemical industry. The burden of sustaining the vast expenditure of the German Empire could not have been borne by a population that was simply agricultural. It was German heavy industry which made possible the maintenance of the huge and splendidly equipped army, the new but rapidly growing navy, the adventurous and expensive colonial policy, as well as a high standard of comfort among all classes.

The great industrialists were one pillar of the German Empire, becoming with every year more conscious of their

The Prussian System. power. They were, however, not the guiding force or forces in 1898. The great directive

agencies of the German state were still, and remained for the next twenty years, the Army and the Civil Service. First, Prussia, and later the German Empire, had been forged in the furnace of war; and the Army was perfectly conscious of this. It was aware, too, that Prussia (and through Prussia the German Empire) had risen to greatness

as a sort of pirate-state, by forcibly seizing Silesia, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Frankfort, Alsace and Lorraine. The means by which such things were gained were the means by which they were to be held. So the Germans had an army which was not merely always ready for war (as, after all, it is the only business of an army to be), but which regarded war as a normal if only occasional feature of a state's life, and as a natural, if exceptional, means of carrying out the state's external policy; and the German people as a whole accepted this view too.

The Army was not simply an inconspicuous element in the German national life (as it was in Great Britain and the United States), it was the dominating feature.

No foreigner could visit Berlin, Dresden, ^{The Army.} Munich, or any other of the German state-capitals without noticing at almost every step the military officers, with their alert, proud, self-conscious bearing, as they moved among the crowds on the pavement, always in full uniform, with sword swinging at their side, amid the respect of the passers-by. Their loyalty to the Imperial state, and their sense of duty, were deserving of the highest praise; and when the time came for them to put into practice the ideal of war in which they had lived through years of peace and comfort, they fought with as high energy, efficiency, and spirit of self-sacrifice as the world has ever seen. At the moments of greatest crisis they also took the helm of state in their hands and directed policy. In no other country was the Army permitted such power.

When the twentieth century opened, the German officer-class, though its military efficiency was not impaired, was giving way to attractions of wealth. Many of the officers came from rich families. Others, owing to the social prestige of belonging to the officer-class, obtained wealth through marrying heiresses. A novel, translated into English under the title of *Life in a Garrison Town* (1906), attracted widespread attention in Europe by depicting, evidently from inner knowledge, the luxury, the animosi-

ties, and the vices of the class which the German people regarded with such esteem. Indeed, even in Germany people were beginning to question the hitherto accepted belief in the social value of a great military caste-system.

In 1906, a shoemaker called Wilhelm Voigt dressed himself in the uniform of a captain of Foot Guards, put himself at the head of a detachment of soldiers who were on the road, marched them to the Town Hall of Köpenick, arrested the Burgo-master, and made the Town Treasurer deliver up the town's balance of money; he then left the soldiers 'on guard' and himself disappeared. The incident caused amusement and satirical laughter in Germany as well as in the rest of Europe. The cobbler, who must have had a keen sense of satire, was soon captured by the police and paid for his escapade with a sentence of four years' imprisonment. Another incident, in 1913, which would probably have ended in laughter in any other country, produced almost a tragedy in Germany, when at Zabern, in Alsace, a citizen appeared to an officer not to be showing sufficient respect to the army uniform; the officer accordingly struck at the citizen with his sabre. The incident created a profound sensation in the German Reichstag, but the military party were able to prevent any changes being made in the army regulations.

Another pillar of the State was the civil servant. 'The Prussian Government,' wrote Varnhagen von Ense about the year 1850, 'is a *confrérie* of bureaucrats who unite to the talent of scribbling that of obedience and of hypocrisy.' An Anglo-French critic later added, however, with a just, and also a prophetic pen: 'There may be a certain amount of truth in these assertions, but they are certainly not calculated to convey a fair impression of the worth and value of that admirably organised body to which Prussia owes so much of her physical well-being and political status. The bureaucracy has not only done wonders as regards internal administration, but

The
Köpenick
and Zabern
Incidents.

The Bureau-
cracy.

has helped in the organisation of the Army which has so much distinguished itself abroad, and may one day be found of more value than that army in staving off the evils and terrors of a revolution. Such a thoroughly organised body of officials as that under the control of the Government is marvellously efficient in guiding the impulses and controlling the passions of the people. . . . He [the bureaucrat] is wretchedly paid, he has been driven almost to his wit's end by the rise in rents and provisions, and yet he does a great deal of work and does it well. But he regards himself as a member of the Government, a pillar of the State, shudders at the thought of what would be the consequence if the country were to be deprived of his services, and adds a coating of official *hauteur* to his native cantankerousness in his dealings with the outer world.'¹ By the end of the nineteenth century the condition of the great directive bureaucracy had altered little. Their salaries had not risen with the general rise in prosperity, yet the bureaucracy still attracted much of the talent of the country into its ranks, and performed its duties with the same efficiency as before. Not until 1912 did the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg take steps to secure increases of pay for the civil service.

The Army and the Bureaucracy were the obvious props of the Prussian State and German Empire; but the body which (as Dr. Johnson said of Chatham) 'pos-^{The} sessed the power of setting the State in motion' Nobility. was the Junker class. This was the class of Prussian nobles or squires (all noble, for all the squires had the appellation *von*), not rich in general, but substantial holders of landed property. The Junkers were energetic, hard-working men, who looked after their property, and sent their sons into the service of the State, either with the Army or the superior grades of the civil service. Although Protestant in principle and in outlook, they were fundamentally secular in spirit, for they recognised the State as

¹ H. Vizetelly, *Berlin under the New Empire* (1879), pp. 101-2.

the centre of all things, and to its service devoted themselves body and soul. Of the older Junker class of the Mark (Brandenburg) or of East Prussia, Bismarck was the supreme type. Silesia, which only became Prussian in 1744, had a numerous nobility which quickly approximated to the Junker type. Caprivi, the Imperial Chancellor after the fall of Bismarck (1890), was a Silesian nobleman, honest, stern, hardworking. The Silesian squires were typical of the whole Junker class. They managed their estates capably, and they were sufficiently up to date to find investment for their surplus income in business, even in German railway projects abroad, like the Bagdad Railway which was being constructed in the early years of the nineteenth century. They brought up their sons carefully, and gave them a good education. They set a good example to the people of their village, went to church every Sunday, and were critical judges of the sermon. They had a high notion of public service and of the duty of loyalty to the State, and they trained their sons in the same idea of service.

Even the high German nobility did not disdain the service of the State, although among them were reigning families, or families which once had been reigning. The Imperial ambassador who, under Bismarck's direction, negotiated the first treaty of the Triple Alliance, was a reigning prince, Henry VII. of Reuss. The Imperial Chancellor from 1894 to 1900 was Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe, the head of a family of 'mediatised' princes,¹ who was related to the British Royal Family. Hohenlohe had begun his official career in the Prussian Civil Service, had been Prime Minister of Bavaria, Imperial Ambassador at Paris, and Statthalter (Governor) of Alsace-Lorraine, before becoming Chancellor. By this time he was old, and had lost grip of affairs. In 1900 he was superseded by

¹ Mediatised princes, the heads of families which had been ruling sovereigns in the German Empire until their states were suppressed during the Napoleonic Wars. They continued to reign but not to rule.

Count Bülow, a Prussian nobleman or squire, but rather more *raffiné* than the Junker type.

There were twenty-two monarchies and three republics, and the *Reichsland* of Elsass-Lothringen, comprising the German Empire. Among the twenty-two were four kingdoms (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, ^{The States of the German Empire.} Würtemberg); six Grand Duchies (Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Saxe-Weimar, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg); five Duchies (Brunswick, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt); and seven Principalities (Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Waldeck, Reuss [elder], Reuss [younger], Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe). The Republics or Free Imperial States were Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck. The *Reichsland*—Alsace-Lorraine—was the only territory in Europe directly under the administration of the Empire.

All the German states, and the *Reichsland*, were represented in the Bundesrat or Federal Council. Prussia had 17 members, Bavaria 6, Saxony and Würtemberg 4 each; lesser states had 3, 2, or 1. ^{The Bundesrat.} These members were really ambassadors for their respective governments, and voted according to their government's instructions. The total number of members of the Bundesrat was 61. Prussia, with her own 17 members, and with the votes of the small states which practically always supported her, really controlled the whole Council. Whereas the Bundesrat represented the individual states, the Reichstag represented the population as a whole. Its members were elected by universal male suffrage, and were 397 in number, elected for a term of five years. The original period, according to the Constitution of 1871, had been three years, but it was changed by a law of 1890.

At the head of all was the Imperial throne, not elective by the body of German monarchs, but hereditary in the Royal line of Prussia. Thus the same man was to be Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, so that he had an

enormous double power in the land. Prussia was the biggest state in the Empire, had nearly 32 million out of a total German population of 52 million ; The Emperor. and, as already explained, Prussia controlled the Federal Council.

In 1898 the Emperor William II. was thirty-nine years old. With a withered left arm, he had grown up under a sense of injury which he strove successfully to hide beneath a magnificent exterior, and a vigorous, charming manner. He was talented and many-sided, artistic, literary, a collector of beautiful and rare things, a good shot, and tennis-player, passionately devoted to yachting, an authority on everything military. He was lacking in depth, for he never would study anything long ; restlessness made him dash from palace to palace, whithersoever the whim took him. He read the dispatches which came into the German Foreign Office and the drafts which were to go out, and scribbled impulsive comments on the margin. His ministers found it very difficult to keep him to a steady line of policy, except in regard to the maintenance of a big army, and the creation of a big navy—ideas on which he was absolutely set. Yet, although war was a common subject of his speeches, he never seems to have wanted it. In times of crisis he usually behaved with restraint ; nevertheless, by his glorification of the position of Supreme War Lord, by the rousing speeches which he loved to make to the officers of chosen regiments, by his martial parade and perpetual military glamour, he kept alive and increased the war-emotion among his strongly sentimental people.

The German Empire had a popular Chamber—the Reichstag ; and the Council of State (Bundesrat), which The Reichstag. prepared laws for the Reichstag and decided what bills should be introduced there. The consent of the Bundesrat was also necessary for a declaration of war, unless the territory of the Empire was attacked. The supreme head was the Emperor. The German Constitution differed from the normal parliamentary type of

Western Government, because it had no ministry or cabinet responsible to the legislature. Strictly speaking there was only one Imperial minister, and he was responsible to nobody but the Emperor, who appointed and dismissed him. The Reichstag had no control over the Chancellor, nor was he a member of it, though he had the right of speaking there. As the work of Imperial administration was too much for one man, secretaries of state were established—one for the Department of Foreign Affairs, another for the Colonial Office ; but these men had no responsibility to the Reichstag nor did they collectively form a cabinet. They were merely departmental heads, and were under the supervision of the Chancellor, who was solely responsible to the Emperor.

The Reichstag was simply a great Imperial debating society. Although representing the people as a whole, elected by universal suffrage, it had little power. It had the right (along with the Bundesrat) of voting or refusing to vote the budget, but it never employed this weapon so as to gain any control over the Government as the English Parliament had done. It never made or unmade a Chancellor. There existed political parties inside the Reichstag, but their relative weight, as against each other, had no marked influence on the policy of the Imperial Government. The chief parties (which included also a number of 'groups') were the Conservative (chiefly Prussian Junker); the Centrum (Catholic, inclined to conservatism); the National Liberals (who still echoed the Liberalism of 1848, but who had succumbed to the fascination of the success of Bismarck and Moltke); and the Social Democrats, a growing 'Labour Party,' whose success at the elections gave the Kaiser and his Chancellors ground for serious thought.

If Germany was the dominant Power in Europe (which, however, was still free) France had not lost her old distinction. She was still the centre of European culture; and after her defeats in the war of 1870-71, French scholars, men of letters, and artists had gained their *revanche* by

outstripping their German colleagues in most, although not in all, the things of the mind. While Germany had not a single artist of high note (unless Lenbach be counted such), France had Millet, Corot, Manet, Degas, Gauguin, and a whole roll of other famous names. The French theatre was easily the first in Europe for acting; and for the writing of plays critics will probably put Rostand above Sudermann and Hauptmann, three distinguished dramatists of the end of the nineteenth century. The French school of history—Sorel, Vandal, Luchaire, Lavisse—was recognised already as the finest in Europe.

Yet France had serious troubles; and many people believed that the Third Republic was tottering and the French people decadent, in 1898.

It is true that since 1871 France, which had previously been considered rather an inconstant votary of politics, had shown distinct political steadiness. The parliamentary republic, with its presidential head and cabinet of ministers, had proved its capacity in building up a new colonial empire for France, in maintaining peace and order at home, and in taking its part with the other great states in congresses and conferences as one of the Powers of Europe.

In 1898 the President was Félix Faure, a member of the prosperous merchant-class, from Havre. The Premier was M. Méline, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Hanotaux. The irritating episode of Fashoda was just being closed, and a serious crisis in foreign affairs was thus averted, when the terrible Dreyfus affair began to tear the vitals of France.

Alfred Dreyfus, an Alsatian of Jewish parentage, was born at Mülhausen (Mulhouse) in 1859, while Alsace was still part of France. After Alsace had become German territory, Dreyfus adopted the French army for his career (1874), passed his examinations with credit, and was commissioned *sous-lieutenant* in 1882.

German and
French
Culture
compared.

The Third
Republic.

The Dreyfus
Case.

Subsequently he did well at the École de Guerre and was attached to the General Staff at Paris. He was still only a captain in 1894 when he was accused of selling military secrets to Germany, condemned by court-martial, and deported to the Île du Diable, French Guiana. The condemnation rested upon a single document, a letter abstracted from the Chancery of the German Embassy at Paris.¹ This letter (*le bordereau*), assumed to have been written by Dreyfus, announced that military documents had been sent to the German ambassador. The trial and condemnation of Dreyfus was hailed as a great triumph by a large section of the French Press and public—the anti-Semitic section, which was also very strong in the Army. Henceforward, to maintain the guilt of Dreyfus became a sort of article of faith, not merely among all those members of the public who hated Jews, but among the greater number of army officers, especially the high officers, who held that criticism of the Dreyfus trial was criticism of the Army and was indeed gross interference with it. In the end the Dreyfus affair became a contest between the oligarchy of the Army and the democracy of France.

Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, one of the officers entrusted by the *Ministère de Guerre* with the compilation of the *dossier* or file of papers relating to Dreyfus in 1896, discovered that the *bordereau* was not written by Dreyfus, but, apparently, by a certain Commandant Esterhazy, a French officer whose expenses outran his means. Picquart was sent out of the way to serve in the garrison in Tunis.

The Dreyfus family, which was fairly wealthy, continued to protest that Captain Dreyfus was innocent, and to do everything possible to furnish proofs. In 1898 the celebrated writer, Émile Zola (author of the *Rougon-Macquart* novels) stepped forth with a passionate 'open letter,' addressed to the President of the French Republic. In this letter, entitled 'J'Accuse' (published in

¹ A portion of the *bordereau* is reproduced in facsimile in Lavissee, *Histoire de France Contemporaine*, viii. 200.

L'Aurore), Zola charged the Ministry of War with having deliberately worked for the condemnation of Dreyfus and against the reopening of his case, contrary to all justice. The Government proceeded against Zola for libel, and in the trial the whole Dreyfus affair was further made public, with evidence highly damaging to the authorities. Zola lost his case, and fled to England, where he remained, writing another novel, until 1899. He returned to France when the Government at last consented to reopen the Dreyfus Case.

The French Government made a great and courageous decision when it commanded that the Dreyfus trial be reopened. The decision was an assertion of one of the fundamental principles of sound government, that the civil executive authority should control the military. It was this question that lay beneath the whole Dreyfus affair, and this was fundamentally the reason for the opposition of the army chiefs to the question of re-trial. So inflamed was public opinion, that the Government would not risk holding the new trial (a court-martial) in Paris, The re-trial at Rennes. where the excitement was intense. The new trial took place in a provincial town, Rennes, in Brittany, in the summer of 1899. The result was a confirmation of the original charge against Dreyfus, but with 'extenuating circumstances.' Nevertheless, almost immediately afterwards, the President of the French Republic issued a pardon for Dreyfus.¹ This curious double result of the second Dreyfus trial was considered to be a compromise which secured the dignity of the Army, while in practice re-establishing the supreme authority of the civil Government. Perhaps it was the best thing that could be done, as politics is the art of managing large bodies of people who tend, in times of excitement, to behave in an unreasonable way. The French Republic had endured a severe crisis throughout the 'Affair' in 1899, and emerged undoubtedly strengthened.

¹ In 1906 the sentence was annulled altogether, and Dreyfus was restored to his rank in the Army.

The man to whom the credit is due for the successful—that is, ‘comparatively’ successful—conduct of the Dreyfus crisis was the Premier, M. Waldeck-Rousseau, whose sculptured bust deservedly occupies a prominent position in the beautiful public gardens of the Tuileries.

The President of the Republic at the time of the ‘Affair’ had not, of course, to bear as much strain as the Premier, who was responsible for carrying on the government of the country; nevertheless, the position of the President, however secure and above party politics, was sufficiently difficult. M. Loubet acted with tact and decision.

The seventh President of the French Republic, Émile Loubet, was sixty years old when elected to his high office in 1899. He was the son of a peasant proprietor of Marsanne in the Department of Drôme, in the south, towards the Alps; he received a good education, and practised with success at Montélimar in the Drôme.

Loubet.

Montélimar is a historic and busy little town, of considerable local importance. M. Loubet became Mayor in 1870, and from the fateful day of September 4, when the Empire fell, was a steady supporter of the Republic. In 1876 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, just after the Republican Constitution had received its final form (1875). Loubet was a decided critic of the clerical party, and a strong champion of the colonial policy of Jules Ferry. In 1887 he became Minister of Public Works in a short-lived Cabinet. In 1892 he became Premier, only for a few months, but he served in the following Ribot Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. In 1896 he was elected President of the Senate, an honour due to his highly respected character. In 1899 he was elected President after the death of Félix Faure.

M. Loubet’s just and firm mind led him to support the reopening of the Dreyfus Case—an attitude which brought upon him the hatred of many of his former republican supporters, and exposed him even to personal attack. It was he who took the momentous step of asking Waldeck-

Rousseau to form the Cabinet which saved the position and prestige of the Republic. Later, M. Loubet was influential in promoting the Entente with Great Britain in 1904.

Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau was born at Nantes, on December 2, 1846. His father was a prominent *Nantois*, Waldeck-Rousseau, a barrister in good practice, and a firm Republican, who took part in the Revolution of 1848, and also in that of September 4, 1870, when the Second Empire fell.

The young Waldeck-Rousseau was educated for the Law and began practising at Saint Nazaire in 1870; when the Second Empire fell, he formed the Government of National Defence in Saint-Nazaire, which was a prosperous little seaport at the mouth of the Loire. In 1879 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, where he strongly supported Gambetta, although Gambetta was anti-clerical and Waldeck-Rousseau was strongly Catholic. In 1881 he was Minister of Labour in Gambetta's short-lived *Grand Ministère*. He set up in practice of the law in Paris and made a great success. Occasionally in office, he showed both administrative ability and firmness of character and incorruptibility. In 1894 he stood, unsuccessfully, for the office of President of the Republic against Félix Faure.

In 1899, amid the excitement of the Dreyfus Case, President Loubet asked Waldeck-Rousseau, who was in the Senate, to form a Cabinet. The great leader of the Paris Bar accepted the offer, and took office as Premier and Minister of the Interior, sacrificing the large income which he was making in his legal practice, and also sacrificing his health.

In *M. Bergeret à Paris*, published in 1901, Anatole France imagines two Royalists talking about the new ministry. One (speaking as a member of a society for overturning the Republic) says that M. Waldeck-Rousseau 'is animated with the worst intentions,' but that the ministry was unpopular and would not last. 'He is unpopular,' replies

the other, 'but unpopular governments last as much as the others.'

In three crowded years M. Waldeck-Rousseau guided France, through the agitations of the re-trial of Dreyfus at Rennes, through industrial strikes, and through a general election. By the summer of 1902 France had come through the worst of the troubles, justice and order had been vindicated, the continuance of the Republic was assured. M. Waldeck-Rousseau left office in June and retired into private life. He died in 1904.

The vindication of the power of the civil Republic through the Dreyfus affair was followed by a remarkable revival of France's morale. It is true that the French had never, as a nation, been decadent, nor had ever thought themselves to be decadent. Confusion
in the
Republic. Yet in the last ten years of the nineteenth century they had been conscious of a political and perhaps also of a social *malaise*—a consciousness which became acute amid the excitements and confusions of the Dreyfus affair. The ironical and satirical French journals were continually making fun of 'Marie,' that is, of the bourgeois Republic, which was cutting such a poor figure before the public of Europe. Honest and serious-minded army officers were disturbed at the prejudices and passions which seemed to govern in the General Staff and the High Command. Public men were alarmed at the falling birth-rate. Good relations seemed impossible to maintain either with Germany or Great Britain. Europe was beginning to wonder if France really 'counted' in international life, and the French themselves were beginning just a little to wonder if their self-respect was intact.

With the turn of the century, however, doubts began to vanish. People began to speak of a 'new France' and of a 'Renaissance' of the French spirit. René A Renas-
cence. Bazin and Maurice Barrès in literature voiced the new spirit. Both of these men of letters wrote a novel about the Alsace-Lorrainers who left their native province

in order to remain citizens of France—Bazin's *Les Oberlé* (1901) and Barrès' trilogy, called *Le roman de l'énergie nationale* (first volume 1897). These novels, quietly expressed, were not incitements to revenge, but were rather somewhat sad acceptances of accomplished fact; they undoubtedly helped to deepen the French national consciousness. Bazin also wrote a book for school-children and young people called *La Douce Francè*—a description of French life and history, based on his principle that 'France is a country of renaissances'; to prove this he could adduce many examples from the Crusades, Joan of Arc, and other facts of history. Two novels of Bazin, *La Terre qui meurt* (1899) and *Le Blé qui lève* (1907), gave both the dark and the light sides, as he saw them, of contemporary French life: the peasant, giving way before the attractions of towns; the Catholic Church with its healing grace working deep down in the roots of French society. The 'new France' was soon, too, to find political leaders worthy of her mettle, Georges Clemenceau, the Tiger, and Raymond Poincaré, the strong men of twentieth-century France, as Bismarck was of nineteenth-century Germany.

CHAPTER IV

ITALY, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL

§ I. *Italy*

DR. JOHNSON greatly longed to see the Mediterranean, because on its shores were once the grand and influential civilisations of the world—the Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman. In Johnson's age, as also later The Union of Italy. in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the

Italians were the most characteristic Mediterranean nation. The tradition of Roman culture had survived the Barbarian invasions of the fifth century, and had come down, revised and expanded by the Renaissance, to modern times. Italian political philosophy was still based on the old Roman, with, however, a strong influence from the opportunistic and egoistic school of Macchiavelli. Yet the Italians, although—among their educated classes at any rate—highly conscious of their Roman tradition, did not attain national unity until the late nineteenth century, until 1870. Six years later they assumed the status of a Great Power by raising their legations in the great capitals of Europe to the dignity of embassies. Since then, 1876, Italy had maintained the position of a Great Power with some difficulty, for the people were poor, and the expenses of a large army and navy weighed upon them heavily. In 1882 the European status of Italy had been emphasised by the forming of the Triple Alliance of the German and Austrian Empires and of Italy—an alliance which was periodically renewed and which remained in force until 1915. Owing to the Triple Alliance, the situation of Italy externally was

secure, to a much greater degree than was her situation internally. For, inside, the Italian situation was troubled by a powerful Socialist movement, which threatened to break down the existing Liberal system of government and the rule of the House of Savoy. There was also an unsettled question at the heart of the Italian State. Unsettled questions, if they are of enduring interest, are always a disturbing element in a nation's life. The 'Roman Question' was the unsolved problem of Italy.

Not that the Roman Question was particularly urgent, or that it endangered the existence of the State. When, in September 1870, the Italian army forced its way into Rome, which at that time was under the sovereignty of the Pope, Pius ix. protested against the invasion, and refused to recognise the loss of his territory. He shut himself up in the Vatican and its precincts, and for the next fifty years and more there were no established diplomatic relations between Italy and the Papacy. The anomaly of the situation was that in the capital of the Italian State there lived, in great dignity and power, the former sovereign of that capital, still refusing to recognise that he had lost it. Not only the Pope and his cardinals, but also a considerable number of the Italian people held the same view; and good Catholics were forbidden to vote in Italian elections or to take part in the business of the State. The Italian Government had several times tried to arrive at some settlement with the Vatican, but had always failed. In 1871 a 'Law of the Guarantees' had been passed through the Italian Parliament, securing to the Pope personal inviolability, an established Royal position, and an assured income or civil list. The Papacy, however, never accepted the Law of the Guarantees, which remained merely a 'unilateral' act of the Italian State, a dead letter without any effect on the Roman Question.

King Victor Emmanuel II. and Pope Pius IX. died both in the same year, 1878. The next king was Humbert, energetic, brave, and reasonable. The new Pope, Cardinal

Count Pecci, Leo XIII., was also reasonable, a pupil of the *Accademia dei Nobili ecclesiastici*, a trained diplomatist of the Church. Leo allowed a sort of *modus vivendi* to grow up between the Vatican and the Quirinal (or Royal Palace), that is, with the Italian state. There were still no regular diplomatic relations between the two; the Pope never left the Vatican, never received visits from the Italian king or Italian officials. He never withdrew the protest against the annexation of the Papal State, but he did not reiterate it. The Roman Question, as it were, slumbered, and seemed almost to be forgotten.

The Italian movement had triumphed with the entry into Rome, September 20, 1870. This movement is the most perfect example of the finest side of European development in the nineteenth century, the progress towards a realised nationalism and constitutionalism. Mazzini Mazzini's Theory of Nationalism. believed that if every race, every large 'cultural group,' was free and independent within its own geographical frontiers, and was governing itself through a liberal constitutional régime, the causes of international friction would have been eliminated, and Europe would be at peace. This was the view held by all the European Liberals—by the Frenchmen of 1830, by the Germans of '48, by Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone when they gave their powerful support to the national, constitutional movement in Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, indeed everywhere on the Continent outside Russia. It was this national-constitutional (or Liberal) movement which held the field in Germany for fifty years after the Congress of Vienna, until Bismarck, the most potent (though not the most beneficent) political genius of the nineteenth century, not merely checked the forces of German Liberalism but attracted them by his dazzling successes, his overwhelming will-power, into the service of Junkerdom.

The Italian Liberals, though they too found that Italy could only be united by the sword, never sold their souls to the militarists, never capitulated to the demands of a General

Staff. Cavour, though he was a Count and had begun his active life as a regular officer, was never anything more than a Liberal bourgeois. He was essentially Italian Liberalism. a man of the black coat, but none the less strong-willed on that account. He knew that generals have only one function—to win battles when they are ordered to do so—and that policy is to be decided by civilians. Nor indeed, even for the sake of obtaining national unity, did the Italian Liberals consider war (as undoubtedly Bismarck did) to be a natural and convenient instrument. By the year 1866 everybody in Europe realised that Venetia would certainly be, sooner or later, joined to Italy. The Italians offered to purchase it from the Austrians. The *Times* newspaper, in a leading article, commented upon this proposal: that purchase, although not a dazzling nor brilliant (nor, it might have been added, a sanguinary and brutal) means of acquiring territory, is, at any rate, an honest and sensible method. Prince Hohenlohe in his *Memoirs* writes that the Italian proposal to buy Venetia was received favourably in Vienna until it came before the Emperor Francis Joseph and the generals, who decided that their honour would not allow them to give up any territory of the monarchy without fighting. So in order to complete a transaction which was inevitable they went through the form of causing the death, by arms or disease, of some forty thousand or fifty thousand men. Pius IX., reactionary and mediæval though he was, was far better than Francis Joseph. In 1870 he would not open the gates of Rome to the Italian army; he could not prevent the Italian army from coming in; but he would not let his soldiers—he had about 20,000—defend the walls. He was not going to sacrifice lives just for pride.

The men of the Risorgimento were all Liberal, all idealists. It can scarcely be believed that the Italians were really compelled to adopt a system of Parliamentary Government, for which they had not the traditions nor experience, chiefly in order to keep or to attract British sympathy. Parliamentary, Constitutional Government was

regarded as essential by all Continental Liberals ; it was the normal instrument through which they looked forward to express themselves ; it was the antithesis to bureaucratic government, under which they had been chafing, and agitating themselves since the early years of the eighteenth century.

Parliamentary Government in Italy.

The movement for Italian unity, which was essentially bourgeois and Liberal, as well as national, issued in a parliamentary system as naturally as did the English revolutionary movement against James II. in 1688. Indeed the parliamentary system had already been established in Italy by the *Statuto Fondamentale*, which King Charles Albert of Sardinia issued in 1848.

Although practically all the Italian politicians and statesmen of the last years of the struggle for national unity were Liberal, they naturally divided themselves into a Right and a Left, as indeed all legislative assemblies do. Down to the year 1876, the party of moderate Conservatives, Right, was the predominant party, and supplied the Prime Ministers. The first Premier of united Italy was Lanza, a Piedmontese who had worked with Cavour and shared that great statesman's troubles. Lanza was Premier from 1869 to 1873. Ratazzi, another great Liberal politician of the Risorgimento, was still a power in the legislature, although he had not been in office since 1867. After this there was a succession of different Premiers, mainly of the Right, of whom Francesco Crispi, a Sicilian of the Risorgimento, was the best known. Meanwhile, a younger man, who belonged to the Left wing of the Liberals, was growing in influence.

Italian Cabinets.

Giovanni Giolitti was born on October 22, 1842, at Mondovi. He belonged to a legal family whose members a few generations earlier had been peasants of the Val di Macra, in the Eastern Alps. In the Middle Ages the rural communes of the Val di Macra were an independent republic which endured until 1427, when it came under the suzerainty of the Marquis of Saluzzo. Later

Giolitti.

the Val di Macra was united, along with the Marquisate of Saluzzo, to the House of Savoy, but the democratic traditions of the little mediaeval republic were, with the persistence of tradition in local European communities, never lost. Three years of Giolitti's boyhood were spent in the Val di Macra, where his mother took him on account of the bracing climate. The democratic traditions of the valley were not lost upon him.

Giolitti's maternal grandfather had been procurator-general at Turin under the Government of Napoleon I., and later took part in the revolutionary movement in the province of Pinerolo. Later he was allowed by the Sardinian Government to settle down quietly in the country. He therefore went to live at Cavour, in a house which his wife had brought him as part of her dowry. This is 'the same old house in the middle of the town where I live in winter,' writes Giolitti in his *Memoirs*; and it was here that he died in July 1928. He had four maternal uncles. One was deputy for Cavour in the first parliament of the kingdom of Sardinia in 1848, held under the Statuto Fondamentale of Charles Albert. Two other uncles were magistrates. The fourth was a Piedmontese soldier, who fought in the war of 1848 against the Austrians, and was made a general on the battlefield of San Martino. Thus the young Giolitti grew up in an atmosphere of North Italian Liberalism and of Piedmontese hardihood. It was monarchical Liberalism that the boy learned, the Liberalism of the Statuto Fondamentale. 'My uncles,' writes Giolitti (he lived much with them, for his father died early), 'chivalrously kept up the Liberal traditions of the family, handed down to them by their father, and consequently were firm believers in the policy of Carlo Alberto. I remember being taken to see the king set out for the war [of 1848], wearing a big cockade on my child's clothes.'

After being educated at the Gioberti Gymnasium, the Lyceo, and the University (where he took his degree in law) at Turin, Giolitti entered the Ministry of Justice

as a probationer. He remained in this office for five years, moving with the Sardinian administration from Turin to Florence, whither in 1864 the capital was transferred. In 1869 Giolitti married; and at the same time he was made chief secretary of the central commission on direct taxes. The unification of Italy resulted in great financial confusion, as the various states—Financial Reform.

Sardinia, Austria Venetia, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, the Papal States—each had a different financial system; in the process of amalgamation there was bound to be a very difficult intermediate period, before anything like symmetry could be established. In 1872, after the annexation of Rome, there were 200,000,000 lire of unpaid taxes. Giolitti, under the able Minister of Finance, Sella, had to collect these overdue taxes and at the same time to put a new system of collection into operation. The Italian ministers of the heroic period were strong, austere men. Sella, as Minister of Finance, scrutinised every item, and refused to pay for extra candles for the commission which was drawing up the new scheme of taxation. The Premier, Lanza, who carried out the moving of the capital to Rome in 1871, had a small property on which he lived the most simple family life with his wife. On his death, the widow refused a pension, saying that if two could live on the small property in Lanza's lifetime, one could do so after his death.

Giolitti belonged to that class of omnivorous and tireless workers of whom there is usually one in every Government office. In 1882 the Premier, Depretis, appointed him to the State Council, a Civil Service position. Bureaucracy. His first duty was to overhaul the contents of a *dossier* which contained eighty different matters. Giolitti sat up day and night and finished the documents in a week. 'That was three months' work,' said his chief; 'but for Heaven's sake don't mention it, else it will become known that it is possible to polish off three months' arrears in a week.' In 1882 Giolitti entered political life as Member of Parliament for the constituency of Cuneo in the Val di Macra.

When Giolitti entered the Chamber in 1882 Depretis was Premier. This simple democratic statesman, a man of the Left, believed that compromise with the Right and Centre was necessary. Accordingly he began the system of parliamentary politics known as *trasformismo*. The word had a bad reputation afterwards, but Giolitti in his *Memoirs* does not condemn the system as Depretis used it. Depretis will always be remembered as the Premier under whom the Triple Alliance was made. He was honest, sensible, and a great worker. Nevertheless, Giolitti, who was himself a believer in compromise, and who thought that *trasformismo* might in certain circumstances be necessary, yet was in opposition to Depretis. The opposition group, in which Giolitti was, numbered only forty-five, but contained four men who later became Premier—di Rudini, Sonnino, Pelloux, and Giolitti himself. There was another opposition group, also of men of the Left, of which Crispi and Zanardelli, two subsequent Premiers, were the chief men. In 1887 the two opposition groups combined to defeat Depretis; but at the last moment Crispi was persuaded by Depretis to accept *trasformismo* and to enter the Government as Minister of the Interior (April 4, 1887). Depretis died a few months later (July). Crispi became Premier, and from then this former Sicilian revolutionary was a man of the Right, a Conservative leader.

The Premier in 1891-92 was the Marquis di Rudini, a gentleman of tact and culture, but lacking in the quality of political decisiveness. His ministry was chiefly drawn from the Right, but not entirely; it fell in May 1892, after an attack made on it by Giolitti, whom King Humbert at once invited to be Premier. Giolitti accepted and formed a ministry definitely of the Left, without any sort of *trasformismo*. Thus the new ministry represented a deliberate attempt to return to Party-Government.

In this, his first, Prime Ministry, Giolitti aimed at three things—reforming the finances, improving relations with

France, and bringing the party or parties of the Left, which had hitherto been drawn chiefly from the small bourgeoisie, into association with the mass of labouring men. The finances benefited by a law passed by Giolitti, that the customs should be paid in gold—this at a time when Italian paper was at a discount of fifteen per cent. Relations with France were eased by a quiet foreign policy, with the result that a French admiral was present at the Columbus celebrations at Genoa in August 1892. In order that attention might be called in the foreign Press to these improved relations, Giolitti mentions with pride in his *Memoirs*, that he was able, in spite of financial stringency, to procure 60,000 lire for this purpose. In regard to his working-class policy, Giolitti could do little except to recognise workmen's associations. In the 'nineties there was much agitation, misery, and even hunger. Giolitti sympathised with the workmen, although he states that the first duty of a Government always is to preserve order; and in many times of riot he had to give the prefects instructions to this effect. He resigned in November 1893 owing to political troubles aroused by the failure of the Banco di Roma. Crispi formed a Right ministry that lasted until 1896.

The chief event of Crispi's last ministry was the ill-managed and ill-fated Abyssinia Expedition. The Italian Government cannot be acquitted of the charge of approving of the use of war as an instrument of policy. This is true of the Abyssinian and Tripoli wars, and even of Italy's intervention in the Great War. The Abyssinian war seems to have arisen out of a dispute concerning the Treaty of Ucciali (1889) which, according to the Italian interpretation, gave Italy a right of protectorate over Abyssinia, but not according to the Abyssinian interpretation. Giolitti writes that Italian public opinion was against the adventure into Abyssinia, and that Crispi's own colleagues would not sanction any large expenditure. Crispi, therefore, according to Giolitti's account, tele-

graphed to the general in command of the expedition, Baratieri, to wage war like Napoleon, and to live off the resources of the enemy country. Only when the danger of the expeditionary force was realised, did Crispi bestir himself to prepare reinforcements and to supersede Baratieri by Baldissera. 'It was too late, however, and the Government did not even know how to conceal the dispatch of Baldissera to replace another general. Baratieri, having had notice of his recall, attacked, and the defeat of Adowa took place the same day on which the king passed in review at Naples the troops ready to embark.'

The rout of the Italian expeditionary force at Adowa naturally caused the fall of Crispi's Government, and is said even to have endangered the existence of the monarchy. Crispi came before the Chamber with his resignation in his hand, and was received with a tremendous uproar. The Marquis di Rudini formed a ministry, still mainly of the Right, but with the promise of support from Giolitti, who, however, did not join the ministry. Di Rudini completely

withdrew from Abyssinia, and seems even to have advocated the abandonment of Erytraea. Erytraea. have advocated the abandonment of Erytraea (Italian Somaliland), but Giolitti opposed this. The Government, however, did give up Kassala, ceding it to Great Britain, which found the place very useful after the occupation of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1898. The Rudini ministry lasted until June 1898, and was disturbed by popular discontent caused by failure of the harvest, the high price of bread, unemployment. A state of siege was proclaimed, but the decree was soon withdrawn on the advice of the generals, Besozzi and Pelloux, who had to enforce it and who thought it unnecessary.

On the fall of the Marquis di Rudini, King Humbert invited the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, a statesman of the Risorgimento period, to form a ministry, but without success. General Pelloux, a Liberal soldier who had been in Crispi's Cabinet, then took up the task. Pelloux knew only too well the expense and the dangers of big armaments,

and he welcomed the proposals of the Tsar Nicholas II. of Russia for disarmament. The Hague Conference of 1899 took place, but failed to arrange for any degree of disarmament, although it succeeded in ^{Italy and} ^{Peace.} somewhat ameliorating the laws of war. Pelloux lost the support of the Liberals when, aroused by fresh agitation among the workmen, he introduced a bill limiting the right of assembly and the freedom of the Press.

With Pelloux' fall in 1899 Giolitti held that a particularly difficult period, inaugurated by Crispi in 1893, ended—a period of reaction towards the Right. Giolitti believed that, in the serious economic situation, repression only made matters worse. Nevertheless he himself later put the railwaymen, during a strike, under military law, and Pelloux (whom Giolitti called a reactionary Premier) strongly opposed this measure.

The time, however, for Giolitti's second Premiership had not yet come. The twentieth century began with two Liberal ministries. One was that of Saracco, which lasted only from June 24, 1900, to February 5, 1901, and which was marked by the atrocious assassination of King Humbert by an anarchist at Monza in July 1900. The second was the ministry of Zanardelli, an old-fashioned Liberal of the type that flourished in France in the reign of Louis Philippe. Zanardelli's Government, in which Giolitti, though a former Premier, held the ministry of the Interior, endured until October 29, 1903. It was opposed both by Conservatives and Socialists—by the Conservatives particularly because it fully recognised the right of assembly, by the Socialists because it prevented meetings called by strikers ^{Strikes.} with the professed intention of preventing workers from returning to their tasks. The balance between liberty and order is always difficult to keep in a time of industrial trouble; and such troubles were frequent in the next fifteen years. It was a great triumph for Giolitti when it was admitted in a debate in the Chamber that the Government were really interested in maintaining order

because this was the only way to preserve liberty. Giolitti resigned from the Government in 1903 because he believed that the State should take over the railways, of which the leases were soon to expire. Zanardelli, who was old and ill, retired in October of the same year (1903); thereafter Giolitti became Premier for the second time. It was in Zanardelli's Premiership that Giolitti, when Minister of the Interior, assured the train services during a great railway strike, by making all the employes who were on the Army lists liable to military discipline.

Giolitti was nothing if not strong-willed—a very necessary quality in a Premier. He included none of the previous ministry in his Cabinet, although he had been in the previous ministry himself, and that and the present one were both Liberal. For Minister of Foreign Affairs he appointed Tittoni, who had hitherto no experience in those matters, but whose parliamentary abilities were likely to prove useful. As a matter of fact Tittoni, although his appointment was much criticised at the time, proved to be a great success, both as minister and later as ambassador. For Finance, Giolitti nominated Luzzatti, the best economist in Italian politics, who was to carry out important conversion schemes in the public debt. A new man, Orlando, who

fifteen years later was Premier at the end of the
 New Men.

Great War, was found for the Ministry of Public Instruction. Indeed, except for Giolitti himself and Luzzatti, none of the members of the Government had been ministers before. 'It has always been my plan,' writes Giolitti, 'to try new men in the Government.' There were several reasons for this policy, one, doubtless, being that it assured the ascendancy of the experienced Premier over his comparatively inexperienced colleagues. But there is something to be said for the policy on its merits; new ministers are always tremendously keen. Giolitti also had rather a liking for choosing ministers from among civil servants who had distinguished themselves for energy and ability. Contrary to what is usually held, he believed that such men are

more elastic in mind than politicians who, he says in his *Memoirs*, frequently have dedicated themselves to politics with preconceived ideas and doctrines, and therefore are without the capacity to adopt themselves to 'concrete questions.'

The first task of the Government was to negotiate new commercial treaties in place of the old treaties which were expiring. Although the Government itself favoured Protection for Italian agriculture and 'infant industries,' it wished to have free trade with other countries—a policy which is neither consistent nor practicable.

However, the commercial treaties negotiated by ^{Fair Trade.} Tittoni and Luzzatti did gain for Italian trade considerable economic benefits, 'which,' writes Giolitti, 'taking into consideration the wave of protectionist ideas then flooding Western Europe, were more advantageous than the Government had expected.' About the same time, after thorough consideration by a parliamentary commission, the decision of the Government was taken to nationalise the railways when the companies' leases expired in 1905. The Government went on with its economic work in spite of a general strike which broke out in 1904. The Socialists loudly demanded that not merely the soldiers but also the police should be kept away from 'economic conflicts.' However, both soldiers and police were used to keep order; and the general strike only lasted a few days.

Giolitti resigned from his second Premiership in March 1905, owing to a prolonged attack of influenza which made it impossible for him to perform his duties. Almost the last act of his Government was to co-operate in the founding of the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome.

§ 2. *Spain*

The State at the west end of the Mediterranean, Spain, had, like Italy, its domestic troubles in the transition period from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Here, too,

as in Italy, the chief trouble came from the Socialist republican movement, consequent upon the rapid growth of a large industrial class among a people which, until late in the nineteenth century, had been remote from the Industrial Revolution. Spain, however, had also what is rare in modern European states, a dynastic complication ; there was a Pretender.

The dynastic trouble arose from the fact that King Ferdinand VII., who died in 1833, had no surviving son.

He left the throne to his elder daughter, Isabella ; but Don Carlos, brother of the late king, claimed to succeed under the ' Salic Law.' A sanguinary civil war ensued until 1839. After this Queen Isabella reigned, not very tranquilly, until 1868, when she had to flee to France. Her abdication was caused, not by Carlists, but by Republicans and Socialists, and also by her unpopularity with the Liberal bourgeoisie who had been alienated by scandals in the Queen's private life. There followed a provisional government for two years, during which took place the famous episode of the ' Hohenzollern Candidature ' in 1870. Next, Prince Amadeo of Savoy, a younger son of King Victor Emmanuel of Italy, was chosen for the throne of Spain ; but, finding himself unable to govern as a Constitutional Monarch, he decided to abdicate, rather than make himself a dictator (1873). There followed

two years of a Spanish Republic, under the leadership of the Socialist professor and journalist, Castelar. He too found that government could only go on in Spain at that time through strong measures ; and though he did not shrink from them, he too failed. On December 29, 1874, General Martinez Campos proclaimed as king the son of Queen Isabella, Alfonso XII., who was then a Sandhurst cadet. Alfonso came to the throne amidst a second Carlist war which raged in the Basque provinces until 1876. After this, Alfonso XII. reigned prosperously until his death in 1885. A son, Alfonso XIII., born posthumously, succeeded under the regency of Queen

Christina until he attained his majority in 1902. Before this happened, Spain had lost the last particle of her once vast colonial empire. A rebellion—by no means the first—broke out in Cuba in 1895. In 1898 the United States intervened in the struggle. The short, sharp Spanish-American War which followed cost Spain Cuba, which became a free republic, and Porto Rico, which was annexed by the United States.

As a matter of fact, Spain seems almost to have been strengthened by her loss. Concentrating their energies upon the homeland, the Spaniards after 1900 went forward to a greater degree of strength and prosperity than they had enjoyed for many years. Yet political and economic life was in a disturbed condition. Trade, commerce, and industry were fairly prosperous. Barcelona, the greatest industrial centre of Spain, was becoming the city of fine buildings, parks, and broad streets which is so justly admired to-day. It had a growing population of workmen who were showing themselves to be susceptible not merely to 'labour' agitation but to political agitation too. The Spanish Government, always nervous about the safety of the Crown since the republican troubles of the years 1868-74, were disturbed at the signs of sedition in Barcelona. The Socialists, who had little influence in regular politics, were regarded by the Government with suspicion and alarm. The authorities resolved to make an example of one prominent Socialist, Señor Ferrer, whose 'case' made a considerable stir shortly after the Dreyfus affair.

Result of
Spanish-
American
War.

Francisco Ferrer was a Spanish Socialist, devoted to education, and particularly to secular education. He desired to see the Spanish schools taken out of the control of the priesthood. He had some private means of his own, and was able to establish a 'Modern School' at Barcelona, which attracted attention both at home and abroad. In 1906 he was accused of complicity in an attempt to assassinate the King of Spain, but

Case of Señor
Ferrer.

the charge was dismissed. In 1909 he was accused of complicity in a revolutionary outbreak at Barcelona. He was tried by court-martial, convicted and shot. The public, at any rate the Liberal public of Spain and of all Europe, regarded the sentence as unjust and the evidence as quite insufficient. Profound excitement prevailed for long in Spain; Socialism and Republicanism seemed to grow in strength.

It is possible that the Socialist party in Spain had a revolutionary tendency because it was practically excluded by the 'Rotativist' system from participation in regular politics. According to this system, the Liberal and Conservative parties in, at any rate, many constituencies, before every general election for the legislature, agreed upon a rota or list of candidates. Thus, in practice, one constituency would be assigned to a Liberal candidate, and the Conservatives would not oppose him seriously there. Another constituency would be allotted to a Conservative candidate, who would then be elected without opposition from the Liberals. Each party would, through this system, enjoy in turn a majority of all the constituencies and would form the Government. Conservative and Liberal Governments would alternate, but the Socialists would never be in office.

The Rotativist system had the advantage for the country of avoiding the extreme bitterness of party-politics, as Parliament and the Rota. between Liberals and Conservatives, which had afflicted Spain in the times of Queen Isabella. It tended, however, to produce another feature in politics, called (in an American phrase) the 'spoils system'; that is, the Liberal and Conservative parties tended to look upon political office as their right and as a means of alternately finding profitable posts and pensions for Liberals or Conservatives. The Rotativist system also, by making the Socialists hopeless of attaining office by lawful, constitutional means, probably biased them in the direction of revolutionary activity. It was therefore in the interest of

the country as a whole that the Rotativist system was abandoned (apparently on the advice of King Alfonso) about the year 1906. It was perhaps never very strong after the death of the veteran Liberal leader, Sagasta, in 1903.

The Spanish Constitution, in force at the end of the nineteenth century (and until 1923), was established in 1876. It was a constitution of the 'normal' Western European type, with an executive head (the King); a Cabinet of ministers under a Premier, who were responsible to the legislature; the legislature (Cortes) consisting of two houses—Senate (partly hereditary, partly nominated by the king, and partly elected), and a lower chamber popularly elected. Italy had a similar constitution (which was really the Sardinian Constitution of 1848); France also, under the laws of 1875, had a régime of like kind, except that the French had a President instead of a King. The three Latin nations of Western Europe had developed politically along the lines of European Liberalism, and had adopted constitutions based on the model of the English parliamentary system, although in actual practice the French, Italian, and Spanish political systems had particular features of their own.

§ 3. *Portugal*

In the earlier part of the nineteenth century Portugal had been troubled by civil war, caused by rivalry for the throne between Donna Maria, the daughter of the previous king, and Don Miguel, her uncle. By 1834, however, Donna Maria was undisputed queen of Portugal. In 1836 she married Ferdinand, a prince of the House of Saxe-Coburg, which had already supplied a king to Belgium, was soon to supply a prince-consort to England, and later a prince to Bulgaria.

Two sons of Queen Maria and Ferdinand reigned in succession: Pedro v. from 1853 to 1861, when he died of

The
Portuguese
Crown.

cholera ; and Luiz, from 1861 to 1889. Luiz was succeeded by his son Carlos, a cultured, scholarly man. The administration of the country was costly and wasteful, and expenditure outstripped revenue. In 1892 the Government declared bankruptcy by repudiating two-thirds of the interest on the State loans held by foreigners. In 1907 King Carlos, in order to bring an end to the existing political abuses, suspended the Constitution of 1826, according to which Portugal had a normal Parliamentary system. Government was now carried on, under King Carlos, by a 'dictator,' Señor Franco, a strong-willed, honest man. In the following year, 1908, King Carlos and his elder son, Luiz, were assassinated while driving through the streets of Lisbon.

The new king, Manoel, younger son of King Carlos, restored the Constitution of 1826. The Republicans, however, continued to gain ground. In October 1910 a revolution broke out. Some regiments and crews of warships turned against the Crown and King Manoel had to flee to England. A republic was established.

The
Portuguese
Republic.

§ 4

The 'Latin' nations of Italy, Spain, and Portugal each had a vigorous literature at the end of the nineteenth and at the opening of the twentieth century. The great continuator in Italy of the classical tradition of Leopardi (1798-1837) was Carducci (1836-1907). This poet was a Professor of Italian Literature at Bologna for forty years. His odes are works of rare beauty, inspired throughout with a living sympathy for the ideas and ideals of Greece and Rome.

Spain, in the last part of the nineteenth century, was rich in dramatists and particularly rich in novelists. Of the dramatists, Jacinto Benavente, born in 1866, is the best known. Several of his comedies have been translated

Literature in
the Romance
Nations.

into English. Of the novelists, Benito Perez Galdos has risen to European, and indeed world-wide, fame through his great series *Episodios nacionales*. Modelled ^{Spanish} perhaps on the modern historical novels of ^{Novelists}. Erckmann-Chatrian, Galdos' *Episodios* portray Spanish history at various periods throughout the nineteenth century.

Portugal, in spite of political decline in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, had a very vigorous literature in poetry, the drama and the novel. Perhaps the best known were the writer of social comedies, Caldeira, and the novelist Coelho, who aimed at being the Portuguese Dickens.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF AUSTRIA

THE Habsburg Monarchy was perhaps the most remarkable thing in the political life of Europe. It might almost be called, in a sense, the successor of the Roman Empire. For, by a series of accidents, it had come to include a large number of different races, to whom it gave a known and equal law, a uniform system of trade and customs, and a common military system. The Habsburg Monarchy, however, never succeeded, as the Roman Empire did, in creating a common nationality. Particularism, racialism, nationalism, were becoming too strongly developed in the nineteenth century for the races of the Habsburg Empire to be able to regard each other as one. They would trade with each other; but they would not co-operate in politics with each other; nor did it ever occur to them to abandon the use of their mother tongues, and to adopt German as a *lingua franca* for the whole monarchy. The Habsburg Empire was a mosaic of races—and of races not very easy to be governed. Over this discordant group it maintained public peace, ruling with dignity, if not altogether by the methods of freedom, the vast Danubian area and the great plains between the Alps and the Carpathians. The problem of the Habsburg Monarchy was the keeping of all these peoples together.

The best Austrian minister of the last half of the nineteenth century was Anton von Schmerling, a 'Liberal of 1848.' He believed in representative, Constitutional Government as a unifying force. Under his influence a

common Constitution was adopted for the whole monarchy (including Hungary and Venice) in 1861. At that time racial feeling, except in Hungary and the Italian provinces, was not particularly strong. If the Magyars had agreed, perhaps the other races of the monarchy would have accepted the common Constitution and would have developed a common loyalty towards it. Schmerling's plan, however, although kept in force for some years, broke down through the opposition of the Magyars, who refused to come to the general Reichsrat of the whole monarchy, and demanded the restoration of their own Constitution. The Italians of Venice also refused to attend from the first; the Czechs soon withdrew too. After the defeat of the Monarchy by Prussia in the war of 1866, the prestige and power of the Viennese Government were too impaired for successful resistance any longer to be made to the Magyars' demands. Accordingly, terms were made in 1867 with Francis Deák, the firm and moderate leader of the Magyars; Hungary was given back its independence. By this compromise or arrangement (*Ausgleich*) the Habsburg monarch was recognised in his ancient condition of King of Hungary—as Emperor of Austria he had no rights there at all. The Hungarian Constitution of 1848 was restored; the Magyars formed their own Government. Foreign affairs and the Army were, however, recognised as being common to the Austrian dominions and to Hungary. There were therefore a common Foreign Minister, War Minister, and Minister of the Finance necessary for Foreign Affairs and the Army. The representative governing body of these services was a joint meeting of delegations of sixty members from the Austrian Parliament (Reichsrat) and of sixty from the Hungarian. At the same time as the political *Ausgleich* was made, Austria and Hungary agreed to have a common customs-union; there were no tariff barriers between them.

Under the terms of the *Ausgleich* the Habsburg Monarchy

Attempt for
a Unitary
Constitution.

Dualism.

went on its way not very smoothly, indeed, but without mishap. The Magyars retained their ascendancy in the Hungarian Parliament, although they had to meet the competition at the polls of the Roumanian (in Transylvania) and Serbian (in the Banat) elements of the population. There were only about seven and a half million Magyars in a total population in Hungary of fifteen million. Croatia was also included in the kingdom of Hungary, but had its own Ban (or Governor) and its own Diet or Parliament.

In the Austrian part of the Monarchy, the task of Government was more difficult than in Hungary. Nominally, there was the system of constitutional monarchy. Constitutionalism in Austria. There was a Cabinet, in theory responsible to the Reichsrat. It was impossible, however, to induce the Polish, Czech, Austro-German, and Italian members of the Reichsrat to agree together; and few, if any, Cabinets had a solid majority. The Emperor did his best to make the Constitution workable; but in practice he had to exercise almost supreme power. He appointed and dismissed the ministers, and held them responsible to himself. Owing to 'obstruction' by the various racial elements in the Reichsrat or legislature, much of the work of Government was done through 'Emergency' decrees, which were permissible under the Constitution of 1867.

The Emperor Francis Joseph was the Nestor of European statesmen and monarchs at the end of the nineteenth century. Francis Joseph. Educated in the somewhat narrow circle of the Viennese Court, which was strongly clerical and conservative, Francis Joseph had developed a strong, although not a very adaptable character. When called to the throne in November 1848, on the abdication of his uncle Ferdinand, he was serving in Italy with the Austrian army, which was hotly engaged in the rising in the 'Lombardo-Venetian kingdom.' He had all the tenacity of purpose which was characteristic of the Habsburg family; the constancy and steadiness of the young monarch in the year of revolutions, 1848-49, was un-

doubtedly of great assistance to the elder statesmen and soldiers, like Schwarzenberg and Radetzky, on whom the chief burden naturally fell. His Empire survived the troubles of 1848-49 (partly owing to military help sent by the Tsar Nicholas I.) without loss of territory ; but in 1859 it lost Lombardy to the kingdom of Sardinia (Italy), and in 1866 Venetia to the same state, when Prussia defeated Austria at the battle of Sadowa and drove her out of the Germanic Confederation. 'How is my nephew a better ruler than I?' asked the ex-Emperor Ferdinand, who was still living in weak-minded seclusion ; 'I, too, could lose battles and cede provinces.' Francis Joseph saw the rise of the great German Empire which supplanted Austria as the leading German state ; and in 1879 he entered into an alliance with that Empire, as the best security for his somewhat unstable throne. For the Habsburg Monarchy was being threatened by disintegration through the national aspirations of its several races. The one substantial success of his reign in foreign policy was the acquisition in 1878 of the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. Misfortune dogged the footsteps of the proud Habsburg in private life. His only son, Rudolf, a man of brilliant parts, a traveller, artistic, but undisciplined and unregulated, committed suicide in the hunting lodge at Meyerling, near Vienna, in 1889. The Emperor's wife—to whom he was not too kind—a beautiful Bavarian princess, a fine linguist, a horsewoman known in the English and Irish hunts, was assassinated when walking from her hotel at Geneva to the quay in 1898. One of his nephews took service in a ship's crew, and was no more heard of. His brother, Maximilian, perhaps the finest of the family, accepted at the hands of Napoleon III. the Imperial throne of Mexico, was captured by the republicans, and shot at Queretaro in 1867. Another nephew, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir-apparent of the Emperor, angered and disappointed the old man by marrying a lady who was not royal (although of the oldest nobility). This -

talented and strong-minded man was never to succeed to the Habsburg throne—the dreadful assassinations of himself and his wife at Sarajevo in 1914 were to be the prelude to the greatest war of history, and to the destruction of the Habsburg Empire.

Francis Joseph seems to have had no friends except a Viennese lady, the actress, Katherine Shratt, to whom he remained devoted all his life, and to whom he went for quiet and sympathy in the times of most exacting duties. He was devoted to his duties; was early at his work-table every morning, at 6 o'clock or earlier, transacted his correspondence, saw his secretaries, gave audiences to ministers and generals. It was one deadly round of formalism and routine, yet the old ruler never quite lost touch with reality, and he managed the unstable system of Parliamentary Government in Austria, and the almost unworkable form of union with Hungary far better than was to be expected from his rigid nature, his narrow upbringing, and his long series of public and private misfortunes.

There was really only one statesmanlike, one feasible course for the Habsburg Monarchy to follow, and that was to watch the times, to give way, in a spirit of reasonableness and compromise, to the spirit of the age. 'Despotism itself,' says Burke in his great speech on American conciliation, 'is obliged to truck and huckster.' The Habsburg rulers had, indeed, given way on the question of Constitutional Government, and they were honestly trying to make Constitutional Government work. What they would not give way to, was the spirit of nationality, except in regard to Hungary. Apart from the Magyars, all the races of the Habsburg Monarchy were to be governed as if they were only one people. A 'Federal Solution' was definitely ruled out. The Monarchy was to go on as if it was still in the eighteenth century, as if the French Revolution and the awakening of nationality had never occurred.

The Habsburg point of view is stated very definitely and

The Problem
of Nation-
ality.

powerfully in the memoirs of Field-Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorff, who was Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian armies from 1906, with a short interval, down nearly to the end of the Great War. In Conrad's The Military View.

eyes all politics—the whole of life, in fact, inside the state and between states—is a struggle for existence ; at bottom, it is a struggle for food. History is the record of the struggle of nations with each other for the means of existence—for *Existenzmittel*. Small nations, however, cannot be sure of obtaining a sufficient supply of the means of existence for themselves ; therefore, they have to join in more or less permanent leagues or unions with neighbouring nations, and thus form a ' many-tongued State of self-interest ' (*polyglott Interessenstaat*). Here, however, the separate interests of the particular nations or races which compose the State conflict with the general State-interest, which is primarily an interest in the ' conditions necessary for existence.' The separate racial interests must therefore be subordinated to the general interest, otherwise the State will fall and every one will starve. The Habsburg Monarchy was such an *Interessenstaat*. It was a union of races none of which could supply itself with all the things it needed—for example, with grain, coal, iron, sea-fisheries, wool, flax ; but they all, when united together, could supply these things for the whole state. Geography and economics—the Danube basin and its natural resources—not race nor language, were the bases of the Habsburg Monarchy. Such is the view of politics given in Field-Marshal Conrad's impressive autobiography, called *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*.

The internal racial divisions of the Monarchy would (in Conrad's view) break it up, if permitted to assert themselves freely. A similar danger threatened the Monarchy from the outside. The ' Southern The Southern Slav Movement. Slav Question ' was always pressing itself upon the attention of the Habsburgs. There were many Slavs inside the monarchy and many outside ; and there was an unceasing agitation in favour of uniting all the Slavs in a

great Southern Slav State. The kingdom of Serbia was the centre and focus of Southern Slav sentiment ; from within its borders secret societies could work for the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Conrad, from the first years of his army service, viewed the policy of the Monarchy simply as a struggle for existence against the racial forces inside and outside the State. Accordingly the Habsburg policy, domestic and foreign, was required to be clear, calculating, and firm, always on the alert against internal or external nationalism, and ready to strike a decisive blow for the preservation of the State.

Within the narrow circle of this mental outlook, Conrad gives an interesting picture of his official life, his *Dienstzeit*. Bestowing just a passing reference on his youthful years on his father's little estate near the Semmering Pass, in the borderland of Slav and German and Italian, Conrad plunges into army life, and tells of the troubles of the German officer and official class in Trieste, Agram, and other provincial centres of Habsburg rule. His views on politics (he writes) were often different from those prevailing among the rest of the official class. What business had he to have any views on politics?—as a soldier he should have had none ; his business was to be concerned wholly with the Army. When he rose to high rank, he was always sending in memoranda to the Emperor Francis Joseph, pointing out the political and military dangers to the monarchy, and urging drastic measures. The taciturn old Emperor was stirred ; he did not like the 'ramshackleness' of his Empire always being thrust upon him, and he resented the fact that his patience was always being made out to be weakness. 'You bewilder me,' he broke out once to Conrad, in one of the many audiences of the Chief of Staff when Conrad presented another of his unanswerable written arguments—*Sie irren mich* ; then, after some moments of tense silence—*Ich danke*, 'I thank you' ; and the Emperor signified that his Chief of Staff could go. His memoranda gave the old man no rest.

It was the same with the soldiers. Conrad was always marching them and counter-marching them, arranging elaborate manœuvres, scheduling impossible programmes of trial-operations. The men came back at the end of the long route-marches and sham-fights utterly fagged out, broken-spirited, slovenly, dejected. Francis Joseph, who sometimes attended the military manœuvres of the German Empire, and knew how trim and 'well-found' were all the German soldiers, how neat and effective were all their marchings and attacks, hated to have the German Emperor come to the Austrian manœuvres, seeing the Austrian ranks breaking down under Conrad's ruthless driving. Once, visiting the German Emperor and seeing the trim regiments, Francis Joseph turned round and asked sharply: 'Why is this kind of thing totally impossible with us?' Nobody liked to say why. Francis Joseph continued: 'Owing to the misguided practices that have now become the fashion with us, any such parade is beyond even my dreams.'¹

Conrad never flinched. He meant to 'key up' the Austrian forces for the grand fight against their brother Slavs, which he believed to be coming and which he wanted to anticipate and indeed to bring on, as the sole means (in his mind) of preserving the Habsburg State. Narrow, inflexible, efficient, patriotic, without vision, without bowels of compassion, Conrad is 'the best—that is, the worst—example of the militarist mind, which believes that war is "inevitable," is ever eager to fight a "preventive" war, and throws all its weight in favour of hasty mobilisation in a time of diplomatic crisis.'²

¹ Quoted in Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, ii. 10.

² Fay, i. 20-21.

CHAPTER VI

TSARIST RUSSIA

RUSSIA has always been an enigma to the rest of Europe. There are especial reasons for this. Firstly, almost nobody outside Russia has taken the trouble to understand the language. Secondly, the extremes of climate and the monotony of the landscape have not attracted visitors from the West. Thirdly, the autocratic government and rigorous police-system of Russia did not invite, but if anything repelled visitors. Fourthly, the Russians themselves, with one foot in Asia and one in Europe, present a blend of Continental characteristics which is not readily comprehensible to the mere European and which all the profuse data of the Russian psychological novel has only made, in explanation, more bewildering.

That the Russians were a great and powerful people, nobody will deny. That their cultural and, in certain directions, even their political achievements in the nineteenth century were remarkable, nearly all historians will admit. Yet at the end of the nineteenth century Russia still lagged far behind the rest of Europe in her general level of culture and in her standard of political progressiveness. Judged by the proportion of the people who could read and write, or from the part which they took in the political directing of their country, the Russians were probably below the standards which the peoples of Western Europe had attained in the Middle Ages.

It is not generally realised among Western observers that

Russia once had a 'parliament of estates,' not unlike the mediaeval Parliament of England or the Estates-General of France. The mediaeval Parliaments of Russia, however, came to an end in the early seventeenth century. From this time, Russia was ruled autocratically and centrally by its Tsar, first from Moscow, down to the reign of Peter the Great, and after his time, from St. Petersburg. There was a germ of local self-government in the *mir* or village community, which had a system somewhat like that of the mediaeval English manor ; but between the parochialism of the *mir* and the central authority of the Tsar, there was until 1864 no intermediate governing body. A huge corps of civil servants, the great Russian bureaucracy, supervised the whole national life, and carried out the instructions of the Tsar in the remotest parts of the empire.

The loss of
Self-govern-
ment.

Catherine II. had divided Russia into provinces in the latter half of the eighteenth century, with a governor at the head of each ; but the governor was, in effect, just a grand civil servant, appointed by the Tsar and wholly accountable to him. In 1861 the Tsar Alexander II. freed the serfs, the vast majority of the Russian peasantry. Three years later Alexander instituted a representative assembly (*Zemstvo*) in each province, elected by the peasants, townspeople, clergy, and nobles, with some functions of local government, chiefly in regard to public health and 'social service.' In 1881 he had decided to follow up this instalment of self-government by taking steps to create a Constitution for the whole Empire ; but the reforms of this humane and enlightened monarch were prevented by the bombs of 'nihilists,' the self-styled friends of freedom. The next monarch, Alexander III., succeeded to the throne, naturally, upon a flowing tide of reaction ; and for the rest of the nineteenth century the Russian Empire continued to be governed by the Tsar and his bureaucracy. Laws were made simply by Imperial decree, by *ukase*.

Reforms.

The responsibility for all decisions lay ultimately with the Tsar. There were departments of State—Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Education, Army, Navy, Finance—with a minister at the head of each ; and ministerial councils were Autocracy of not infrequently held, in the presence of the the Tsar. Tsar. There was, however, no obligation on the Tsar to consult his ministers in a body ; he regularly saw the ministerial heads of departments separately, and gave his commands to each, so that the head of one department did not know what was happening in another. There was no premier or chief minister. Formerly the Chancellor had been both Foreign Minister and chief of all the ministers ; but since the retirement of Gortchakoff in 1882, there had been no Chancellor appointed. There was simply a Foreign Minister (M. de Giers from 1882 to 1895 ; Count Muravieff from 1897 to 1900), who certainly had the highest prestige amongst the Tsar's ministers, and who had most frequent access to his person, but was in no sense a premier. There was a permanent Council of State of about sixty members, nominated by the Tsar. Its business was to discuss legislative measures drafted and sent up by the various departments or ministries. The Council of State, however, was in no sense a Parliament ; its functions were deliberative. The legislative authority lay absolutely with the Tsar.

There was a big army and every man was liable to four years of military service. In practice only one out of every three men was conscripted ; even thus, the army was large and, along with the numerous police, made every one in Russia aware of the Tsar's power of coercion. But the The Bureau- Army could not have functioned without the cracy. bureaucracy. This great body of men was recruited from the secondary schools and universities, and most of the talent of Russia was drained into it and there 'sterilised.' For the life of a bureaucrat is inevitably one of routine. He goes up to his bureau in the morning and writes memoranda and copies reports into registers until the

late afternoon. He departs home, and next day returns to the same bureau to write and copy into registers, and to create more files of papers. As a result of much writing and reporting, some decision will be made by a high official in the office, and an instruction will be issued to another official to put the decision into action. So the administration throughout the vast empire, from the borders of Germany to the Far Eastern Pacific, dragged an endless chain of bureaucratic orders and reports. The vast cumbrous mechanism of the bureaucracy ground and creaked and revolved slowly, but nevertheless it revolved; the orders went out and were executed, the reports came in and were acted upon; and the unwieldy, unpractical mass of the Russian people were guided along lines which led to, at any rate, a moderate degree of prosperity and enlightenment. The bureaucracy could do almost anything except develop habits of initiative and self-government in the people, or develop statesmen from among its own body. The bureaucratic system is obviously not congenial to the growth of initiative, self-government or statesmanship.

Alexander III., coming to the throne on the murder of his father in 1881, drew the bonds of autocracy more strictly together; a heavy, although not arbitrary, despotism settled down upon Russia. The whole power of Government was directed towards repression at home and con- A Period of
quest abroad. At home, Liberalism had no Repression.
chance; and many members of the 'intelligentsia' went to live in Western Europe because they would not or could not dwell in unison with the iron regulations of the Tsar. Meanwhile the conquest of Central Asia—Khiva, 1872, Bokhara, 1873, Merv, 1883—to some extent supplied the outlet for energy of men who were denied an outlet in home politics. Alexander III. died in 1894, and was succeeded by his son Nicholas II.

The Tsar Nicholas II. was born in 1868, and succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Alexander III. He was well educated, knew English perfectly, and carried

on his long correspondence with the German Emperor in that language. Before succeeding to the throne, he toured in India and Japan. As Tsar, he had a peaceful foreign policy; and in internal politics, while retaining the bureaucratic system unchanged, he tended to soften somewhat the rigours of the administration. He was an upright man, but his character was weak. He was superstitious, and lived too much in the past. His wife, Princess Alix of Hesse (renamed Alexandra Feodorovna), who was highly strung and over-emotional, did not have a good influence on him. The chief defect of the Tsar's position was that he lived in a sort of Byzantine seclusion, shut off from the world, chiefly on account of the personal dangers which lurked everywhere outside the gates of the palace.

Although bureaucracy was not congenial to the growth of statesmanship, occasionally a statesman did appear.

Sergius Witte was such an one. As was the case with many of Russia's statesmen—for example Nesselrode, who was of Germanic, and de Giers, who was of Swedish origin—Witte came of a family originally of foreign extraction, Dutch. He was educated at the University of Odessa, and entered the service of the State Railway in 1877 when he was twenty-eight years old. In Russia all the ministers were chosen out of the bureaucracy. By the year 1892 Witte had risen to be Minister of Ways and Communication, and in 1893 he was made Minister of Finance. During the ten years for which he held this office Witte greatly improved the financial system, and also carried out a very important programme of railway construction.

When the Russo-Japanese War drew towards its disastrous end, Witte had the ungrateful task of heading the Russian Delegation which made the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. When he returned, he was entrusted by the Tsar with the task of inaugurating the system of Parliamentary Government which was at last to be estab-

lished. Witte became Prime Minister, but the rest of the bureaucrats never favoured Parliamentary institutions, and in 1906 Witte retired. He died in 1915.

All countries require peace ; Russia, even more than other countries, needed peace. For war is the enemy of any normal and regular development of a country's resources. Russia was a land of huge extent, and of inexhaustible and almost untapped natural resources. Mines, forests, fisheries, grain-growing areas, required railways before they could be made available to Russia and the rest of the world. The budget and the national debt weighed ^{The Tsar} heavily upon developed resources and goods that ^{and Peace.} were scanty when compared with those of the great Western states. It was because of this, as well as for humanitarian reasons, that the Tsar Nicholas in 1898 proposed that an international Conference be held for the limitation of armaments. This proposal led to the First Hague Peace Conference, which, however, failed to bring about any agreed limitation of military expenditure (see below, p. 99).

Meanwhile Witte pushed forward his many projects of railway construction. The Black Sea was linked with the Baltic ; and by a daring flight of vision a railway line was planned to join St. Petersburg and Vladivostock, ^{Railroads.} the Gulf of Finland and the Sea of Japan. Russia possessed, and had sparsely colonised, Siberia ; and beyond Siberia she had taken the Amur region and the province on the Pacific Coast. In 1891 the great railway project was taken in hand, and by 1904 it was completed. A single track, with ' passing-stations ' at fairly frequent intervals, the Trans-Siberian Railway, owned and operated by the Russian State, carried men and goods and postal mails, through the snow or the heat, unceasingly, and joined together the ends of the earth so that East and West now met. During the Russo-Japanese War, in winter when the great Lake Baikal was frost-bound, rails were laid on the ice and trains were driven across by the route thus shortened.

Later the track was completed round the lake, going through tunnels by its side. Every train took a company of merchants, soldiers, bureaucrats, diplomatists, travellers, missionaries, naval officers. Every tongue seemed to be spoken in the train. Trim Japanese, wise-looking Chinamen, capable Germans, bearded, vigorous Russians, smart French attachés, energetic Englishmen travelling for pleasure or 'on leave'—these and men of many other nations could be heard chatting as they sat in the coaches or strolled on the ground by wayside passing-stations.

Although not developing politically in the reign of Alexander III. and in the early years of the reign of Nicholas II., Russia was making steady progress in the things of the intellect. Repressive towards all political initiative, the Tsarist Government was favourable to scholars and men of letters, provided that they kept away from politics. The Ministry of Education, which controlled the universities, sent promising young scholars abroad to Germany, France, Italy, and elsewhere. A young man who had passed his examinations brilliantly, and who was recommended by his teachers to be a professor, would be sent by the Ministry of Education on full pay for two or even three years to carry out advanced studies at Berlin, Paris, or Rome; to work in the laboratories of a famous scientist; or to help in the excavations of classical antiquities at Athens or Smyrna. After the scholar had returned to take up his official duties at his university in Russia, long leave of absence was frequently granted for engaging in scientific work abroad. The Imperial Academy at St. Petersburg, which elected its own members, was supported with a regular income from the Treasury; all the members of the Academy drew a moderate stipend. The Ministry of Education published 'Proceedings' (*Sbornik*), that is, journals of scientific and literary research containing the contributions of Russian scholars. The *Sbornik* of the Imperial Russian Historical Society, under the direction of the Ministry of Education, is a

series of many volumes, filled with valuable documentary material taken from official archives, much of it in French.

The glory of Russia at the end of the nineteenth century was literature. The great age of Russian letters extended just short of a century—from the publication of Pushkin's first book of poems in 1820 to the death of Tolstoi in 1910. Pushkin's position in Russian letters has been compared to Chaucer's in English; he established his country's literature on a national basis, whereas before it had been based upon foreign models. The comparison is a striking recognition of the lateness of Russia's development. Pushkin died in a duel in 1837. A link between his age and late nineteenth-century literature was formed by Turgenev, who was born in 1818, was educated at the universities of Berlin and Moscow, and who published his first book (a long poem) in 1843. Turgenev was a 'Westerner,' and spent most of his life (he had ample private means) in Berlin, Baden, or Paris, writing novels of society in a finished, polished style that is like that of the great French stylists. He may be said to have discovered to the educated public of Europe the existence and aims of Russian Radicalism (in *Rudin*) and of Russian Nihilism (in *Fathers and Sons*).

Turgenev died in 1883, two years after the death of Dostoievsky, the master-writer of the long psychological novel. Dostoievsky was born in 1821, the son of a well-to-do physician. He became an officer in the Army, but was imprisoned and sent to Siberia for his Socialist views. After being released (he was four years a prisoner) he engaged in literature, composed long novels—*Crime and Punishment*, *The Brothers Karamazov*, and others—in which the author writes as knowing all that is going on inside the heart and mind of the characters of the story. No more powerful picture can be conceived than Dostoievsky's of the seething, if often inarticulate, Socialism of Russian middle-class life, of the clumsy, all-pervading effectiveness

of the bureaucracy, of the yearning, striving, and futility of the bourgeoisie.

The Western point of view and the Slavonic are strongly contrasted between the work of Turgenev and Dostoievsky. Which of the two attitudes was more likely to save Russia? Was she to follow Western models, acquiesce in a Westerners European balance of power, introduce cabinet and Slavists. Constitutional Government, manage her cities like German municipalities, administer her provinces like French prefectures, throw her universities open to the influences of all the world, like the great free universities of old Europe? Or was Russia to pursue a Slavonic ideal, to aim at union with the Slavs of the Balkans, to nourish her peculiar Slavonic culture, to go on being managed by a bureaucracy, an army, a police, so that all the spiritual energy of the people went into reading and writing and vague sentimental discussions without any outlet in practical politics?

Tolstoi seems to represent, in his greatest books, *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, a middle course between Slavism and Westernism, or perhaps rather Tolstoi. a magnificent fusion between the two. He was born in 1828 on the estate called Yasnaya Polyana, which belonged to his father and which was to be his own home down to his death in 1910. Tolstoi was a nobleman, served in the Crimean War, married in 1862, settled down on Yasnaya Polyana, and had a large and adoring family. He published *War and Peace* in 1866, and *Anna Karenina* in 1875. The first is a huge, unfinished novel, with no particular beginning or ending, a full, satisfying chronicle of two families of the noble class—old men and women, young men and girls, dreamers and practical people, statesmen, soldiers, all the degrees of high life. *War and Peace* is a prose epic, a novel on the grand scale, of the Napoleonic Wars; and there are mighty descriptions of the campaigns of the Russian armies against Napoleon. Its philosophical thesis is that the great men of the time were really puppets

in the grip of circumstances, and that the real makers of history were the mute peoples on either side whose unconscious spirit was subtly working upon their leaders. The novel brings out strongly the chivalry of the Russian gentleman, the idealism of educated youth, the capacity for endurance in the masses. The long, lovely family chronicle has all the charm of good people known in real life.

In 1898 Tolstoi was still writing. *Resurrection* appeared in 1899—a novel on the social ills of Russia. It was an attack upon the Russian Orthodox Church, and brought about Tolstoi's excommunication in 1901. He had now renounced all property in his estate, which was accordingly managed by his family. He himself lived the life of a peasant, devoted to charity and to his library and philosophical work. In November 1910 he suddenly left Yasnaya Polyana on some mystical quest that has never been fully explained. On November 20 he fell a victim to pneumonia, and died at the little railway station of Astapovo.

There were still some younger men left who were writing notable work. The best of these was probably Chekhov, a physician (he had investigated plague in Sakhalin), who wrote some masterly short stories and plays—comedies of Russian life, not humorous, but humane and sympathetic, like *The Cherry Orchard* and *Uncle Vanya*. Maxim Gorky was writing works of powerful and terrible realism, showing up the dregs of Russian city life. He was an 'intellectual' who later joined the Bolshevik movement when the Russian middle class had shown its incapacity to deal with the revolution at the end of the Great War.

Undoubtedly the cause of the ultimate breakdown of Russia in the Great War lay with the Tsarist system of government. The Russians may be a difficult ^{Tsarist} people to govern, but nobody will deny that ^{Inefficiency.} they have remarkable qualities and are capable of contributing powerfully to the prosperity and peace of the

world. They were, moreover, a growing people, physically and intellectually. The Tsarist system should have shown some elasticity. It was not enough simply to administer the people through bureaucrats and policemen. The Tsarist system was too heavy, too static, too like the ancient Byzantine administration of which, indeed, it was a copy. The Tsar lived secluded from the danger of assassination in one or other of his numerous palaces, seldom appearing at any function except military reviews, when, dressed in the stiff Russian uniform, he took the salute from some thousands of stolid peasant-soldiers. It was seldom, if ever, that any of the Tsars wore civilian clothes; in their portraits they are all dressed as soldiers. Nicholas II., who was devoted to his wife and children, had a happy family life, and maintained an active correspondence with his relatives at other courts. This world of domestic royalties, however, gave him no insight into the wide world of plain human beings. Apart from his family and relatives, he saw only a few diplomatists, high court nobles, and high civil servants—all, except the diplomatists, hide-bound by their traditions and inexperienced in the life of the wide world. Andrew D. White, the American minister at St. Petersburg, had conversations with Nicholas II. He found the Tsar interested 'in a languid way' in the good of his people, but unaware that the peasants were starving.¹ No breath from the outer world ever seemed to enter that secluded court, or even to reach the senses of the high functionaries of the bureaux and departments of State.

In a recent work called *La Russie des Tsars*, M. Paléologue, French ambassador at St. Petersburg when the World War began, has given a graphic picture of High Russian high society and Government circles. The impression left on the mind of the reader is one of wealth and gorgeousness, of some recklessness, of considerable inefficiency, of lack of touch with the realities of

¹ A. D. White, *Autobiography* (1905), ii. 251.

ordinary, everyday life. There was in Russian society patriotism, generous emotion, courage; there was also self-seeking and pride; and with many people a world-weariness which the War only increased. It was in circumstances such as these that the Tsarist system had to face the greatest crisis in its history, in which it was to go to ruin.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SMALL STATES

THE glory of Europe is the cultural, that is, its intellectual and artistic production, which, strong or weak, has never ceased to be created since the time of the European Culture. Greeks or Romans. No other continent of the world can be compared with Europe in respect of the volume and continuity of this production.

There is no doubt that the division of Europe into nations contributes to the maintenance of this tradition of cultural activity. Each nation has something unique ; the natural impulse makes the citizens burn to achieve something great ; and the differences of national culture have a stimulating effect upon the whole.

The greater part of the contribution of Europe to the culture of the world comes from the Great States. The smaller states, however, have an existence of great social value to Europe and to mankind. The tendency of the citizens of small states is to be safe and unadventurous. There was a time when they were bellicose, but now it is no longer so. Only the Great Powers have the privilege of fighting. The small states are not encouraged to resort to arms. They could not fight the Great Powers, nor could they fight each other, for the Great Powers would not let them. Therefore the small states (outside the Balkans) were all peaceful in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By reason of this they were all prosperous. The level of comfort and the level of culture were probably higher, if the whole population is taken into account, in Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, than

among the Great Powers. Knowledge of languages unlocks the treasure-stores of the nations. The citizens of small states tend to learn two or three languages, the citizens of a Great Power rest content with knowing no language but their own.

The last male prince of the House of Orange-Nassau, William III., King of Holland, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, died in 1890. He left a daughter, Wilhelmina, ^{The Dutch} ten years old. The Queen-Mother, Emma, ^{Crown.} Princess of Waldeck-Pyrmont, was regent for the next eight years. On August 31, 1898, Queen Wilhelmina attained her majority; and on February 7, 1901, she was married to Prince Henry of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Luxemburg, according to a family pact of the House of Orange-Nassau, had passed in 1890 to Adolphus, Duke of Nassau-Weilburg.

Holland, like England, had adopted the system of Parliamentary Government and free trade. It was distinctly a bourgeois country; neither the nobles nor the wage-earners (small classes both of them) had much effect upon politics. A nobleman might occasionally be elected to the Parliament, because the nobility was almost indistinguishable from the bourgeoisie. Few workmen were qualified to vote. Holland continued to be directed, as it had been since the seventeenth century, by the mercantile and trading interest.

The Constitution (established in 1848) was a limited monarchy. The executive power was exercised through a Cabinet of Premier and other ministers. The ^{The Dutch} Parliament, called States-General, comprised ^{Constitution.} two Chambers. The Upper Chamber or Senate consisted of fifty members elected by the Provincial States (or Assemblies) from among the inhabitants who paid the most in taxes and from among certain high functionaries. The Second Chamber, consisting of one hundred members, was elected directly by the citizens who possessed the franchise. There were 700,000 voters out of a population of over five million. The political outlook of the people was decidedly bourgeois and individualistic. Liberal and Conservative Cabinets alternated with each other at almost equal inter-

vals. There was a small Socialist party, with four or five to ten seats in the Second Chamber.

Being a country dependent for its economic existence, not on certain manufacturing industries but upon the general flow of trade—for the Dutch are great merchants, buyers and sellers—Holland had been for the most part a country of free trade.

**Economic
System of the
Netherlands.**

In 1890 the Finance Minister, Pierson (author of a notable book on Political Economy), further lowered most of the customs-duties; and his policy was maintained by subsequent ministries. The people remained prosperous and with little cause for excitement except for the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. The Boer cause attracted great sympathy from the 'Hollanders.' President Kruger, fleeing from the Transvaal, was brought to Holland in a Dutch man-of-war. In 1899 the great International Conference for promoting peace and the reduction of armaments met at the Hague. In 1903 the Socialists won some more seats in the States-General and endeavoured to bring about a general strike; the attempt collapsed in the face of the particularly strong measures which the Government took to maintain public order.

The general level of prosperity is maintained by the industrious and saving habits of the people. The State and the municipalities have a large public debt in which very many of the Dutch have investments. The great overseas Empire of Holland (next in size only to the British and French Empires) also provides a profitable field for investment of capital. The Dutch are a nation of investors, with capital widely spread among the people.

Dutch literary and artistic output is remarkable for so small a people. The seventeenth century was their great age for painting and for letters. The painters, such as Rembrandt and Hobbema, have a direct appeal to the eye, and being unimpeded by difficulties of language, are known all over Europe. The seventeenth-century poets, such as Vondel and Cats, are less well known.

**Dutch
Culture.**

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Dutch culture was not up to the standard of the seventeenth ; towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, art revived in the work of Van Gogh, Maris, and Israels. In literature distinction has been attained in novels, of which there is a large output. The novels of Cuperus have been translated into English. Maarten Maartens wrote in English.

Next door to the Netherlands (or Holland) is Belgium. The two countries were a united kingdom from 1815 to 1830. The July Revolution of 1830 in Paris had a ^{The} repercussion in Brussels which brought about ^{Kingdom} Belgian secession. A separate kingdom, with ^{of Belgium.} neutrality guaranteed by the Powers, was established by the Treaties of London, 1831 and 1839. Leopold, a prince of the Liberal German house of Saxe-Coburg, was adopted as King of the Belgians. He ruled with prudence and tact, highly respected by his brother sovereigns, until his death in 1865. His son, Leopold II., was a man of great energy and ingenuity, although not of so high a character as the father. Leopold II. was the chief founder of the International African Society in 1876. He employed the English explorer H. M. Stanley to make expeditions into Central Africa, and he ultimately succeeded in founding the Congo Free State in 1884. The vast territory of this State became in effect the possession of King Leopold, who invested large sums of his own money in it, and exploited its natural resources with the greatest energy. King Leopold, a constitutional sovereign in Belgium, was an autocrat in the Congo Free State. Administering the great colony as a commercial estate, and never visiting it himself, King Leopold allowed abuses to grow up which produced much unhappiness among the natives. Belgium, a small, busy, industrial state, could not easily provide a sufficient supply of trained administrators of high character for the proper governing of the Congo Free State, nor were the administrative authorities of the Free State in any way responsible to the Belgian Parliament. The governance of tropical

African territories, where there are many difficult, almost insoluble, native problems, requires a high type of administrator, and control by humane public opinion. The abuses in the Congo Free State, as regards such things as the forced labour of natives, and the methods of collecting rubber and ivory, did not begin to be remedied until 1908, one year before the death of Leopold II., when by Act of the Belgian Parliament the Congo Free State was annexed to Belgium. Thus the little European state at the mouth of the Scheldt acquired in Africa an empire eighty times its own size. By the European treaty known as the Berlin Act (1885), the basin of the Congo has to be kept open to the trade of all nations upon terms of equality for all. In 1909 Leopold II. died. He was a rich and ambitious man who found his little kingdom in Europe too restricted for his great designs, his love of power and enterprise. Much of his time was spent on his Congo schemes and the development of property nearer home, for instance in the seaside town of pleasure, Ostend. He had a great knowledge of foreign affairs, and was said to read *The Times* daily from beginning to end. He always apprehended that Belgium would be attacked by Germany, and he was determined that his kingdom should be able to defend its neutrality. In 1906, three years before his death, he was at last able to induce the Belgian Parliament to provide money for the reconstruction of the defences of Antwerp and for the increase of the army. He was succeeded on the throne in 1909 by his nephew Albert, Count of Flanders (born 1875), a man of high character and simple habits, a lover of mountain-climbing and of the open air, handsome, tall, an attractive personality. Shortly before succeeding to the throne, Albert visited the Belgian Congo.

The energy of the Belgians did not go all into commerce and colonising. In the 'nineties a literary movement was started by a group of ardent youths who called themselves 'Young Belgium.' The eminent dramatist Maurice Maeter-

linck was inclined to stand by himself; his fame was already made when the Young Belgian movement started. Its leading spirit was a poet called Charles van Lerberghe, who died in 1907, and whose charming literary letters have been edited and published by Fernand Severin of the University of Ghent.

Belgium was recognised in International Law as a neutral state. Holland, although not subject, like Belgium, to an international régime of perpetual neutrality, was, in practice, neutral; she has engaged in ^{Neutrality.} no hostilities in Europe since the war of Belgian Secession in 1831-39. The tendency for all small states was to keep clear of international complications, to have no 'great policy' (Leopold II.'s Congo enterprise was the nearest thing to 'great policy' for a small state), and to live in peace. Switzerland was such a state, peaceful and contented; it was bound to perpetual neutrality by the treaties of 1814-15 which ended the Napoleonic Wars.

The Swiss Confederation—a union of twenty-two cantons and people with three languages, French, German, Italian—formed its modern Constitution by Acts of 1848 ^{The Swiss} and 1874. In form the Constitution resembles ^{Constitution.} that of the United States rather than those of Western Europe; it is a Federal Constitution and the executive authority, the ministers of state, do not hold office at the pleasure of a parliamentary majority. Each canton has its own legislature for cantonal purposes. For Federal legislation there is a central legislature or 'Federal Assembly' of two Chambers. The first Chamber or Senate is called the Ständerat (State Council); the second or popular Chamber was called the Nationalrat (National Council). The Ständerat is composed of forty-four members, two chosen by each canton according to whatever system of election it chooses to adopt. The Nationalrat has 198 members, representing the Swiss people as a whole, directly elected, one for every 20,000 of the population. The executive authority is vested in a Federal Council or

Bundesrat of seven members elected by the Federal Assembly (that is, by the Ständerat and Nationalrat combined) for three years. The members of the Bundesrat each take charge of a portfolio or department of state. They are not members of the Federal Assembly, although they may and do appear in it and make speeches and answer questions. One member of the Bundesrat is elected by the Federal Assembly to be President of the Swiss Confederation for one year, not re-eligible until another year has passed away.

The seven members of the Bundesrat are the real governors of Switzerland. The Federal Assembly has tended to re-elect the same seven, each of whom therefore can become an expert in his department of state. The President—one of the seven, for one year—has little more power than that conferred by his 'chairmanship' of the Bundesrat. The European public might know the names of some of the seven, but it seldom knew who was President of the Swiss Confederation for the year. The affairs of the Confederation were well managed in this period of history from 1898; Switzerland was stable, free, and prosperous. A large number of foreigners chose to reside there for the sake of the scenery, the education, the quiet social and political atmosphere. Switzerland is the triumphant adaptation of the mediaeval patrician burgher republic to the conditions of modern democracy.

Switzerland's geography made railway construction difficult, but all difficulties were overcome. In 1898 the railways, belonging to separate companies, were nationalised. By agreements made with Italy and Germany and with their financial co-operation, the great Saint Gothard tunnel had been made between 1872 and 1880, nine and a half miles through the rock.

The small states of the North of Europe, Denmark, and Norway, had once been joined together. Since 1814, however, Norway had been joined in a personal union with the Swedish crown. The dividing line in recent Danish

history was the War of 1864, when Prussia and Austria annexed the two duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. This loss diminished enormously the extent of the Danish dominions; the economic, perhaps also ^{Denmark.} the political, stability of the kingdom was endangered. Accordingly, when the war was over, the Danes began a vigorous policy of exploiting the natural resources of the country. The heathland of Jutland, hitherto almost barren, was turned to productive use. Denmark became one of the leading stock-farming countries of the world. Iceland, united with Denmark since 1280, was administered under a system of 'Home Rule' since 1874.

The Constitution of Denmark dated, like so many of the Continental constitutions, from the great year of European revolutions, 1848-49. Denmark had a monarchy, a cabinet of ministers, a legislature (Rigsdag) of two Chambers. The people found it very difficult to make Constitutional Government function through Parliament and a responsible Cabinet. Ancient habits and a generous interpretation of the Constitution of 1849 left much authority to the king and ministers. The lower Chamber of the Rigsdag, called the Folkething, was predominantly Liberal in the latter part of the nineteenth century; but the king, Christian ix., who was highly respected and popular, favoured the Conservative policy, especially in regard to the building of more fortifications. From 1885 to 1894 the Conservatives were in office under Jacob Estrup (who was Prime Minister for nearly twenty years altogether), and never had their budget passed by the Folkething. In 1894 Estrup retired, and changes in the ministry enabled some measure of consent to be obtained in the Folkething; and in 1901 a Liberal Government came into office. The question of defence continued to trouble political life, some people holding that as Denmark was too small to be able to defend itself under modern conditions of war, and was surrounded by vastly greater states, she might as well save the expense of having any defences at all—neither army, nor navy, nor

fortresses. And indeed this argument would appear, on the face of it, to be unanswerable.

The King of Denmark, Christian IX. (reigned 1863-1906), was father-in-law to Alexander III. of Russia and to The Court of Copenhagen. Edward Prince of Wales (King Edward VII. of Great Britain); he was father of King George of Greece. In his quiet household at Copenhagen princes of European dynasties often came together, so that the Danish capital was considered to be a diplomatic post of high interest, in spite of the insignificant power of the Danish state. M. Isvolski, one of the most active of Russian Foreign Ministers, was, before being appointed to this office, Russian diplomatic representative at Copenhagen. Here he had to deal with the very delicate and difficult episode, the Dogger Bank Incident (1904).¹

Across the Sound were Norway and Sweden united under the same crown since 1814. The king who occupied the throne from 1872 to 1907 was Oscar II., grand-son of the French Marshal Bernadotte who The House of Bernadotte in Sweden. became King of Sweden under the name of Charles XIV. Probably nothing shows so strikingly the advance in the general morale of society which has taken place in the course of modern history than the improvement in the conduct of secular and lay sovereigns. The lax conduct and worldly character of the Renaissance popes is well known; but since the end of the seventeenth century, at any rate, no breath of scandal has touched the papal court. Secular royalties took longer to reach the standard which the public expected of them; but in the last half of the nineteenth century their general moral level had risen enormously. The character of the Kings of Sweden of the House of Bernadotte stands deservedly high in history.

King Oscar II. (reigned 1872-1907) was a pattern of kingship. Well educated, widely travelled (as most princes now are), cultured, refined, and dutiful, he established the ascendancy of high character among his people, and won

¹ See below, p. 110.

the respect of the other Governments of Europe. Statesman, scholar, poet, he was a fitting head for a people like the Swedes, who were rapidly developing their culture as well as their resources.

Although Norway and Sweden were under the same king, they had separate Constitutions. Both countries had parliamentary institutions; but in Sweden the king was much stronger than in Norway.

The old Swedish Diet of four estates—Nobles, Clergy, Burghers, and Peasants—gave place in 1866 to a two-chamber parliament of the modern type. In 1876 the constitutional principle that the Prime Minister was responsible to the legislature (Riksdag) was adopted. The king, however, retained a great share of personal authority; and the prevailing public opinion endorsed this. The Conservatives—led by the large land-owners—had the chief influence in the Riksdag; towards the end of the nineteenth century the Liberals began to be prominent; in the early years of the twentieth century the Socialists began to be important. In foreign policy Sweden had been active down to 1864; but the defeat of Denmark by Austria and Prussia in that year, and the futility of the parts played by other states (including Sweden), convinced the Swedes that 'great politics' were not for them. The Franco-German War aroused much excitement, public sympathy being decidedly for the French; but no action was taken; and since 1870 Sweden has pursued a peaceful and purely Scandinavian policy.

Problems of defence agitated Swedish domestic politics, like those of Denmark, for much of the last part of the nineteenth century. The Danes, in any case, can never be strong in military affairs, and it is not worth while for them to try. Sweden, on the other hand, had sufficient resources to enable her to become a respectable military power. The party of preparedness triumphed; and by a series of steps, completed in 1901, universal military service was established. In the same period, between 1891 and

1901, under the guidance of the Conservative Boström Ministry, the national economy was changed from one based on Free Trade to a system of Protection. An impetus was given to the Industrial Revolution that was taking place. Mining and manufacturing increased, with consequent rise of the industrial labourers to some political influence. An era of industrial strife was opened, and before the twentieth century had gone on for ten years, the conflicts became intense, culminating in a 'general strike' in 1909. The strikers failed to impose their will upon the public, and the movement collapsed after enormous losses had been incurred by all. In spite of the industrial strife, the economic condition of Sweden steadily improved. Beautiful buildings—public and private—arose in the chief towns. Stockholm in particular became its present happy blend of the old and new, harmoniously spaced and adjusted. The budget of the Government was increased enormously, and large sums were spent upon education. The Swedish *lycées*, or secondary schools, became admirable institutions, in respect of buildings, of the highly trained staff of teachers (a corps of Government professors), and of the thorough curriculum prescribed for the pupils.

Between 1890 and 1905 the Norwegian Question was acute. The parliamentary system had been put into Norwegian practice completely in Norway, where the king had far less authority than in Sweden. Each country had a completely separate administration, except that the Foreign Minister and Foreign Office were Swedish, and that the Consular Service was joint Swedo-Norwegian. The cause of Norwegian discontent with the Union was purely nationalistic. There was no sort of oppression, no injustice; the Swedish Government had no right to interfere in Norway and, at any rate in the last half of the nineteenth century, never tried to do so; King Oscar, mild and statesmanlike, carefully carried out his duties under the Norwegian Constitution.

National feeling made the Norwegians desire to be separate from Sweden, or at least to share the Foreign Office (including, occasionally, the post of Foreign Minister) and to have a separate Norwegian Consular Service. The Swedish Government was only interested in the Union because it greatly eased the problem of defence against any possible attack from outside the Scandinavian peninsula. Various compromises were suggested from Sweden on the question of control of the Foreign Office and the question of a separate Norwegian Consular Service. In April 1905 Sweden seemed ready to concede the Norwegian demands, but by this time the Norwegian Government had really decided for independence. On June 7, 1905, the Norwegian ministers resigned in a body, and nobody could be found to take their place. The Storting (Norwegian Parliament) then declared that as the king was unable to form a Government, he had ceased to reign.

Feeling was running very high in Sweden, and public opinion would have supported the Government in a war to suppress the Norwegian revolution. King Oscar, however, was averse from war, and, with his usual tolerance, agreed to make a settlement. Commissioners from both countries met in Conference at Carlstad and arranged terms for the dissolution of the Union (Treaty of Carlstad, September 23, 1905). A neutral zone of territory, in which no fortifications could be built, was defined between the two countries, and provision was made for settling disputes by reference to the Hague Arbitration Tribunal.

The wisdom of King Oscar in refusing to make a war over the Union question has been proved by events. Norway and Sweden have been on good terms with each other. The progress of Swedish prosperity has not been interrupted. A considerable party in Norway appears to have desired a republic. This caused much anxiety to King Edward VII. and other interested European monarchs.¹ Norway, how-

¹ Cust, *King Edward VII. and his Court*, p. 222.

ever, decided to maintain the monarchical system ; the Storthing elected a younger son of the Crown Prince of Denmark, who took the title of Haakon VII. Sweden has not found her security threatened ; and progress has been made towards a common Scandinavian policy among the three states—Denmark, Norway, Sweden—which may lead in time to a permanent Scandinavian league or federation.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

At the end of the nineteenth century there took place the first serious effort to organise peace which had been made since the collapse of the first Concert of Europe in 1822. This first Concert had been a league of the Great Powers, formed to maintain the peace which they had imposed upon France and upon Europe at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The Hague Peace Conference, on the other hand, was not the product of war. It was the outcome of a proposal made by the Tsar Nicholas II. to all the Powers who had diplomatic representation at St. Petersburg and with all of whom Russia was at peace. It is true that the world was not quite peaceful at the time. A war concerning Cuba, fought between the United States and Spain, was just drawing to a close. Great Britain was engaged with the Transvaal Republic, in a controversy concerning the Transvaal domestic franchise, a controversy which, just after the Hague Conference closed its sessions, resulted in the South African War. The Tsar's proposal, however, did not originate in any connection with the Spanish-American War or with the Anglo-Boer controversy, which were not regarded as world-questions.

The Tsar Nicholas II. was a well-educated man who had travelled much, and, belonging to the international caste of European monarchs, had an international outlook. He wrote English with ease. He had a good knowledge of European affairs—far better, indeed, than his knowledge of Russian domestic affairs. He was sincerely anxious for peace, and his advisers at this time held similar views.

Ill-natured people in the diplomatic world of Europe said that Witte, the Russian Finance Minister, wanted armaments to be reduced, or at least not to be increased, because money was scarce and he could raise no more loans in Paris.

Nicholas II. Others said that Count Muravieff, the Russian
and Count Foreign Minister, was a vain man, and wished to
Muravieff. attract attention on the stage of high politics in Europe. The motives of all but the most saintly of men are mixed ; but there is no need to go behind a good act—something good must enter into its origin. Nicholas II. was not vain nor was he a calculating man. His proposal for a universal peace conference was sincere.

Nicholas had been reading a good book on International Law by a Pole called Bloch. The Tsar was impressed with
The Tsar's the idea of promoting regulation of international
Rescript. questions by law instead of force. His proposal, however, as put forward in a paper communicated by Count Muravieff to foreign representatives, August 24, 1898, was moderate and cautious. It stated :

‘ The maintenance of universal peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations represent, in the present condition of affairs all over the world, the ideal towards which the efforts of all Governments should be directed. . . .

‘ Being convinced that this high aim agrees with the most essential interests and legitimate aspirations of all the Powers, the Imperial Government considers the present moment a very favourable one for seeking, through international discussion, the most effective means of assuring to all peoples the blessings of real and lasting peace, and above all of limiting progressive development of existing armaments. . . .

‘ The ever-increasing financial burdens strike at the root of public prosperity. The physical and intellectual forces of the people, labour, and capital, are diverted for the greater part from their natural application and wasted unproductively. Hundreds of millions are spent in acquir-

ing terrible engines of destruction which are regarded to-day as the latest inventions of science, but are destined to-morrow to be rendered obsolete by some new discovery. National culture, economical progress, and the production of wealth are either paralysed or developed in a wrong direction.

‘Therefore the more the armaments of each Power increase, the less they answer to the objects aimed at by the Governments. Economic disturbances are caused in great measure by this system of excessive armaments, and the constant danger involved in this accumulation of war-material renders the armed peace of to-day a crushing burden more and more difficult for the nations to bear. It consequently seems evident that if this situation be prolonged, it will inevitably lead to that very disaster which it is desired to avoid, and the horrors of which make every humane mind shudder by anticipation.

‘It is the supreme duty, therefore, at the present moment of all States to put some limit to these unceasing armaments, and to find means of averting the calamities which threaten the whole world.

‘Deeply impressed by this feeling, His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to command me to propose to all Governments who have representatives at the Imperial Court the meeting of a Conference to discuss this grave problem.

‘Such a Conference, with God’s help, would be a happy augury for the opening century.’¹

In conversation with Sir C. Scott, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Muravieff further explained that the specific objects which the Conference would set before itself would be : (1) To check the progressive increase of military and naval armaments, and study any possible means of effecting their eventual reduction ; (2) To devise means for averting armed conflicts between States by the employment of specific methods of international diplomacy. It was also suggested that the Conference should not take place in the

The
Programme
of the Peace
Conference.

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, C.—9090 of 1899.

capital of one of the Great Powers. The Hague, the capital of Holland, was proposed ; the Dutch Government cordially agreed. Before the Conference met, the Russian Government sent to the various Governments a programme of the actual points on which, it was hoped, agreement would be reached. These comprised, among other things, (1) an undertaking on the part of each Power to fix for a definite period the effectives of its military and naval forces, and at the same time not to increase the budgets pertaining thereto ; (2) to prohibit the use in the armies and fleets of any new kind of fire-arms whatever and of new explosives ; (3) to prohibit the use of submarines, torpedo-boats, or plungers (*bateaux-torpilleurs, sous-marins, ou plongeurs*) ; (4) to accept in principle the employment of good offices, of mediation, and facultative (*i.e.* optional) arbitration, in cases lending themselves thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between nations.

All the Powers who were invited accepted the proposal 'in principle,' although few of them seemed to expect, or even to desire, that anything very definite would result from the Conference. From the first the proposal for limitation of armaments seemed to be doomed. No state was really willing to take the risk of restricting its power of

arming itself ; limitation of armament is the
 Arbitration.

most stubborn of all the problems that make up the grand problem of peace. There was more chance of something being effected along the line of good offices or arbitration, for states had occasionally experimented with these means successfully. The British Government and United States Governments in particular had submitted some very troublesome Anglo-American disputes to arbitration, and were ready to push forward this means of peace at the Conference. To Sir Julian Pauncefoot, British ambassador at Washington, who was to be the chief British Delegate at the Conference, Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote :

'With regard to the question of making the employment

of arbitration or mediation more general and effective for the settlement of international disputes, it is unnecessary for me to say that it is a matter to which Her Majesty's Government attach the highest importance, and which they are desirous of furthering by every means in their power. During the negotiations which Your Excellency has conducted at Washington for the conclusion of a Treaty of General Arbitration between this country and the United States, you were placed in full possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government on the subject. These views have further received practical application in the conclusion of a Treaty, also negotiated by Your Excellency, for the admission to arbitration of the disputed questions of frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela. The success with which you conducted both these negotiations inclines Her Majesty's Government to feel sanguine that on the present occasion your efforts may be equally productive of good result.'

The German Government, in the person of Holstein, the Political Director of the Foreign Office, wrote to its chief delegate in a very different spirit :

' Little, uninterested States as subjects, little questions as objects of arbitral activity, are conceivable ; great States and great questions, not. For the State—the The German Theory of the State. greater the more so—regards itself as an end in itself, not as means to the attainment of a higher outside aim. For the State there is no higher object than the protection of its interests. These, in the case of Great Powers, would not be necessarily identical with the maintenance of peace, but much more with the undoing (*Vergewaltigung*) of the enemy and of competitors through a rightly constructed stronger group.' ¹

This message was certainly not favourable to the proposal for a permanent system of international arbitration. With regard to the other chief proposal, for limitation or reduction of armaments, the German Emperor wrote, on August

¹ *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, xv. 188.

29, 1898, to the Tsar (their correspondence was conducted regularly in the English tongue) :

‘ Could we for instance figure to ourselves a Monarch, holding personal command of his army, dissolving his regiments sacred with a hundred years of history and relegating their glorious colours to the walls of the armouries and museums (and handing over his towns to Anarchists and Democracy). However, that is only *en passant*. The main point is the love of mankind which fills your warm heart and which prompts you to this proposal, the most interesting and surprising of this century.’¹

The first Hague Peace Conference was opened on May 18, 1899, at The House in the Wood (*Huis ten Bosch*), a palace built in the seventeenth century by Princess Amalia of Solms, widow of the great Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange. The chief British delegate, Sir Julian Pauncefote. Pauncefote (later Lord Pauncefote), was a noted international lawyer and diplomatist. He had been Attorney-General of Hong Kong, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, and in 1889 was appointed Minister of Great Britain to the United States. In 1893 Her Majesty’s Government raised the British Legation at Washington to the rank of Embassy. Pauncefote was a most successful and appreciated diplomatist in the United States, and probably did more than any single man, except James Bryce, to bring about good relations between the two Governments and between the two peoples. So fully in accord were the two Governments in their attitude towards the Hague Conference that the United States Secretary of State, John Hay, had asked Pauncefote at Washington : ‘ what will be the number and rank of the British Delegation ? ’ Evidently the United States Government wished to make the composition of its delegation correspond in rank with the British. Pauncefote, who did not at this time know

British and
American
Co-operation.

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, xv. 152.

that he was going to represent Great Britain at the Conference, telegraphed to Lord Salisbury and received the reply : ' It is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to appoint as First Plenipotentiary a diplomatist of high standing.' Two months later (May 9, 1899) came the notification to Pauncefoot of his appointment to the Conference.

The United States delegation comprised Andrew D. White, ambassador to Russia, a former President of Cornell University ; Seth Low, President of Columbia University, New York ; and Captain A. T. Mahan, of the United States Navy, author of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*.

The chief German delegates were Count Münster, ambassador at Paris, Baron von Stengel, Professor at the University of Munich, and Dr. Zorn, Professor at the University of Königsberg. France was represented by Léon Bourgeois, who had held the posts of Premier and Foreign Minister, and by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, a diplomatist and member of the Chamber of Deputies. Both these men were ardent advocates of international arbitration. Italy sent Count Nigra, ambassador at Vienna, who had been Cavour's friend and fellow-worker. Russia sent the Baron de Staël, ambassador at London (in compliment to the Tsar, he was elected President of the Conference), and M. de Martens, who was the foremost international lawyer of his time. The Japanese Government sent Baron Hayashi, ambassador at St. Petersburg, who was one of Japan's leading statesmen. Altogether twenty-six states were represented at the Conference. The strength of the representation, however, did not indicate any spirit of healthy optimism. ' Probably, ^{Pessimism} since the world began, never had so large a body ^{about Peace.} come together in a spirit of more hopeless scepticism as to any good result,' wrote Andrew D. White, the American plenipotentiary. ' Successful diplomatists of the old school in conversation lamented the fact that at the end of their career they were come on a mission which was bound to be a failure.' Yet faith, if it is steady enough, will usually

triumph over the doubters and the despairing. On July 31, 1899, at the end of the Conference, Pauncefoot wrote to Lord Salisbury: 'Many of the delegates entered upon their duties with the conviction that nothing practical would come of their labours. But before they had been at work a fortnight, a remarkable change came over the spirit of the Conference, and it was discovered that with a little goodwill it would be possible to arrive at a common understanding on some of the questions propounded by Count Muravieff, and which continue to agitate the civilised world.'

As at all international conferences, the substantial part of the work was necessarily done, not at full session, but in the committees into which the Conference divided itself, and which had to thrash out details of the proposed schemes and to endeavour to arrive at agreements. One committee (or commission) took up the question of limitation of armaments; a second dealt with the laws and customs of war; a third with the proposal for a permanent system of arbitration. The delegates worked hard all day through the hot Dutch summer in their rooms in the *Huis ten Bosch*; the Dutch Government provided a good luncheon in the building, so that all the delegates of all the committees could meet together and talk, without losing time.

It was found that no progress could be made with the proposal for stabilising armaments at their existing level.

The German delegation, acting on its instructions, absolutely opposed any scheme for limitation. It is doubtful whether any of the other Great Powers (except the United States and Great Britain, whose standing armies were already reduced to the level of national police) were cordially in favour of the proposal. The second committee was able to agree on some rules to mitigate the laws and customs of war. The third committee, on arbitration, however, was the only one which achieved a really substantial success. It had to abandon any idea of making international arbitration compulsory.

The
Conference
and its
Committees.

Failure of
attempt to
limit Arma-
ments.

The German Government declared definitely that it could not entertain any such proposal; nor, indeed, was public opinion in any other country ready to accept compulsory arbitration on all issues. The British and United States Governments, and possibly the Russian and French, would have accepted compulsory arbitration on a limited number of issues (excluding 'honour' and 'vital interests'); but in order to preserve what Pauncefoot called the 'precious benefit of unanimity' this plan also was abandoned, and, instead, a scheme for 'facultative' or optional arbitration, which the German Government agreed to accept, was elaborated.

Question of
Compulsory
Arbitration.

The last session, the *séance de clôture*, of the Conference was held in the *Huis ten Bosch* on July 29, 1899. All the agreed Conventions were ready for signature. The President of the Conference, M. de Staël, made a closing speech. He regretted that no substantial result had been achieved on the proposal to limit military budgets and effectives. He was able to note with satisfaction that the proposal to deal with the laws and customs of war had resulted in the formulation of rules that were more precise and more humanitarian than those previously recognised. Coming to the third subject, concerning a proposed court for international arbitration, he said:

'The work which opens a new era, so to speak, in the domain of the Law of Nations, is the Convention for the Pacific Regulation of international conflicts. . . . The Peace Conference, with the authority attached to an assembly where the civilised states are united, has devoted itself to safeguarding questions of capital interest, the fundamental principles of international law. . . . It has wholly accomplished a work which the future will without doubt name "the first international code of peace," and to which we have given the more modest name of "Convention for the pacific settlement of international conflicts." This work is, doubtless, imperfect, but it is sincere, practical, and wise.'

The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by all the twenty-six states represented at the Conference, stated (Article 1) :

‘ With a view to obviating, as far as possible, recourse to force in the relations between States, the Signatory Powers agree to use their best efforts to assure the pacific settlement of international differences.’

Article 2 stipulated :

‘ In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to arms, the Signatory Powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers.’

These articles were an important expression of international morality, and statement of *intention* on the part of the Powers ; but the Powers were not thereby obligated to anything very definite.

Article 3 gave to every State signatory to the Convention the right to offer good offices in any dispute between two states ; and such offer could not be construed by the parties to the dispute as an unfriendly act. The United States offered such good offices before the outbreak of the World War of 1914, but the offer received little attention.

‘ Good offices ’ were defined as an attempt on the part of a mediator to reconcile opposing claims and to appease the feelings of resentment between states at variance.

Article 9 recommended disputing states, in cases involving neither honour nor vital interests, in which they should not be able to come to an agreement by means of diplomacy, to set up, by special agreement, a Commission of Inquiry for the particular dispute. The object of such a Commission would be ‘ to facilitate a solution of these differences by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation.’ (Such a Commission of Inquiry was set up and succeeded in concluding peacefully the

'Dogger Bank Incident' between Russia and Great Britain.)¹

The most important articles (15-57) dealt with arbitration, which was defined as follows :

'International arbitration has for its object the settlement of differences between States by judges of their own choice, and on the basis of respect for law.'

Article 18 declared that 'The Arbitration Convention implies the engagement to submit loyally to the Award.' Further, with the object of facilitating recourse to arbitration, the Signatory States agreed to establish a standing or permanent Court, accessible at all times, and operating according to rules of procedure which were inserted in the Convention. This Court was to be known as the Hague Arbitration Tribunal.

The Hague
Arbitration
Tribunal.

The members of the Arbitration Tribunal were to consist of a panel to which every state signatory of the Convention would nominate four persons of known competency in questions of International Law, and of the highest moral reputation. Any two states which might have a dispute could, if both agreed to do so, submit the dispute to the Tribunal. The two disputing states would each select two arbitrators, and both together would choose an umpire, out of the general list or panel. If no agreement could be reached on the choice of an umpire, provision was made for the selection of the umpire by disinterested states. Article 27 stated : 'The Signatory Powers consider it their duty, if a serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind those latter that the Permanent Court is open to them.' (On July 29, 1914, before the outbreak of the World War, the Tsar appealed to the Emperor William II. of Germany to submit with him the questions at issue to The Hague Arbitration Tribunal, but the appeal was rejected).² Each party to a dispute before the

¹ See below, pp. 138-9.

² *Ibid.* p. 260.

Tribunal was to pay its own expenses and an equal share of those of the Tribunal.

The Hague Peace Conference was at any rate a beginning of a sustained international effort at making permanent peace. A similar Conference was to be held every seven years. The second actually took place in 1907; the third was prevented by the outbreak of the World War of 1914. Pauncefoot was earnestly convinced of the value of the views expressed at the Conference of 1899 and of the standing Arbitration Tribunal. On the conclusion of the Conference he wrote to Lord Salisbury: 'Thanks to the noble initiative of one of the youngest and at the same time one of the most powerful rulers of the world, the great family of nations has met in solemn conclave to devise measures for the settlement of future differences on the basis of reason and justice, and to denounce the arbitrament of the sword. Thus the new century will open with brighter prospects of peace.'

The value of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was proved in 1904 when the Russian Baltic Fleet, on its way to the Far East, fired on British fishing-smacks off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea. This occurred on October 21, the Russian naval officers fearing that they were going to be attacked by Japanese torpedo-boats. The incident was referred for investigation to an international Commission set up at Paris under Article 9 of the Hague Convention. The Commission reported on February 23, 1905, that there were no Japanese torpedo-boats on the scene in the North Sea. Russia paid compensation for British ships and lives lost.

The Dogger
Bank Inci-
dent.

CHAPTER IX

JAPAN, CHINA, AND THE POWERS

JAPAN had two dynasties : one, the ancient Imperial line (claiming to be the oldest royal family in the world), which reigned but did not rule ; and two, the Shogunate line which, nominally inferior to the Emperor (or Mikado), did all the governing. The title Shogun originally meant commander-in-chief.

In 1867, after some troubled years, the last Shogun resigned ; the Emperor was restored to full powers. In 1871 all the feudal lords (Daimios) The Restoration of 1867. surrendered their privileges. Thus Japan became a modern state.

In 1889 a Constitution was granted to the people by the Emperor, and lastly, in 1895, the modern navy and army of Japan was tested in a war with China concerning the ancient but feeble empire of Korea.

China, about this time, was almost at its feeblest. Until the year 1840, the ' Flowery Empire ' had been closed to foreign trade, except at Canton. In this year The Opening of China. there was a war with Great Britain caused by the Chinese insisting that British subjects accused of crime on Chinese territory be tried in a Chinese court. The war was brought to a close by the Treaty of Nanking, August 29, 1842. Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain, and Canton, Amoy, Fuchau-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai were opened to British trade. Other states, mostly by means of ' most-favoured-nation ' treaties, or clauses in treaties, obtained the same rights as the British in the ' Treaty Ports.' These privileges were : (1) a uniform tariff (at first fixed at 5 per

cent. *ad valorem*) on all foreign imported goods, the rate not to be changed without the Powers' consent ; (2) the trial by their own Consul of foreign subjects accused of crime in China ; (3) the right to hold land in certain settlements or concessions.

A concession is an area of land leased by the Chinese authorities to a Consul, who then lets out the land to private persons, chiefly those of his own nationality. A settlement is an area where, by arrangement between a Consul and the Chinese authorities, foreigners may acquire land directly from the Chinese owners. Thus in the Treaty Ports (which have increased in number since the Treaty of 1842) there have come into existence British, French, and other settlements or concessions. These reserved areas were managed solely by the nationals of the Power which had obtained the right of settlement or concession. They formed, as it were, foreign *enclaves*, although legally China retained sovereignty over these areas. Under foreign management, the concessions and settlements were excellently managed, and became flourishing centres of trade and commerce, with lighting, sanitation, shops, and clubs, and all the usual amenities of European life. Although under foreign management, the concessions and settlements did not exclude Chinese from living there. Outside the Treaty Ports no foreigner had any rights, except Christian missionaries who, by a treaty of 1844, were permitted to go anywhere in China.

In Japan, as in China, foreigners had the privilege of extra-territoriality, that is, of being tried by their own consular courts. Great Britain, however, agreed with Japan in 1894 to give up extra-territoriality ; subsequently all the other Powers did the same. Japan was a modern state, with Western standards and methods of justice. China had not yet attained to this condition.

In 1894 China and Japan engaged in war in a dispute

for control of the ancient but now very weak Empire of Korea. China was defeated, and was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895). By this China agreed to cede to Japan the Liao-tung Peninsula (including Port Arthur), Formosa, and the Pescadores; and also to pay a war indemnity of 200,000,000 taels. Suddenly, however, France, Russia, and Germany intervened, through their ambassadors at Tokio, advising the Japanese Government not to annex the Liao-tung Peninsula (April 23, 1895). As armed pressure was plainly hinted at, the Japanese Government prudently yielded and renounced the Liao-tung, whereupon Russia herself shortly afterwards occupied its strongest place, Port Arthur (March 16, 1898). Germany also occupied Kiaochow, in 1897, a few months before Russia took Port Arthur. Great Britain, in order to preserve the balance of power in the Far East, demanded Wei-hai-wei from China, after the Russians had secured Port Arthur. All these places were only held on lease from China, but to all intents and purposes they were under foreign sovereignty, and were fortified by the possessing Power.

In 1898 the Dowager Empress of China deposed her nephew, who was a keen reformer, reversed the policy of the Reforming party, and supported the Society of the Boxers (or 'patriotic harmonious fists'). The members of this society led a series of murderous attacks upon foreigners; a large number of missionaries were murdered.

The 'Boxers' and their defeat, 1899.

In 1899 matters went from bad to worse, the Boxer Movement spreading through Northern China. In June the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, and the Chancellor of the Japanese Legation were both murdered in Peking. The Boxers, who had the support of the Imperial troops, took control of Peking. The Legations in Peking were besieged and were not relieved until August 14, 1900. The relief of the Legations was effected by an International Force which came up from Tientsin. It

The Boxer Rising.

consisted of 8000 Japanese, 4800 Russians, 3000 British, 2600 Americans, 800 French, 58 Austrians, and 53 Italians. German troops arrived later, after the International Forces had reached Peking.

While the International Force was fighting its way from the sea at Tientsin to Peking, the supreme command was taken in turn for one day by the generals of the national contingents. The German Government, however, had proposed that a German general should be in supreme command, in view of the fact that the murder of the German minister at Peking had led directly to the siege of the Legations. The Powers, with perhaps unusual good nature, agreed to the German proposal.

On July 27, 1900, a small German force left Bremerhaven after a violent address by the Kaiser, in which the troops were charged by him 'to give no quarter to the enemy.' The Commander-in-Chief of the German forces was Count Waldersee, a distinguished soldier who had fought in the Franco-German War of 1870. He did not land in Tientsin until September 25 (1900), more than a month after the Legations at Peking had been relieved. Waldersee then took over the command of the International Force which, however, had now very little to do, except to keep the peace in and around Peking, while arrangements were being made with the Imperial Chinese Government. Waldersee's appointment is a tribute to the high prestige of Germany at the opening of the twentieth century.

Having relieved the Legations and pacified the most disturbed area of China, the Powers had naturally to take measures in order to ensure that such terrible troubles did not recur. There was no doubt at all concerning the complicity of the Chinese Government, under the Empress Dowager, in the Boxer Rising; and Chinese Imperial troops had taken part in the siege of the Legations. The terms of peace which the Allies meant to extort were necessarily hard. The Anti-reform Chinese Government

had no statesman to negotiate such a treaty. It called, however, upon the patriotism of an aged man, the only real statesman of the time, in China, who had taken no part in recent events. This was Li Hung Chang. Li was born in 1823, and had filled all the highest posts that were open to talent in China, and was the only Chinaman who was well known to Europe, and who was familiar with European policy and understood it. He now came forward, at the call of the bankrupt and defeated Imperial Government, and conferred his last service upon the country by concluding a peace which was bound to impose heavy burdens and restrictions on his people. After eleven months of laborious and anxious negotiation at Peking, Li signed the treaty generally known as the The Boxer Boxer Protocol, September 7, 1901. Protocol.

The treaty stipulated that the Chinese Government should erect a monument, inscribed with a statement of regret, on the scene of the murder of Baron von Ketteler; that certain of the worst offenders in the late troubles, including some Manchu princes, should be severely punished; that indemnities should be paid to those who had suffered in the troubles, and also to the Powers for their war expenses; and that in Peking a special quarter (where most of the Legations already were) should be set aside, to be fortified and garrisoned by European troops.

The total sum assessed upon China by the Boxer Protocol, for compensation to private people and for war expenses, was £67,500,000. China was to pay over annually to each Power the appropriate share of this sum, until 1940, when payments were to cease.

The Legation Quarter, as established by the Protocol, is an area of 200 acres, with a clear space or belt, 40 metres wide, all around it. Here the Legations stand in large cool gardens, along with dwellings for The Legation the European families and their servants. Quarter of

Pekin.
The diplomatic corps here forms a real fraternity, with a close social life of its own. The senior minister or ambassa-

dor acts as president of the diplomatic corps, and chief supervisor of the Legation Quarter. The great gate is closed at night, and contingents of European and Japanese troops guard the whole area. Inside this fortress the club life and the athletics, the dances and the dinner-parties, dear to Europeans, go on tranquilly, and the diplomatic relations of the Powers with whatever Government is recognised in China, are conducted.

The necessity of raising money for the Boxer indemnity increased the weight of the Chinese public debt, which

Chinese by 1905 amounted to about £185,000,000.
Loans. Apart from the indemnity, most of this debt

had been contracted for the construction of railways and other public works. The annual interest on the debt (apart from the Boxer indemnity payments) was only about £11,000,000. An unpleasant feature of Chinese finance was the keen competition among the Powers to secure for their nationals a share in the subscribing of loans ; and sometimes political pressure was put upon the Chinese Government to favour the banks of one Power more than another. The real trouble, however, about the Chinese public debt was probably the amount of the money wasted by Chinese officials after the loan had come into Government hands. The most efficient department of the Chinese finances was the Maritime Customs which since 1863 had been staffed with European officers, under the Chinese Government. Many of the Chinese taxes were merely

The provincial, raised and spent in the provinces.
Maritime The Maritime Customs Service was national,
Customs. answerable to Peking, and therefore it tended

greatly to strengthen the power of the Central Government, always rather weak in this huge country. By agreement between Great Britain and China, the head of the Maritime Customs was to be a British subject so long as Great Britain had the greatest share of Chinese foreign trade. From 1863 to 1907 the head was Sir Robert Hart.

The year 1902 was in the history of the Far East of no

little importance. In the first place Great Britain, in search for a counterpoise to Russia's influence in North China, made, on January 30, an important defensive alliance with Japan which lasted for twenty years. England and Japan recognised the independence of Korea and China; and in the event of a war of Great Britain or Japan with a third Power, the other was to remain neutral. In the event of a war of Great Britain or Japan with more than one Power, the other was to come to the aid of her ally with all her forces. The terms of the alliance were made public.

Alliance of
Great Britain
and Japan,
1902.

In the second place, Russia, which during the Boxer troubles had occupied Manchuria, a Chinese province, arranged with China in April 1902 to evacuate that province, by sections, in three periods of six months each.

In April 1903 Russia refused to carry out the restoration of the second section of Manchuria. Japan, owing to the neighbourhood of Manchuria to her shores, felt the Russian occupation to be a great menace, both to her political and economic interests. Accordingly Japan demanded that Russia should evacuate Manchuria. This, after long negotiations, brought on war.

The Tsar's advisers were confident of victory, refused to evacuate Manchuria, and accepted the Japanese challenge.

In 1895 Japan (as previously mentioned), owing to the intervention of France, Russia, and Germany, had been compelled to restore Port Arthur to the Chinese.

Two years later Russia had taken possession of it. Therefore, on the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904, the capture of Port Arthur was one of the chief objects of the Japanese. As long as Russia held Port Arthur the expulsion of the Russians from Manchuria, and from Korea, the chief port of which was Chemulpho, could not be effected. In April 1903 a Russian syndicate had begun to cut timber on the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in Korea. Therefore in the great war that was to ensue,

Port Arthur.

Port Arthur would be the centre of the struggle. France did not consider herself bound, under the terms of her alliance of 1894 with Russia, to come to the aid of the Tsar in the Far East. Great Britain therefore (Japan being at war with only one Power) was not bound to take part on the side of Japan, but only to remain neutral—a consideration which doubtless influenced the French Government in its decision to remain neutral. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance thus helped powerfully to ‘localise’ the war as a Far Eastern struggle between Russia and Japan only.¹

China was saved from Russian domination by the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese, however, were not able, like the prudent Japanese, to absorb Western ideas and Western inventions without disturbance. A revolutionary ferment was produced, which resulted in 1912 in the overthrow of the Manchu Imperial dynasty and the establishing of a Chinese Republic. Since then civil war has been practically uninterrupted.

¹ For the details of the Russo-Japanese War, see below, Chapter XI.

CHAPTER X

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

Preamble

IN South Africa, that is the region south of the Zambesi River, there were two independent republics, the Orange Free State, bordering on Cape Colony, and the South African Republic or Transvaal, bordering on Natal. Great Britain had (by a treaty of the year 1881, known as the Pretoria Convention) a right of suzerainty over the Transvaal. Also, by treaty of 1884 (the London Convention), the Transvaal Government was bound to impose upon foreigners no heavier taxes than were imposed on citizens of the Republic; in other respects the Transvaal had complete freedom of internal Government.

The South
African
Republics.

Since the discovery of gold on the Rand in 1884, many British people had come into the Transvaal and had settled down at Johannesburg. They were a numerous class, and of course contributed largely in taxes to the Transvaal Treasury. On the other hand, they were not freely given the rights of citizenship by the Transvaal laws; for the Boers were afraid of the effects which might ensue if so many foreigners were admitted to the rights of citizenship. Being thus denied any political power, the Uitlanders, as the foreigners were called, became extremely discontented; and, indeed, their position under an alien and rather ill-informed and not very efficient Government was unfavourable to them. On the other hand, the point of view of the Boers, farmers who had seen little of the world, faced by an unprecedented invasion or penetration by restless,

assertive foreigners, can be appreciated. Yet there were Liberal Boers, General Joubert being the chief, who held that the best way to ensure the independence of the Transvaal would be to admit the Uitlanders to the citizenship and so make them loyal subjects. President Kruger, however, and his advisers from Holland were against this view.

At last the Uitlanders thought to remedy their position by revolution. A committee in Johannesburg, in which was Colonel Frank Rhodes, a brother of Cecil Rhodes, conspired with Dr. Jameson, the administrator of the powerful 'Chartered Company,' to rise against the Boer Government and to seize control of the city. The revolutionary committee probably hoped that if they succeeded in their design, and held Johannesburg, the Transvaal Government would give way to pressure, and grant a Constitution giving equal citizenship to Uitlanders and to Boers. The Uitlanders maintained the independence of the Transvaal as part of their policy.

On December 29, 1895, Dr. Jameson, starting from the territory of Cape Colony, invaded the Transvaal with some 500 troopers, who of course served voluntarily.

The Jameson Raid. On January 2, 1896, he was surrounded by Boer sharpshooters at Doornkop and, after a hot fight, was forced to surrender. The revolution failed altogether to take place at Johannesburg. The raiders, who by International Law were at the mercy of the Boer Government, were handed over to the British Government, and were sentenced, under the Foreign Enlistment Act, to various terms of imprisonment, one year, or one and a half years.

The news of the Jameson Raid caused profound excitement in German Government circles. When the first report arrived, that the raiders had crossed into the Transvaal, Baron von Marschall, German Secretary of State, sent a dispatch to the British Foreign Office, to be delivered through the German ambassador at London, Count Hatzfeld (January 2, 1896). The dispatch warned the British Government that Germany 'was not

inclined to acquiesce in any alteration of the status according to International Law of the South African Republic.' The dispatch had no sooner been sent out from Berlin than news came of the defeat and capture of the Raiders. The danger to the independence of the Transvaal was therefore at an end, for the time at least ; so Baron von Marschall telegraphed to Count Hatzfeld not to deliver the threatening dispatch. Unfortunately it had just been handed in to the British Foreign Office. By a stroke of fortune, however, Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was away, and the dispatch was still lying unopened in the Foreign Office. Count Hatzfeld begged to have it back, and the good-natured, although rather mystified, Foreign Office officials returned it unopened.

Nevertheless, although the German Government withdrew the menacing note or dispatch, they felt that some warning should be given to Great Britain, to show that the independence of the Boers must not be tampered with. On January 3, 1896, Kaiser William II. held a conference with his ministers. The Kaiser wished something striking to be done, and he even suggested that Germany should declare a protectorate over the Transvaal and send troops to the Boers' assistance. Prince Hohenlohe, the Chancellor, opposed this proposal, pointing out that, if put into effect, it would certainly lead to war with Great Britain. It was then that the Colonial Minister suggested, in order to 'head off' the Kaiser from doing something more rash, ^{The Kruger Telegram.} that a telegram of congratulation should be sent to the Transvaal. This is the origin of the famous 'Kruger Telegram,' which was deliberately drafted in the German Foreign Office and was approved by the assembled ministers. The telegram, which was signed by William II. and addressed to President Kruger, was as follows :

'I express to you my sincere congratulation, that you have succeeded along with your people, without appealing to the help of friendly Powers, with your own power, in

restoring peace against the armed bands which have broken into your land as disturbers of the peace, and in preserving the independence of the land from attacks from without.'¹

This telegram, which was immediately made public, aroused high indignation in Great Britain, where the Government had in any case absolutely disowned the Jameson Raiders, and was behaving with perfect correctness. Indeed, from every point of view, the telegram was most unfortunate. It aroused the resentment of the British public; and by its reference to 'the help of friendly Powers,' it gave the Boer Government the impression that the Transvaal would have, in case of need, armed support from abroad, and particularly from the German Empire.

After the Raid the Transvaal Government became more unfavourable than ever to the Uitlanders; and what had been an internal political dispute was degenerating into racial opposition and antagonism. In March 1899, 21,000 Uitlanders who were British subjects sent to Queen Victoria a petition of appeal for support. Joseph Chamberlain, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, resolved to respond to the appeal.

The British High Commissioner for South Africa at this time was Sir Alfred (afterwards Earl) Milner, who had been appointed in 1897 particularly to deal with the Transvaal Question. Milner, authorised by Chamberlain, demanded that the Transvaal franchise should be conceded to Uitlanders after five years' residence in the county. Kruger offered a law guaranteeing the franchise after seven years' residence (the existing term was fourteen). The British Government, however, would not agree to the seven-year term, which, in Kruger's offer, was restricted by certain conditions, among others that any future disputes between the Transvaal and Great Britain should be decided by arbitration. Meanwhile British reinforcements were being sent to South Africa. The

Racial
Friction in
South Africa.

Milner,
High Com-
missioner.

¹ *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, xi. 31-32 (Jan. 3, 1896).

Transvaal Government, determined upon war, demanded in an ultimatum, with a limit of forty-eight hours, that the troops should be withdrawn (October 9). The Boer Ultimatum. An ultimatum issued to a Great Power always involves war, which thus began from the expiration of the time-limit on October 11, 1899.

When the war broke out it was at once manifest that the result of the war, if the Boers were successful, would be nothing less than the destruction of the British power in South Africa.

A. THE EUROPEAN ASPECT OF THE WAR

The war in South Africa was not merely a South African affair; it was, in a sense, European. As in the case of the colonial wars of the eighteenth century, there was always a risk that the overseas hostilities might merge into hostilities in Europe.

For the British Empire as a whole the war involved a big risk. Had Great Britain lost the war against the Dutch republics, there was every likelihood of the Dutch in Cape Colony rising successfully, and joining the independent Boers; and if one colony seceded from the Empire, others might secede too. Thus failure of Great Britain in the Boer War would probably have brought about the break-up of the British Empire.

The British Empire at Stake.

The Boer War occurred at a time when the international situation of Great Britain was not good. France had recently experienced a rebuff at the hands of Great Britain over the affair of Fashoda (1898); the French people and politicians could not be expected to forget this at once. Bülow, the German Foreign Secretary, thought that Fashoda was perhaps as much 'in their [the French] heads as Sedan.'¹ The

A Tense International Situation.

¹ Bülow's Memorandum, written on his visit with the German Emperor at Windsor, November 24, 1899, in Dugdale, *German Diplomatic Documents*, iii. 111.

German Government had shown its sympathy with the Boers by sending the 'Kruger telegram' in 1896. There was friction over British and German claims to Samoa; and the growth of the German navy was beginning to disturb the minds of a good many people in Great Britain. It was not until the British Government renounced its rights in Samoa in favour of Germany (1898) that the Berlin Foreign Office agreed not to embarrass Great Britain over the question of the Boer War. This is what the German Under-Secretary of State must have meant when he told Sir Frank Lascelles, British ambassador at Berlin, that Great Britain need *no longer* feel uneasy concerning the attitude which Germany would maintain in regard to the Boer War.¹

Lord Salisbury felt that Germany had, a little unscrupulously, used the opportunity of the Boer War to extract something from England.

The interest and excitement of France over the Boer War were obvious from the heated articles in the newspapers, *The French Press* and from caricatures in certain journals. This attitude was not confined to the 'chauvinist' section of the Press or to comic papers. The most moderate and sane French opinion, which is always to be found in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, was not sympathetic with British South African policy. M. Leroy-Beaulieu, a well-known publicist, travelling in South Africa shortly before the war, gave it as his opinion that an armed conflict of Great Britain against the Boers would only increase racial bitterness, and would not in any case prevent the Dutch stock, by the natural increase of population, from having, within a generation or two, ascendancy in South Africa. François Charmes, an able French journalist, writing in the same review during the war, said that the supreme British quality was tenacity (like that of Wellington in the Peninsular War), but that now *it was the Boers* who were displaying Welling-

¹ *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, i. 131 (Lascelles' Dispatch, Feb. 16, 1900).

tonian tenacity; and on the whole he summed up against the British policy.¹

German opinion was no better inclined towards England. It is true that the German Government, in the period of tension between the British and Transvaal Governments immediately before the war, The German Press. behaved with complete correctness and advised President Kruger not to rush into war. When the war broke out, however, the German Press and public became almost furious. 'Men delighted in depicting the war as a British campaign of robbery against the gold and diamond fields of the Transvaal, as the oppression of a small, free, and harmless people by brutal Albion.'² The Emperor William II. later told an English diplomatist that he himself had been England's only friend in Germany during the Boer War. The Kaiser said :

'It is commonly believed in England that throughout the South African War Germany was hostile to her. German opinion undoubtedly was hostile, bitterly hostile. The Press was hostile, the private opinion was hostile. But official Germany—what of that? Listen. What was it that brought to a sudden stop and absolute collapse the tour of the Boer delegates in Europe who were striving to obtain European intervention? They were fêted in Holland, France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin where the German people would have crowned them with flowers. They asked me to receive them. I refused. The agitation at once died away. The delegation returned empty-handed.'³

In Holland, the people, usually so friendly with England, felt bitterly towards this country on account of the Boer War. The historian of the Dutch people, who Dutch Opinion. was then writing his History, states :

'The old hatred of England revived, the memories of

¹ *Revue des Deux Mondes* (1896), tome 133, and (1900) tome 157.

² Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War* (trans. 1927), p. 135.

³ *Daily Telegraph* Interview; see below, p. 128.

the war of liberation against Spain became more vivid, and the thought seemed not too bold of a *general European war against the powerful maritime state*, in which the Netherlands also would take part.' ¹

In this time of an almost universal 'bad Press' with which England was treated in Europe, and of her obvious unpopularity on the Continent, one friend appeared from an unexpected quarter, from the other side of the Atlantic. In the Spanish-American War, the United States had been in a somewhat similar international situation to that of England in the Boer War—all continental European opinion took the Spanish side, and affected to regard the United States as a bully and robber. Only Great Britain had shown friendliness and sympathy. Now, during the Boer War, the United States replied in kind, and officially showed sympathy and consideration for Great Britain. John Hay, American ambassador in London, wrote to a brother diplomatist: 'As long as I stay here, no action shall be taken contrary to my conviction that the one indispensable feature of our foreign policy should be a friendly understanding with England.' To another friend he sadly confessed: 'The serious thing is the discovery—now past doubt—that the British have lost all skill in fighting: and the whole world knows it, and is regulating itself accordingly.' This was written after Great Britain's defeats in the early part of the war. Nevertheless Hay had faith in her ability to win the struggle in South Africa: 'Sooner or later,' he said, 'her influence must be dominant there, and the sooner the better.' There were indeed some people in America who for reasons of domestic politics 'put the anti-English plank in their platforms.' Hay disregarded them. 'It is too disgusting to have to deal with such liars,' he said.²

¹ Blok, *History of the People of the Netherlands* (trans. 1912), v. 311. The italics in the quotation are mine.

² These extracts are from Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, ii. 220-21.

Although the international situation of Great Britain was delicate and dangerous during the Boer War, there does not seem to have been any attack actually planned against this country. The immediate and very real danger was that the Continental Powers should bring pressure to bear upon the British

The German Emperor and the Prince of Wales.

Government in order to make it concede the independence of the Boer Republics before the war was over. On February 4, 1900, the German Emperor wrote to Edward, Prince of Wales, urging that Great Britain (this was after the battle of Spion Kop, when the war was going badly) should give in: 'Even the strongest football club when, in spite of the bravest defence, it is beaten, ultimately accepts its defeats with equanimity.' The Kaiser, who wrote in English, added a German phrase: that in 1897 *bei einen grossen Cricket Match All England gegen Australia*, Great Britain had submitted to defeat with 'knightly recognition' of the victors. The Prince replied rather tartly to his Imperial nephew that he was 'unable to share' the comparison of the Boer War to a cricket match. 'The British Empire,' the Prince wrote, 'is now fighting for its very existence, as you know full well, and for our superiority in South Africa.'¹

Diplomatic pressure from Germany alone might be resisted, but diplomatic intervention by three Great Powers would be more difficult to withstand.

The Russian Government, which could probably count on the co-operation of its ally France, approached the German Government on March 3, 1900, with a proposal for joint diplomatic intervention. The German Government replied that it could not take any step in concert with the other two Powers unless a general agreement could first be reached 'in which the Contracting Powers mutually guarantee their European status for a long term of years.' This proposal of Germany for a Russo-Franco-German territorial guarantee meant, of course, that

A Proposal for a Continental Bloc.

¹ *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, xv. 553-8.

France would have definitely to renounce Alsace-Lorraine and to guarantee its continuing as part of the German Empire. As no French Government could dare in the face of French public opinion to take such a step in regard to the lost provinces, the whole intervention proposal came to nothing.

The general effect of the Boer War, in its early stages so far as Europe was concerned, was a decided lowering of British prestige. More especially did the reputation of Great Britain suffer in what was called 'Black Week' (1899), when three sharp defeats in succession were sustained by the British forces: Stormberg December 10; Magersfontein, December 11; Colenso December 15. So feeble and muddled did British organisation appear to be in Continental eyes, that the Emperor William II. of Germany, who regarded himself as 'the viceroy and guardian of British interests on the Continent,' wrote out a plan for carrying on the war better in South Africa and sent it off to the British Government. The Kaiser told a British diplomatist later that :

'Just at the time of your Black Week, when disaster followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother written in sorrow and affliction and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. But I did more than that. I had one of my officers procure for me as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants in South Africa on both sides, and of the actual position of the opposing forces. With the figures before me I worked out what I considered to be the best plan of campaign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my General Staff for their criticism. Then I despatched it to England, and the paper likewise is among the State papers at Windsor Castle

¹ Lieut.-Col. Grierson's report in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, i. 42.

awaiting the severely impartial verdict of history. And, as a matter of curious coincidence, let me add that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts and carried by him into successful operation.’¹

In one of his letters to Queen Victoria (perhaps the one mentioned in the above quotation as being ‘among the State Papers at Windsor Castle’), the Kaiser said: ‘I cannot sit on the safety-valve for ever. My people demand intervention. You must get a victory. I advise you to send out Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener.’²

In spite of the Kaiser’s benevolent military interest in the British effort in the Boer War, and just about the time when he was sending his plan of operations to ^{The} Great Britain, relations between the British and *Bundesrath*. German Governments grew very strained over the question of the freedom of the seas. In January 1900 a German mail steamer, the *Bundesrath*, was stopped by a British warship and taken into port at Durban, to be tried in a British prize-court on a charge of carrying contraband of war. The German Government claimed that the seizure was against International Law, for the *Bundesrath* was trading between neutral ports, and there is no such thing as contraband of war between neutral ports. The British Government challenged this principle, if there was an enemy agent at the neutral port ready to receive munitions out of the ship’s cargo. The sharp tone of the German notes, demanding release of the *Bundesrath*, was deeply resented in Great Britain. The incident recalls that of the *Trent*, a British mail steamer stopped and searched by a United States cruiser in 1861 during the war of North against South. The *Bundesrath* affair, however, was not

¹ See the *Daily Telegraph*, Oct. 27, 1907. The interview is reprinted in full with other relevant documents in *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, xxiv. 170-4.

² See W. S. Churchill, *My Early Life, a Roving Commission* (1930), p. 318.

quite so serious as that of the *Trent*, as it never looked like making another war. The British Government, without committing itself to agreement with the German point of view, released the *Bundesrath*, and undertook not to stop neutral mail ships merely on suspicion. A United States newspaper commented: 'Germany's diplomatic victory over England seems complete.'

B. THE MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WAR

In military history, the South African War was important as being the first war, on a continental scale, in which Great Britain was engaged since the Crimean War. The troops who actually fought in the battles were not in number comparable with those who fought in other great wars. Indeed, neither in respect of the size of armies nor of the losses sustained was the South African War on the scale of what the French call *la grande guerre*. The theatre of operations was, however, enormous; the lines of communication were far longer than those of the Germans in the war of 1870, or even of the Russians in the war of 1878; and the problems of supplying food, munitions, and drafts of men for the widely scattered columns or armies of British troops were exceedingly difficult to handle. Military attachés of neutral states were permitted, as the custom then was, to follow the military operations in the theatre of war. The German General Staff was thus able to write an excellent history of the South African War. The authors of this history regarded the war as a struggle of considerable military importance, and they considered that the British War Office, in respect of organisation, and the British army, in respect of leadership and fighting qualities, had acquitted themselves well. The experience gained by the British War Office and Staff officers in organising war, in which many of the problems were those of grand-scale war, was of immense importance in the later development of the British

The Experi-
ence of the
Boer War.

army. The magnificently trained British Expeditionary Force of 1914 was largely the result of the experience of the South African War. Most if not all the generals who led the British armies in the World War had been discovered in the testing time of the Boer War; Kitchener, French, Haig, Smith-Dorrien, Plumer, Rawlinson, Horne, Robertson, Allenby, and Hamilton were all distinguished South African War officers. The German General Staff history of the South African War has a remarkable description of Kitchener, as he then appeared in German eyes :

The German Staff History.

‘ He was at this time one of the most remarkable officers in the British army. His personality was extremely soldier-like ; he was very independent and reserved, and disliked asking the advice of others. Nevertheless, he has a deep appreciation for everything really great and lofty, but, although deliberate as a rule, he can, on occasion, become impulsive, and allow himself to be carried away by his temperament.’¹

The war may be considered as falling into three parts. The first part is from October 12, 1899, when the first shot is said to have been fired, to the end of the year. During this time the Boers, on the whole, had the ascendancy, invaded Cape Colony, and had a good chance of making contact with some active rebels there. The second part of the war is from January 1 to October 1900, the period of British advance, ending with the occupation of the two Boer capitals and the annexation of the Boer republics. The third part, from October 1900 to May 31, 1902, is the period of chiefly guerilla warfare—the longest but not the most important period of the war, for the final result was never in doubt.

In the first part of the war which occupied the last months of 1899 the British had to act on the defensive, as there were only 22,000 British troops in the whole of South Africa.

¹ From the *German Official Account of the War in South Africa*, p. 126.

The Boers invaded Natal and Cape Colony. Natal had a predominantly British population, but in Cape Colony there were large numbers of Dutch. If the Transvaal and Free State Boer forces had been able to break up all the British concentrations of troops, and to march through Cape Colony, all the Dutch population in the colony might have risen and joined the invaders. If the British had lost Cape Colony entirely, some European Power or Powers might then have been encouraged to interfere; the Boer War would thus have become a great European War, in very unfavourable conditions for the British army. All this, however, was prevented by the resistance of three small towns which had garrisons of British troops: Ladysmith in the north of Natal, Kimberley and Mafeking in the north of Cape Colony.

The advance of the Boers from the Transvaal border to Ladysmith was slightly checked by the British at the battle of Talana Hill on October 20 (where the British were repulsed with the loss of General Penn Symons and about 200 men); and at Elands-laagte, when Colonel French, the later Field-Marshal, distinguished himself as a commander of cavalry, October 21. General White, who was in command at Ladysmith, himself came out before the town was invested and attacked the oncoming Boers at Lombard's Kop. During the action a large body of his men were cut off at Nicholson's Nek. White had to retire with a total loss of about 1500 men. By the end of the month Ladysmith was invested by combined Transvaal Boers and Free Staters, under General Joubert.

Early in November General Buller arrived from England with considerable forces, Buller's immediate task being to relieve Ladysmith. Five separate attempts were made, beginning with the battle of Colenso on the Tugela on December 15, when the British lost over a thousand men.

In the same week as Buller was defeated at Colenso

General Lord Methuen, who was advancing in western Cape Colony to the relief of Kimberley, was defeated at Magersfontein on the Orange River by General Cronje (December 11). On the previous day General Gatacre, attacking a Boer concentration in northern Cape Colony, was repulsed at Stormberg with the loss of over 700 men. The year 1899 finished, after a 'Black Week' of defeats, with the towns of Mafeking, Kimberley, and Ladysmith still unrelieved.

In January 1900 Field-Marshal Lord Roberts and General Kitchener arrived in South Africa to take over the direction of the operations. Reinforcements were steadily being added to the British troops; from every Dominion, as well as the British Isles, large volunteer forces were raised. The tide of defeat did not, however, turn at once in favour of the British. One of General Buller's commanders suffered a serious reverse at Spion Kop (January 24). Buller's fifth advance, however, was successful, and Ladysmith was relieved on February 28.

Lord Roberts and Kitchener relieved Kimberley on February 15. A fortnight later General Cronje and 4000

Boers were surrounded by the Roberts-Kitchener army and compelled to surrender (February 29).

This was the most dramatic victory of the war, for Cronje, who had shown himself to be both stubborn and skilful, had a great reputation in England. Difficulties of commissariat made the advance of Roberts' army slow, especially as the clever Boer guerilla General de Wet was quick to attack convoys. Bloemfontein, the Free State capital, was occupied by Lord Roberts on March 13; then came a long pause. On May 1, Roberts began the march again. On May 17, Mafeking, where Colonel Baden-Powell had sustained a siege for seven months, was relieved; and on June 5, Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, was occupied. The Boer republics were annexed to Great Britain by proclamation. In October the Boer generals, wishing to be relieved of the responsibility of protecting President Kruger, sent him to Lorenzo Marques in Portuguese terri-

tory, where he was taken off to Holland in a Dutch war-ship.

The rest of the war, from October 1900, was merely a protracted but quite desperate prolongation by guerilla fighting of a war that in effect was really over. The Boers had a number of highly talented and determined leaders—Botha, Smuts, Hertzog, De la Rey, and De Wet, the first three of whom became later in succession prime ministers of the Union of South Africa.

The Guerilla War, 1900-02.

On May 15, 1902, at Vereeniging the peace conference opened, some sixty-four delegates representing the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The Free State delegates, headed by De Wet, were for the continuance of war, the majority of the Transvaal delegates were for the most part in favour of peace. However, the influence of De la Rey, Smuts, and Botha prevailed upon De Wet. At the last debate, on May 29, Smuts made a striking speech in favour of peace. The proposed sacrifice of independence was, he declared, necessary in the pursuance of a grander aim. On May 31, 1902, the treaty was signed. It provided for the surrender of all the Boer forces in the field, but Great Britain was to contribute a sum of £3,000,000 towards the restoration of destroyed Boer farms. The Transvaal and Orange Free State became British colonies. The treaty, however, contained a promise that the annexed states should in the future be granted self-government—a promise fully honoured in 1906 and 1909.

Peace Conference, Vereeniging, May 1902.

CHAPTER XI

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905, AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

SINCE the Revolution or Restoration of 1867 Japan had made enormous progress. While preserving much of their ancient and remarkable Oriental civilisation, Japan, Korea, and Manchuria, the Japanese had adopted Western inventions, and had developed Western forms of organisation in their Government departments. Their pressing need, crowded as they were in their islands, was for markets and spheres for emigration. The most convenient areas for these purposes were Korea and Manchuria. Korea was an independent, feeble state. Manchuria was part of the Chinese Empire, but being outside the Great Wall, was not very closely under control from Peking. The Japanese felt that both their economic and military security depended upon Korea and Manchuria being kept out of the hands of a Great Power.

Russia loomed as a tremendous danger to the future of Japan. In 1898 she occupied Port Arthur and managed to establish a strong pro-Russian party at the Japanese grievances. Court of Korea. When the Powers undertook the International Expedition in 1900 to save the Peking Legations from the Boxers, the Russian forces which advanced into Manchuria for this purpose stayed there. Thus opportunities for Japanese trade and emigration were blocked.

Russian power already extended legitimately through Siberia and across the northern regions of Asia (to the north of Manchuria and the Amur River) and reached the Pacific at Vladivostok. The Russians were not cramped for want

of space, nor was their commercial future insecure, nor were their sources of food threatened. Their advance into Manchuria and the Liao-tung Peninsula was not 'defensive.' Japan's decision to stand against such advance was strictly defensive. In view of Russia's militarist and commercially monopolist policy, it was a matter of life and death for Japan to keep open Manchuria, the Liao-tung, and Korea.

Japanese,
British, and
Russian
Interests.

Russian domination in North China and the Northern Pacific would also endanger British interests, which depended on maintenance of the 'Open Door' and of Chinese territorial integrity. Therefore, though it surprised the other European Powers, the making of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was reasonable and natural. The object of the alliance was the maintenance of the balance of power in the Far East. The result of this alliance when the Russo-Japanese War broke out was that no third party took sides, either for Russia or Japan; in particular France, though connected with Russia by the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894, remained neutral, taking the view that this alliance did not apply to Far Eastern affairs.¹ In practice, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance amounted to the recognition of Japan as a Great Power; the victory of Japan over Russia made this recognition complete. The Russo-Japanese War is, therefore, one of the decisive struggles of world-history; for the arrival of a new Great Power in the family of nations is an event of universal importance.

The Anglo-
Japanese
Alliance.

A new Great
Power.

Lord Lansdowne was right when he said, in his speech on the Franco-British *entente*, that modern war breaks out with terrible suddenness. In January 1904 Japan was still negotiating with Russia in regard to Manchuria and Korea; Russia was still making difficulties about evacuation. On February 5 the Mikado broke off diplomatic relations. On February 9

The Out-
break of
War.

¹ See above, p. 117.

Admiral Togo's torpedo-boats attacked the Russian war-ships in Port Arthur roadstead and practically destroyed about half the squadron. Thus Japan gained command of the Yellow Sea.

On command of the Yellow Sea and of the Sea of Japan (that is, of the waters on both sides of Korea, and between the Chinese mainland and the Japanese islands) the whole war depended. If the powerful Russian battle-squadrons of Port Arthur (in the Yellow Sea) or of Vladivostok (in the Sea of Japan) had defeated Admiral Togo's fleet, Japan would simply have had to abandon the struggle. She could not have landed troops on the mainland, or, even if successful in landing troops, could not have fed and maintained them. Thus on Togo everything depended. He had no margin of superiority in men, guns, or ships; he must win every action, or see his country ruined. Togo never made a serious mistake. He blockaded Port Arthur; he drove the Vladivostok squadron, when it issued forth, back to its base; and when the Russian Government, correctly divining that everything depended on command of the Far Eastern Seas, sent out Admiral Rozhdestvensky with the Baltic Fleet, Togo met and destroyed it off the island of Tsushima (May 27, 1905).

The navy, however, could not alone win the war. It could enable troops to be transported to land with supplies of food and munitions; but unless the troops had attacked and driven back the Russians from Korea, the Liao-tung Peninsula, and Manchuria, Japan would have lost the war. Japanese statesmen, sailors, and soldiers all worked together with complete precision and mutual understanding. The statesmen chose the right moment for war, at the end of winter 1904, when the ports of the Far East were just becoming free from ice; the navy seized and kept command of the sea; the soldiers drove the Russians out of Korea, captured Port Arthur, and rolled the Russian armies back from South-Eastern Manchuria.

The Influence of Sea-Power on History.

The Japanese Objectives.

On May 1, 1904, General Kuroki's army, which had been conveyed to Korea, attacked the troops of General Zasulich near the mouth of the Yalu River (or Oryokko, Battle of the Yalu River, May 1, 1904. on Korea Bay), and drove them back into Manchuria. By May 14, General Oku had completed the investment of Port Arthur, which was held by the Russian General Stoessel with some 40,000 men. The siege was conducted partly by costly infantry frontal attacks, partly by sap and bombardment, until January 1, 1905. Although the fortress held out for over Siege of Port Arthur. seven months, it is believed that General Stoessel could have held out still longer; this would have been a great assistance to General Kuropatkin in Manchuria, for the fall of Port Arthur meant that Oku's troops were released to fight Kuropatkin.

Manchuria was the decisive theatre of war. Here were pitted against each other the Russian General Kuropatkin, gallant, skilful, resourceful, and the Japanese The Great Battles in Manchuria. marshal Oyama, scientific, cool, far-seeing, holding all the threads of war in his telephone-box and office. In a series of vast battles (anticipating the ghastly wave-attacks of the World War of 1914) Oyama drove back, though he never could rout, the armies of Kuropatkin. The greatest struggles in Manchuria were the nine-days' battle of Liao-yang (August 24-September 2, 1904), and the twenty-days' battle of Moukden (February 22-March 14, 1905). The Japanese won the city of Moukden.

The war now arrived at a condition practically of stalemate. The Japanese, who are not a wealthy people, were almost at the end of their resources. On the other hand, the Russians had lost their grip on the most important part of Manchuria. They had also lost their last fleet, destroyed by Togo Peace Treaty of Ports-mouth, September 5, 1905. in the Tsushima Straits (May 27, 1905). Both sides were therefore ready for peace, which was arranged through the good offices of President Roosevelt, at Portsmouth, Maine, in the United States on September 5, 1905. The Japanese

Government waived its claim to a pecuniary indemnity, and received from Russia the Liao-tung Peninsula (including Port Arthur) and the southern half of the Island of Sakhalin. The Russian Government acknowledged that Japan was paramount in Korea. Both Russia and Japan undertook to evacuate Manchuria, which was thus restored to Chinese sovereignty. The war cost to each side about one hundred million pounds sterling and a quarter of a million men. At this cost Japan had secured her object: the withdrawal of Russia from Chinese territory.

On Russia the effect of the war was almost shattering. Never very strong internally, Russia staggered under the heavy blows dealt by the Japanese in Manchuria; the Tsarist system nearly collapsed.

The war which began in February 1904 was undertaken, partly at any rate, on the advice of Plehve, Minister of the Revolution in Russia. Interior, the most complete supporter of the autocracy. The military failures in the war emboldened the secret forces of disorder. On July 28, 1904, Plehve was killed by an assassin's bomb. It was not only the Nihilists, however, who were active. The Liberal elements of the people, who were chiefly found among the small professional class, were now calling loudly for a Constitution. The numerous workers of the St. Petersburg factories were seriously affected by the prevailing agitation. The colossal naval disaster at Tsushima, May 27, 1905, took away for the time almost the last shreds of prestige of the Tsarist Government. At last, yielding to constant public demands, the Tsar or his advisers (it is doubtful how much will he had of his own) decided on August 19, 1905, that a Duma should be held.

Agitation continued, with riots and even risings or attempted risings in the country. On October 10 there was a great, almost a general, strike. Lenin and Trotsky, two active revolutionaries, were directing much of the agitation; and on October 14 they formed a Soviet of workmen, which, however, was suppressed after about six

weeks. Fortunately, the Russian statesman, Witte, had succeeded in concluding the Peace of Portsmouth with the Japanese (September 5), so that the Government could now concentrate its energy on trying to suppress the Revolution. First of all, however, on October 30, it issued a manifesto which contained the outline of a regular Constitution; and Witte was made Prime Minister. He only remained in office long enough to see to the election of the first Duma, and to raise a loan on the French money-market. Witte was too Liberal for the Tsar and the bureaucracy. He was succeeded by a regular bureaucrat, Goremykin (1906).

The newly created House of Representatives or Duma was elected chiefly by indirect election; the primary voters elected electors, who in their turn chose the deputies. In six large cities direct election was permitted. In addition to the Duma, there was an Upper House; the members were in part nominated by the Tsar, in part elected.

Although not very successful (for it was suddenly dissolved after seventy-three days of session), the first Duma served at any rate as a kind of safety-valve. The Government would not listen to its projects of reform. It was dissolved on July 22, 1906.

A second Duma was convened in March 1907. It lasted for one hundred and three days. Like the first Duma, it was predominantly Liberal, not Socialist. It was permitted to debate, but nothing was accomplished. The third Duma had a longer life—five years (1907-12). The fourth Duma (1912-17) fell partly within the period of the World War, and was allowed no more power than the rest. The Revolution of 1905-6 was practically over when the first Duma was dissolved. The dissolution was the work of Stolypin, who in this month (July 1906) became Prime Minister in place of Goremykin. Stolypin proved himself to be the strongest man of the *ancien régime* in Russia until he was assassinated at Kiev in 1911.

After the Peace of Portsmouth, Russia continued to labour under serious domestic troubles, and had scarcely recovered her prosperity when the World War broke out.

The Progress of Japan. Japan, on the other hand, made steady progress, and built up a valuable export trade, especially in cotton goods and silk. Although popular, constitutional government was the law of the land, the aristocracy continued to retain the leadership. The affairs of the nation were well managed; all debts were punctually met. Earthquakes occasionally interrupted the course of prosperity. The patient and industrious people at once set to work to repair the havoc. Education was improved and extended. English teachers were frequently employed, chiefly in the universities.

When the World War broke out, Japan was not called upon to send troops to Europe, but she bore the chief part in the siege and capture of Tsingtau (the fortress of the German colony of Kiaochow), November 7, 1914.

CHAPTER XII

THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

THE phrase Entente Cordiale to express the friendly relations of Great Britain and France had already been used in the nineteenth century. It represents the attitude of both countries to each other in the early years of Louis Philippe's reign and during the Crimean War.

Sketch of the relations of England and France, 1815-1904.

The attempt, however, of Orsini, an Italian refugee from London, to assassinate Napoleon III. in Paris on January 14, 1858, led to strained relations between France and Great Britain, one of the results of which was the volunteer movement in England and Scotland.

The purchase of shares of the Suez Canal by Beaconsfield, the overthrow of Arabi Pasha by a British army under Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1882, the government of Lord Cromer, which established a supremacy of England in Egypt, seemed to render closer relations between England and France still impossible ; for the French themselves had an old connection with Egypt, and regretted the loss of their political influence there. In 1898 an Anglo-Egyptian army conquered (or reconquered) the Sudan. The French, having sent a small expeditionary force under Major Marchand to Fashoda on the Upper Nile, seemed to be attempting to establish a claim to part of the Sudan there. After, however, a rather serious diplomatic dispute with Great Britain, the French Government withdrew Marchand from Fashoda.

The isolation of England at the opening of the twentieth century constituted a fearful danger, especially as England was involved in the desperate struggle with the Boer

republics ; it was not till Lord Roberts' successes in South Africa in 1900 that the danger was, at least partially, removed. Fortunately for England the French refused certain suggestions from the German Government which might have led to intervention, perhaps not merely diplomatic, in support of the Boers in 1899.

On January 30, 1902, the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Japan was signed at London. Hitherto the policy of Great Britain had been one of isolation, all foreign alliances being avoided ; but in 1902 there was a tendency in Asia and Europe for the Great Powers to increase their armies and to form groups. War was liable to break out with terrible suddenness. The treaty of 1902 marked the emergence of Great Britain from its isolated position ; and the declaration of war by Japan upon Russia on February 7, 1904, proved the truth of Lord Lansdowne's statement in the House of Lords about the impossibility of foreseeing the outbreak of war, and the dangers of isolation.

In 1898 Delcassé had become French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Early in 1899 he showed that he favoured a reconciliation with Great Britain, but public opinion in France remained hostile to England during the first six months of the Boer war which broke out in October 1899.

In the year 1900, however, the year of the Paris Exposition, Paris was crowded with British visitors.

In January 1901 Queen Victoria died. The new king, Edward VII., had paid many visits, as Prince of Wales, to France, and was well known and liked there. In May 1903 Edward VII. paid a notable visit to Paris, where he made a speech, in French, alluding to the ties between the two countries.

He was received with enthusiasm. In July 1903 President Loubet and M. Delcassé visited England and were given a warm welcome from King Edward and Lord Lansdowne,

who had succeeded Lord Salisbury as Foreign Secretary in 1902. The British public showed great cordiality to the French.

The visit of Delcassé to England practically completed the arrangements for the Anglo-French Conventions, which are the diplomatic basis of the Entente Cordiale.

The Conventions were signed in London on April 8, 1904, by Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador. Long-standing disputes regarding Madagascar, Siam, the Newfoundland fisheries, Senegambia, and the New Hebrides were settled. France gave up her special

Entente of
France and
Great Britain,
April 8, 1904.

rights (originally established under the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713) in the Newfoundland fisheries. In return she received financial compensation, and a small territorial compensation in West Africa. In return France acknowledged England's paramount position in Egypt; England acknowledged France's predominant position in Morocco, subject to the condition that no commercial restrictions should be imposed on foreign trade with Morocco for thirty years.

The Franco-British Entente was a remarkable thing. As has been repeatedly stated (all the relevant documents were published from the beginning), it was in no sense a formal alliance. It represented merely a serious effort on the part of British

The Entente
not an
Alliance.

and French statesmen to eliminate particular causes of friction which were of long standing. These causes were removed by the Conventions concerning Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, Siam, and certain other places. Then, the particular grounds of friction being removed, the causes which naturally tended to bring together two neighbouring, powerful, and civilised nations came into operation. Each nation had great self-respect, and neither feared the other. Their nearness made indifference practically impossible; and now grounds of enmity had been removed. Therefore they became friends. This, of course,

was the intention of Delcassé and of Lansdowne when the Conventions of 1904 were negotiated. Some influence must, no doubt, also be ascribed to the possible danger from Germany, always present in the minds of Frenchmen since 1870, and especially to the objection felt in England to the German policy of building a great High Seas fleet. In 1904, however, the Franco-British Entente was not regarded at all by the public in either country as an anti-German grouping; indeed there were many people in England, and some in Germany too, who believed that an Anglo-German entente could go on alongside of the Anglo-French. In the previous years, between 1898 and 1902, a serious attempt at an Anglo-German entente or alliance had been made, but unhappily failed.

Both the 'entente method' and the 'direct alliance' method of bringing the two countries into agreement were tried by the British and German Governments. The attempt to form an Anglo-German Alliance. It is not known with whom the idea of the negotiations which began in 1898 originated. Lord Salisbury and Bismarck had both thought of the possibility of Anglo-German co-operation about twenty years before this. Lord Salisbury was again in office in 1898, as Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The German Chancellor was Prince Hohenlohe, a charming, broad-minded nobleman, of great experience in international affairs, but unfortunately too old in 1898 to have a firm grasp of policy. The German ambassador at London, Count Hatzfeld, was an able diplomatist, and on good terms with the Foreign Office. His health, however, was now poor, and he had frequently to take leave of absence. The moving spirit in the German embassy in regard to the project for an Anglo-German alliance was the Freiherr von Eckardstein, who was second-in-command and acted as ambassador when Hatzfeld was absent.

Between 1898 and 1900 the British and German Governments tried what may be described as the 'entente method'

by removing particular grounds of Anglo-German discord in East and West Africa, Samoa, and China. None of the Conventions thus concluded, however, did much good; except in Samoa, where Great Britain gave up all her rights to Germany in return for the Tonga islands, the give-and-take was not complete enough; both countries continued to grumble. During the Anglo-Boer War the feelings between the British and Germans (and also the feelings between the British and the French) were embittered.

In November 1900 Lord Salisbury, while remaining Prime Minister, gave up the position of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Lord Lansdowne. Great Britain was now winning the Boer War, and so the Government was able to give more attention to foreign affairs.

Lansdowne, who knew Eckardstein socially, took up the question of an alliance. The situation as between England and Germany was greatly improved by the sympathy and kindness shown by the Kaiser, in January 1901, when he came over to visit his grandmother, Queen Victoria, on her death-bed. He stayed for about a fortnight and was present at the Queen's funeral.

Some leaders in high society in England were working to help on the *rapprochement*, especially the Duchess of Devonshire. Conversations between Eckardstein and Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was very active at this time in promoting Anglo-German accord, took place at a house-party of the Duchess at Chatsworth (January 1901).

By the end of March 1901 the conversations had gone so far that Lord Lansdowne, Hatzfeld, and Eckardstein agreed upon the possibility and the desirableness of

a 'purely defensive alliance' between Great Britain and Germany, especially (this was Hatzfeld's addition) if the alliance took the form

Great Britain
and the
Triple
Alliance.

of the accession of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance. 'I believe the right way is via Vienna,' wrote Holstein

the Political Director of the German Foreign Office, to Eckardstein (May 1901). It appears to be on this point, the question of England's accession to the Triple Alliance, that the negotiations broke down. The British Government would not enter into any commitments which would oblige it to defend the Habsburg Empire. The domestic situation and the international policies of Austria-Hungary were complicated and also incalculable; Great Britain, although desirous (as Lord Lansdowne told Eckardstein) of 'clearing up matters with Germany,' would not involve herself in the problems of Austria-Hungary. Another obstacle to the proposed Anglo-German alliance was that the German Government wished the treaty, when signed by the respective Governments, to be submitted to the Reichstag and to Parliament. Lord Lansdowne did not like this method of ratification. The Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty, made one year later, was not submitted to Parliament.

In spite of this check to the Anglo-German negotiations, Lord Lansdowne and Eckardstein continued their efforts to establish a basis of an alliance. Before the end of March they had agreed on a draft treaty, binding Great Britain and Germany together in a defensive alliance. Japan also was to be associated in this, and efforts were to be made to induce the United States to join the new diplomatic grouping. At this point the German Emperor put aside, for the time being, the alliance policy, because the British Government was not agreeing with Germany's views on the question of the Boxer Indemnity. In December 1901, Lord Lansdowne was officially informed through the German ambassador that an alliance of Germany with Great Britain was at the moment impossible. Here the matter practically ended.

This serious effort at Anglo-German association was a great adventure, and might have led without war to the peaceful organisation of the world. It is impossible accurately to assess the amount of blame due to either

side. It was a failure of statesmanship. The German view is that Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, was not really very anxious for an alliance, although he gave Lansdowne and Chamberlain a fairly free hand in the negotiations; and that if the British Government wanted a real alliance, it should have been ready to include Austria. The British view is that the German Government deliberately procrastinated, and refused to commit itself definitely from time to time, in the hopes of obtaining better terms than were offered at the moment. 'We must await developments with absolute reserve, and maintain a sphinx-like demeanour,' Bülow (German Chancellor since 1900) wrote to Hatzfeld. Certainly there was a failure on both sides, a lack of the highest statesmanship. German historians are inclined to put a good deal of the blame on Holstein, the Political Director at the Wilhelmstrasse, who was by nature suspicious and secretive, and who, refusing to be a minister and thus to come out in the open, was always writing long and convincing memoranda to the Kaiser and the Chancellor on the need for caution, for not committing Germany, for not trusting too much in the good faith of a foreign nation. A German historian has gone so far as to write a long and deep study of the Anglo-German alliance-project under the title of *Holstein's Great 'No!'* (Eugen Fischer, *Holsteins Grosses Nein*). Holstein himself, on the other hand, professed that it was the English Government which put an end to the negotiations, and that he himself did not regard the 1901 failure as decisive, but meant to continue the effort in 1902.

Failure of the
plan for an
Anglo-
German
Alliance.

Holstein.

Lord Lansdowne also told Eckardstein in the summer of 1901: 'I think we both understood that the discussion was to be renewed after the holidays.' The discussions, however, were not renewed; and Holstein wrote (in English) on January 3, 1902, to his friend, Valentine Chirol of the *Times*, that what England had really done was 'to send

us the mittens in all form,' meaning to close the negotiation, and in a not very polite manner.

Whoever was to blame—and on the whole the failure seems to lie with Holstein's suspiciousness, his refusal to divulge his full plans to the British Government, and his appetite for further concessions than at any moment were being offered—the failure led directly to a counter-grouping, namely, the Anglo-French-Russian Entente.

The Anglo-French Entente came first. Difficult as it was to make, it was not so difficult as the Russian. Eckardstein, in his book, *Ten Years at the Court of St. James's*, tells of a grand official dinner that he attended in February 1902, given by King Edward VII. at Marlborough House. 'While we were smoking and drinking coffee after dinner,' he writes, 'I suddenly saw Chamberlain and Cambon go off into the billiard room. I watched them there, and noted that they talked together for exactly twenty-eight minutes in the most animated manner. I could not, of course, catch what they said, and only heard two words, *Morocco* and *Egypt*.' It was between February 1902 and April 1904 that the Franco-British Entente was made. Also in 1902, January, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was signed.

After the successful conclusion of the Entente of 1904, there still remained the Russian question to be considered.

France and Great Britain had the Entente Cordiale with England. (1904). France had a military alliance with Russia (since 1894). Yet Great Britain remained on terms of coolness, if not of actual enmity, with Russia. On the Russian side there was an abiding sense of grievance, ingrained in the education of the Army officers, and perhaps also of the intelligent bourgeoisie, to the effect that England had balked Russia's natural and national policy of expansion, by means of the Crimean War of 1854-56, and at the Congress of Berlin, at the end of the successful war of Russia against the Turks in 1877-78. On the English side, there was a general impression to the effect that Russia aimed

at attacking the British Empire in India; one of Kipling's most popular stories (and perhaps his finest), *Kim*, has a Russian plot upon the security of India in its *dénouement*. The British public also were brought up with a profound prejudice against the political system of the Tsar, as being illiberal and repressive. To the constitutionally and liberally minded English of the 'eighteen-nineties' and early 'nineteen-hundreds,' the Tsarist Government was a suspicious and cruel tyranny which wielded the knout, and sent kindly schoolmasters and humanitarian doctors to the mines of Siberia. History has not yet made clear how much of this story was truth, how much legend created by Russian fugitives in England. Anyhow, the prejudices on both sides were very strong; and when a Liberal, almost Radical, Government came into office in Great Britain in 1906, with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister, the chances of an entente with Russia seemed perhaps more remote than ever.

On the other hand, the Liberal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, was not Radical. He took over, and perhaps even extended, Lord Lansdowne's policy, which was to do away with the isolation of England's international position. Moreover, Foreign Offices have less prejudices than the public has. The business of a Foreign Office is to make the best arrangements that it ^{Russia and} can for its country, to settle each problem that ^{England.} arises from day to day, and adjust itself to the prevailing situation. As an entente with Russia seemed to be the natural completion of the Franco-British Entente, the Foreign Office sought for such a solution. The way for this was facilitated by the ending of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. As long as this war was going on, Russia could scarcely be friendly with Japan's ally. When, however, the war was over (with the victory of Japan) the Russian Government recognised accomplished facts and, renouncing all hope of controlling Manchuria, adopted instead a policy of agreement with Japan in the Far East. The policy

obviously also provided an opportunity for *rapprochement* between Russia and England. The Russian Revolution of 1905-6, the grant of a Constitution by the Tsar in 1906, and the meeting of the first Duma, took away much of the political prejudice which the English, whether Liberal or Conservative, had felt towards Russia.

No contract of alliance was made ; but by Conventions signed at St. Petersburg on August 31, 1907, the way was smoothed (as with France in 1904) in various directions between the two countries. The chief points of difference concerned the Anglo-Russian attitude towards Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The two Governments agreed to respect the independence and integrity of Persia, which was regarded as falling into three zones. In the first, the northern zone, England would not compete with Russia for commercial or political concessions ; in the third or southern zone, Russia would not compete with England. In the second or intermediate zone, Russian and British subjects were to be on an equal footing. Russia acknowledged that Afghanistan was outside her sphere of influence, Great Britain on her side declaring that she had no intention of altering the existing political condition of Afghanistan. Russia and Britain acknowledged the suzerainty of China over Tibet, and agreed to respect Tibet's territorial integrity ; Great Britain, on account of the proximity of India, being acknowledged to have a special interest in Tibet.

The Entente of Great Britain and Russia was never very popular, at any rate in England, but it did have the effect of putting an end to over fifty years of Anglo-Russian friction. In order to mark the friendship between the two countries, King Edward VII. and Queen Alexandra in June 1908 made a voyage to the Baltic, and were cordially received by the Tsar at Reval.

While the Entente was being made, or even before, Italy was drawing away from her association with the Central Powers. It was not that she actually withdrew from the

The Russo-
British
Entente, 1907.

Triple Alliance (Austria, Germany, Italy, first signed in 1882). This was a purely defensive treaty, so that Italy was technically correct when in what are known as the Prinetti-Barrès negotiations she assured the French Government that 'in the renewal of the Triple Alliance there is nothing directly or indirectly aggressive towards France' (June 1902). At the same time, France recognised Italy's claim to Tripoli, and Italy recognised France's claim to predominance in Morocco. These agreements or declarations were secret, and Germany and Austria knew nothing of them.

Italy and the
Central
Powers.

In October 1909 King Victor Emmanuel of Italy met the Tsar Nicholas II. of Russia at Racconigi, near Turin. The two monarchs exchanged assurances of friendship. Italy appears to have agreed to support Russia's claim for the opening of the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to Russian warships; Russia promised favourable consideration to Italy's interests in the Balkans.

Thus in 1902 Italy made an understanding with France and in 1909 with Russia.¹

¹ See Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary* (trans. 1921), pp. 146-7, 243-7. Prinetti was Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1902, Barrès French Ambassador at Rome.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, 1907

No historian can help noticing the immense change which came over international relations between 1870 and 1900.

European	In 1870 the Great Powers had almost exclusively
Interests	European interests, and their dealings with each
become	other concerned only the continent of Europe.
World	
Interests.	By the year 1900 their interests met each other

in every quarter of the world, and had to be adjusted by mutual arrangement, if war was to be avoided. Moreover, two states in the Far East and West had stepped forth as Great Powers: the United States and Japan. There was now no 'no man's land.' The whole world, except for the uninhabitable areas at the North and South Poles, was divided up and owned; and all the Great Powers were neighbours. Never before had the world been so much of a unity—a unity, indeed, of somewhat discordant elements. And because the world had shrunk so much, and because its members—the Great Powers and other states—must live somehow together as neighbours, the times were full of plans of mutual adjustment, of strivings after a world-system of politics. The man whose vision extended furthest at this time was the Tsar. It was he who had brought about the first Hague Conference at the end of the century.

No man, not even the Kaiser, Wilhelm II., is better known from the reports of diplomatists and other observers than Nicholas II. His character, unlike that of his German cousin, was quite simple. He was a peaceable, well-meaning, neurotic, physically languid man. He had all the

autocrat's sense of power, but he lacked the invincible force of will, without which the autocrat's sense of power nearly always ends in futility. He was a well-educated, travelled, cultured gentleman of the European type, versed in international politics, appreciative of the realities of international strife, seriously anxious to avoid them, moving (in spite of the Byzantine court which surrounded him) in a much more real world of his own than did the Kaiser Wilhelm with his obsolete war-pomp of a Renaissance monarch.

The result of the first Hague Conference (1898) seemed at the time to be inconsiderable. It had absolutely no effect upon the rapidly mounting total of military effectives and budgets. The soldiers and sailors who were the technical advisers of the diplomatists at the Conference were extremely depressing

Character of
Nicholas II.

Technical
Experts and
Peace.

by reason of the views and the statistics which they brought forward to support their attitude against disarmament and against the amelioration of the laws of war. It was, of course, the business of the military men to point out the dangers which such changes would entail; but the diplomatists ought not to have let the military men practically settle the questions. The chief obstacle to disarmament, however, came not from the soldiers and sailors themselves, but from the fact that the German Government was solidly backing their military point of view, and would have nothing to do with disarmament. German writers now acknowledge that this was a mistake,¹ although they contend that some other Governments were just as adverse to disarmament although not openly opposing it at the Conference. It is perhaps a remarkable fact that the only big accomplishment of the Conference (although it did not at the time attract very much public attention) was that of the Commission (or Committee) which was wholly given up to diplomatists and which produced the *Convention for the*

¹ Cp. Montgelas, *The Case for the Central Powers*, p. 224; Brandenburg, *op cit.*, p. 132.

pacific regulation of international conflicts, establishing the Hague Arbitration Tribunal.

The Conference of 1899 was not regarded as an isolated effort at world-concert, but was to be the first of a series of conferences, meeting at intervals of about seven years.

When the time for holding a second Peace Conference came round, the United States, conscious of its newly

assumed rôle as a Great Power, was ready to take the lead in the peace movement. President Roosevelt, having successfully mediated in the war between Japan and Russia, desired

to take the initiative in summoning a Conference. The Tsar Nicholas II., however, the promoter of the First Conference, desired to have the summoning of the second. President Roosevelt agreed and the summons went out from St. Petersburg to all civilised states. Forty-five accepted and attended the Conference. The Tsar's circular, proposing the assembly of a second Peace Conference, mentioned only improvements in the Arbitration Tribunal and in the laws and customs of war as subjects for discussion. At the suggestion of the British and United States Governments, however, the question of the reduction of armaments was included in the deliberations. People were still not very hopeful about disarmament, but stated: 'They felt it was better to have a discussion, even if it did not lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Discussion without result would, at any rate, have kept the door open for continuing negotiations on the subject.'¹ Sir Edward Fry, the chief British delegate to the Conference, was instructed to co-operate with the United States delegation on the subject of disarmament.

The delegates of the forty-five states assembled at the second Hague Peace Conference were of a high quality. Great Britain was represented by Sir Edward Fry, who was a member of the Hague Arbitration Tribunal, and by three diplomatists Sir Ernest Satow, Lord Reay,

¹ Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Fry, June 12, 1907, in *Parliamentary Papers*, Command 3857 of 1908, p. 12.

The United States and the Peace Movement.

and Sir Henry Howard. The United States had Joseph Choate, ambassador at London, Horace Porter, ambassador at Paris, David Jayne Hill, author of the *History of Diplomacy*, and James Brown Scott, a noted international lawyer. All the other representatives were either skilled professional diplomatists or international lawyers. Léon Bourgeois, who had been at the first Hague Conference, was again the chief French representative. Russia had, besides M. Nelidow, ambassador at Paris, the veteran international jurist, F. de Martens. Germany sent Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, ambassador at Constantinople, who had a great reputation as a diplomatist, and Professor Zorn, who had taken part in the first Hague Conference. The discussions were formally opened by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 15, 1907, in the Knights' Hall of the Binnenhof. The full sessions were held in public; most of the work, however, was necessarily done in committees, which were held in private. The deliberations came to an end with the signature of the Final Act and Conventions on October 18, 1907.

Delegates to
the Second
Hague
Conference.

The practical result of the second Hague Peace Conference was not great. All the states, it is true, affirmed in principle their approval of compulsory arbitration; and this approval was solemnly recorded in the Final Act; but no Convention binding the states to submit disputes to compulsory arbitration was signed. The delegates, however, were not without hope for the future. The Final Act, declaring the Conference to be 'unanimous in admitting the principle of compulsory arbitration,' continued:

Question of
Compulsory
Arbitration.

'Finally, it [the Conference] is unanimous in proclaiming that, although it has not been found feasible to conclude a Convention in this sense, nevertheless the divergencies of opinion which have come to light have not exceeded the bounds of judicial controversy, and that by working together here during the past four months, the collected

Powers not only have learned to understand one another, and to draw closer together, but have succeeded in the course of this long collaboration in evolving a very lofty conception of the common welfare of humanity.'

Following this general statement of the Final Act were fifteen Conventions, which were signed by all the states represented in the Conference. The first was a 'Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.' It replaced the Convention of 1899, but was not essentially different from it; for it continued the Permanent Court of Arbitration (or 'Hague Arbitration Tribunal'), on a voluntary basis as before, with some improvements in procedure. The remaining fourteen Conventions dealt with the conduct of war and tried to mitigate the rigour of its operations.

The result of the second Hague Peace Conference, it must be admitted, was disappointing to all the friends of peace. It merely amplified a little the achievement of the first Hague Conference; it adopted no measure which in principle went beyond the rules of the first Conference. It is usual to put the blame for this on the German Government which, certainly, was uncompromisingly against all schemes of disarmament and of compulsory arbitration. It is the custom of German apologists to explain this by saying that nobody wished for disarmament or compulsory arbitration, but that only the German Government was honest enough and also maladroit enough to state this bluntly. The support given by Paris, Rome, and St. Petersburg to the British and American proposals, writes an authoritative German, was merely tactics. 'Berlin disdained such tactics and declared candidly that it would not accept the inclusion in the programme of the Conference either of this question or of the project of an obligatory court of arbitration.'¹

Germany and
the Disarma-
ment
Question.

¹ F. Stieve, *Germany and Europe*, p. 103.

It is always difficult to analyse motives. The historian has to be content if he can ascertain *what* actually happened. This we know, that the German opposition did make discussion of disarmament almost impossible, and discussion of obligatory arbitration futile. All the blame for the failure of the proposals for disarmament and obligatory arbitration cannot equitably be laid at the door of the Germans, but they have the major portion of the responsibility. As Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Edward Fry: 'The position of Germany both as a military and as a naval Power is such that it is difficult to regard as serious any discussion in which she does not take part.'

CHAPTER XIV

GERMANY, THE ENTENTE POWERS, AND MOROCCO

EVERY one who lived through and remembers the ten years before the World War will retain a vivid consciousness of the word *Morocco*, associated with international friction and unrest, like the words *Macedonia* and *Far East*. The Morocco Question has now so completely passed out of public affairs that people may be inclined to wonder why it ever made such a stir.

The 'Shereefian Empire' was very large, very undeveloped, replete with possibilities of commercial progress, and possessing a few fairly good seaports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coast. The authority of the Emperor or Sultan was almost illusory; and the outlying tribes were absolutely uncontrolled. Order and disorder cannot permanently exist side by side. With Spain opposite (and also possessing some of the Moroccan coast) and with France in Tunis since 1881, Morocco was bound to feel European influence, and to some extent to receive European penetration. The international position of Morocco rested on the Act of Madrid, signed on July 3, 1880, by Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Holland, the United States of America, and also by Morocco itself. This Act secured 'most-favoured-nation treatment' on the part of Morocco towards all the signing Powers. Therefore any favour or privilege conceded by the Sultan of Morocco to one of the Contracting States had to be conceded to all the rest.

All the States which signed the Act of Madrid had, or presumed that they had, trading interests in Morocco. The States, however, which had the chief trading interests were Great Britain, France, and Spain; the trade of Germany, though inferior at the end of the nineteenth century to that of the other three Powers in Morocco, was expanding. In the Franco-British Convention of April 8, 1904, concerning Morocco (one of the Entente Conventions) 'the Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. . . . His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France . . . to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.' This article really amounted to a recognition on the part of Great Britain of a French protectorate over Morocco.

In March 1904 the Kaiser visited Alfonso, King of Spain, at Vigo, assuring him that Germany desired no territorial acquisitions in Morocco but merely the safe-guarding of her commercial interests. Bülow, Holstein, and the Pan-Germans were dismayed at this assertion of the Kaiser's disinterestedness in Morocco affairs, for his Vigo declaration tied their hands.

Visit of the
Kaiser to
King Alfonso
at Vigo,
March 1904.

Shortly after the Vigo Declaration an inhabitant of Morocco in German employ was imprisoned by one of the Sultan's officials in spite of the protest of the German Consul. Under the Act of Madrid, foreign States had the right to protect Moorish subjects who should be employed by a consul and who were registered by him.

Bülow and his Foreign Office colleagues at once urged the Kaiser to send a warship to Tangier to force the Sultan to release the imprisoned Moroccan, and to indemnify the family of a German who some months previously had been murdered in Morocco.

In spite of the influence of Bülow and Holstein and the arguments of German officials in Morocco, no German warship was despatched to Tangier in 1904. The Kaiser, clearly, wished to avoid making trouble in regard to Morocco.

In March 1904, Delcassé, in conversation with the German ambassador at Paris, alluded to the negotiations between Great Britain and France. These resulted in the Entente Conventions, signed on April 8. They dealt with Egypt, Newfoundland, Sokoto, and above all Morocco, and were specially alluded to by Bülow in a speech in the Reichstag on April 12, asserting that Germany must protect its commercial interests in Morocco. Holstein was insisting that German prestige would suffer, as Germany was not officially informed of the Anglo-French treaty. He claimed that the German Government should be permitted to act with France in carrying out police measures to check the continuous anarchy in Morocco.

The truth is that the British and French Governments seem to have made a mistake in notification of their Morocco Convention of 1904, and in omitting to communicate officially to Germany the contents of the Entente Agreement, although it was published in the Press. Germany, as a signatory of the Act of Madrid, with important and growing trading interests in Morocco, had legitimate ground of complaint for being ignored in the Franco-British Morocco Agreement.

It was at once seen how the failure of Russia affected Western Europe. The Japanese capture of Port Arthur on January 2, 1905, was followed on March 16, 1905, by the twenty days' battle of Moukden (one of the great world battles before 1914), which ended in a stalemate. For the time being, the Franco-Russian Alliance counted for nothing in Europe.

Bülow and the 'forward' party in Germany persuaded the Kaiser to take action. The German consular officials in Tangier also thought that France was in no

position to settle the affairs of Morocco without German assistance.

Therefore at the beginning of 1905 Bülow had an announcement printed in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, of the Kaiser's coming entry into Tangier on a visit to the Sultan. Though at first opposed to such a visit, the Kaiser had finally yielded to his advisers.

On March 31, 1905, he arrived in his yacht at Tangier, where there were German and many other European traders. He spoke boldly and pointedly of the Sultan Abdul Aziz as an independent sovereign.

The Morocco Government, inspired, it is believed by Germany, demanded that an International Conference should meet, to regulate the diplomatic situation of Morocco, and to adjust the interests of the Powers, including Germany. Delcassé believed that France should resist this demand, as amounting to an attack upon her predominant position in Morocco. He was prepared to face the risk of war with Germany. The British Government suspected that what Germany really wanted was to obtain a port of Morocco on the Atlantic coast to serve as a coaling-station or a naval base. If Germany should attempt to carry out such a design, the British Government was prepared to support France, probably even by force of arms. There was no Franco-British Alliance, and no promise of armed support was made, but there is little doubt that Great Britain would have regarded a German occupation of a Moroccan port as a *casus belli*. M. Delcassé may have thought that he could count on British armed support in general if he refused the demand for a Conference.

M. Rouvier, however, the French Premier, could not support M. Delcassé to the extent of facing war with Germany over the Conference question. It may be that M. Rouvier was apprehensive at Russia's weakness in her war with Japan; for on May 27 and 28 the Russian Baltic fleet was over-

Influence of
Bülow, 1905.

The Kaiser
at Tangier,
March 31,
1905.

Fall of
Delcassé,
June 1905.

thrown near the island of Tsushima. About a week later Delcassé, unable to gain his way with his colleagues in the Cabinet, resigned (June 6, 1905). M. Rouvier himself took over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.

After the fall of Delcassé, negotiations between Germany and France on the Morocco Question took place, leading to the Conference of Algeciras, which met on January 16, 1906, and was attended by all the States signatory of the Act of Madrid.

At this Conference France had powerful allies. Of these were Russia, now at peace with Japan (Treaty of Portsmouth, U.S.A., September 5, 1905); Spain, in agreement with France since September 1, 1905; England, owing to her recent Entente with France; Italy and the United States were not unfriendly. Only Austria gave Germany diplomatic support. American criticisms were most effective, and President Roosevelt's influence was seen in the withdrawal of Austria's proposal that eight Moroccan ports should be divided among the Powers.

Meanwhile, the British Press had attacked Germany, and 'the Morocco Question became almost more an Anglo-German than a Franco-German conflict.' Germany's efforts to establish an international rather than a French control in Morocco only partially succeeded. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 held good and strengthened the ties between England and France.

On April 7, 1906, the Final Act of the Conference of Algeciras was signed. Germany had the satisfaction of seeing the police duties in Morocco placed under international control; the Act of Algeciras also reaffirmed the complete economic equality and liberty of all the signatory States in regard to Morocco. The Entente had stood firm, and Germany had not embroiled Europe nor destroyed the French ascendancy in the Shereefian Empire.

In the eyes of the Germans Delcassé's attitude personified a *revanche* policy, and a challenge. France, in the

opinion of the Kaiser, refused to take up the challenge, and therefore there was no reason why a defensive alliance between Germany and Russia should not be arranged, which should include France, as being Russia's ally.

On June 7, the day after Delcassé's fall, which was regarded by many Frenchmen as a distinct 'diplomatic humiliation,' the Kaiser raised Bülow to the rank of Prince.

Bülow a
Prince,
June 7, 1905.

Early in July the Kaiser, with the *Hohenzollern* yachting in the Baltic, met the Tsar in the harbour of Björkö, in Finland, and arranged with him on July 25 a defensive alliance. This 'Björkö incident' is one of the curiosities of diplomatic history, and a significant example of the working of autocratic and bureaucratic government. Russia was involved in the half-suppressed, half-eruptive revolution which went on during the last months of the war with Japan; and the Government was on the brink of taking a notable step towards a parliamentary and constitutional system. Yet here was the Tsar, without apparently consulting the high bureaucracy, which was the only power limiting his authority, now concluding a treaty with the most fateful possibilities. The Kaiser, on his side, without the presence of the Imperial Chancellor, whose counter-signature was necessary for all the Emperor's official acts, likewise negotiated and signed this treaty of far-reaching concern.

Treaty of
The Björkö treaty, discussed and then signed Björkö.

by the two monarchs in the Kaiser's private state-room in the *Hohenzollern*, was as follows: 'In the event of one of the two Empires being attacked by a European Power, her ally would help her in Europe by land and by sea with all her forces.' The French Government was not informed while the negotiations were in progress, but was to be given the option of acceding to the Björkö alliance as actually concluded. If France were to accede to the alliance, then the Franco-British Entente which had looked so strong at Algeiras would have been destroyed. If France refused to accede, she would sacrifice her famous Russian

alliance. The accession of France might seem likely to ensure peace on the continent of Europe, by uniting the Dual (Franco-Russian) with the Triple (Austro-German-Italian) Alliance. It would certainly have put Great Britain into complete isolation; and Germany, the maker and head of the Björkö alliance, would have been supreme in Europe.

As a matter of fact, the Björkö treaty was still-born. Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, when shown the treaty on the Tsar's return to St. Petersburg, pointed out that it was difficult to reconcile it with Russia's obligations towards France. The Tsar then notified the Kaiser that the Björkö alliance between Russia and Germany would not be operative in a war of Germany against France, and could not come into effect until France should join the alliance. This message put an end to the Björkö treaty, on the Tsar's side. On the German side, the Kaiser, on going back to his capital, had difficulties coming from his Chancellor, Bülow. The Chancellor knew that the Kaiser was going to try to negotiate a treaty with the Tsar, but he objected to the limitation of the proposed alliance to co-operation only in a war in Europe. Bülow wanted to be able to count on Russian forces being directed, if necessary, against England's power in India. He intimated that he would resign. The Kaiser replied: 'Your person is worth 100,000 times more to me and our Fatherland than all the treaties in the world. . . . Telegraph to me *All Right*; then I shall know that you stay; because the morning after the arrival of your demand of resignation would no longer find your Emperor alive. Think of my poor wife and children.'¹ Bülow did not resign, and the Björkö affair was at an end. This attempt at a great diplomatic *coup* and its failure may have made the German Foreign Office particularly sensitive again about the advance of French influence in Morocco, and so perhaps may partly account for Germany's next step.

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, xix. 497-8. *All Right* is in English.

In April 1906 the Kaiser and Bülow, the Chancellor, accepted the resignation of Baron von Holstein, who after Bismarck's retirement had become a considerable power behind the throne. The refusal of Germany to accept the proffered alliance of Great Britain in 1898 and 1901 was, at any rate partly, due to him, and he was largely answerable for the Kaiser's Moroccan policy in 1905 and 1906. It is possible to discern a rather more decided, perhaps a rather more straightforward, policy on the part of Germany after the retirement of this 'meagre, grey-bearded, spectacled little man' about whom the Germans and the whole European public knew so little.

Baron von
Holstein's
resignation,
April 1906.

✓ The second Peace Conference was held at The Hague from June to October 1907, and had some success in strengthening the means for international arbitration, but was unable to do anything towards limiting armaments.

The Second
Peace Conference at
The Hague,
June-Oct.
1907.

The years 1908 and 1909 were critical years for the peace of Europe. In 1908 the power of Abdul Hamid was overthrown—the result of the Young Turk Revolution. In the autumn of 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the same year French troops were still in territory around Casablanca. This was a place in Morocco where in 1908 French subjects had been assassinated, and in September deserters (apparently not Germans) from the *Légion Étrangère* had been arrested by the French authorities, in spite of the efforts of the German Consul, to whom the deserters had appealed and who tried to protect them.

Austrian
Annexation
of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
1908.

However, the Casablanca incident did not lead to war. It was submitted to the Hague Tribunal, which in March 1909 decided that the French military and the German consular authorities had each exceeded their customary powers.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908 produced a war-crisis with Serbia, which received

diplomatic support from Russia. In 1909, however, the Tsar, faced with a threat of war with Germany, withdrew and advised Serbia to cease to oppose the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was believed 'by all classes of society that Russia had suffered a deep humiliation.' France, as the ally of Russia, felt the rebuff to the Entente.

In July 1909 Kiderlen-Wächter succeeded von Schoen (who became German ambassador at Paris) as Foreign Secretary; and Bethmann-Hollweg became Chancellor in place of Prince Bülow. Bethmann-Hollweg had had an honourable career as a civil servant, and was a man of broad outlook and conciliatory temper. Kiderlen-Wächter was of a firmer and less compromising nature, but was not without gifts of statesmanship.

In May 1911 troubles in Fez had induced France to send a column of troops there, thus (in the German view, at any rate) endangering the integrity of Morocco and re-opening the whole Morocco Question. The international situation at once became tense.

On June 26 Kiderlen-Wächter interviewed the Kaiser at Kiel; and, as a result of a decision taken then, the gun-boat *Panther* on its voyage back from Southern Africa dropped anchor at the Moroccan port of Agadir on July 1. This was another dramatic reminder to France to the effect that Germany must not be ignored in Morocco. It looked also like a revival of the former plan of Germany perhaps to gain a coaling-station on the Moroccan coast—a plan to which Great Britain was unalterably opposed.

On July 4 Sir Edward Grey saw Count Metternich, the German ambassador in London, and told him plainly that Germany's action at Agadir had created 'a new situation.'

On the evening of July 21 Mr. Lloyd George made a speech in the City of London with regard to the despatch

of the *Panther* to the port of Agadir in Southern Morocco, nominally for the protection of German subjects and their interests. Mr. Lloyd George said :

‘ I am bound to say this, that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past redeemed continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster, and even from national extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international goodwill except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, when her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.’

The Mansion House speech had the full approval of Sir Edward Grey and proclaimed Anglo-French solidarity, at any rate on the Morocco Question. The German public was much excited and called upon the Kaiser to pick up the gauntlet which Mr. Lloyd George had thrown down. The Kaiser, however, advised by Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen-Wächter, acted prudently, and did not make a warlike answer. The speech of Mr. Lloyd George was considered by some people even in England to be provocative.

During the three weeks following the Mansion House speech and the interview of Grey with the German ambassador, negotiations took place between Kiderlen-Wächter and Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at

Berlin, and at Kissingen, a watering-place in Bavaria. Before July had come to an end the German ambassador in London had ended the difficulties between England and Germany, the Imperial Government declaring that it had no intention of seizing land for a naval base in Morocco. A final agreement between France and Germany was not reached till November.

Though in August the Kaiser made at Hamburg what is known as the 'Place in the Sun Speech,' the Imperial Government continued the negotiations patiently with France. The outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey on November 29 made prudence all the more necessary for Germany, which now could not count upon securing the assistance of either Italy or Turkey in the event of a war with France.

On November 4, 1911, a treaty was signed by which Germany recognised the French Protectorate in Morocco (although the actual word 'Protectorate' does not occur in the treaty); Germany was given in exchange by France a large part of the French Congo. By the end of November the *Panther* and other ships sent to support her had sailed away from Agadir.

Western and Central Europe had now three years (1911 to 1914) of quiet.

CHAPTER XV

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD POLITICS

IT is impossible to regard the history of Europe in the twentieth century without reference to the politics of the whole world. Every country was closely inter-locked with every other by trade, commerce, and finance; and every country took the keenest interest in the fortunes of its nationals in foreign trade. The world was in many respects becoming *one*, in spite of political boundaries and tariff walls; this is why the Great War of 1914 soon became a world war. A knowledge of affairs in the Far East and in the Western Hemisphere is indispensable to any proper appreciation of the history of twentieth-century Europe.

The United States had always drawn upon Europe for learning and culture, just as it also contributed from its own learning and culture to Europe. In politics, however, it had always stood apart. A result of the Spanish-American War, however, was that the United States assumed responsibilities overseas in the Pacific, in the Philippines, as well as nearer home, in the Caribbean, in Porto Rico, and to some extent in Cuba.

In 1898 a violent social and political movement, known as the Boxer Rising, had been started in China.

The anarchy let loose by the Boxers, and especially the assaults and murderings inflicted upon foreigners, and the atrocious attack upon the Legations, was certain to provoke foreign intervention; and this intervention, if the government and social fabric of China broke up altogether (as it looked like doing), would not

improbably end with the partition of the country among foreign nations, nearly all of whom at that time were particularly anxious to secure concessions in China. To prevent this contingency, the United States Secretary of State, John Hay, sent to the various Powers a Note (September 6, 1899) advocating adherence to the principle of the Open Door—that is, no Power should endeavour to secure special advantages for itself. Great Britain was the first to accede to the Note; the other Powers did so shortly afterwards. In August 1900, in order to relieve the Legations (the inmates of which would inevitably have been murdered had the Boxers captured them), an International Force was assembled at Tientsin. All the Powers, including the United States and Japan, sent quotas of troops. The International Force proceeded to Peking and after some fighting raised the siege and restored peace to the city. After difficult negotiations, conducted by the diplomatic ministers of the Powers and the veteran Chinese official Li Hung Chang (who was not implicated in the Boxer Movement), the 'Boxer Protocol' was signed on September 7, 1901. The ground around the Legations was greatly increased; the whole Legation Quarter was to be fortified and garrisoned; and an indemnity of £67,500,000 was imposed upon China, to be divided according to an agreed scheme among the Powers concerned. The indemnity was to be paid in annuities extending until the year 1940. A few years later President Roosevelt converted the American instalments of the indemnity into a fund for providing scholarships for enabling Chinese students to be educated in the United States. Early in 1905, when the Russo-Japanese War was drawing to a close, John Hay, who was still Secretary of State, sent out another Far Eastern Note. This contained a proposal for a self-denying ordinance; none of the neutrals were to claim compensation in China for any gains which Japan or Russia might make. The neutral Powers agreed. Thus the United

States had abandoned the old attitude of isolation, and was pursuing in international affairs a very steady policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the ^{The Open} Open Door there. This policy was based substantially upon a sincere desire to maintain the interests of China; it was also partly due to the determination to promote the commercial interests of the United States, which would have suffered if the European States extended their dominion there.

Later in the same year in which Secretary of State Hay sent out his Note of 'Self-Denying Ordinance,' President Roosevelt managed to bring the belligerents of the Far East, Russia and Japan, into a peace conference among themselves at Portsmouth, Maine. Hay was ill and dying; the President was acting as his own Foreign Minister, and held all the threads of negotiation in his hands. It was with the greatest difficulty that peace was concluded, as the Japanese were winning the war, and yet the Russians would not concede their demands.¹ At last ^{The Treaty of} peace was concluded on compromise terms on ^{Portsmouth.]} September 5, 1905. It was Roosevelt's peace. The Nobel Prize Committee awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize. An American historian comments: 'By the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth Roosevelt established for his country a right, that she did not want, to be consulted in world politics.'² In the following year, 1906, the United States took part as a full member of the Conference of Algiers concerning Morocco. All these facts show that the Spanish-American War of 1898 was the opening of a period of vigorous international action on the part of the United States.

In the Western Hemisphere the United States always

¹ The Japanese demanded a war-indemnity and the whole of the island of Sakhalin. Ultimately they compromised, after much pressure from Roosevelt, on half of Sakhalin and no indemnity. See R. B. Mowat, *The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States* (1925), pp. 296-7. See also above, pp. 139-40.

² Morison, *The Oxford History of the United States*, p. 446

had a fairly active policy ; and this was quite in accordance with the principles of the Monroe Message of 1823. The most important event in the Western Hemisphere was the making of the Panama Canal.

The idea of such a canal was of long standing, but it was not taken up as a practical question until the time of the Spanish-American War. The United States Navy warship, *Oregon*, in order that it should be available in the hostilities, had to make the long journey from the Pacific Coast around Cape Horn to the Atlantic and the Caribbean. The Government and people of the United States decided that the delay caused by such a voyage should not be incurred again ; a canal must be dug across the Isthmus of Panama, so that the Atlantic and Pacific fleets could be ' pooled.'

A French Construction Company originally held the concession from the Republic of Colombia (in which was Panama) for making the Isthmian Canal. After expending much time and money, the French Company had to abandon the enterprise in 1888. In 1902 the United States Government agreed to purchase the concession from the French Company for \$40,000,000, subject to the condition that the United States should obtain from Colombia a strip of land across Panama, for the construction of the canal.

On January 22, 1903, Secretary of State Hay and the Colombian *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, signed a treaty which assigned to the United States a lease for one hundred years of a ten-mile wide strip of territory across the Isthmus, in return for \$10,000,000 down, and \$100,000 a year. The Colombian Government delayed to ratify the treaty, apparently because it desired to arrange for a further payment to itself from the French Construction Company, which was being bought out. On November 3 of Panama. a revolution broke out in Panama. Secession was declared from Colombia by the revolutionaries and an independent republic was proclaimed. On November 4, the United States recognised the Republic

The French
Panama
Canal
Company.

The Republic
of Panama.

of Panama, and on the 18th, Secretary of State Hay and the Panamayan representative at Washington signed a treaty which leased the Canal Zone in perpetuity to the United States. The Panamayan revolution was not organised by the United States Government. Unofficially some Americans probably had a hand in it; and the official recognition accorded by the United States Government may be said to have been given with remarkable despatch. Later, in 1921, the United States paid the Colombian Republic \$25,000,000 for the loss of its interests in Panama.

Great Britain also had an interest in the proposal to make an Isthmian Canal, because of her great shipping trade, and also by reason of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. This treaty, signed by the United States Secretary of State John M. Clayton and the British minister at Washington, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, bound each of the two countries never to 'obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal.' Both contracting parties undertook to protect the Canal, and also to invite other states to enter into the stipulations of the treaty. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, when it looked as if the Canal might really soon be begun, the United States was very anxious to rid itself of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; for it wanted to own it and control it exclusively, without the participation of any other states at all.

In the good years of British-American diplomatic relations which ensued after the Spanish-American War, it was not difficult for the United States to induce the British Government to meet the American view with regard to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The only stipulation which the British Government was vitally interested in retaining from the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was that the Canal should be open to the commerce of all nations on equal terms, and to ships of war at all times. The British ambassador Pauncefoot and Secretary of State Hay negotiated a treaty upon this basis (November 18, 1901). The Canal

was to be open in times of war as in times of peace ; there was to be no discrimination against the citizens of any nation in respect of charges ; the Canal was never to be blockaded, nor was any act of hostility to be committed within it. The United States was to construct and own the Canal, and was to have the policing of it (this last right has been construed to include fortification). Later, when the Canal was constructed, a dispute arose over the interpretation of the clause respecting equality of charges, a controversy which, however, was honourably settled by President Wilson in 1913.¹

The abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which ensured to Great Britain a partnership in the proposed Canal, was a great concession to the United States. The British Government, therefore, when a controversy arose over the boundary of Alaska, felt that the United States might be prepared to yield a little on its side.

The huge territory of Alaska, 577,390 square miles, on the extreme north-west of America, was separated from the United States by British Columbia. Originally a Russian possession, Alaska had been purchased by the United States for \$7,200,000 in 1867—in the same year, and shortly before the various British colonies on the mainland of North America were federated into one Dominion of Canada.

In the 'sixties and 'seventies the Canadians did not think much about Alaska, for they had scarcely reached the further limits of their own territory in the West. In 1896, however, gold was found at Klondyke in the Yukon valley ; the Canadian north-west looked like becoming in time wealthy and prosperous. Alaska shut off Klondyke from the sea, unless Canada could establish some claim to portions of the seaboard.

Canada had a claim, under a Russo-British Treaty of 1825, which defined the frontier between the British

¹ See below, p. 225.

possessions and Alaska as a line passing along the crests of the mountains at a distance of thirty miles from the ocean. The Canadians contended that the line ran straight across the tips of promontories and the mouths of inlets, parallel to the ocean and at a distance of thirty miles from it. The United States Government maintained that the line ran parallel not to the outer ocean, but to the salt water; and that therefore it followed the curves of the shore, and left to the United States the whole coast of Alaska for a distance of thirty miles inland. The difference between the Canadian and United States point of view represented territory of enormous potential value, and involved the question of Canadian access through Alaska to the sea.

The Alaskan-
Canadian
Boundary
Question.

One wholesome feature of British-American disputes is that there has been no haste, no nervousness, no precautionary mobilising and seizing of positions. Controversies have been acute, but they have been conducted with *sangfroid*. War is practically impossible, just as assault and battery between individuals is impossible, if people preserve *sangfroid*. Pauncefote was working in his deliberate and sure way with John Hay over the Alaskan affair from its inception in 1898, but he died early in 1902. The next British ambassador, Sir Michael Herbert, who had been trained under Pauncefote, carried on the negotiation, and on January 24, 1903, signed with Hay a Convention for solving the dispute. The question of the frontier was not referred to arbitration, for President Roosevelt refused this method of settlement, but to a joint Commission of three American and three British citizens. The Commission was to investigate and decide, if they could, by a majority of votes. It handed down its decision on October 20, 1903, in favour of the contention of the United States; the three American citizens (Henry Cabot Lodge, George Turner, Elihu Root) and one of the British commissioners (Baron

The Arbitral
Award.

Alverstone) formed the majority; the other two British commissioners (Sir Louis Jetté and Allen Aylesworth, Canadians) voted against the majority. The decision was probably correct, as the Russo-British Treaty of 1825, while it stipulated that the Alaska-Canadian boundary should be parallel to the ocean, also said that it should follow 'the sinuosities of the coast.' Canadians felt aggrieved at the decision, but since then, at a distance of thirty miles from the innermost point of a bay, an old post has been found which is believed to have been a Russian boundary mark, and which would therefore prove that the American view of the Alaskan boundary was correct.

After the episode of the Alaskan boundary the United States had quiet, although not inactive, foreign relations, and increased its influence by mediating at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and by taking part in the Conference of Algéciras in 1906. In regard to China the United States continued to pursue a policy of disinterestedness, refusing even under President Wilson to share in the issue of a loan which a financial 'consortium' of Powers was arranging. Nearer home than China there was an affair of international relations requiring serious attention. This was Mexico.

In 1911 President Porfirio Diaz, who had given the country peace and prosperity for thirty-five years, was compelled, after the outbreak of a revolution, to resign. The causes of the discontents were not so much because Diaz governed the country autocratically behind a 'façade' of democratic institutions, but because he had allowed the great landowners to increase their power and influence over their tenants (who were the mass of the people) and even, by enclosing the common lands, to add to their domains. The revolution was brought about by a small group of Radicals or Liberal *intelligentsia*, supported by the land-hunger of the millions of *peons*, the poor Indian common labourers. The leader of the revolution, an educated gentleman of high ideals, was Francisco

Madero, who became President. A counter-revolution, however, resulted in his Government being upset and himself killed (1913). The party which had formerly supported Diaz now set up a Conservative soldier, General Huerta, as President.

The affairs of Mexico troubled President Wilson, and cast a shadow between the United States and Great Britain. These two countries had incomparably the greatest interests in Mexico, British and American citizens having been especially energetic in the development of Mexican oil lands. Great Britain and most of the Powers made no difficulty about recognising General Huerta's Government, but President Wilson absolutely refused. His view was that the Mexican people should have the opportunity of choosing a ruler or Government for themselves; Huerta had not been constitutionally elected.

In 1914 Huerta seemed in process of being involved in direct conflict with the United States. In the prevailing anarchy of Mexico episodes frequently occurred Mr. Wilson—assaults upon foreigners, insults to foreign and Mexico. flags or consulates—which might provoke intervention. In April 1914 President Wilson sent marines to Vera Cruz, which was occupied after some fighting. Most people expected that the American troops would stay there. Wilson, however, desired no territory and would take none. Vera Cruz was evacuated; soon afterwards Huerta was upset by another revolution and was killed. Venustiano Carranza, Conservative but not wholly in favour of the great landholders, as Huerta was, became President and remained for nearly six years before he too came to a bloody end (1920). Outside the capital, political conditions continued to be unsettled. Wilson maintained his policy which he called 'watchful waiting.' In 1916 he reacted upon the audacity of a Mexican rebel or revolutionary leader called Villa, who had crossed the American frontier. Wilson sent General Pershing with a corps of 15,000 troops into Mexico to disperse the bands of Villa and to capture him. Villa

escaped and the American invading army, after having gained some useful experience of war-conditions during the raid, returned to the United States. No attempt was made to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico, which went on in a condition of violence, varied only by brief periods of quiet or lassitude. After the World War was over, however, the situation in Mexico became more stable.

CHAPTER XVI

GERMANY AND THE NAVAL QUESTION, AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

§ 1. *The Naval Question*

IN 1898 and 1900 the Kaiser and Admiral von Tirpitz by the Navy Laws, which were passed through the Reichstag, laid the foundation of the great German navy. Before this there had only been a small Prussian fleet. The growing colonial and commercial interests of Germany demanded, in the opinion of the Kaiser and Tirpitz, protection; and moreover, in event of a diplomatic crisis, Germany had no adequate sea force with which to induce England to make colonial concessions rather than 'risk' a naval struggle. Tirpitz called his navy a 'risk navy.'

Perhaps the 'grand design' for the creation of German naval power—a legitimate object of national ambition in this period—goes back for its origin to the acquisition of Heligoland in 1890. The German Great Navy Plan. Britain, which had acquired Heligoland in 1814 at the end of the Napoleonic War, gave it in 1890 to Germany in exchange for political and territorial concessions in Zanzibar and East Africa. Heligoland was made into a great fortress.

Tirpitz erred in thinking that the effect of the creation of a 'risk navy' would intimidate the English nation or induce the British Government to make concessions. On the contrary it only stiffened their determination to maintain the superiority of the British navy, so vital to the existence of the British Empire. In 1900, however,

Anglo-German naval rivalry was not yet consciously felt.

Throughout the early years of the twentieth century, the increase of the German navy, which was subject to fixed laws, went on steadily. The British Government, which aimed at keeping the British navy as strong as the force of the two strongest Continental Powers added together, was feeling the strain, though it was not yet excessive. On February 3, 1905, Mr. Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty in the Conservative Government, made a speech at Edinburgh strongly (in almost threatening terms) deprecating the further increase of the German navy. The speech naturally attracted much notice in Germany, and Mr. Lee sprang into celebrity for a time, with his photograph in the newspapers. Rather ominously the British navy was being to a large extent concentrated as a permanent thing in the North Sea, and the white ensign was less often seen in foreign parts. The concentration in the North Sea was the work of Admiral Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord.

It is necessary to draw attention to the Naval Question, for a nation's memory, at least the memory of the English nation, is apt to be short; but all those persons who lived through the years 1898-1914, and who were old enough to observe public affairs, will agree that nothing so promoted the feeling of Anglo-German strain and antagonism as this Naval Question. This feeling reacted on Continental affairs. It could not help sharpening German military spirit on land, and giving a war-note to every crisis, which made such crises so difficult to handle.

To assess responsibility between civilised nations is never easy. Germany had obviously a perfect right to have a powerful navy, although such a navy was not indispensable to her existence. To Great Britain, a crowded island, unable to supply itself with food or raw materials, a navy of commanding strength was probably quite indispensable. What made the English people indignant was not the

strength or size of the German navy, but the steady, annual, inflexible increasing of it. This imposed upon Great Britain an equally steady but much greater increase (4 to 2, or 6 to 4) of the British navy, and a gigantic expenditure which was continually mounting, without making any difference to the ratios of strength between the two navies. Except England, all the possible or conceivable enemies of Germany were on land; therefore it was felt in England that the steadily growing German navy represented a policy which could have one objective only—England and the British overseas dominions and possessions. And indeed this is the objective for which sooner or later such a swelling naval strength was almost bound to be used, although in the minds of its creators, William II. and Tirpitz, it was merely a 'risk navy' and an expression of national or imperial pride.

The increase of the German navy was governed by fixed laws, passed in the Reichstag, and defining rates of construction for years ahead. The first of the ^{The German} great Fleet Laws was 1898; the second was ^{Fleet Laws.} 1900. By 1906 the British naval constructors had designed a wonderful new type, colossal fighting vessels, called the Dreadnought class, of which the first example was launched in February of that year. The German reply to the inception of the Dreadnought class of battleships was the Third Fleet Law of May 1906, and the Fourth Fleet Law of 1908, fixing the construction of 'capital' ships of the Dreadnought type at four a year down to 1911 and two a year from 1911 to 1917. According to the standards adopted by the British Admiralty, this required of Great Britain (whose construction had been 'slackened' in 1907) the laying down of eight new battleships in 1908. In this year there was in England a real apprehension of immediate war. On November 5, Mr. Balfour, who was leader of the opposition, was taken aside by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, at the end of a sitting in the House of Commons. Mr. Balfour informed Lord Lansdowne in

a letter, dated November 6, 1908, now printed in Newton's *Life of Lord Lansdowne* :

'Asquith asked me to speak to him last night after the House rose. He was evidently extremely perturbed about the European situation which, in his view, was the gravest of which we have had any experience since 1870. He said that, incredible as it might seem, the Government could form no theory of the German policy which fitted all the known facts, except that they wanted war. . . . I was very much struck by the pessimistic tone in which he spoke of the position.'

Germany and Great Britain were now in an absolute *impasse*, from which, if the existing policies were main-

King Edward's Visit to the Kaiser.	tained, there was no escape. Germany would not stop building. That the German Government had no intention of restricting the size of its navy, even though they entered into negotiations on
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this subject, seems completely established by numerous documents ; for instance, Prince Bülow to the Prussian Minister at Munich, June 25, 1908 (for communication to the Bavarian Government) : 'Arrangements leading to the limitation of our defensive power are not capable of discussion by us in any circumstances' ¹ [in the same paragraph 'defensive power' is explained as 'armament by land and water']. In August, 1908, King Edward, accompanied by Sir Arthur Hardinge of the Foreign Office, paid a visit to the Kaiser at Kronberg. Hardinge had a long talk with the Kaiser on the Naval Question, and spoke with extraordinary bluntness. 'Can't you put a stop to your building, or build less ships ?' he said. The Kaiser argued the question very frankly. Then : 'You must stop or build slower,' said Hardinge. 'Then we shall fight, for it is a question of national honour and dignity,' replied the Kaiser, looking straight in Hardinge's eyes (*und dabei sah ich ihm fest und scharf in die Augen*). The conversation was in English ; the Kaiser reported it fully to Prince Bülow.² On

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, xxv. 478.

² *Ibid.* xxiv. 127.

October 28 the *Daily Telegraph* published an amazing report of a conversation of the Kaiser with some person described as 'a source of unimpeachable authority.' In the course of a long discourse by the Kaiser on his attitude (which he described as extremely friendly) to England in the Boer War, and on Morocco, the Kaiser broached the Naval Question. He said that the German navy was being forged to keep pace with Germany's growing commerce, and that it was also necessary because of the growing power of Japan and China in the Pacific. 'It may be,' he added, 'that England herself will be glad that Germany has a fleet, when they speak together on the same side in the great debates of the future.'¹ This suggestion, however, did not reassure the English on the subject of the German fleet. Another statement of the Kaiser in the same interview was that he supplied a plan during the Boer War to the British Government, and that this plan 'as a matter of curious coincidence' was 'on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts and carried by him into successful operation.' The publication of the interview stirred up a regular storm among the British public. Early in 1909 Bülow, influenced by the dispatches of Count Metternich, German ambassador in London, tried to induce the Kaiser and Tirpitz to agree to a slackening in the pace of naval construction. Failing in this object, he resigned from the Chancellorship. His resignation had not the slightest effect on naval policy. The new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, never had any control over the masterful Tirpitz.

In February, 1912, Lord Haldane, Lord Chancellor, who had been previously Secretary of State for War, and was also a profound German scholar, went on a mission to Berlin. His object was to try and come to some arrangement on the Naval Question, and in general to relieve the Anglo-German

Lord
Haldane's
Visit.

¹ The interview is printed in full in *Die Grosse Politik*, xxiv. 170; see also above, p. 129.

tension. The suggestion for such a mission had originated from the German side, through Herr Albert Ballin, the head of the great Hamburg-Amerika line of steamships. A German Supplementary Naval Law for further construction had been announced as coming shortly before the Reichstag. Haldane and Bethmann-Hollweg conferred together and tried to arrive at a 'political agreement' which might in turn make possible an easement of the naval situation. Bethmann proposed an agreement to the effect that if either Power became involved in war with a third Power the other would remain neutral. The British Government, however, would not agree to bind itself beforehand to neutrality, in case of a war between Germany and France. It offered neutrality in case of a war in which the other contracting party 'cannot be said to be the aggressor.' Bethmann pointed out in objection to this that it gave no security about England's attitude, because there was always uncertainty in deciding who was an aggressor. The upshot was that the German Supplementary Navy Law went forward. On March 18 (1912), however, Mr. W. S. Churchill announced in a public speech that Great Britain would lay down two keels for each German one; but that if Germany relaxed construction, Great Britain would relax construction in the same proportion. This proposal, however, for an Anglo-German 'naval holiday' received no attention in Germany; the new Navy Law went forward and was passed by the Reichstag (May 1912).

Redistribution of the British Fleet. The British Government withdrew the bulk of its Mediterranean fleet to the North Sea; and the French Government concentrated most of its fleet in the Mediterranean. Something like an understanding thus came into existence that Great Britain would defend the French channel coast from a German attack.

From 1906, military conversations took place annually between the French and British General Staffs. In August 1912 it was decided by the Cabinet that similar naval conversations should take place between the British

and French Admiralties, and also between the British and Russian Admiralties.

These consequences of the growth of the German navy were inevitable. As far back as 1904 Lord Fisher had begun the concentration of the British fleet in home waters. Gradually a sense of mutual reliance grew between the French and British navies, especially when the former was transferred to the Mediterranean, the latter being concentrated in the North Sea.

The common naval interests between England, France, and Russia had indeed become very close.

§ 2. *International Finance and the Bagdad Railway*

Anglo-German rivalry and irritation were, unfortunately, outstanding facts of the first fourteen years of the twentieth century. That two of the most powerful, the most progressive, states of the world should be continually suspecting and thwarting each other, and thus, though not deliberately, threatening to plunge the world into universal war, is a terrible blemish on the history of those years. The great British and German peoples ought—to use an American phrase—to have ‘got together,’ consistently, of course, with their friendships with other nations.

Friction
between
Great Britain
and
Germany.

Indeed a good many efforts were being made, both among the peoples and between the two Governments, to allay this conflict of feelings or interests; and in the first six months of 1914 these efforts looked like being crowned with success. The practical labours of the German and British Foreign Offices had eliminated most of the grounds of difference (except the Navy Question) by July 1914. One of the differences was over the Bagdad Railway.

Efforts at
appease-
ment.

Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia, fertile countries in the days of the Roman Empire, had become, to a large extent, little productive and arid under the Ottoman

Empire. In the last part of the nineteenth, and the early part of the twentieth century, efforts were made by the Powers, not continuously but from time to time, to bring about improvement in Turkish administration. Another, perhaps, a more practicable line at that time, was the endeavour to bring about an improvement in Turkish communications. Roads and railways go a long way towards making barren, or at least undeveloped, lands to bear fruit and to flourish.

The first people to enter the field of Turkish railway development were British and French financiers who arranged for the construction of the Oriental Railways. This system began at Semlin on the Danube in Croatia, and was connected through Belgrade, Nish, Adrianople, with Constantinople. An enterprising cosmopolitan Jew, called Baron Hirsch, was the chief financier and constructor of the Oriental Railways. Baron Hirsch was one of those great international financiers who are so much suspected by Socialist journalists and orators, but who, on the whole, have been steady workers for peace, and are becoming more and more powerful in this direction every day. War ruins their productive enterprises; and though there are undeniably profits to be made during war, these are nothing compared with the commercial losses made in other directions, both during the wars and during the depressions that follow after. Baron Hirsch, who was born in 1831 in Bavaria, was a prominent international figure, and entertained, among other notabilities, the Prince of Wales (Edward VII.) in his *château* in Hungary. Hirsch died in 1896. Another cosmopolitan financier, who became a British subject, was Sir Ernest Cassel. He was a German Jew, emigrated to England, and made an enormous fortune by commercial banking. For years he was a friend of King Edward VII., and worked hard (and with some success) to improve Anglo-German political relations. The Haldane Mission to Berlin in 1912 was brought about

Railway
Projects in
Turkey.

through arrangements which originated with Cassel, the English banker, and Ballin, the German shipper (see above, p. 186).

Although appearing in the field later than the French and British, German financiers soon had an active policy of international railway development in which, it was hoped, French and British capital would participate. Just as there was a famous 'Orient Express,' from Paris to Constantinople, so the Germans aimed at establishing a Berlin-Bagdad system. This system could only function through using the Oriental Railways system in Turkey-in-Europe and the Anatolian Railway from Haidar Pasha to Konia. Moreover, the Bosphorus was not to be bridged; so that the Bagdad Railway was a purely Turkey-in-Asia railway, connecting Konia with Bagdad.

The great undertaking which was to become the Bagdad Railway was inaugurated in 1888 by a syndicate of German financiers chiefly belonging to the Deutsche Bank. The German syndicate acquired the shares and stocks of Baron Hirsch in the Oriental Railways from Semlin to Constantinople, and so gained control of this system. Construction of the railway in Turkey-in-Asia went on rather slowly. In 1897 Baron von Marschall von Bieberstein (later the German Foreign Secretary) became ambassador at Constantinople, and established a great position for himself there. He was particularly successful in helping German syndicates to obtain concessions from the Sublime Porte; politics and commercial affairs were very closely bound together at Constantinople. In 1898 the Kaiser Wilhelm II. made a much-talked-of and much-advertised journey to Constantinople and to Jerusalem. The Kaiser always spoke of the Sultan, Abdul Hamid II., as a personal friend. The full scheme for the Bagdad Railway was not thought out nor were all the legal arrangements made until 1903, when the German syndicate obtained the complete concession to carry the line from

The Bagdad
Railway
Project.

William II.
and the
Sultan.


Asia Minor to Bagdad in Mesopotamia and down to the Persian Gulf.

The moving spirit among the German financiers in the Bagdad Railway project was Herr von Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank. His plan was to make the capital and the directorate of the railways international. French capitalists did actually participate, and there were French directors on the Board. The British Government, in which Mr. Balfour was Prime Minister, and Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was in favour of participation, and concluded an agreement to that effect with Herr von Gwinner in April 1903. Unfortunately an agitation in certain 'nationalist' journals and among certain Members of Parliament forced the British Government to cancel this agreement; and thus a grand opportunity, offered by the Germans, of internationalising the Bagdad Railway, was lost. For the next ten years the railway, which was being successfully pushed forward by German enterprise, continued to be a subject of bitterness in England towards Germany.

The British suspected that the Bagdad Railway was, or might be, directed against India. To forestall this design or possibility, Lord Curzon, as Viceroy of India, concluded in 1899 an agreement with the Sheikh of Koweit, on the Persian Gulf, for taking him under British protection. This action blocked the way of the railway to the Persian Gulf. The French Government felt the impact of nationalist pressure, and in 1903 withdrew all official support for French participation in the Bagdad Railway Company.

Intermittently some efforts were made by the Governments to come to an agreement about the Bagdad Railway. The line was gradually approaching completion, and was opening up the country and earning a moderate dividend (about 5 per cent., but not every year). The Russian Government came to an agreement to recognise the

'correctness' of the railway, after what are known as the Potsdam Conversations between the Tsar and Kaiser in 1910. In 1912, during Haldane's Mission to Berlin (February), the British statesman suggested that objections would be removed if Great Britain was assured regarding the 'gate' of the railway on the Persian Gulf. 'I will give you the gate,' said the Kaiser.



At last, on February 15, 1914, a Franco-German agreement was signed, ensuring French official interest in certain sections of the Bagdad Railway. The British Government had already, in negotiation with Turkey, succeeded (May 1913) in obtaining an agreement that the terminus of the railway should be Basra, and that no extension should take place to the Persian Gulf without Britain's consent. The German Government accepted this arrangement in a conversation concluded by Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador at London, on June 15, 1914.

The Railway
Question
settled.

CHAPTER XVII

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

ON May 24, 1899, the eightieth birthday of Queen Victoria was celebrated amid scenes of great enthusiasm, notwithstanding the critical relations with the Transvaal and Orange Free State, which led to the outbreak of the South African War on October 11.

The British Empire was involved in what became a desperate struggle with the Boer Republics. The names of Ladysmith, of Kimberley, and of Mafeking were in everybody's mouths. In the same week in the year 1899 Gatacre was defeated at Stormberg (December 10), Methuen at Magersfontein (December 11), and Buller at Colenso (December 15). It was known as 'Black Week' in England.

Death of Queen Victoria, Jan 22, 1901.	On January 22, 1901, Queen Victoria died and was succeeded by Edward VII. The new king, born on November 9, 1841, was married to Alexandra of Denmark in 1863, and reigned till May 6, 1910.
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Close of the South African War, 1902.	In the first half of the year 1902 the South African War was drawing to an end. On March 26, Cecil Rhodes, who was born in 1853, died at Cape-town some three months before the close of the peace of Vereeniging (May 31).
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In 1902 an important Education Bill was passed, after keen debates and stormy controversy. This act abolished the School Boards which had been the local authorities for education since the coming into force of the Elementary Education Act of 1870. The County Councils and City

Councils, acting through Education Committees of their own members, or appointed by them, became the local Education Authority both for higher and for elementary education. These Education Authorities were authorised to establish secondary schools in their districts. They were completely responsible for the public elementary schools which are wholly supported out of rates and taxes, and they were given supervisory power over 'voluntary' (or 'non-provided') schools, that is, schools (chiefly those of religious bodies) maintained partly out of voluntary contributions, but aided by grants from rates and taxes. The Act of 1902 is a great landmark in the history of English education, and really created the splendid system of to-day.

Since 1895 the Conservative Government of Lord Salisbury was in office. In July 1902, Lord Salisbury retired on account of his advanced age. Mr. Arthur James Balfour became Prime Minister; the Conservatives still remained in power.

The Tariff
Reform
Question.

With the conclusion of the Boer War, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, came gradually to the conviction that the Empire required additional bonds of union; and he fixed his mind on 'Tariff Reform.' By this phrase he meant that Great Britain should abandon her Free Trade policy, should establish tariffs against foreign countries, even, indeed particularly, tariffs on imported food. Then, by charging lower duties on the produce of the Dominions and colonies overseas, the whole Empire was to be knit together in an economic union.

In November 1902, Mr. Chamberlain paid a memorable visit to South Africa, a visit of conciliation and reconciliation with the South African Dutch. When he returned, he found that his 'Tariff Reform' proposals had been repudiated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Ritchie, afterwards Lord Ritchie of Dundee), and by other important members of the Cabinet. Mr. Chamberlain shortly afterwards resolved

Split in the
Conservative
Party.

to resign from the Cabinet (1903), and to devote himself to a great public campaign for Tariff Reform. At the same time the most stalwart Free Traders resigned from the Cabinet too. Mr. Balfour was left with a Government which seemed to have no very clear or decided views on the Tariff Question. Mr. Chamberlain carried on a vigorous campaign for Protection and Imperial Preference, but at the General Election of 1906 a vast majority of the country returned a Free Trade Liberal Government.

The Tariff Reform controversy, with the divisions which it brought into the party, was fatal to the Conservatives.

The Liberal Government, 1905. In November 1905, Mr. Balfour had to resign; and in the ensuing election (January 1906)

the Liberals, after many years of disunion, had an overwhelming majority. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, Chancellor of the Exchequer, R. B. Haldane, Secretary for War, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, David Lloyd George, President of the Board of Trade, John Morley, Secretary of State for India, John Burns, a Labour member, President of the Local Government Board. The younger and most promising of the junior members of the Government were Winston Churchill, R. McKenna, Herbert Samuel.

From 1906 onwards the tension between Germany and Great Britain steadily grew, on account of the rapid increase of the German navy.

Before Campbell-Bannerman had resigned the Premiership on April 6, 1908, Augustine Birrell had succeeded Bryce (who became the British ambassador to Washington in 1907) as Irish Chief Secretary. He established a Roman Catholic University in Ireland; a Home Rule Bill (the third, including that of 1886) was being prepared.

On Campbell-Bannerman's resignation, Mr. H. H. Asquith became Premier. He was succeeded as Chancellor of the Exchequer by Mr. Lloyd George, whose Budget speech of

four hours' duration on April 29, 1909, showed him to be possessed of very remarkable political courage and unusual eloquence. Other changes in the Cabinet were made, Winston Churchill becoming President of the Board of Trade, Lord Tweedmouth, President of the Council, Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Education, the Earl of Crewe, Secretary for the Colonies.

Asquith
Premier,
April 6, 1908.

The Liberal Government was fortunate in having not merely a large parliamentary majority, but a buoyant revenue. Enormous expenses were incurred, for Old Age Pensions in 1908, for National Health Insurance in 1910. Still, the revenue went on expanding, and money was found for paying off some small portion of the National Debt. Much more of the Debt, however, ought to have been paid off in those prosperous times.

Mr. Lloyd George's Budget speech of 1909, introducing a new and heavy series of land taxes, was the beginning of a famous struggle between the two Houses, the Lords contending that his proposals were political rather than financial, and that fundamental social changes ought not to become law without an appeal to the electorate. On November 30 the Lords rejected the whole Finance Bill (for the first time since the introduction of the complete Finance Bill system in 1861). The Commons replied that the House of Lords had usurped the rights of the Commons. Parliament was then prorogued, and was dissolved on January 10, 1910.

Dissolution of
Parliament,
Jan. 10, 1910.

On February 1, 1910, King Edward read the King's Speech on the opening of the new Parliament, in which the Liberals still had a substantial majority. In the struggle which at once ensued in the Commons, the Irish Nationalists, a solid block of some eighty members, exercised enormous influence. The Liberal Government had promised them a Home Rule Bill for Ireland, which, however, would never pass the House of Lords.

On April 14, Mr. Asquith made it clear that if the Lords resisted the proposals of the Government, he would recommend the King to overcome that resistance by the creation of a suitable number of new peers. Before, however, this recommendation could be carried out, King Edward had gone for his health to Biarritz, and died on May 6, 1910.

The new Parliament was opened by the King, George v., on February 6, 1911. Shortly afterwards the question of the House of Lords was considered in both Houses, and the second reading of the Parliament Bill was carried on March 2.

Debates on the naval estimates brought from Sir Edward Grey a statement that our fleet could hold its own against any reasonably probable combination. Mr. Haldane explained his important work of reorganisation in the Army. In May the Imperial Conference began its sittings, being attended by representatives from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Newfoundland. Of the highest importance was the determination of the Colonial Conference to ensure co-operation for national defence. The Parliament Bill was carried in the House of Lords. In order to prevent a 'flooding' of the House of Lords by new peers, a sufficient number of Conservative peers abstained from voting, to permit the Liberal peers to carry the Bill. The House of Lords, under the provisions of the Parliament Act, lost all power of rejecting Finance Bills, and could not reject any other bill which had been passed through the House of Commons in three successive sessions.

Till the close of July questions of foreign policy occupied the attention of the country and indeed of Europe. The immediate cause of the excitement which arose in England was the despatch of the *Panther* by the German Government to Agadir on July 1. On July 21 Mr. Lloyd George made his notable speech at the Guildhall,

Death of King
Edward.
May 6, 1910.
Accession of
King
George V.

The Parlia-
ment of 1911.
Foreign
Policy.
The Agadir
Incident
July-Nov.
1911.

warning Germany that Great Britain would act if 'her interests were vitally affected.'

In July 1911 the King had visited Ireland and Wales, the Prince of Wales's investiture taking place at Carnarvon Castle. In the same month Lord Kitchener Home became British Agent and Consul-General in Events, 1911. Egypt, on the death of Sir Eldon Gorst. The same month saw a conflict between the two Houses of Parliament over the Lords' Amendments to the Parliament Bill. During the autumn the payment of members of the House of Commons was agreed upon. Unrest among railwaymen and coal-miners made the autumn an anxious time. On November 8 Mr. Balfour resigned the leadership of the Conservative party and was succeeded by Mr. Bonar Law.

Meanwhile Europe was astonished to find that war had broken out between Italy and Turkey in October—the war which eventually resulted in the permanent Italian occupation of Tripoli. England had The year 1911. no difficulty in preserving a neutral attitude during the war.

On November 11 King George and Queen Mary left England on a visit to India, and a magnificent coronation ceremony took place at Delhi on December 12. After the King had visited The Royal visit to India, December 1911—January 1912. Nepaul, and the Queen Agra and Rajputana, they left Bombay on the *Medina* for England on January 10, 1912.

Meanwhile foreign affairs had been discussed in Parliament, it being the opinion of many members that we had been on the verge of war with Germany in Foreign Policy. August and September, and that we were bound to support France. Sir Edward Grey, however, successfully defended his foreign policy, though the Labour party and advanced Liberals were far from being satisfied. A National Insurance Bill was passed in December, and also a Finance Bill. A defence of the Anglo-Russian Agreement regarding Persia, by Sir Edward Grey on December 14, wound up the session.

The year 1912 found the Continent and Great Britain passing through a period of doubt and anxiety which tended to increase. The war between Italy and Turkey continued during the greater part of the year. In April the Imperial Chancellor brought forward in the Reichstag new Army and Navy Bills which added enormously to the strength of the German forces.

Meanwhile in England labour unrest assumed serious proportions: several strikes took place, of which the Coal Strike was the most important. The Government, too, had undertaken to carry various contentious measures, of which Welsh Disestablishment, Manhood Suffrage, and Home Rule were the chief. On February 14, the King, accompanied by the Queen, opened Parliament. After the Easter recess the Home Rule Bill for Ireland was introduced after a long and acrimonious debate. In May questions relating to the navy and foreign relations were discussed. New Zealand had engaged to put a cruiser at the disposal of the Admiralty, and Canada had offered battleships. But domestic matters chiefly occupied public attention. The Welsh Disestablishment Bill passed its second reading; one of its results would be the transferring of £170,000 a year from the Church in Wales to museums and county councils. In June Parliament discussed the causes of a serious transport strike which had broken out the previous month, and the Government brought about a settlement.

On June 10 Lord Haldane ceased to be War Minister and became Lord Chancellor on the resignation of Lord Loreburn; shortly afterwards Sir Rufus Isaacs (later Earl of Reading), the Attorney-General, was admitted to the Cabinet, and Colonel Seely became War Secretary.

Meanwhile strong opposition to the Home Rule Bill continued in July to show itself in Ulster. Mr. Asquith visited Dublin, where he was enthusiastically received, and

spoke in favour of Home Rule. About the same time debates on Great Britain's foreign policy, and on the naval estimates, made it evident that ^{1912.} war with Germany was regarded as a probability during the next few years.

In September much interest was aroused by the statement made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. W. S. Churchill, that while the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean, that of Great Britain would remain in the Channel and North Sea. The imminence, too, of a war in the Balkans, a war that might involve the greater part of Europe, diverted public attention from domestic questions.

The Fleet in the Channel and North Sea.

October 1912 found Parliament busy with the Home Rule Bill, while the war in the Balkans gave Lord Roberts reasons for supporting the National Service League. Wars, he declared, broke out suddenly, so England should have a strong army, which could only be created by some form of compulsion. His remarks seemed to be justified later by the events of 1914. As it was, he was vigorously attacked by the Liberal Press, and also by Liberal members in Parliament. At this very time (November) the First Balkan War had broken out, and Turkey was confronted by the Balkan League (Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Bulgaria) and heavily defeated.

Lord Roberts and the coming War, in 1912.

The First Balkan War, 1912.

Turkey was regarded with favour by the German Government; her defeat and the firm establishment of the Balkan League endangered the Eastern projects of Austria and Germany. There was therefore considerable apprehension felt by the Cabinet that a European conflict might arise. After an armistice had been arranged, negotiations were opened in London on December 16 by delegates of the Balkan States, and continued till the end of the year, without arriving at any satisfactory solution. Progress was made in Parliament with the Home Rule Bill and the Welsh Disestablishment Bill; the World War ultimately prevented the Home

Rule Bill from coming into operation. The Welsh Dis-establishment Bill became law in 1914.

From the opening of the year 1913 till the adjournment of Parliament on March 7 the Home Rule Bill, the Welsh Church Bill, the Franchise Bill, the Trades Union Bill, and the question of National Service occupied the attention of Parliament and the country. On February 16 Lord Roberts inaugurated at Bristol his 'campaign' in favour of compulsory service; the question of naval defence was also brought before the country. The new session was opened on March 10 by the King, in whose speech regret was expressed at the continuance of the Balkan War. Allusion was also made to the gift of a warship by the Malay States, and to the establishment of the Australian navy. In March an interesting debate took place on the Navy Estimates, followed in April by debates on Home Defence. On April 18, three days before

Lord Roberts
at Leeds,
1913.

the close of the debate, Lord Roberts had at Leeds advocated a strong defence force, and found that his opinions were now being supported by large numbers of Englishmen. On May 6 Lord Roberts concluded at Glasgow his campaign for compulsory military service, calling attention to the 'dangerous inaction' of the nation. The view of the Government, however, was that it would be more dangerous to involve the nation in an elaborate scheme of military reorganisation. In May (1913) King George and Queen Mary visited Berlin.

Throughout a great part of the year 'Women Suffragist' outrages, which had already taken place in 1912, continued at intervals. In June, Parliament was chiefly occupied with the second reading of the Home Rule Bill, while the agitation against the Bill in England and Scotland, as well as in Ulster, continued.

During the autumn labour unrest was apparent in various parts of Great Britain. Strikes in Dublin and Birmingham were followed by a strike at the Manchester Docks, a miners' strike in South Wales, and a

London omnibus strike. Even more distressing was the illegal organisation of a Provisional Government in Ulster on September 25, to come into operation if the Home Rule Bill became law. By the end of the year there were at least 85,000 well-drilled volunteers in Ulster. The year closed, it has been truly said, 'amid anxiety and gloom.' While the Continental situation was apparently improving, the position of Ulster gave cause for alarm. At the same time it must be noted that the defeat of the Bulgarians in the Second Balkan War and the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10) greatly increased the political unrest in the Balkans.

The first six months of the year 1914, before the crisis which produced the World War, were in the British Isles a period of political and economic unrest, although the international situation was remarkably serene and hopeful.

During these six months previous to the outbreak of war, Ireland seemed to be drifting steadily towards a terrible civil war.

On February 10 the opening of Parliament took place. The chief discussions were concerning the navy, national defence, and Ireland. The question of the possible coercion of Ulster by British forces and by the navy led to acrimonious debates in Parliament. General Gough and other officers practically gave notice of refusal to initiate military operations against Ulster; and on March 25, Generals Sir John French and Sir J. G. Ewart (members of the Army Council) resigned, as did Colonel J. E. B. Seely, Secretary of State for War, on the 27th. On the night of April 24-25, rifles and ammunition from Hamburg were landed at Larne for the 'Provisional Government'; and in consequence stormy debates took place in Parliament. The 'Women's Suffragist Movement' had become serious, and labour unrest was developing, while the Ulster question now seemed insoluble, for the

Conservative (or Unionist) party were openly encouraging the Ulstermen to resist the Home Rule Bill by force of arms; the Liberals and Irish Nationalists, on their side, insisted on the Bill becoming law.

The British 'Covenanters' had been organised for the defence of Ulster, and gun-running continued. In order to make some peaceful arrangement for Ireland, a Conference representing all parties was held at Buckingham Palace, being opened by the King on July 21. It closed on July 24, having failed to bring about an arrangement which all parties would accept. On July 26 a number of rifles and a large amount of ammunition were landed near Dublin, and civil war in Ireland, which seemed to be inevitable, was averted only by the European crisis, and the outbreak of the World War.

The Irish
Situation,
1914

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

AFTER 1898 the British Empire was realised to be a fact of world-wide significance. Before this, it had not been constantly before the minds of the European public, not even before the English section of that public. India was in a different position. It was itself a great crowded Empire, frequently visited by people from Europe ; and very many English middle-class families had sons or fathers serving there as civil servants or officers in the Army. These sons or fathers came home regularly on leave, and finally returned to England to spend the last ten or twenty years of their life there, talking about India, receiving letters and newspapers from it, watching their sons' careers there, and in general maintaining the constant and lively interest of the English people in ' the great sub-continent.'

In the ' colonies,' as these overseas dominions and settlements were called down to 1900 or thereabouts, people took root for ever ; and although many returned to England on visits, there was not the constant stream of families ' on leave ' in England from, for instance, Australia, that there was from India, although improvements in steamship connection were making visits from the overseas possessions easier and more frequent than they had been forty years before. Nevertheless, the overseas possessions were very distant from Europe, and on the whole very little in the public eye. The South African War changed all this.

From 1899 to 1902 the attention of Europe was riveted

on South Africa, and the European foreign offices were busy with schemes for dealing with all the alternatively possible policies—what to do when England was losing the war, was holding her own, was winning; what new combinations of Continental Powers the war in South Africa made possible. The Continental Press teemed with reports and comments, usually bitter, against England. Soon it became clear that on the result of the war depended not merely the position of the British Empire in South Africa, but its position in Europe and the world—so far-reaching, so unforeseen are the issues of that most incalculable of human ventures, war. The ‘limited war’ with the ‘limited object,’ the clean-cut ‘Bismarckian’ war, is not possible in the modern world. With the conclusion of the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902, Europe settled down to the realised acceptance of the British Empire as an accomplished fact, a stable thing in the world of the twentieth century. Thus it may be said that about the year 1898, or in the years 1899-1902, the British Empire (like the United States owing to the Spanish-American War) became a world-power. Before this Great Britain had been a world-power, but now it was the whole Empire that counted as such.

Since the American Revolution, which ended with the establishing of the United States in 1782, the British Empire had been tending slowly to a system of self-government. In 1867 the Canadian colonies had been joined together in one ‘Dominion’ with its own central Cabinet and Parliament. There were many other self-governing colonies, but no other large dominion like Canada until 1900, when the Australian colonies or states were joined (through an Act of the British Parliament) into the Commonwealth of Australia. In 1909 Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and Orange River Colony (again to be called the Orange Free State) were joined together in the Union of South Africa.

Self-govern-
ment in the
Empire.

Australia and South Africa, like Canada, were endowed with a central Cabinet of Ministers and a two-chambered legislature. The other two 'Dominions,' New Zealand and Newfoundland, had also fully developed parliamentary institutions. Down to the World War the Imperial Government (that is, British Government) retained some control over Dominion legislation and foreign policy, and occasionally interfered by refusing assent to Acts of a Dominion Parliament. This degree of control has been abandoned since the War; the Dominions are now absolutely independent; each has the same King, who is represented by a Governor-General. The Governor-General acts on the advice of the Government or Cabinet of the Dominion.

The British Empire, however, comprises not merely Great Britain and the five Dominions, but also the Crown Colonies, sometimes called the 'Dependent The Crown Colonies. Empire,' to distinguish it from the 'independent Empire' of Great Britain and the Dominions, which are completely independent units. The Crown Colonies are mainly tropical lands with a population of which the majority consists of black people in a backward state of civilisation; these colonies therefore are of necessity dependent upon direction from England. As they are not industrial, they need England's manufactured goods, just as England needs their raw materials. The Crown Colonies, therefore, stand in relation to England in a somewhat similar relation to that in which the French colonies stand towards France, except that the relation of the French colonies is even closer to their metropolis. They send deputies to the French Parliament, and are in theory a part of France.

Not yet a Dominion, and not a Crown Colony, is India, which is a separate Empire, with the King of England as Emperor, and with a complete structure of government of its own. It is still, however, constitutionally subject to direction from England, through the Secretary of State for India, who is a member of the British Cabinet, and

through the British Parliament, which by legislation decides the Constitution of India. From the enactment by Parliament of the Morley-Minto scheme of 1909, down to the World War, India had representative (through a partially elective Legislative Council), although not responsible, government.

From the point of view of European and World history, the chief interest in the development of the British Empire from 1898 to 1914 was the steady progress of the Dominions towards a greater and greater degree of independence, until the Empire was on the point of becoming, as it became through the World War, a Commonwealth of Nations. When the Boer War broke out, the 'self-governing colonies' were still apparently some considerable distance away from independence. In the domestic affairs of the Dominions the Government of England seldom interfered; and each self-governing colony had its own tariff system, against British as also against foreign goods. Foreign policy, on the other hand, was still entirely controlled by the Government of England. The consolidation, however, of the self-governing colonies in Australia (1900) and in South Africa (1909) into big units was bound to result in a greater degree of independence. The Imperial Conference (originally called the Colonial Conference), instituted in 1887, proved to be both a means of securing common action and of promoting independence. The Conference, held at London since 1887 at varying intervals of five or three years, consists of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions meeting under the chairmanship of the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. Through discussion, it has been able to co-ordinate methods of Imperial defence; at the same time the Dominion Premiers have gained successive acknowledgments of degrees of independence until, in 1926, 'Dominion status' in the fullest sense was defined.

The critical meeting in the history of the development of the 'independent Empire' was the Imperial Conference

of 1902. Joseph Chamberlain, who must always be ranked as a great Secretary of State for the Colonies, decided to use the opportunity of the successful ending of the South African War in order to bring about a system of closer union in the Empire. The war and the peace involved of necessity a work of reconstruction in South Africa, and particularly, of course, in the territory of the former Boer Republics. Chamberlain announced in a speech of August 1902 that the reorganisation of the newly acquired territories was to be linked with a great scheme 'by which we hope to make our Empire something more than a geographical expression.'¹ The Imperial Conference of 1902, however, proved to be a great disappointment to him. Chamberlain had a plan for the establishing of a standing Imperial Council, to be at first merely consultative, but in time to have some executive and even legislative authority. The colonial Prime Ministers, however, did not desire closer union; Chamberlain's plan had to be abandoned. His next effort was to attempt to bring about an economic union of Great Britain and the Dominions through a system of linked tariffs. With this object in view he resigned from the Cabinet in 1903, and engaged in a great campaign to induce the people of Great Britain to adopt a tariff in place of free trade, as the necessary preliminary to tariff agreements with the Dominions. He completely failed, however, to convert the people of Great Britain. In the Conference of 1907 the Dominion Prime Ministers were ready to discuss and perhaps to conclude tariff agreements with Great Britain, but the powerful Liberal Government of the day in Great Britain was whole-hearted for the maintenance of British free trade. Since then the possibilities of closer union in anything but sentiment (which after all is perhaps the only strong form of union) have grown ever more remote. The World War, while it demonstrated the strength of the sentimental union of the Empire, completed the constitu-

¹ Egerton, *British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century*, p. 2.

tional independence of each, and thus added the Dominions as new Powers in a world where international policies were to be no longer made only in Europe.

Down to the year 1914, however, the influence upon the world of the British Empire, apart from Great Britain, was not considerable. The last time when Imperial affairs riveted the attention of the whole world was The Union of South Africa. in 1899-1902, when the South African War was being fought. The annexation of the Boer Republics meant that South Africa would be within the British Empire, would be a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In 1906 the former Boer Republics were given full responsible government; this showed, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian Prime Minister, said, that they had not lost their freedom, even if they had lost their independence. In 1909 they joined in the creation of the Union of South Africa. In 1912, when very serious riots, amounting to rebellion, occurred on the Rand, Imperial troops were required to restore peace; but when another rising took place on the Rand in 1913, the forces of the Union itself were sufficient to quell it. In this period, 1909 to 1914, the leading statesmen in South Africa were General Botha, Prime Minister of the Union, and General Smuts, Minister of Defence, both of them successful soldiers in the war with Great Britain, 1899-1902.

In Australia a striking political development was the advent of a Labour Government to power in 1910, under Australia. Andrew Fisher. It was Mr. Fisher who already in 1910 called the Empire a 'family of nations,' and who, while asserting independence, said that this was the surest way to keep the Empire together, in war as well as in peace—an assertion which the action of the Dominion Prime Ministers (himself included) proved to be true, when the World War came.

New Zealand had, until the death of the Prime Minister Seddon in 1906, thirteen years of Radical administration, which Mr. Seddon combined with a fervid Imperial

patriotism. Since then the Radicalism has perhaps been less prominent in New Zealand politics, while ^{New} the Imperial spirit in this, the Dominion on ^{Zealand}. the extreme of the Empire circle, has remained equally outspoken and generous.

In Canada the outstanding event in the years before the World War was the controversy over the Reciprocity Agreement made with the United States in ^{Canada} 1910. The Liberal party in Canada contended that the effects of a tariff were to raise prices at home, and to restrict trade with other countries. In 1901 the Canadian Liberal leader, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, said: 'Protection has been the curse of Canada.' In 1906 the Liberals came into power in Canada, but found themselves unable to make much alteration in the tariff system which was a great support of Canada's revenue. In 1910, however, an opportunity came for making an agreement with the United States which, under the presidency of Mr. Taft, was favourably inclined. In 1911 the Canadians had a general election which was held to decide the issue of the Reciprocity Agreement. On the side of the United States there was readiness to accept the arrangement. President Taft in a message to Congress pointed out that all the questions relating to the partition of territory in existence since the Revolution had now been settled with Great Britain. The next logical step, wrote Mr. Taft, was, between two countries situated as were Canada and the United States, 'to give play to productive forces, as far as is practicable, regardless of political boundaries.' On the Canadian side, people began to fear that the Reciprocity Agreement, if approved and put into effect, might draw Canada, somehow, politically towards the United States. The British Government naturally took no part in the controversy, but Rudyard Kipling wrote: 'It is her own soul that Canada risks to-day.' The General Election resulted in the defeat of Laurier's Liberal Government; and with it the Reciprocity Agreement fell.

The twenty years before the World War, whether they be regarded from the point of view of British Imperial history or of Anglo-German relations, are a chapter which was rounded off with a significant Anglo-German treaty. This important act, which was initialled and only awaited signature when the War broke out, was part of the policy of conciliation between Great Britain and Germany undertaken by Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador at London. Lichnowsky, of course, was acting under instructions from the German Foreign Office, so that on the eve of the great conflict England and Germany successfully adjusted their colonial interests.

In 1898 the British and German Governments had made a treaty for the division of the Portuguese territory in Africa *in case* the Portuguese Colonial Empire should fall to pieces, and it should be found impossible to maintain its integrity. The treaty was secret. Next year, 1899, Great Britain, by what is known in history as the Windsor Treaty, renewed or confirmed the alliance of 1661, when England undertook to defend the integrity of the Portuguese Empire. The Windsor Treaty greatly annoyed the German Government, though it was not inconsistent with the stipulations of the Anglo-German Convention of 1898. In any case, the Portuguese Empire held together, in spite of the revolution of 1910, the fall of the monarchy, and the chaotic politics of the Republic. In 1914, after prolonged discussions, a second Anglo-German Convention was negotiated to define and reconcile British interests in Africa. The chief provision in this Convention was that the two Governments agreed to regard the Portuguese African colonies as falling into 'zones,' Germany undertaking not to compete with Great Britain for commercial or financial business in certain zones, Great Britain not to compete with Germany for such business in others.

German and
British
Colonial
Interests.

Anglo-
German
Convention
regarding
Africa.

The Convention, initialled by Grey and Lichnowsky in June 1914, was to be public; it was only this condition, made by Grey, which was delaying the actual signature, when the World War broke out. The object of the Convention was to assure Germany the 'place in the sun' which the Kaiser had demanded for her in a famous speech. It was understood, by both the British and German Governments, that in case the Portuguese Empire fell to pieces, Germany would have possession of the zones in which Great Britain was now agreeing not to compete for commerce. The British Empire would have its share too.

This Anglo-German Treaty of 1914 was not a design for the actual partition of the Portuguese colonies, but it resembled the scheme which the Tsar Nicholas I. put before the British Government in 1853 for the *eventual* partition of the Turkish Empire in case the 'Sick Man' should shortly die. Great Britain refused to consider the Tsar's proposal; and the Crimean War took place instead. 'If we had only listened to the Emperor Nicholas,' wrote Lord Salisbury, some forty years later, 'what a much pleasanter outlook would meet us when we contemplate the continent of Europe.' By her action in 1853 Great Britain ensured Russian opposition, which lasted down to the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907.¹

The view held in the British Foreign Office was that the Portuguese colonies were really 'derelict,'² and might fall to pieces any time. For such a contingency the British and German Governments made their Convention of June 1914. This Convention, when published, would be made known to Portugal, and might, Grey thought, stimulate the Portuguese Government to develop its colonies by admitting foreign capital and enterprise, and so to save them from falling to pieces.³ Thus the political

¹ *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. vi. p. 780 (Aug. 31, 1896).

² *British Documents*, vi. 758.

³ *Ibid.*

situation in Africa would remain unchanged, but Germany and England would have made their friendly convention and would therefore not be rivals, overseas or in Europe.

The connection between affairs overseas and in Europe can be seen also at the time of the Imperial Conference of 1911. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, took the Dominion Prime Ministers into his confidence in a frank survey of British foreign policy. This was done, not actually at a meeting of the Conference, but at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence to which the Dominion Prime Ministers, assembled for the Conference, were invited. Sir Edward Grey reduced British foreign policy to a question of sea-power, on which the Dominions depended just as much as Great Britain. If any Power were to become dominant in Europe, it could make the policies of the other Continental Powers conform to its own. 'If that was the result, then the naval situation would be this, that if we meant to keep the command of the sea, we should have to estimate as a probable combination against us of fleets in Europe not two Powers but five Powers.'

Grey meant that hitherto the British fleet had been maintained on the 'Two-Power Standard,' that is, as large as the combined navies of any other two Powers; but a really dominant Power in Europe would, as Napoleon tried to do, bring all the navies of Europe into line against England. To prevent such a contingency, which would destroy the independence alike of Great Britain and of the Dominions, Great Britain would have to intervene on the Continent. Intervention in Europe against the domination of any Power would really be intervention to protect England's freedom on the seas, and therefore to protect the whole Empire which could communicate within itself only by water. Thus the Dominions and all the colonies were just as interested as

Great Britain in preventing any Power from dominating all Europe.¹

This exposition of foreign policy was heard with the closest attention by the Dominion Prime Ministers, and, along with a feeling of chivalrous loyalty to the whole Empire, was the basis of their policy when the European War broke out in August 1914.

¹ Speech of Sir Edward Grey, May 26, 1911, in *British Documents*, vi. 781-786.

CHAPTER XIX

THE UNITED STATES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

IN the last thirty years of the nineteenth century a great change came over the political condition of the world, because three Great Powers appeared upon the scene. These were the kingdom of Italy, the German Empire, and the United States of America. Italy, which was 'a geographical expression' for a number of different states in the time of Metternich, became a Great Power after the union brought about by Cavour, Garibaldi, and Victor Emmanuel. The occupation and annexation of Rome in 1870 completed the union. The German Empire came into existence, in place of the old, ineffective *Bund* or Germanic Confederation of the Congress of Vienna, in 1871; a very potent force was at once felt to be in action throughout Europe. The United States did not take up the position of a Great Power until 1898. Until then it had persisted in an attitude of at least partial (certainly not complete) isolation from the politics of the rest of the world; but the Spanish-American War immensely increased the diplomatic 'contacts' of the United States, and the result of the war was to augment America's international responsibilities. The annexation of Porto Rico and the Philippines, and the virtual protectorship of Cuba, which were the results of the Spanish-American peace treaty at the end of the war (December 10, 1898), necessitated subsequently a wider interest in world affairs than the United States had hitherto shown.

The domestic development of the United States corresponded to the increase of its external responsibilities.

Throughout the nineteenth century the country was still, internally, in the developing stage. Pioneer work was going on; the 'Western Movement' across the North American Continent was in process. Not until 1890 did the census-takers fail to find a 'frontier' of the settlers advancing towards the West. By 1890, however, the process was complete; the United States population had slowly spread over the Continent and had joined on the Pacific Coast with the scanty population which had arrived there previously by sea.

The Western Movement in the United States.

Thus, by 1890 the moving frontier, towards the West, of the United States no longer existed, and the country was being filled up by a population that was now fixed in its habitation. In general, the attaining of this 'stable' condition on the part of a hitherto growing nation is sometimes accompanied by an arrest (for a time) in the development or prosperity of the country. This happened in the United States. The years 1893 and 1894 were particularly bad years for trade and commerce. The business community was depressed. The spirit of enterprise seemed to languish. There were failures and bankruptcies.

The Frontier in American History.

When times are hard and trade is bad, people look for mechanical remedies, and usually fix upon tariff and currency. Raise the tariff and keep out foreign competition; give up 'the gold standard' and make money cheap; then capital will become plentiful, wages high, and all the factories busy—such is the argument. From 1893 to 1897 the Democratic party was in power, with Grover Cleveland as president. The Democrats had favoured a tariff for revenue only, or at most a comparatively low protective tariff. The Republican party was protectionist. In 1890 (when the Republican Harrison was president) it had been able to enact a Tariff Bill into law—the McKinley Bill—a tariff which made prices rise so high that at the next presidential election the

The Tariff.

Democratic party won, and Grover Cleveland became president. When, however, the year of election, 1896, came round, people had forgotten the effect of the McKinley tariff on prices, and only thought of the present depression and of the tariff as a remedy. The campaign of the Democrat William Jennings Bryan in favour of 'Free Silver' (that is, for a bi-metallic standard, silver and gold to be equally legal tender) failed to win the people. In November 1896 the elections resulted in a victory of the Republicans, and in William McKinley becoming president. He came into office, according to the Constitution, in March 1897. A special session of Congress was at once summoned to deal with the Tariff Question. 'In a somewhat chastened spirit, the leaders of Congress proposed to set up more moderate schedules than those of 1890; but by the time every member had secured his pet interest, the Dingley Tariff of 1897 was the highest protective tariff that had yet been enacted.'¹ As a matter of fact, the period of acute business depression was passed; but the high tariff had come to stay.

In 1898 McKinley allowed himself to be forced, by American sympathy with the Cuban rebellion, into the war with Spain which resulted in the destruction of the last vestiges of Spanish rule in the western hemisphere and in the Pacific, and in the creation of an overseas empire (although not on a large scale) for the United States. In the elections of 1900 McKinley again stood for the office of president with Theodore Roosevelt for vice-president. Bryan, the Democrat, also stood once more, on the 'Free Silver' platform. The Republicans won by a large majority. Mr. McKinley's second term as president began in March 1901. Six months later (September 6, 1901) he was fatally shot by an anarchist at Buffalo. The vice-president, Theodore Roosevelt, then became president.

Roosevelt, at forty-three years of age, was the youngest

¹ S. E. Morison, *History of the United States* (1927), ii. 409.

of the American presidents. Born of an old settled New York family, he had, in spite of bad health, been able to receive a good, though somewhat broken education. He was a graduate of Harvard University. He had ranched in the 'Bad Lands' of Dakota, and had learned to love riding and 'roughing it' in the open air. He had been a member of the Assembly of New York State, and later was Governor. His strongly-waged war against 'graft' and corruption had made his removal to the vice-presidency a relief to evil-doers. He was a man of energetic, enthusiastic, and somewhat dogmatic temperament, who 'greeted professors and pugilists with equal warmth.' He was strong and purposeful, enormously industrious, honest and public-spirited, with perhaps just a shade of a tendency to 'bully' his opponents. When he had a good cause, he was a magnificent champion, ardent, fearless, outspoken. The great battle to which he went forth as president was against the trusts or 'combines.'

Roosevelt.

The United States became the great home of trusts, partly because the enormous extent and resources of the country gave them scope for their operations, partly because the Tariff provided a wall behind which they could organise themselves, free from foreign competition. Senator Sherman's Anti-Trust Act, 1890, had declared illegal all combinations or agreements made in restraint of inter-state trade. The depression of trade in the early 'nineties (as in Great Britain between 1922 and 1930) induced manufacturers and also the railway companies to enter into combinations with the object of maintaining prices and preventing competition. In 1897, however, a case was brought against the Trans-Missouri Traffic Organisation; the Supreme Court gave judgment that the association was illegal, as being in restraint of trade. The decision brought consternation upon all similar organisations. So they started on another system. Instead of making agreements with each other about buying, selling, and producing, they began to

Trusts.

amalgamate. A group of similar businesses would be consolidated into one great business, like the United States Steel Corporation, or the International Harvester Corporation. The meat trade came into the hands of packers' trusts. The public began to be afraid that all their necessities would come into the power of monopolists.

President Roosevelt made a determined effort to control trusts partly by sending vigorous (if rather verbose) messages to Congress, asking for fresh legislation, and partly by using the Inter-State Commerce Commission. The effort to secure fresh legislation was only partially successful; the attitude of Congress was conservative. The Inter-State Commerce Commission was a more manageable instrument. It had been established by Congress in 1887, in virtue of the power given to Congress by the Constitution to regulate commerce among the separate states. Fortified by some new Acts, the Commission, between 1903 and 1909, when Roosevelt went out of office, engaged in many inquiries and in many prosecutions against trusts, and imposed certain fairly drastic limitations upon their activities. Railway rates were brought under control, free passes (except to railway employes) were forbidden. Rules respecting accounts and their publication were enacted. The obvious abuses were purged away, until in recent years public opinion seems gradually to have been turning in favour of the trusts.

It may be that the 'campaign' against the trusts was justifiable and necessary. Certainly in the United States the cost of living is high. Wages, however, although not perhaps salaries, seem to have kept pace with the rise of prices; the United States is, without doubt, a pleasant country to live in. The great trusts have effected economies in the production of certain articles of common use. Boots are moderate in price and are good to wear. In 1905 there were fewer motor cars in the United States than in Great Britain. Now there are said to be just enough to seat the entire population (between 115,000,000 and

120,000,000) without overcrowding.¹ The 'big business' provides an article of a high standard quality, and usually at a moderate price.

Conservatively minded people complained that the Roosevelt régime, 1901 to 1909 (he was elected to a second term of the presidency in 1904), with its strict controlling of the trusts, was socialistic. Certainly the unmitigated competition, the perfect *laissez-faire*, of the nineteenth century, had gone. Private enterprise still governed trade, but under Federal or State regulation. There were, and still are, millionaires and magnates, but they were no longer the 'feudal chieftains,' the 'barons' of the 'eighties and 'nineties, as depicted in the novels of the American, W. S. Churchill.² The trusts and their ways of working have become more known to the public; and the stock of the trust has become widely distributed among a very large number of people who are by no means all large capitalists.

As each state is sovereign within the limits set by the Constitution, there is scope for much state-action, quite apart from what the Federal Government can ^{State In-}do. Each state is a democracy, more or less ^{dependence.} complete, more or less judicious. In the 'nineties the municipal and even the state administrations had not a good reputation. Corruption was openly imputed to many of them.

In the first ten or fifteen years of the twentieth century the condition of state and municipal administration noticeably improved. There were earnest re- ^{La Follette of}formers in several states; and none was more ^{Wisconsin.} earnest or more powerful than Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin. This beautiful, agricultural state of the Middle West, peopled largely by men of sturdy honest German and Swedish stock, became under La Follette's guidance, in many respects, a model. Its regulations and laws respecting Labour and Capital, its rules of public

¹ Cp. Morison, *op cit.*, ii. 437.

² e.g. *Mr. Crewe's Career*.

health, its banking laws, have been criticised as 'socialistic.' Its policy regarding open spaces, state parks, fishing and shooting rights, certainly aims at keeping the pleasures and the pursuits of life out of doors open to all citizens. The State of Wisconsin has notable public buildings as well as state parks, all acquired without any debt being incurred. The noble Capitol of Madison City, a magnificent classical building with lofty dome, was paid for, like all the other state enterprises, out of taxation. Not a penny was owed, and, it is said, no 'graft' was practised. La Follette's leadership was unchallenged in Wisconsin from 1901 until his death in 1925.

Since George Washington refused to stand for a third term as president, the custom has been established that every president, if elected for a second term, must stop at that. In March 1909 Roosevelt went off on a prolonged shooting trip in Africa. One of the tests of the success of an American president is the bringing forward of a successor. Mr. Roosevelt's administration, though it could not be continued in his own person, was supposed to be continued in the person of the man who had been his Secretary for War. This was William Howard Taft, a lawyer of Cincinnati, big, competent, fair-minded, good-natured; he was elected and, in 1909, was inaugurated as president. Much was hoped of Mr. Taft, but somehow there was disappointment. The progressive Republicans, those who went with La Follette, thought that Mr. Taft was relapsing into the hands of the big businesses. They began to revolt, and at the next presidential election in 1912, a 'dark horse,' Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, was elected president. In Taft's time two new states—New Mexico and Alaska, formerly 'Territories'—were admitted to the Union, which now numbered forty-eight states (1913).

The Democratic party had (with the exception of Cleveland's two terms as president) been out of office since the Civil War; nor would they have gained at the elections

of 1912 had not the Republican party been split by the personal rivalry which arose between Taft and Roosevelt. Taft stood for election to a second term of office, with the support of all the 'Old Guard' Republicans. Roosevelt stood as a Progressive Republican, having declared his intention to work for 'the initiative, the Referendum, and the popular recall of judicial decisions.' The opposition of the two former friends was ruinous for the time being to the Republicans. The Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson, polled forty-two per cent. of the votes; Roosevelt twenty-seven per cent.; Taft twenty-three per cent.

The new president belonged to an entirely different type of man from Roosevelt. Thomas Woodrow Wilson was not genial, breezy, impetuous. He was calm and restrained, aloof and a little superior, ^{Wilson.} essentially the aristocrat. In his lifetime he was something of an enigma; and he remains an enigma to-day. 'Was he a great man,' a historian wrote a few years after Wilson's death, 'or only the illusion of a terrible age?'¹

Woodrow Wilson (originally Thomas Woodrow, but he dropped the Thomas in later life) was born at Staunton, Virginia, in 1856. His father was a Presbyterian minister, and young Wilson also was educated with the idea of becoming a minister. His health was not good, and he spent much time at home, walking and talking with his earnest, cultured father, or (after the family moved to Wilmington) poking about the docks, looking at the ships and thinking of distant voyages. Eventually he went to Johns Hopkins University, read widely in political science and history, led the debating society, and wrote a book on Congressional Government, with which he graduated Ph.D.

By this time Wilson, although a deeply religious man, had given up the idea of becoming a minister. His secret ambition was to be a statesman, and he hoped that the professoriate would be a means towards this end. On

¹ W. E. Dodd in the *Contemporary Review*, January 1929.

leaving Johns Hopkins, he became professor—at fifteen hundred dollars a year—at the new women's college, Bryn Mawr. After two years he was called to Wesleyan University, Northampton, and from there to Princeton. As a teacher of political science and government he made a great reputation, and he was in constant demand for lecturing all over the United States. In 1902 he was appointed President of Princeton; in ten years of hard work in administration he brought that institution to the front of American universities. His reforms, however, were not popular; and in 1910, after a prolonged disagreement with some of the professors and members of the governing body of the university, Wilson resigned. Almost at the same time he was elected Governor of the State of New Jersey.

Thus practically (as his enemies said) 'turned out' of Princeton, Wilson was put in the way of becoming President of the United States. He had always read **A Democratic Victory.** Burke and Bagehot, he lectured incessantly on government, he had dreamed (without any prospect of fulfilment) of being a statesman; and then, somehow, the Democratic party, acting on the suggestion of a journalist called George Harvey, picked him out as the one man likely to lead the lost Democratic cause to victory.

As Governor of New Jersey Wilson was a success. His intellectual gifts impressed people. His reforms were bold yet practical. Nevertheless, when the Democratic party put him forward for president in 1912, he would have had no chance against the masses of Republicans but for the 'split' between Taft and Roosevelt. The new president came into office in March 1913.

The Americans felt that a new force had come into public life. Calm, austere, rather lonely, strong-willed, intellectual and fearless, Wilson 'took hold' on American affairs in a way which marks a new era. It is true that the era of reform had begun with Roosevelt, and had been continued, though not very strenuously, under Taft; but

Wilson's administration was so firm, logical, and progressive that in history it stands by itself.

When Wilson came into office as president in March 1913, the United States was troubled by industrial strikes. The moderate American Federation of Labour, ^{Organised} which was led by Samuel Gompertz, seemed to ^{Labour.} be losing its influence over masses of foreign workmen. An extreme, perhaps revolutionary, association called the International Workers of the World was stirring up industrial strife in the West and in the East. The New England textile industry, perhaps the most highly protected of all American industries, was beginning to suffer from decline. At the first session of Congress held in his presidency (April 7, 1913), Wilson restored the practice, obsolete for over a hundred years, of the president personally addressing the legislature. This act was highly popular; 'it restored the president's initiative in law-making, and established a relation between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue'¹ (Congress is at one end, the Executive Mansion, generally called the White House, where the president lives, at the other).

Two big legislative acts made Wilson's first presidency memorable. One was a new tariff; the other was the Federal Reserve Act. The Underwood Tariff ^{A Lower} of 1913 (introduced by the Democrat Senator ^{Tariff.} Oscar Underwood of Alabama) replaced the high 'Payne-Aldrich' Tariff, which President Taft, not altogether willingly, had signed in 1909. The Underwood Tariff was the lowest that had come into force since the Civil War. 'Unfortunately it never had a proper test. The European War so deranged American economic life as to bring on business depression in the winter of 1914-15, which was followed by artificial prosperity.'² When the War was over the Fordney Tariff Act, passed into law under the next Republican presidency (Mr. Harding's), established

¹ Morison, *History of the United States*, ii. 464.
² Morison, *op cit.*, ii. 465.

the highest American tariff wall in order to preserve this prosperity through the time of peace.

The Federal Reserve Act was passed to correct the lack of elasticity in the existing banking system of the United States. These banks are, with very few exceptions, purely local; every town, however small, has one or more banks which operate in that town only. In time of nervousness or panic, such as the year 1907 was, the want of big central and nation-wide financial institutions was greatly felt. The tradition of United States history, however, was against a central bank for the whole country. President Wilson's Federal Reserve Act divided the country into twelve districts; in each district the local banks would subscribe stock to establish a Federal Reserve Bank; and this bank was authorised to issue legal-tender banknotes on the security of traders' bills. The Federal Reserve Bank thus rested on the strength of the ordinary banks of its huge district and could act in time of crisis, or to prevent crisis, in much the same manner as the Bank of England does, or the central bank of a Continental country.

During the Wilson Administration there was also established a Federal income tax, after the necessary amendment of the Constitution had been approved (1913). In labour legislation the Clayton Act, 1914, declared that labour unions, strikes, and picketing were not, as such, illegal. It did not, however, 'like the British Act of 1906, relieve unions from corporate liability for damage caused by their members.'¹

The Panama Canal. In August 1914 the Panama Canal, constructed and owned by the United States Government, was opened to traffic. There was a sharp dispute with the British Government, because in Taft's administration the United States Government had decided to charge the ships of its own citizens using the canal lower tolls than foreign ships. The British Government contended that this was

¹ Morison, *op cit.*, ii. 466.

against the article of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, which exacted that the canal should be open to the trade of all the nations of the world upon equal terms. President Wilson was not convinced that legally this article prevented the United States from giving a preference to its own nationals, so long as it treated all foreign nationals on an equal footing ; but recognising that it is impossible to be too scrupulous about the interpretation of treaties, he waived further argument and signed a bill embodying the British point of view (June 1914). 'Thus the last problem in Anglo-American diplomacy was solved just before the guns began to boom across the Danube.'¹

¹ See Mowat, *The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States* (1925), p. 340.

CHAPTER XX

TURKEY AND THE BALKAN STATES

THE government and the social condition of the Ottoman Empire had not changed much in the last hundred years ; not very much in the last four hundred. A certain number of provinces had broken away or had been detached : Serbia in 1815 ; Greece in 1821-32 ; Roumania in 1856 ; Bulgaria and Cyprus in 1878 ; Egypt in 1881 or earlier. Of these provinces, by the year 1898 only Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Egypt retained even a nominal tie of vassalage. Besides these detached provinces, there were two which under guarantee of certain Powers had a considerable decree of autonomy : the island of Samos, which was under a Prince, nominated by the Sultan and an elected assembly ; and the Lebanon, which had a Christian governor and an elected council. Samos gained its autonomy in 1832, and was guaranteed by Great Britain, France, and Russia. The Lebanon secured its privilege in 1864 as the result of a military expedition sent out by Napoleon III. to put an end to civil war there.

The rest of the huge empire of Turkey-in-Europe and Turkey-in-Asia was governed by the Sultan, who had absolute power, except in so far as he was limited by the religion and customs of Islam, and by the impossibility of supervising his officials. Under the Sultan was the Grand Vizier or chief minister, and some twelve or thirteen ministers of departments ; all the ministers formed, when called together, a Privy Council.

Turkish
Administra-
tion.

The Sublime Porte, a gate of the old palace, Eski Serai, was the name commonly applied to the Turkish Government in its foreign relations. There was in 1898 a 'paper-constitution' which had been promulgated in 1876 by Abdul Hamid immediately after his accession, on the advice of a progressive minister, Midhat Pasha. This constitution, which provided for a Cabinet and Parliament of two Chambers, was only in operation for a few months; it was suspended during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and was not revived when the war was over. The Sultan was also Caliph or head of all the 'Sunni' Mohammedans. Other religions were recognised and were accorded a definite status in the Ottoman Empire, the members of each religion being treated almost as a separate political community. The Orthodox Greek Church was allowed to elect its own patriarch or head, who had a palace at Constantinople, and wielded considerable powers within the Turkish Empire, and was also regarded as the religious head by the Orthodox Church in Greece. The system by which the Turkish Government allowed each religious community or *millet* to have its own separate privileges was a means of keeping the Christian sects divided from each other. *Divide et impera* is an ancient secret of empire. The system has its good side, in so far as it stimulated each *millet* to manage its own affairs as capably as it could. The Christian communities maintained schools for their own members; and thus there was a greater amount of popular education in Turkey than would normally have been expected in a country so ill-governed.

Of the Christian subjects of the Porte, the most unfortunate were the Armenians. Under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, the Armenians and all the other Christian subjects of the Sultan promised reforms; and the Powers acquired a right of supervising the execution of the Sultan's promises. The Armenians, however, the majority of whom were in a

The Religious
Question in
Turkey.

The
Armenians.

remote region south of the Black Sea, were practically at the mercy of the Turk. Terrible massacres of Armenians took place in 1890, 1894, 1895, and 1896. Protests were made to the Sultan by the British, French, and Russian Governments, who joined together for this purpose in what was called an 'Armenian Triple Alliance,' but no reforms were obtained, as the Sultan soon noticed that *all* the Powers were not acting together. The miserable condition of the Armenians was not remedied before the World War came and made their position still worse.

An outlying portion of the Turkish Empire, favourably situated for intervention on the part of the Mediterranean Powers, was the island of Crete. Under two

Crete.

Turkish Acts called the Organic Statute of 1868 and the Pact of Halepa in 1878, the Cretans were promised certain administrative concessions; and as the island was often visited by British and French travellers (and also by naval squadrons) the concessions were, on the whole, put into effect. It was inevitable, however, that the Christian Cretans (who were about double the number of the Mohammedans) should feel strongly the desire of being united to the Greeks of independent Greece. In 1896 an insurrection broke out in Crete; and in 1897 Greece made war upon Turkey with the object of freeing the island. The Turks, however, defeated Greece in a short, decisive campaign in Thessaly; and Greece was glad to be saved further losses by the mediation of the Powers.

Though Greece was defeated and could do nothing for Crete, the islanders continued in chronic insurrection. The British, French, Italian, and Russian Governments sent their Mediterranean squadrons to occupy the ports of the island. Turkey was persuaded to withdraw her troops, and a Christian governor, Prince George, who was a son of the King of Greece, was appointed by the Powers to administer the island, with the title of High Commissioner. Thus Crete was, in effect, lost by Turkey. Prince George was High Commissioner until 1906. He was then succeeded

by another statesman from Greece, M. Zaïmis. In 1913, during the Balkan War, when Turkey was suffering one defeat after another, Greece quietly annexed Crete.

The Turkish province of Macedonia, like Crete, had the guarantee of reform under the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, with very little result. Between 1895 and 1903 there was unrest in Macedonia, and ^{The} ^{Macedonian} a movement demanding autonomy and a ^{Question.} Christian governor. The Macedonians themselves, however, were divided between those who regarded themselves as Greek or Serbian or Bulgarian or even Roumanian (Vlach, *i.e.* Wallachian). In 1903 Lord Lansdowne, British Secretary of State, declared in a dispatch to the British ambassador at Constantinople that 'the condition of the population in this portion of the Turkish Empire has become almost intolerable.'¹ On October 2, 1903, however, the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorff, and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Goluchowski, meeting at Mürzsteg in Styria, drafted a scheme of reform for Macedonia which was accepted by the other Powers. Under this scheme Austrian and Russian officials were attached to the staff of the Turkish Inspector-General in Macedonia; and the province was divided into five police districts with foreign officers in the gendarmerie in each district. Thus, Austrian police officers took charge of the gendarmerie in the district of Uskub, Russians Salonika, Italians Monastir, French Seres, British Drama. Germany took no part in this system of reform. The system did some good down to the time of the Young Turk Revolution.

This event occurred in the year 1908. It aroused great hopes in Western Europe at the time. Soon it began to cause great disappointment; but it must be held to be the beginning of that movement for reform from within which has created the modern Turkish state of to-day.

The inefficiency of the Hamidian régime, its impervious-

¹ *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, v. 51.

ness to any ideas of improvement or progress, convinced a number of keen army officers and civilians that Turkey required for salvation the complete overthrow of the old system. The Young Turks—a name suggested by the ‘Young Italians’ and ‘Young Germans’ of the time of Mazzini—had for long had an organising committee. This, the ‘Committee of Union and Progress,’ had started among some Turkish subjects living abroad, at Geneva, about 1891, but by 1908 it was located at Salonika. In this flourishing port, almost as cosmopolitan as Constantinople, the Committee drew into its circle officers of the Turkish army corps there. The unrest in Macedonia had flared up again, and there seemed a likelihood that Austria might intervene. The Committee of Union and Progress decided to forestall Western intervention by proclaiming, on July 22, the restoration of the Constitution of 1876. The officers of the Macedonian army corps (the most energetic was Major Enver Bey) and garrisons were mainly on the Committee’s side. Abdul Hamid II. gave in, and on July 23 (1908) decreed the restoration. Elections, without distinction of religion, were immediately held, and in due course the Senate and Chamber of Deputies met at Constantinople. Kiamil Pasha, the Liberal Cypriote, became Prime Minister; it was announced that the Hamidian spy-system was swept away for ever. In April 1909 Abdul Hamid and officers of the old régime attempted a *coup d’état* or counter-revolution, but the Salonika army corps, under General Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, marched to Constantinople. Abdul Hamid II. was deposed and placed in easy confinement. A brother, Mohammed V., was set up in his place as a Constitutional monarch. Although the new régime made many mistakes and was guilty of cases of oppression, Turkey never lost the tradition or habit of Parliamentary Government thus inaugurated, although there was a great deal of the working of the Committee of Union and Progress ‘behind the scenes.’

Out of the Young Turk Revolution came four first-rate rises: the Prince of Bulgaria proclaimed his complete independence from Turkey; Austria-Hungary ^{The Balkan} annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; Russia ^{League.} tried to open the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to warships; and the Balkan States formed a league among themselves and made war upon Turkey. All these things together helped further to accentuate international irritation and distrust, and to increase the tension, and so contributed to the great explosion of the European war.

Bulgaria, autonomous but tributary to the Sultan since 1878, had never paid any of the sums due, although it had continued to acknowledge the Sultan's suzerainty in theory. As a strong Constitutional ^{Ferdinand and Bulgaria.} Turkey might take steps to put its claims into effect, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed complete independence on October 5, 1908. Turkey protested, but, on the mediation of Russia, agreed to accept compensation in the form of arrears of tribute for which Russia advanced the money on behalf of Bulgaria.

On October 8, the Austro-Hungarian Government announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These Turkish provinces, inhabited by a population partly Mohammedan, but in the majority ^{Crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina.} Christian, had been occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, according to the terms of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Under this treaty, Austria-Hungary had also the right of putting garrisons into the narrow strip of territory, called the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, which separated Serbia from Montenegro, and which had a road and railway leading towards Mitrovitza and Southern Macedonia, the valley of the Vardar and Salonika. The Treaty of Berlin fully maintained in theory Turkish sovereignty over Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. The cool announcement by Austria-Hungary on October 8, 1908, that she was completely annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina (but evacuating the Sanjak, leaving

Turkey sole master there), was simply the naked repudiation of a European treaty. It is true that the time was ripe for a change in the conditions under which Austria-Hungary held Bosnia-Herzegovina; and such a change could, without doubt, have been obtained with the consent of all the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Berlin, sitting in conference. It is impossible to say exactly why Count Aehrenthal, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, preferred to *brusquer* the annexation by suddenly facing Europe with the fact of annexation, in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin. Had he asked for the meeting of a European conference and put a proposal for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina before it, he would have obtained what he wanted, but at the cost of some concession to some other Signatory Power; to Russia (who wanted to have the right of sending warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles); possibly also to Serbia, who would have been awarded some compensation, and rightly, because Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria was annexing, contained a majority of people of Serb race. The violent breach of the Treaty of Berlin by a Great Power such as Austria-Hungary was a terrible shock to the good faith, the obligation to respect treaties, on which European peace depended. It provoked a war-crisis between Russia and Serbia on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary on the other, which (though it ended peacefully with Russia giving way) left Austro-Serbian and Austro-Russian relations terribly disturbed. Thus the Austrian Government in 1908 brutally and deliberately, in pursuit of a particular object, risked arousing a European war. It was to act in the same way in 1914, in spite of the fact that Russia, having given way once, was practically certain not to give way on the second occasion. A Great Power cannot (or could not as public affairs were understood in those days) accept a humiliation twice within a few years, and at the hand of the same neighbour. The German Emperor emphasised this humiliation, saying in a speech

to the City Council of Vienna that he had supported his ally, 'taking his stand in shining armour by the side of your most gracious sovereign.'

The state most affected by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was Serbia, for the annexed provinces were largely inhabited by people of the Serb race. Serbia, since winning her freedom from the Turks at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, had had nine princes or kings (the title of 'kingdom' was assumed in 1882). Of these nine sovereigns two belonged to the Karageorgevich line, the rest were Obrenoviches, who held the succession to the throne without interruption from 1859. In 1889 King Milan Obrenovich, an able ruler, a firm supporter of a policy of good relations with Austria, abdicated in favour of his son Alexander. Milan thereafter was for a time commander-in-chief of the Serbian army under his son; but he was also much in Vienna, enjoying the luxuries of that magnificent Imperial city; he died there in 1901.

In 1903 King Alexander Obrenovich suspended the Constitution. This naturally caused dissatisfaction. He had also lost prestige through his marriage (1900) with Madame Draga Mashin, the widow of an engineer. There were no children of the marriage. In the night of June 10, 1903, a group of military conspirators forced the doors of the palace in Belgrade and murdered the king and queen. The head of the Karageorgevich line, who had been living abroad most of his life, was proclaimed King Peter I. The dreadful murders caused a breach of diplomatic relations for a time between Serbia and Great Britain and between Serbia and France. With the last of the Obrenoviches there also came to an end the policy of *apaisement*, of good relations, with Austria. King Peter, in the circumstances of his accession to the throne, was bound to pursue a nationalist policy away from Austria.

When the violence of Balkan history is mentioned and criticised, it must also be borne in mind that the Balkan

peoples, during the time that they were under the domination of the Turks, were in a condition of mediæval misery and ignorance, or worse ; and that when they gained their freedom they were suddenly called to conform to the standards of a modern world to which they were not used. This reflexion, however, cannot excuse assassinations, the outstanding blemish on Balkan society. In some, doubtless small, but violent sections of the population there has been, it appears, almost a cult of political murder, and assassins have been celebrated with anniversary orations and memorial tablets. The terrible events of 1903 in Serbia were an outstanding example.

A Balkan state which had never lost its freedom was Montenegro, the Black Mountain. This little principality was separated from Serbia by the Sanjak of Montenegro. Novi Bazar, and had no access to the sea until in 1878 it acquired Antivari, at the Congress of Berlin. In 1881 another small strip of Adriatic coastland was added, at Dulcigno, ceded by Turkey after considerable pressure from the Powers. The Montenegrins were of the same race as the Serbs, but in their rugged mountain territory had maintained their freedom when the rest of Serbia fell before the Turks. Until 1851 the Prince of Montenegro was the bishop. The see was kept in the ruling family, the Petrovich ; and as bishops in the Orthodox Greek Church do not marry, the succession passed from uncle to nephew. In 1851 the succession was converted into an ordinary lay system ; the head of the House of Petrovich was no longer a priest. From 1860 down to the World War the ruler of Montenegro was Prince Nicholas, who in 1910 took the title of King.

The largest of the Balkan States was Greece, which had been an independent kingdom since 1832, at first under a prince of the House of Bavaria, Otto, but since 1863 under a prince from Denmark, who was called George I. Like George III. of England, King George I. of Greece was a farmer, a good husband and

father, and a careful administrator. He was brother-in-law to the Tsar of Russia, the German Emperor, and the King of England. These high dynastic connections led to a frequent interchange of visits of royal princes between Athens and the great capitals of Europe, and brought also to Greece a good deal of political support from abroad. The antiquities of Athens and of the rest of Greece also attracted scholars and travellers from all over Europe; and some of these, like the Homeric scholar Schliemann and the mediæval historian Finlay, spent much of their lifetime in the country. Easily accessible by sea to the rest of Europe, powerfully attractive through the eloquent memorials of ancient Greece, on the threshold of an enchanting interior—Sparta, Delphi, Olympia, Thermopylae—Athens was another Rome, an eternal city, both national and international. Down to the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, in which Greece recklessly plunged through excitement over the Cretan Question, the political and economic progress of the country was well sustained. The war checked this progress, and opened a period of internal unrest which continued until Venizelos became Prime Minister in 1910.

Political unrest extended itself to the Army. A Military League (or political union of officers) was formed which presented demands to the Government, bringing about among other things the resignation or dismissal of the Crown Prince (afterwards King Constantine) from his command in the Army. The Royal Family at this time (1910) was very unpopular in Greece. A helpless Government and an insubordinate corps of officers were reducing Greek politics to chaos, when King George, in October 1910, offered the position of Prime Minister to Venizelos, hitherto known as one of the leading Cretan patriots. He had actually come to Athens from Crete to act as a kind of adviser to the Military League. As Prime Minister, however, Venizelos soon won an extraordinary position of ascendancy over the people. Officers

The Military
League and
Venizelos.

were forbidden to take part in politics. The Military League was induced to dissolve itself (1911), and the Crown Prince was restored to his position in command of the Army. By the time the Balkan War broke out in 1913, it was plain to all that Greece, under Venizelos, had made extraordinary progress.

Bulgaria became a state in 1878, after centuries in which Bulgarian nationality had disappeared under Turkish rule. A Peasant State. The English writer on public affairs, Edward Dicey, visited the new state, and published an interesting book on it under the title of *Bulgaria, the Peasant State*, in 1895. Hardworking, frugal, honest, and taciturn, the Bulgarian peasant-farmers presented a picture of contentment and of substantial material progress. There were no aristocracy, and few bourgeoisie. In their political tranquillity the Bulgarian people were in striking contrast to the Greeks and Serbs, so keenly, it might almost be said, so passionately interested in politics. Gradually, however, Bulgaria developed a political class, chiefly lawyers. The first Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, abdicated in 1886, owing to opposition of Alexander III. of Russia to his régime. A new prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, was elected by the Bulgarian National Assembly, the *Sobranýe*, in 1887. He was then twenty-six years of age.

The dominating personality in Bulgaria down to 1894 was Stefan Stambolov. He was born in 1854, and was educated in Russia, along with some other Bulgarian youths, at the expense of the Russian Government. He served with a Bulgarian battalion in the Russian army in the war against Turkey in 1877-78. After the establishing of the Bulgarian state, he became the right-hand man of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and helped to carry through the internationally dangerous union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in 1885. When Prince Alexander abdicated in 1886, Stambolov arranged for the election of Ferdinand of Coburg. As Premier from 1887 to 1894 he held almost despotic power, and was eminently successful in

promoting good relations with the Powers of Europe and in developing Bulgaria's resources. Good roads were made, a system of national education was established, and Bulgaria was freed from the tutelage of Russia. Prince Ferdinand, however, found Stambolov at last too masterful, and made him resign in 1894. The ex-Premier had made many enemies, and was a marked man. In 1895 he was murdered in Sofia.

After Stambolov's retirement, Ferdinand, though he had a Prime Minister and Cabinet, kept much power in his hands. His proclamation of himself as King in October 5, 1908, which brought about the disappearance of the last vestiges of dependence upon Turkey, seems to have strengthened his position both at home and abroad. With the help of J. D. Bourchier, correspondent of the *Times*, who had gained a position of extraordinary influence in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Government made (or rather helped to make) the Balkan League in 1912.

The genesis of the highly important, although short-lived Balkan League has never been fully explained. Until 1912 the Balkan States had disputed, although they had not gone so far as to fight, over their competing claims to Macedonia, which was still held by the Turks. Probably the 'Libyan' or Tripoli War of Italy against Turkey gave the final impulse to a movement for Balkan union.

The chief power in Italian politics since 1903 had been held by Signor Giolitti, although he was not always in office. The Prinetti-Barrès Notes of 1902 (see p. 153) had brought Italy and France together, and practically assured French diplomatic support to Italy in any undertaking to incorporate Tripoli. In September 1911 the Government of Signor Giolitti presented an ultimatum to Turkey, after much friction over questions of Italian trade in Tripoli. The ultimatum was followed by war, in which the Italians conquered Tripoli, and secured it by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed with Turkey on October 18, 1912.

The Balkan Governments may have thought that the Turkish Empire was on the point of breaking up; they naturally would wish to be prepared for such an event, and to be in a position to forestall other Powers from monopolising the division. On March 13, 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia signed a treaty of alliance; and on May 29 a Greco-Bulgarian treaty was signed. The object of the League was the solution of the Macedonian Question, by taking Macedonia from the Turk and dividing it among themselves. Unfortunately the treaties did not make perfectly precise the area of Macedonia which was to go to each ally in the event of a successful war. The actual cause alleged by the allies for the war was the non-fulfilment by Turkey of Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878—the article which stated that the Porte would introduce into Turkey-in-Europe rules analogous to those which had been established in Crete.

The war was opened by Montenegro on October 8, 1912, with an advance into the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. This was the region, between Serbia and Montenegro, which Austria had garrisoned from 1879 to 1908, and had then evacuated on annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Had the Austrians remained in the Sanjak, the Montenegrins and Serbs would not have joined there. Very hard fighting ensued on three fronts, and on each the Turks (to the surprise of Europe) were defeated: by the Bulgars at Kirk Kilisse on October 24; by the Serbs in the same month at Kumanovo; by the Greeks near Elassan, also in October. These victories brought about the capture of Uskub by the Serbs, and of Salonika by the Greeks. Terrible battles at Lule Burgas at the end of October resulted in victory for the Bulgarians. The Turks evacuated Thrace, except Macedonia; and the Bulgarians marched through to the Chatalja lines, which are only about twenty-five miles from Constantinople. Adrianople and the Chatalja lines were successfully held by the Turks; the Bulgarian advance

went no further. All Macedonia, however, had been lost by the Turks.

The history of Turkey's wars in 1878, 1912, and 1914 shows the same thing in each case, namely, extreme defeat and the prospect of the loss of everything, but finally a recovery of territory owing to dissensions among European states.

By the end of the year 1912 Turkey had lost everything in Europe except Yanina in northern Greece, Scutari in Albania, Adrianople in Thrace, the Gallipoli Peninsula, and Constantinople. An armistice was concluded early on December 3, 1912, and the belligerents met in London to consider terms of peace. The negotiations, however, made little progress. Fighting was resumed on February 3, 1913. The Greeks captured Yanina on March 5. The Bulgars, along with a Serbian army that had lately come to assist them, took Adrianople on March 20. The Montenegrins took Scutari on April 22.

Meanwhile, although the belligerents had been unable to come to terms in London, a Conference of Ambassadors of the Powers, meeting under the chairmanship of The Enos-Midia Line. Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at London, was more successful. It agreed, in consultation with the representatives of the belligerents, on a treaty, which was signed by Turkey on the one hand, and by Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro on the other, on May 30, 1913. Turkey-in-Europe was reduced to the territory east of a line drawn from Enos on the Aegean to Midia on the Black Sea. All the Turkish territory west of this line, except Albania, was to be divided among the states of the Balkan League in accordance with treaties previously made between them.

The Conference of London was a great triumph of the principle of concerted action among the Great Powers. The effect of its decisions and agreements was that Greece was to have Southern Macedonia (including Salonika and the Peninsula of Mount Athos) and most of the islands of

the Aegean ; Bulgaria was to have Thrace and Adrianople ; Serbia was to have Northern Macedonia and part of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, but not a port on the Adriatic ; Montenegro was to have the rest of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, but not Scutari. The Powers decided that Albania should be an independent kingdom ; this plan was considered to be the best way out of the rivalry between Serbia, Austria, and Italy for this piece of the Adriatic coastland and hinterland. The Conference of London thus made peace between the warring states, and prevented war between Austria and Russia over Albania (for Russia was originally supporting the Serbian claim to an Adriatic port, which Austria would never allow.

Unfortunately, the treaty was never fully carried into effect. The Bulgarians had made more sacrifices during The Second Balkan War. the war than they had expected to do. The Serbs had been baulked by Austria of their coveted port on the Aegean. The Bulgarian and Serbian Governments therefore fell to disputing over their compensations. Suddenly, on June 29, 1913, the Bulgarian army launched an attack on the Serb line in Macedonia. Greece supported Serbia in this, the Second Balkan War. A frightful though brief war ensued within what had been the Balkan League. It was suddenly terminated by the intervention of Roumania, which had been only a spectator of the First Balkan War.

Roumania, north of the Danube (except for a small coastal strip called the Dobruja, south of the river), had been under the same prince, Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, since 1866. It was recognised as a kingdom in 1881. By 1913 it was a substantial and prosperous state. The intervention of Roumania in the Second Balkan War, whatever the motives, had the effect of bringing the dreadful struggle to a speedy end. The Roumanian army, having crossed the Danube, was marching, unresisted, upon Sofia, when Bulgaria capitulated. A conference of the Balkan States and Roumania met at Bucharest ; peace

was made by the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913. Bulgaria emerged embittered and humiliated; naturally she was not able to make good her claim against Serbia for a piece of Macedonia; and she had to cede a piece of territory to Roumania, to be joined to the Dobruja, as indemnity for Roumania's costs in the war. Worse than all this, the Turks, during the Second Balkan War, had marched into the Bulgarian prize, Adrianople, and now kept it. The Enos-Midia line was disregarded; the Turks now held most of Thrace again.

The Peace Treaty which the Conference of London had arranged on May 30 was thus torn up, and the Balkan region was given over to the old hates and rivalries. One important decision, however, that issued from the Conference of London was the resolution to establish a kingdom of Albania, designed to be a buffer state between Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and in a sense between Austria and Italy, all of whom had desires for this region.

CHAPTER XXI

EUROPE BEFORE THE WAR

ON August 1, 1914, when the Great War began, a break was made in the continuous development of Europe; a violent alteration occurred in a historical process which had been comparatively peaceful for a hundred years—for there had been no 'general war' since the fall of Napoleon in 1814.¹ The historian Maitland used to say that English mediæval history was divided at 'the red line of the Norman Conquest.' So it should be said that the modern history of Europe is divided at the red line of the Great War.

It was on the whole a peaceful Europe, pleasant to live in, which embarked on a course of systematic self-destruction (fortunately not completed) in August 1914. There is a responsibility for the outbreak of war, a responsibility which the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and the German ultimatum to Russia, would seem to place upon the Central Powers. The condition which made war likely (although not inevitable, for statesmanship had been averting it for years) was the existence of great armaments; and these had been in existence for nearly half a century. Standing armies are still older, but 'the nation in arms,' in which all the men of military age are systematically trained for war, dates from about the year 1870. The Franco-German War ended with the creation of a great German Empire and with the defeat and dismember-

¹ The brief campaign of July 1815 did not amount to a general war, although it would inevitably have become such if Napoleon had won the Battle of Waterloo.

ment of France. A great fear settled upon Europe. The crushing force of the German army, a nation in arms, had been a revelation to all peoples and governments. Any nation any day might be overwhelmed by the mass and precision of up-to-date armaments. Therefore one nation had to be armed as well as any other. The best armaments, however, might not avail against a surprise attack. Success could only be assured by an army's 'getting its blow in first.' Therefore great armaments involved a constant pressure upon every country in time of crisis to anticipate a probable or possible attack by itself attacking. The stakes—success or total destruction—were too great to brook delay. Thus the great armaments made peace frightfully precarious. It is to the credit of European statesmanship that the 'Armed Peace,' 1871-1914, lasted so long.

Added to the tension caused by the existence of huge, high-powered armies, in continual training for war, there was a bitter naval rivalry. This was a ques- International
tion that concerned Germany and Great Britain. Rivalry.

Since 1890 the German Empire had been building up a considerable navy; from the year 1898 the 'pace' had become intense. The German navy, by the year 1908, was a force of remarkable striking power; and every subsequent year added to its strength. The British Government viewed the naval effort of Germany with dislike and indeed with something like indignation. They felt, in the first place, that Great Britain, with a population that drew its food from overseas, absolutely depended upon sea-power; and that, secondly, the German navy could only be aimed at Great Britain, for any other war in which Germany could be involved (against Russia and France) would be settled on land. It would not be correct to say that the British feared the German navy, because (among other reasons) they knew that they were wealthy enough to construct more ships than the Germans, and so could always keep a substantial margin of superiority. They

did, however, greatly object to being forced by the Germans to spend, quite needlessly, the vast sums of money required for this additional construction, which did not alter the ratio of strength between the two countries in the least. It seemed to the British Government to be a piece of common sense to propose to the German Government that the strength of the two navies should be 'stabilised.' It was scarcely to be expected, of course, that the German Government would tie its hands by an agreement of years ; but it was not unreasonably hoped that they might adopt a 'naval holiday.' This was what Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, put forward in 1912.
The Naval Question. He stated in a public speech that if Germany laid down one new ship for construction, Great Britain would lay down two ; and if Germany forbore to lay down a new ship, Great Britain would forbear to lay down. The German Government made no variation in its announced programme of naval construction. The mission which Lord Haldane undertook in the same year in order to discuss some possible naval agreement had no result.

The truth concerning the Naval Question as between Germany and England seems to be this. Each navy would probably be about equally efficient. The British navy would always be bigger, and therefore the German navy could not expect to defeat it. In the last resort, therefore, the British Government would not shrink from accepting a German challenge to war. There were, however, navy questions of national importance to both countries, but not quite important enough to fight about. When such a question came up, the British Government could be expected to give way diplomatically, rather than risk a war. This was the reason why the German navy was called by Admiral Tirpitz a 'risk navy.'

In the last years of peace there was a feeling of *malaise* all over Europe. Every European Power was hastily strengthening its armaments, as if it were working against time. Russia was constructing a great system of

railways, equally suited for commercial or strategical purposes. France was increasing her army, despite a stationary population, by converting the two-year period of conscript service into a three-year period. The British Government was doing everything that it could to popularise its voluntary Territorial Force; and it was only deterred from seriously considering plans to introduce universal military service by the apprehension that Germany might choose the moment of the delicate transition from a voluntary to a compulsory system to make war. The German Government itself (1913) made a special 'capital levy' (a thing which by its nature can only be done once in a long while) for military expenditure, and therefore it must have apprehended war as not unlikely to occur in the near future. The Austrian Government, in the first half of 1914, raised a big loan (in foreign countries, for Austria herself had little capital for investment). This loan went upon military expenditure. Events, although no one could say exactly why, seemed to be so obviously moving towards a great European war, that Mr. Wilson, the new President of the United States, sent his friend and confidant, Colonel House, to visit the chief European Governments and to urge them to maintain the peace. House found the British Government in what appeared to him to be a reasonable frame of mind; but after visiting Germany, he reported to Mr. Wilson: 'It is militarism run stark mad.'¹

Nationalism was the most disturbing factor in Europe. The Italians who lived under the Austrian flag were, sometimes violently, claiming to have opportunities for national expression, for instance, by demanding to have a university with all instruction carried on in the Italian tongue at Trieste. The Austrians, on their side, were not very nationalistic (predominant people seldom are); never-

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, edited by C. Seymour (1926), i. 249 (May 29, 1914).

theless they reacted against the assertion of Italian nationalism by more completely 'Germanising' their universities; for instance, Italian professors at Innsbruck were relieved of their posts. They were not exactly expelled; they were pensioned off.

The popularity in Germany of the German navy and of the naval law for further construction was really due to nationalism, which itself is sometimes due to a feeling of inferiority. Being a new empire, with no ancient traditions of grandeur, Germany, conscious of this, tried to convince itself of greatness by 'building up' against the great traditional ruler of the sea.

The Pan-Slav movement was another and one of the most powerful and pervasive disturbing national influences.

Pan-Slavism. Nobody knows what the word 'Pan,' when joined on to a racial adjective, means; it does, however, definitely imply the assertion of a racial 'ego' against other races, and it usually springs from the fact or appearance of subjection or inferiority to some other race. Slavs for centuries had been politically subject to Turks, Germans, or Austrians. 'Culturally' they were less advanced than the Nordic or Latin races, probably because of their long term of political subjection. All Slavs accordingly asserted their racial communion with each other, agitated against alien domination (for instance, against Austrian rule), and proclaimed the greatness of the political and cultural destiny of the Slav race. Russia, the premier Slav state, was naturally regarded by her own intelligentsia and by all the other Slavs as the head of this movement. The Russian headship of a Pan-Slav movement which obviously endangered the Habsburg Monarchy was bound to be a disturbing thing in the tense international system of Europe. Besides the Pan-Slav there was a Pan-German movement which, among the sentimental German peoples, encouraged an unreflecting nationalism and maintained the unfortunate emphasis upon 'navalism,' upon Germany's place on the blue waters.

Great Britain was profoundly disturbed all through the year 1913 and the first six months of 1914. Since 1906 a Liberal Administration had been in office. After a long period of powerlessness, the Liberals had been returned to Parliament at the General Election of January 1906 with a huge majority. It was only natural that they should use their new-found and very substantial power to pass into law measures in which they were deeply interested, and which they believed to be long overdue. The result was the introduction of a large mass of highly contentious legislation, against which the Conservative Opposition in Parliament fought stubbornly but vainly. As one by one Bills, on the principles of which feelings were deeply divided, were passed into law by the relentless exercise of the Government's great majority, the emotions of the Opposition and of its supporters became steadily more inflamed. It is doubtful whether it was statesmanlike of the Liberal Government to use its power quite so uncompromisingly, although it was not unnatural. Certain it is that by the end of the year 1913 the Conservative or Unionist elements in the United Kingdom had become embittered, and were feeling even violently aroused. The Parliament Act and the Irish Home Rule Bill especially touched them to the quick, and they even began to speak guardedly but quite openly of a possible recourse to armed resistance. If the Liberals are to be blamed for using the automatic stroke of their great majority to pass measures which, in the view of the Opposition, pressed upon the limit of minority acquiescence, the Conservatives (the party of order) are also to be blamed for invoking the monstrous spirit of armed resistance to the law. The Army itself was infected with the idea of hostility to the Government, and officers whose duty was to obey the civil power, talked of putting on their tunics for the last time. Whether this inflamed situation in the United Kingdom had any repercussion on the Continent, it is

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impossible to say in the absence of any exact study of the 'psychology of the crisis of 1914.' Continental statesmen were watching the situation in Great Britain and Ireland. Subject to nervousness themselves because of their own domestic and international anxieties, they were probably influenced subtly by the high-pressure of public feeling among the English, the people whom they had always counted upon to show phlegm, *sangfroid*. The English statesmen themselves were suffering from the high-pressure of public feeling. It cannot be maintained that their domestic anxiety unfitted them to deal with the international crisis which arose in 1914, but it did not make their task easier. They were suffering from the malaise which affected the whole of Europe, but from which, owing to their insular position, the British might have been expected to be free.

There were some influential people—not indeed very many—who had a 'European mind,' whose view and action passed beyond the narrow circle of national interests. Such were Mr. Wilson, who sent Colonel House on a mission in May 1914; Sir Max Waechter, a German nationalised as a British subject, who used his leisure and his fortune in the years before the War in travelling over the Continent, interviewing statesmen and pressing upon them his plan for a 'United States of Europe'; such were the international lawyers, Elihu Root and Lord Phillimore, who were looking forward to the meeting of a third Hague Conference in the summer of 1914. William Jennings Bryan, Mr. Wilson's Secretary of State, emotional, superficial, rhetorical, had a plan which, as it happened, struck the note of the possible for averting general war. This plan was to conclude treaties between the United States of America, on the one hand, and each of the other Powers on the other; these treaties were to provide that no war should take place in consequence of a dispute between the United States and a Signatory State until a Commission had investigated the dispute and

reported on it; the Commission was bound to report within a year of the time at which its investigation had begun. Thus, in practice, there would be a 'cooling-off' period of one year from the beginning of a crisis.¹ If all the Powers had accepted Mr. Bryan's proposed treaties, and if (as Mr. Bryan hoped) his example had been followed and they had made similar 'cooling-off' treaties among themselves, the Great War could scarcely have occurred. No two peoples are likely to go to war if a year has elapsed since the opening of a crisis. 'Bryan Treaties' were made between the United States and all the Great Powers except Germany, but no similar treaties were made between any of the European Powers.

Socially, Europe was stable before the War. The existing order of society, based upon the principle of private property and upon the leadership of the middle classes, was indeed questioned by individuals and parties, but was not seriously menaced. There was in every country a Socialist party or group which aimed at bringing private property, or certain categories of private property, into national possession or control, by peaceful, legislative means. This programme was not within sight of achievement in 1914, judging by the numbers of the Socialist group or parties in State legislatures. Revolutionary Socialism was far weaker than parliamentary Socialism. It existed probably everywhere to some extent, but nowhere, except perhaps in Russia, was it represented by more than a powerless fraction of the people. In Italy there were, it seems, some hidden groups of anarchists. In France the terrible rising of the Communards in 1871 had revealed an ugly stratum in French society, and the Syndicalist agitations of 1909, 1910, and 1911 seemed to show that the party of violence was not extinct.

¹ For an example of a Bryan Treaty see Martens, *Nouveau Recueil Général des Traités (troisième série)*, 1929, vol. xix. p. 59 (Treaty between the United States and Holland, Dec. 18, 1913).

Syndicalism, the chief exponent of which was Georges Sorel (a French civil engineer, particularly active as a writer in the years 1895-1908) envisaged the organisation of society by trades. Each guild or *syndicat* of workmen would be self-governing, in politics as well as in industry; and the State, so far as there was to be any State-organisation, would be an association or federation of 'syndicats.' Large numbers of French workmen, especially railwaymen, seem to have been syndicalists. Working men joined together in a *Confédération Générale de Travail*, founded in 1895. They aimed at imposing their views of social organisation upon France not merely by political persuasion, but by means of general 'strikes,' and especially by bringing the systems of transport and communication to a standstill. A particularly serious railway strike occurred in 1910. On this occasion the Prime Minister, M. Briand, took the critical step (certainly only to be justified if it succeeded) of recalling the railwaymen to their posts according to the terms of their military service obligation. The men obeyed the call, and the railways resumed full operations. In addition to strikes, however, there was another means for disorganising the means of transport. This was *sabotage*, a term which suggests a workman's wooden shoe or *sabot* being thrown into the revolving gear of a machine. By tearing up a section of railway line or cutting a signal wire, workmen not averse from violence could *sabotage* a railway system. Sabotage was not part of the official programme of Syndicalism, but it was not altogether uncommon among French Syndicalists. Since the end of 1911, however, the Syndicalists seemed to be less active in France than in the immediately previous years, and appear to have had no influence whatever in the crisis of 1914. Jean Jaurès, who was murdered on July 31, 1914, was a 'State-Socialist,' not a Syndicalist, and was no supporter of violence or revolution.

The German Socialists had a very strong party, highly

organised in the country and the Reichstag, called the Social Democratic party. The leader of this party from 1870 to 1913 was August Bebel, and after that Friedrich Ebert (later, the first President of the German Republic). When the war crisis of 1914 occurred, the German Socialists split into two parties—the Majority, who threw in their lot with the governing class and joined in voting the war credits; and the Minority Socialists, who refused to support the War. Ebert remained with the Majority Socialists. Karl Liebknecht led the secession of the Minority, who inevitably became more hardened and extreme in their views, and ended by adopting sheer Communism. Their numbers, however, were not sufficient to endanger the stability of the State except in the period of national exhaustion immediately after the War.

Even in Russia, where the social structure was probably the least firm among European Powers, the Communist party seemed to have no more chance of influencing events in 1914 than in any previous year. It is doubtful whether Communism was increasing at all in Russia; and with the growth of parliamentary prestige, which would have been expected if peace had continued and given the young Duma scope, Communism might never have come to anything. Only the exhaustion and misery caused by the War, the feebleness of the bureaucracy, and the smallness of the middle classes, made the Communist revolution of 1917 possible in Russia.

A new administration had come into office in 1913 in the United States, and was to have a profound influence upon the future of Europe. Mr. Wilson was a philosopher as well as a man of affairs, and was probably more free from prejudice than any statesman of his age. A student of Burke and Bagehot, he regarded politics as a science not limited by national boundaries. His solution of the Panama Tolls question, his support of the Bryan treaties, his sending Colonel House on a mission to Europe, all prove this. Mr. Wilson was well

Ambassador
Page.

versed in the European situation. Colonel House and Ambassador Page in London sent illuminating reports. At Washington the British ambassador, James Bryce, was a famous public figure.

Page's letters from London to Mr. Wilson were published after the War, and are among the most moving documents connected with that greatest of modern tragedies. Page was magnetic. He quivered like a needle in response to pervasive electrical influences. He felt danger to be in the air, and he described his feelings to the President, and proclaimed his belief in the necessity and the wholesomeness of British-American solidarity. It never seemed to occur to Page to think that if troubles came upon the world, the United States should stay outside them; yet such a view was natural, and was held by many people. It was not, however, held by Mr. Wilson, though he never expressed his attitude with passion like that of Page. This journalist from the Southern States, turned ambassador, clanged like a bell to the strokes of the war machines of Europe.

Lord Bryce brought European fame with him to Washington. He had written the best descriptive book of the United States. He had been for years a member of the British Parliament and a Cabinet Minister. He was a world-wide traveller and interpreter of one nation to another, eloquent with pen and tongue. As ambassador he still travelled, moving over the United States, giving lectures in his lofty, universal, democratic strain. When the Great War broke out, the United States was agitated as it had never been since the Civil War.

In 1914 Europe had a political and territorial system which, if far from ideal, yet suited it passably well. Every state, it is true, clung to the doctrine of absolute State-sovereignty; there was no 'European Areo-pagus' (as Bismarck and his successors continually pointed out). The Powers, however, often acted

James Bryce
at Washing-
ton.

in concert; and the Hague Arbitration Tribunal offered a means for the voluntary settlement of any and every international dispute. There were many Minority questions—of Czechs and Slavs under Austria, Poles under Russia, Prussia, and Austria, Slavs under Turkey. Yet, except for the Christian subjects of Turkey, it can hardly be said that the Minorities were oppressed; their grievances were, on the whole, not very 'clamant.' Political frontiers, in general, corresponded to economic needs. In the absence of a system of European free trade, it was to the advantage of Europe that the Habsburg Monarchy should be able to 'pool' the resources of the large variety of lands included under its rule. Within the territorial frontiers of 1914 the peoples of Europe were growing in prosperity; the blessings of peace were being fruitfully exploited.

It is true that Europe was an armed camp; but armed camps are cheaper than wars; and in spite of huge armaments, wealth was being created quicker than it was being spent. The division of the Powers into two diplomatic groups—the Triplice and the Entente—did not necessarily lead to war. The Triplice and Entente had existed side by side for ten years without fighting. In 1914 the British and German Governments were negotiating agreements which would have constituted a link between the Triple Alliance and Entente groups. These agreements, which were initialled but not yet ratified when the War broke out, concerned the Bagdad Railway and commercial and financial concessions in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Each Government agreed to a reasonable compromise over those subjects; and with these two problems solved, perhaps the Anglo-German Naval Question could have been taken in hand and solved too.

Although Europe had made no progress at all towards disarmament by the year 1914, it had made great strides towards common action through the Concert of Powers

and towards arbitration. It was the refusal of Grey's proposal for a Conference on the European Crisis by the German Government on July 26, and the refusal by the same Government of the Tsar's proposal to refer the dispute to the Hague Tribunal on July 29, that led straight to the World War.

CHAPTER XXII

THE COMING OF THE WAR

THE year 1914 had been completely peaceful down almost to the end of June. International affairs were steadily improving; in particular the tension between Great Britain and Germany, caused by questions of the Navy, the Bagdad Railway, and affairs in Africa, had been greatly eased. Treaties made between Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador at London, were ready, awaiting signature. These treaties would probably have prevented, or at any rate greatly restricted, any colonial rivalry between Great Britain and Germany. There was some trouble concerning Albania, where a new kingdom, carved out of Turkey at the end of the Balkan Wars, was finding difficulty in establishing itself. In other directions the international sky seemed to be clear. Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, reported as the summer went on: 'We have no very urgent and pressing question to preoccupy us in the rest of the world.'

^{A Clear Sky in 1914.}
¹

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated at Sarajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia. The conspiracy had been hatched in Belgrade by a secret society called the Black Hand, a society which had for its aim the separation from Austria of all territories inhabited by members of the Serbian or 'Southern Slav' (Yugoslav) race. The Serbian Government had no part in

^{The Assassinations at Sarajevo.}

¹ *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, xi. 26 (July 6, 1914).

the conspiracy, nor did the Austrian Government accuse it of having any part. What the Austrian Government did assert was that the assassinations came at the end of a long series of provocations, by which agitators of Serbian race (whether living in the kingdom of Serbia or outside it) had been endeavouring to break up the Habsburg Empire. Accordingly the Austrian Government resolved to take steps which would put an end to Serbian or Yugoslav propaganda, and which would establish Austrian prestige and also secure the punishment of all the conspirators.

Unfortunately the Austrian Government decided to do more than this. Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, seems to have determined to present such terms as the Serbian Government would refuse; then Austria would proceed to use her army, and would reduce the Serbian kingdom to impotence. 'He therefore bluntly informed Count Tisza [Hungarian Premier] of *his intention to make the horrible deed at Sarajevo the occasion for reckoning with Serbia.*'¹ It was therefore agreed in the Austrian ministry: 'The demands presented to Serbia must be so far-reaching that their rejection would be a foregone conclusion, and so the way would be prepared for a radical solution through a military attack.'²

Count Berchtold did not act precipitately. His was a cool, calculating policy, to which he held steadily, in spite of all sorts of pressure brought to bear on him to modify it. The only Great Power that did not make any attempt to restrain him was Germany.

Before deciding to take action against Serbia, the Austrian Government consulted the German Government. On July 6, 1914, the German Emperor authorised the Austrian ambassador at Berlin to send the following message to the Emperor Francis Joseph :

¹ *The Coming of the War, 1914*, by B. E. Schmitt (1930), i. 265, quoting the *First Austrian Red Book*, July 1, 1914 (i. 2).

² *Austrian Red Book*, i. 8.

'We might rely on Germany's full support. He must, as he had said, first hear the opinion of the Chancellor, but he did not in the least doubt that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would agree with him, especially in the matter of the action against Serbia. It was his (the Emperor William's) opinion that the action must not be delayed. Russia's action would doubtless be hostile, but he had been prepared for this for years, and should it come to war between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we could be assured that Germany would stand by our side with her accustomed loyalty.'

The Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who was absent from Berlin, returned in the afternoon of the same day (July 6) and agreed with the Emperor's view. Thus Germany explicitly authorised Austria to take drastic action against Serbia, recognising that Russia might intervene with her army, in which case Germany promised to join with Austria in the war. There is no ground for saying that the Austrian Government misled Germany. The German Government, as the Emperor William's telegram states, knew that a European war might easily result from the invasion of Serbia which Germany was authorising Austria to make.

On July 23 the Austrian ultimatum was ready, and was delivered to the Serbian Government in Belgrade. This note declared that 'the painful events of the 28th June last have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy'; and that this movement 'had its birth under the eye of the Serbian Government.' The Austro-Hungarian Government therefore demanded that the Serbian Government should issue a declaration condemning propaganda against Austria-Hungary; and further, that it should suppress a propagandist and revolutionary secret society, remove from its service all officials guilty of propaganda, accept the collaboration in Serbia of

The Ulti-
matum to
Serbia.

Austrian officials for the suppression of the subversive movement, take judicial proceedings against the accessories to the plot of June 28, and admit delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government to take part in these proceedings. These demands were concluded with a statement that 'the Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal [Serbian] Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.' Serbia was thus allowed forty-eight hours in which to decide her fate. Attempts made by Great Britain, France, and Germany to have the time-limit extended proved unavailing.

The reply of the Serbian Government, delivered to the Austrian diplomatic representative at Belgrade just before the expiry of the time-limit, substantially accepted the Austrian demands, except in regard to two points: (1) the Serbian Government stated that it would admit the collaboration in Serbian territory of Austrian officials for suppressing the subversive movement so far as this 'was consistent with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations'; (2) as regards the participation of Austrian delegates in the judicial proceedings against the conspirators, the Serbian Government refused, as the Serbian Constitution made such a thing illegal. The Austrian minister at Belgrade, having read the reply, at once left the city. His instructions from Vienna left him no choice; he was under orders to depart unless the whole ultimatum was accepted.

The Russian Government had made it quite clear to the Austrian, before the ultimatum was sent to Serbia, that Russia would stand by Serbia. Now that the Austrians considered their ultimatum as having been rejected, their next step would be war with Serbia; next, Russia would step in to help Serbia; Germany, in accordance with the Austro-German alliance of 1879, and with her pledge of July 6, 1914, would defend Austria against Russia; France, in accordance with her

alliance-treaty of 1894, would come to the assistance of Russia; and finally, Great Britain, ever friendly with France and Russia owing to the Entente Conventions of 1904 and 1907, would probably intervene on the side of these two Powers. Thus the frightful calamity of a general war would be precipitated. People may blame the system or chain of alliances for thus making the war general; but the alliances would not have resulted in war in 1914 had not Austria decided to invade Serbia, and had not Germany promised to support her in this action, even against Russia and France.

After the withdrawal of the Austrian minister from Belgrade, the Austrians were only waiting until their army-mobilisation could be completed in order to begin action against Serbia. As such action would bring all the 'chain of alliances' into operation, no time was to be lost if world war was to be prevented. If only the disputing Powers could be brought into conference, so that they could talk over the Austro-Serbian or Austro-Russian controversy, a reasonable settlement could be made. States practically *never* fight while they are conferring; and there *is* a reasonable answer to every political question. Therefore on July 26, the day after the Austrians had received the Serbian reply, and had withdrawn their minister from Belgrade, Sir Edward Grey sent out by telegraph to Berlin, Paris, and Rome a proposal for the meeting of a conference (of the German, French, and Italian ambassadors, with Sir Edward Grey), 'to endeavour to find an issue to prevent complications.' Austria, Serbia, and Russia were not to be invited to the conference, because they were already committed to their dispute; but the Powers outside the dispute were to meet and consider possible solutions of the trouble; and while the conference was sitting, 'all active military operations should be suspended.' This would not prevent Austria, Serbia, and Russia from mobilising their troops if they thought fit, but it would prevent them from fighting.

Grey's proposal for a Conference.

The Governments of France and Italy agreed to Grey's proposal for a conference; the German Government refused. The Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, rejected the proposal (July 27) without consulting or even informing the Emperor, who was not in Berlin at the time.¹ Further, on July 25, the day before Grey proposed the conference, the Austrian ambassador at Berlin had telegraphed advice from the German Government to the Austrian Government, 'to go ahead at once and present the world with a *fait accompli*.'²

The Austrians took the advice, and, although their mobilisation would not be complete until August 12, they declared war upon Serbia on July 28. The Russian Government answered this by ordering and announcing a *partial* mobilisation—that is, a mobilisation of Russian troops in the areas opposite the Austrian frontier, but not against Germany.

On the same day, July 29, the Tsar telegraphed to the Emperor William: 'It would be right to hand over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference.' The Tsar meant that the Hague Arbitration Tribunal, a permanent body established in 1899 for the purpose of receiving appeals from disputing states, should be entrusted with an examination of the dispute between Austria and Serbia. The German Government rejected this proposal also, but it evidently knew that it was doing wrong, for it suppressed the Tsar's telegram and did not publish it in the *White Book* issued in Berlin and elsewhere immediately after the outbreak of war.

The actual outbreak of hostilities soon occurred.

On July 30 the Tsar decreed general mobilisation of the Russian army. This was obviously a military threat and a military danger to Germany, who therefore, as a precautionary measure, had a perfect right to mobilise her army too. Mobilisation does *not* mean war,

Proposed
reference to
the Hague
Tribunal.

The Mobil-
isations.

¹ Schmitt, *The Coming of the War, 1914*, ii. 57.

² *Austrian Red Book*, ii. 32.

for it is quite possible under military discipline for each Government to keep its mobilised army on its own side of the frontier. It is only when one army has invaded the territory of the other that war begins. The Tsar understood this, and telegraphed to the Emperor William II. (August 1) that 'these measures (mobilisation) do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate.'

The German Government, however, did not meet the Russian mobilisation with German mobilisation; it met it with an ultimatum which meant immediate war.

At midnight on July 31-August 1, Count Pourtalès, the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, presented to M. Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, an ultimatum demanding that Russia undertake to suspend her mobilisation. Twelve hours were given for reply. Shortly after the twelve hours had expired without any reply being received, Count Pourtalès handed to M. Sazonov a declaration of war (6.45 P.M., August 1, 1914). Thus began the Great European War.

Germany at
war with
Russia and
France.

So far, on August 1, only Serbia, Austria, Germany, and Russia were in the state of war. France, however, under the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance, was certain to join in the struggle. Actually it was the German Government which took the initiative by delivering a declaration of war to the French Government on August 3.

Great Britain was still outside the struggle. Although she was in friendly relations with France and Russia through the Ententes of 1904 and 1907, and although British military and naval staff officers had regularly consulted with French and Russian staff officers, no treaty obligation existed on the side of Great Britain to give military support. On the other hand, Great Britain (along with France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia) was a guarantor of Belgian neutrality under a well-known treaty of 1839, a treaty which, far from being obsolete, had been frequently reconfirmed and acknowledged. The policy of Great Britain towards the European War was quite uncertain,

The Invasion
of Belgium.

and was the subject of much anxious questioning in Germany, France, and Russia, until the afternoon of August 3, when information arrived in London that the German army had invaded the neutral state of Belgium, and was marching through it. An attack upon Belgium involved Great Britain's guarantee of that country; also, obviously, a military occupation of Belgium by a Continental Power was a threat to the security of Great Britain, just as much now as in the days of Louis XIV. or Napoleon. The British Government, accordingly, on the morning of August 4, demanded that Germany, by midnight, should give an assurance to respect Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Goschen, British ambassador at Berlin, went at once to the German Foreign Office and presented this demand, which was at once declined. He found the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg very agitated. The Chancellor said that 'the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word, *neutrality*, a word which in war-time had so often been disregarded—*just for a scrap of paper*, Great Britain was going to declare war on a kindred nation.'¹

Next day all the Great Powers of Europe, except Italy, were at war. Italy, claiming that Austria had violated the Triple Alliance, entered the war in May 1915, on the Entente side. Turkey had joined with Austria and Germany (the 'Central Powers') in October 1914. The United States intervened on the Entente side in April 1917. Before the gigantic struggle was concluded there were altogether some thirty-one states at war; and all the remaining states, the neutrals, though spared from invasion, shared the universal exhaustion and misery.

¹ *Collected Diplomatic Documents* (H.M. Stationery Office, 1915), p. 110.

CHAPTER XXIII

1914: THE CALL TO ARMS

THE peoples of the Entente and the Central Powers went to war for a cause that they deemed just. It is unlikely that both sides in a war can be in the right; yet in the absence of any international body with power to investigate the issue and decide the quarrel, the peoples of each side accepted the views of their Governments, and took up arms.

Although each side believed its cause to be just, although each must admire the devotion and patriotism of the other, yet a historian of the Entente can still hold the view, with complete conviction, that the Western Powers were right. While admitting the hard situation in which Germany frequently found herself between 1890 and 1914, it is fair to hold that Germany was responsible for the war for the following reasons:

Firstly, by insisting on the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1871 Germany made permanent the strained Franco-German relations which ought to have ended when the war of 1870-71 ended. Thus the Treaty of 1871 was not a real peace-settlement; the Germans felt that they required a powerful army to defend it; and because Germany maintained a powerful army, all the other great Continental states had to do so too. Thus Continental Europe from 1871 onwards was an armed camp, the frontiers bristling with bayonets, the great armies kept continually on the strain so that their efficiency could be relied upon. The peoples of Europe were thus for nearly forty-five years in the nervous tension of the 'armed peace.'

Outbreak of
War.

Responsi-
bility for
the War.

Secondly, the German Government, finding most of the uncivilised part of the world already partitioned into colonies of the other Powers, sought to obtain a share by a policy of 'compensation'—that is to say, the Imperial German Foreign Office raised difficulties, for instance, against France in Morocco, against Great Britain in Egypt or Africa, in order that Germany might be 'bought off' by some concession—a coaling-station or some tract of land. An instance of trouble raised in this way was the despatch of the 'Kruger telegram' in January 1896.¹

Thirdly, the German Government refused the offer of a British alliance in 1899.²

Fourthly, Germany supported Austria when the latter Power broke the Treaty of Berlin by suddenly annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908; and when Russia began to make ready to fight Austria, and then drew back, the German Emperor said publicly that Russia had retired because of Germany's 'shining armour'—thus making it almost impossible for Russia ever to retire again in similar circumstances.³

Fifthly, when the naval tension between Germany and Great Britain was particularly high, in 1912 and 1913, the German Government rejected the British offer of a reciprocal 'naval holiday'⁴—that is, a mutual and strictly proportionate relaxation in pace of building warships.

Sixthly, after the Sarajevo murders of June 1914, the German Government, although by no means desiring a European war, promised to support Austria in whatever action she might take against Serbia,⁵ and thus tied its own hands when the general war-crisis arose.

Seventhly, the German Government rejected the British proposal, made on July 26, 1914, for a conference of four Powers (Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy)—a conference which might have averted war, as the Conference of London had done in 1913.⁶

¹ See above, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 147-9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 167-8, 231-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 256-7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

Eighthly, on learning that Russia had (on July 30) ordered a general mobilisation of troops, the German Government replied, not with a counter-mobilisation (which would have been quite fair and which would not *necessarily* have produced war) but with an ultimatum which rendered war absolutely inevitable.

The invasion of Belgium is not part of the charge against Germany for her responsibility in precipitating the war; it is only part of the charge against Germany in respect of the way in which she conducted the war. It was, however, the invasion of Belgium which brought the British people into the war in August 1914; although, even without this, Great Britain would almost certainly have had to come into the war sooner or later.

The call to the colours was answered with equal enthusiasm in every country. In Germany, although the army was fully organised on a conscript basis, large numbers of men who were not due to serve National Enthusiasm. (being too old or too young, or for other reasons) flocked to the recruiting stations. Students threw aside their books, clerks left their offices, apprentices left their trades, and the Ministry of War formed them into special companies—such as students' companies—so that friends should be together, and each man have his own kind about him. Passionate enthusiasm inspired every heart, like the great surge of emotion which uplifted every man and woman in Germany when the war broke out in 1870. Germany, encircled by foes, was in deadly danger; that was enough for them.

In France there was equal determination and devotion, although no cheerfulness, no feeling (as undoubtedly existed in Germany) that the hour of victory as well as The Spirit of France. destiny had struck. For the French knew that they had not the most powerful army in Europe. Russia was on their side, but Russia was a slow mover. The attitude of Great Britain down to August 3 was uncertain. Every Frenchman knew that France would have to bear

the brunt of the massed German attack, at any rate for some months, and that few who went to the front in this period would survive. All the available men—slow, pipe-smoking peasants, wiry *ouvriers* from the factories, dapper, vivacious *bourgeois*—went up to the mobilisation depots rather grimly.

In Great Britain there was excitement, but few misgivings. Nearly every one thought that it would be a short war. 'Imports into Germany will stop; and even if German finance doesn't break down, food will become scarce,' said an acute observer.¹ 'Yes, but there's always a large margin in peace-time, and you don't know how far it will go when a nation is *rationed*,' said his interlocutor warningly. Most people, however, only gave the war three months to last; one—a rather stolid-looking man—had the vision to pierce into the future; this was Lord Kitchener; he said 'three years or more.'

Kitchener's long view and his preparations were to save Britain, save Western Europe, though only by a small margin of victory. The young men recked nothing of this who on that radiant day of August 4 abandoned their homes and holidays, their sports and businesses, and came from every centre and corner of the land to the military depots and offered to serve. Great Britain was not a conscript country; there was no 'drafting.' Apart from the regular army and the reserve, comparatively few could be taken, for there were not the arms nor the uniforms for them, nor even the clerks and books to register their names; they were turned away by the thousand. A few were taken: the time for the rest was not yet come.

On the afternoon of August 3, Sir Edward Grey went to the House of Commons, to make a speech on the crisis. Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador, had just been to see him, to learn, if possible, what the attitude of Great Britain was to be; but Sir Edward had put him

¹ The philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet (died 1923).

off, for everything was still uncertain. In a crowded and hushed House Grey gave a careful account of the relations of Great Britain and France; he read notes which he had exchanged with the French ambassador in 1912 relative to conversations between the British and French General Staffs—notes which explicitly declared that there was no obligation on either party to fight for the other. He went on to say that the French had for some years concentrated their fleet in the Mediterranean and the British theirs in the North Sea. Therefore the British Government felt that they ought to guard the open coasts of France. Accordingly, the Secretary of State had given an undertaking that if the German warships came into the Channel to attack the north coast of France, the British fleet would stop them.

Such a decision on the part of the British Government did not make British participation in the war inevitable, for the German fleet might abstain from attacking the north coast of France—its obvious sphere of operations being the Mediterranean, where it might stop the transport of troops from Algiers and Tunis to Toulon and Marseilles. But quite apart from the maritime question, there was something else which would bring Great Britain into the war—an invasion of Belgium, a state whose existence was necessary to Great Britain's safety, and whose independence Great Britain (along with Prussia, France, Russia, and Austria) had guaranteed. In answer to an official British question about their intentions towards Belgium, France had given an undertaking to respect Belgian neutrality. The German Government had answered evasively, that a direct reply would disclose the German military plan. While Sir Edward Grey was making his speech to the eager and tense audience of the House of Commons, a message was brought to him announcing that German forces had crossed into the neutral state of Luxemburg. He delivered

Grey's
Speech,
August 3.

The Position
of Belgium.

this sensational news to the House. Few who heard it can have thought that neutrality could longer be maintained. It was not until next day, however, that the Foreign Office heard of the German invasion of Belgium. The British ultimatum and declaration of war followed, without any further announcement to Parliament.

On August 4, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, made, on his side, a great explanatory speech, as the British Secretary of State had done on the previous day. He was excited and nervous. The prospect of a European war appalled him, for he was a peaceful and moderate man, statesman-like, though not strong. When he came in the course of his speech to the German invasion of Belgium his honest mind blanched at the prospect: he became confused, but pulling himself together he went straight on with his defence—a lame defence indeed.

‘It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait; we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and who is fighting for his highest possessions can only consider how he is to hack his way through.’

Once their countries were committed to fight, stern critics of policy put aside their criticism and thought only of service. There was, indeed, a small although compact Socialist minority in every country that refused to countenance hostilities. In England a Socialist journal, only a day or two before the British declaration of war, displayed a picture of a great inverted

piece of heavy artillery, towering up above burning houses, while a fat 'Capitalist' smoked a large cigar and watched the conflagration. The inference which was meant to be drawn by the journal's readers was that everybody would suffer from war except the armament firms, and perhaps also that the financiers wanted war so as to make money by it. This was a very superficial view. The European war was a deadly calamity that nobody desired, and presented the prospect of a world in flux, all too likely to be fatal to property and to the very existence of the Western races.

At the shock of war the whole world tottered. It was not only Europe that was shaken. In every British Dominion and Colony men answered the call of the Old Country. Andrew Fisher, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, sent a cabled message to Downing Street, to the effect that Australia was with Great Britain to 'the last man and to the last shilling.' The other Dominions showed equal eagerness.

The British
Overseas
Dominions.

In the United States crowds gathered outside the newspaper offices, expectant for news from Europe, and trying to imagine how an army of Germans looked as they marched over the frontier of Belgium.

The United
States of
America.

Mr. Wilson, President of the United States, was indignant at the violation of Belgium; Colonel House describes the President, scarcely able to restrain his wrath, but curbing himself so as to present an impassive countenance, conformable to his duty as a neutral. Mr. Charles Eliot, formerly President of Harvard University, urged President Wilson to declare war on Germany for the defence of civilisation. Mr. Wilson read the letter to his Cabinet, but felt that no action could be taken. Ex-President Roosevelt spoke and wrote passionately for warlike intervention on behalf of Belgium. Americans stranded in Europe had difficulty in reaching home. Walter Hines Page, United States ambassador at London, worked night

and day in his chancery to relieve them (and to relieve stranded Germans too) and to procure their passages. Meanwhile his heart nearly broke because he could not fight for Britain. He was to be a martyr for the cause of the Western peoples.

CHAPTER XXIV

1914: LIÉGE, NAMUR, CHARLEROI, AND MONS


THE people of Great Britain did not regard their situation as tragic. They felt themselves to be safe owing to what Oliver Cromwell once called their 'ditch,' with the great warships riding thereon. The French, having a land frontier with Germany, and almost a certainty of ruthless invasion, saw the tragic element in their situation quite clearly. But what were their feelings compared with those of the Belgians whose little country was, in a solemn and menacing note of the Germans, pitilessly condemned to military occupation by the strongest and harshest army in Europe? Yet the Belgians never hesitated. Led by their simple, devoted king, a great-hearted monarch, they voted for rejection of the German offer of a price for a way through their territory almost with unanimity in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus Belgium saved her self-respect and did her duty under the Treaty of 1839, at the cost of four years' occupation by the Germans.

Meanwhile great armies were hastening to the assistance of Belgium. General Staffs have to take all possible contingencies into account. As Prussia was one of the parties to the Treaty of 1839 establishing Belgium as a neutral state, it was most likely that she would make a frontal attack upon the French (not the Belgian) frontier, in order to break through and to advance upon Paris. But the French General Staff had also to take into account the possibility that the German armies, in order to avoid costly frontal attacks on the great eastern fortresses—

The Resist-
ance of
Belgium.

The French
Plan, No. 16.

Map of
WESTERN FRONT
1914-18



Verdun, Toul, Épinal, Belfort—might try to slip around their northern end, by going through the neutral state of Belgium. So the French Staff had a plan, called No. 16, which they would put in force to deal with a German advance through Belgium as soon as they could ascertain if the Germans were actually coming that way.

The German General Staff had, on their side, plans prepared for every possible means of attacking France. They were right to do so; it was their business. It was for the statesmen of Germany to decide whether any of the plans were consistent with Germany's political obligations or not. Count von Schlieffen, who (until 1906) was Chief of the Great General Staff after the great Moltke, had made a plan for using the whole of Belgium and its resources as a means of entering in full strength into France. When the Emperor William II. and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg consented to the invasion of Belgium, the Schlieffen Plan was at once put into force. The French detected this movement in time to concentrate the bulk of their troops along part of the Franco-Belgian frontier according to Plan No. 16 of their General Staff. Plan No. 16 only provided for meeting an invasion of France through a corner of Belgium—the corner where the Sambre and Meuse flow near each other before joining at Namur. The German armies, however, swept through Belgium on a broad front with which the French Plan No. 16 was not adequate to deal. The French were caught at a double disadvantage: first, because the German troops came through Belgium at all, against the almost unfortified Franco-Belgian frontier; secondly, because they came through by all the Belgian routes and avoided the chief French concentrations.

It took the Germans nearly three weeks to force their way through Belgium. These three weeks probably saved Europe from German dominion. The first ^{Leman and} serious obstacle was Liège, a city with a great ^{Liège.} circle of powerful and well-designed forts, but not of the most recent type or equipment. Liège was defended by

General Leman and about 30,000 (one division) Belgian troops. Leman was a student-soldier; he had been professor at the Belgian École de Guerre. Years before the war his friends had often heard him speak of the likelihood of a German advance against France through Belgium. When he heard of the Germans crossing the Belgian frontier on August 3, he knew that his hour had struck, and the doom that was prepared for him. The bombardment of the great guns upon the fortresses of Liège began on August 7; it was over by August 15. The forts were shattered, the men killed or disabled at their posts. Leman himself was found in Fort Loncin (the last to be reduced), asphyxiated with the gas of exploding shells. He was taken first as a prisoner to Germany; later he was sent for internment to Switzerland. He returned to Belgium after the war, with his health irretrievably ruined, and died in 1920. This quiet, scholarly soldier had taken the first impact of the massed military resources of Germany, and had stood unflinching against all the unknown terrors of an oncoming world-war; he had done his simple duty, saved Western Europe, and now was dead.

The capture of Liège demonstrated the ineffectiveness of fortresses against the great artillery of modern war. Yet the capture of Liège had not been an easy task. It required courage and resource on the part of the German infantry commanders to exploit the advantage which the artillery fire gave them. It was at this time that Major-General Ludendorff showed his energy and initiative. He had no command, and was merely watching the operations as a staff officer. He came upon a defeated column, of which the general had been killed, and which was on the point of falling back. He took command of the column, pushed on, made a dash for the citadel, and, owing to the surprise, entered it almost unopposed.¹ Time was now everything to the Germans. It

¹ Edmonds, *Official History of the War* (1922), i. 33.

was because the Belgian resistance was losing them so much time that they began to show pitiless severity to the Belgians. 'War is war,' said their officers, as they rode into a ruined village. The troops, as a rule, were not gratuitously cruel. There was usually Atrocities. some provocation from the inhabitants, driven to anger and misery almost beyond endurance. But the Prussian code of war permitted repression of civilian resistance by measures which modern opinion, however 'realist,' cannot justify. Acting under the notion that a stern 'realism,' a plain, harsh view of existing facts, would quell civilian antagonism and shorten the war, the Germans systematically destroyed by dynamite a large section of Louvain, including the priceless ancient Library of the University. At Dinant 670 civilians were shot by regular files of soldiers; heavy indemnities (for instance, a sum equal to £8,000,000 levied on Brussels) were levied on cities and towns. There were the deliberately inflicted reprisals; in addition there were the mutilations and desecrations, summarily known as 'atrocities,' inflicted by drunken or blood-maddened soldiers upon men, women, and children who came in their way. War always brings atrocities.

After the fall of Liège the German way was comparatively clear. Much was hoped on the Belgian and Entente side from Namur; but this great fortress fell, after a shorter resistance than Liège, on August 26. Brussels was an open town, and admitted the German army according to the laws and customs of war for the occupation of peaceful cities (nevertheless it was forced to pay £8,000,000). It was at Antwerp that the Belgian forces hoped to make their big stand.

The mobilisation of the French army was completed by August 12. By this time General Joffre, the Commander-in-Chief, was convinced that the main German onslaught was coming from the direction of French advance into Belgium. Belgium. The best line of defence for the French probably was one situated inside France; but with

the Belgians valiantly defending themselves against invading Germans, it was natural, indeed inevitable, that the French should advance to the help of the small nation. So Joffre took up positions along a line from the Ardennes on the east to Charleroi on the west, and even north-westward of Charleroi towards Mons. Along this line the French may have disposed of about 700,000 men. The British Expeditionary Force, under General Sir John French, had been quietly mobilised in Great Britain and then shipped across the Channel to Havre and other northern French ports without the loss of a man. It has been suggested that the German navy was under orders not to interrupt the Expeditionary Force's passage; that the German General Staff wanted the British army to come over as quickly as possible, to be swallowed up on land. It was indeed swallowed up, the greater part of it, but not before it had done an imperishable work.

The British troops that went up by rail to take their place on the left flank of the French were the flower of the old British army. Few in number—there were altogether about 120,000 men in the British Expeditionary Force—but trained for years in view of the present danger, they were splendidly disciplined, incomparably led, perfect in every technical detail. It was reported a little later that the crew of a United States battleship watched the disembarkation of the British troops. As the British soldiers, bronzed, cheerful, equipped for war, filed over the gangways to the quays, and the regimental bands played the tune of 'Rule, Britannia!', the American sailors, struck by generous sympathy for a campaign in which they could not themselves engage, took up the refrain with powerful voices: 'Rule, Britannia!'

The British troops were speedily brought up to the scene of action in Belgium. A considerable number had to be kept on the lines of communication; only about 75,000-80,000 men were immediately available

for fighting in the front lines. They were strung out on a 'front' of about twenty-five miles on either side of the town of Mons. They began cheerfully throwing up entrenchments, unaware that four German army corps were coming against the devoted British two.

It was elsewhere than at Mons that the great battles were being decided. On August 21, General Joffre launched a series of grand attacks on the Germans at Charleroi. Charleroi and along the front between the Sambre and Meuse. The attacks failed, after terrific losses on the part of the French. On August 23, General Joffre gave the order for retreat.

It was on the same day, at 12.30 on Sunday, August 23, that General von Kluck launched his great assault on the British in front of Mons. The British line was strongly held; rifle-fire and machine-gun fire, and some bayonet charges, inflicted considerable damage on the German attackers. But later in the afternoon came the news of the French retreat from Charleroi. The British army was in danger of being left suspended, as it were, in the air, cut off by the enveloping Germans from all touch with its allies. Darkness enabled the troops to snatch some hours of rest. At daybreak on August 24 the retreat from Mons began. Its story was later described by General French in one of the finest dispatches in military history.¹ The Germans had the initial success, and they well knew that their great chance had come to exploit this without an instant's relaxation. By continuous pressure, by violent, ceaseless attacks, by an enormous enveloping movement, they hoped (with good prospects) to cut off the whole British force, or at least to drive it for safety into a French fortress. The 'checking' battle fought by General Smith-Dorrien and the Second Army Corps at Le Cateau on August 26 gave invaluable temporary relief. The fortifications of Maubeuge seemed to offer a secure haven. If the British had gone there they would never have left the

¹ It was printed as a 'Blue Book,' or *Parliamentary Paper*.

city except as prisoners. One thing about which French and Joffre were perfectly determined was that they would keep their field armies in being—they would never allow themselves to be penned into a fortress like Bazaine at Metz.

CHAPTER XXV

1914: THE MARNE

THE war was still in the condition of open fighting. The Germans had great mobile armies, sweeping onward from Belgium and from Luxemburg westwards towards Paris. The French armies, under General Joffre, and the two British army corps, under General French, were in full retreat between August 24 and September 5. Modern armies have much of the paraphernalia of great cities—hundreds of thousands of men have to be supplied with food, fuel has to be provided, vast trains of motor lorries have to be driven without blocking the traffic, men must sleep somewhere. The material difficulties in the way of the retreat were enormous, but so were the material difficulties in the way of the German advance; roads were blocked, traffic disorganised, while here and there the retreating forces would stop, as the British stopped at Le Cateau, and fight a desperate battle. All this checked the Germans from time to time, in spite of their splendid and continuous efforts to maintain the pressure of the pursuit.

The German generals in the field, von Kluck and von Bülow, nearly brought off a great success: they might have captured a whole British or French army. They were hampered, however, by the Great General Staff, which was many miles away.

Throughout these early operations of the war, the General Staff had, with the field armies in Belgium and Northern France, a representative who had power to make decisions and give commands to the commanders of the German

armies. The man who wielded this extraordinary power was only a colonel on the General Staff, Colonel von Hentsch. On September 9, when the great struggle, later known as the First Battle of the Marne, was in progress, Colonel von Hentsch ordered General von Kluck to retreat.¹

While the Great General Staff was interfering with the concentration of German effort, the French were fortunate in having a Commander-in-Chief who knew his own mind and who could make decisions. This was General Joffre. There are large Frenchmen and small; fair Frenchmen and dark. Joffre belonged to the large, fair type. Big-boned, broad-shouldered, with a massive head and large, tranquil eyes, Joffre was a man whom no responsibility could disturb, no danger unbalance. Steady, resolute, calm, he kept his shattered armies together, retreating, fighting, preparing for the worst, preparing for opportunity of recovery; thanks to him, there was no panic, no débâcle, in a retreat where (as Joffre said in a later dispatch) 'the least check would run the risk of transforming itself into a rout.' Thirty miles behind the swaying front was the city of Paris. The French Cabinet had decided to leave it. Lord Bertie, British ambassador in Paris at that time, tells in his memoirs of the vast train-loads of papers, the immense movement of offices and staff, involved in the transfer of the seat of government from Paris to Bordeaux. Paris was left with a large garrison; but could this defend the huge and vulnerable city, with its two million of nervous population? The authorities had requisitioned all the available means of transport. Officials who stayed behind in Paris had cars standing outside their bureaus, ready to transport them swiftly away if the Germans approached the city; but the enemy was still about thirty miles away when Joffre's opportunity came.

The French
Government
leaves Paris.

On September 3, French airmen reported that the great forces of General von Kluck, hitherto pressing incessantly

¹ Edmonds, *Official History of the War*, i. 302-7.

against the retreating Allied left (the British), seemed now to be inclining to the south or south-east. This is the famous swerve or *glissement* in front of Paris. Kluck. The cause of it is clear enough. By going swerves. straight onward, von Kluck would have taken Paris, but Joffre's armies would have escaped. It is better worth to destroy an army than to take a city.¹ Von Kluck, following a sound rule of strategy, moved south-eastwards to join his colleagues in a last great assault on Joffre; but in so doing he exposed a flank towards the British army; and at that moment Joffre struck.

Everything was ready, so far as could be in those terrible days of defeat and disorganisation. The garrison poured out of Paris; Galliéni, the military governor, collected every omnibus, lorry, taxi-cab, and ^{The Marne.} sent his men rapidly forward to the Ourcq, a tributary of the Marne. At the Invalides in Paris there is shown to-day one of the historic taxi-cabs that formed part of the transport-trains for the battle of the Marne. The first great attack was launched by General Manoury along the Ourcq. Then along the line of the Marne, for miles, the fight became general. For five days (September 6 to 10) the battles raged, and then the Germans drew away; their advance was turned into a retreat.

The five days of the Marne form one of the grand decisive battles of history. In the first battles of the war, around Charleroi, and in the retreat, the French had ^{A Decisive Battle.} lost terrifically—some three hundred thousand men. If on the top of these tremendous losses the battle of the Marne had also gone against France, it is likely that she could never have taken up the fight again. The Germans would have taken Paris, and with Joffre's field armies destroyed, would have dealt at their leisure with what was left. Such was the risk which Joffre had to take when he quietly signed the order for the general attack of

¹ General von Kluck, *The March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne* (trans. 1923), pp. 94-5.

September 6. The battle of the Marne decided the fate of Western Europe.

And now it was the turn of the Germans to be 'on the run,' as the French and British had been from August 24 to September 6. Acting on the same sound rule of strategy, never to allow a beaten enemy to have rest, the French and British maintained a ceaseless pressure on the retreating Germans, hoping to bundle them out of France once and for all. But the prudent Germans had marked out lines on the Aisne river where they could come to rest and defend themselves; and although powerful and costly efforts were made by the French and British to break the German defence, no further success was achieved. The British Expeditionary Force 'made good the Aisne' (as General French reported), that is, crossed to the right bank and established themselves there; but here they stopped.

Throughout these exciting times, from the opening of the war on August 3 to the dying down of the battles on the Aisne, the peoples of Europe had scarcely divined the tremendous issues that were at stake. They had read of the big battles, they had watched, tense with excitement, the breathless retreat to the Marne; they had, according to their nationality, shared the relief or the disappointment of the tremendous decision in the battle of the Marne. But they had not divined the losses. On Sunday, August 30, while the retreat to the Marne was still in progress, an English newspaper printed a detailed report from its correspondent, describing unheard-of losses by the British Expeditionary Force in men and guns. The report (which seems to have been substantially accurate) at once received official contradiction. In France a grim silence was maintained. After the war official statistics were put forth,

The Margin of Victory. but it was not until the publication of the first volume of Mr. Churchill's *World Crisis* in 1923 that the public realised how narrow was the margin in September 1914 between the Allies' ability to sustain the

war on the one hand, and their complete collapse on the other. That the French armies were able to recover from their loss of 300,000 men, sustained within a month, is one of the marvels of history, and one of the grandest demonstrations of courage. The public were continually comforting themselves in France and Britain with the belief that the Germans, though winning battles, were losing far more men, as attackers, than were the defending French and British armies. But this belief was not justified by facts. The French and British were losing three men for every two Germans killed.

When a general war is started, it is like an ungovernable machine which cannot be stopped, but must run its course, until all motive-power is exhausted.

Proposals for peace-negotiations were made ineffectively by (1) Pope Benedict xv., November 16, 1914; (2) President Wilson of the United States, February 22, 1916; (3) the German Government (without committing itself to any specific terms), December 12, 1916; (4) President Wilson again, December 18, 1916; (5) the German Reichstag, in a peace-resolution (which the German Government disregarded), July 17, 1917; (6) Prince Sixte of Bourbon-Parma, an officer in the Belgian Army who was brother-in-law to the Emperor Charles of Austria, February-June, 1917; (7) Count Czernin, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, during the winter of 1917-18 (through Count Revertera, an Austrian diplomatist in Switzerland).¹

The Frank-
enstein of
war.

¹ An account of the various negotiations is in Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy*, 1914-25, chapters viii, xi.

CHAPTER XXVI

1914: THE WAR IN EASTERN EUROPE

THE German Government had two main 'fronts' to deal with—the West and East. It had made its great attempt to achieve a short decisive war by its lamentable decision to march through Belgium and the open north-east flank of France; and that design had somehow (at terrible cost) just failed to succeed. What the German Government could have done, had it not succumbed to the temptation of a rapid march through Belgium, would have been to 'mask' or lightly blockade the French eastern fortresses (Verdun, Toul, Épinal, Belfort), to hold the French at bay on this side, and meanwhile to direct the main German attack against Russia, which was still only half mobilised. Then, having crushed the Russian armies, the Germans could have returned, with all their forces concentrated against France. Dishonestly, however, and cynically, the Germans had elected to take the (as they believed) open road through Belgium: and sending their main forces along this route, they had exposed their eastern frontier to the Russians.

M. Paléologue, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg before and during the war, has vividly described Russian court life—its richness, its refinement, its remoteness from the main currents of the Russian people. Hedged around, as it were, by a thick curtain of chamberlains and guards, high noblemen and high officials, the Tsar strove to do his duty, and to govern by instinct rather than by experience and observation.

Outside the court circle, the vast complicated adminis-

Remoteness
of the
Russian
Court.

trative machine of the bureaucracy creaked and groaned as it gathered up all the resources of Russia and directed them into the war. From the furthest bounds of the great empire peasants were drafted to the mobilisation centres; regiments were brought up to full strength, and by long monotonous train journeys were taken down to the theatres of war. The greatest efforts were directed to invading East Prussia, for the French Government had sent urgent messages, imploring its ally to do something, anything, to relieve the pressure on the West. The Russians responded nobly. An army of about 150,000 men, under General Samsonoff, invaded East Prussia, and advanced rapidly towards Königsberg. Samsonoff's slender lines of communication could scarcely ensure him a proper supply of food and munitions. Troops nearly always go into battle hungry; the food-convoys rarely arrive in full supply or punctually at the firing line. Samsonoff's army pushed on, taking every risk, aiming at a great prize. In the district of the Masurian lakes, on August 28, near the little village of Tannen-
 berg, the Russians marched into a half-moon of fire prepared for them by Paul von Hindenburg, the Prussian general commanding in the East. Hindenburg was a Junker, a serving Prussian nobleman of the old type—dutiful, unimaginative, efficient. He had thoroughly studied the country, knew by heart the heights of the hills and the depths of the marshes, the routes that were safe and the routes that were treacherous. He had been waiting for just such a chance as now came to him. Samsonoff's swift advance fulfilled the Russians' chivalrous intention, for it drew German troops to the East who otherwise would have swelled the victorious forces in the West; but it proved to be Samsonoff's doom. Stricken by Hindenburg's batteries, out-manceuvred, ill-munitioned, the Russian army lost 100,000 men, and was driven back in hopeless rout. The despairing general bade his staff ride for safety, while he remained to die.

Hindenburg saved East Prussia from a Russian occupation, although the province was not left scatheless. The invaders had treated the inhabitants roughly; evidence of atrocities (like those committed in Belgium by the German troops) inflicted by Russian troops upon East Prussian villagers was collected and published by the German authorities. Atrocities, which later histories always regard with silence, are among the most terrible tragedies of war—sufferings without the sense of sacrifice, pains endured without reason owing to the passions of undisciplined men.

The Serb lands south of the Danube, where the explosion had originally occurred, were almost forgotten by the rest of Europe when the struggle became a world war. Yet, for the Serbs the war was a great national struggle—the Third Balkan War. The diversion of Austrian troops towards the Russian front in Galicia gave the Serbs the opportunity of meeting their Austrian opponents on something like equal terms. They could not hold the capital, Belgrade, which was easily bombarded from the Austrian side of the Danube; but with their backs to the Maljen Mountains they could hold their own in the district around Valievo. The Austrian Government had confided the task of invading Serbia to General Petiorek, who was the military governor in Sarajevo when the fateful murders of the Archduke and Archduchess took place. He was no more successful in fighting the Serbs than he had been in guarding the Archduke. On November 10 he occupied Valievo; but when, on December 3, he attacked the Serbs, who were posted on the heights to the south, he was sharply repulsed. Victory lit on the Serbian bayonets; and with irresistible élan the Serbs drove the Austrians in hopeless retreat right out of the country. Belgrade was reoccupied by the victors. News of the Serbian success came to England like a ray of light in the long gloom of an almost hopeless winter.

Valievo was a fine victory on the Eastern or South-

eastern front. Away in the north, too, there were some successes to compensate the Russians for their defeat at Tannenberg. Hindenburg's reply to the invasion of East Prussia was a German invasion of Poland. He marched right up to the line of the Vistula, and on October 15 attacked the Russian lines in front of Warsaw. Failing to take these, he recognised the futility of further operations on the inclement Polish steppes. Quietly his army bundled up its baggage and made off by the same way as it had come, back to safety and winter quarters in East Prussia. If Hindenburg's advance into Poland was a mistake, his unostentatious retreat was a masterly way of covering it.

Hinden-
burg's In-
vasion of
Poland.


In Austrian Galicia a formless campaign of battles swayed back and forth over hundreds of miles of loosely held 'front.' The Austrian forces consisted of picturesque and persistent soldiers, but there was a good deal of disaffection among the Slavonic elements. Many Czech soldiers wanted to go over to the Russian armies, but when they escaped from their own units and came forward, they were apt to be shot by the Russians. On one of these days, in far-off London, an American citizen of Czech nationality called upon a prominent English journalist and asked if some means could not be found to prevent Russians from shooting Czech deserters from the Austrian forces. Between them, the American Czech, whose name was Vosca, and the journalist (Mr. Wickham Steed) arranged that the singing of 'Hei Slovane,' the Czech national anthem, should be a sign of friendship and a passport to the Russian lines. The Russian authorities were apprised of the arrangement, and it was found to work well.¹ Meanwhile, a vast anti-Austrian Czechoslovak movement was being organised by two Czech professors, Masaryk and Benes.²

The Czechs.

The great and necessary object of the Russian armies

¹ H. Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, ii. 41-5.

² See Benes, *My War Memories* (trans. 1928).



International boundaries, 1914 Farthest Russian Advances, 1914-15

 Farthest German Advances, 1915-16 Territory regained by Brussilov's
 Offensive, June-Aug. 1916 German Advance at Riga, Sept. 1917

 Approximate German line at Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 3 March 1918

was to force the line of the Carpathians, so that they could descend upon Hungary, the granary of the Habsburg Empire. But in order to reach the Carpathians, the Russians had to fight their way over the plains and through the foothills of the Austrian province of Galicia. Intense struggles took place between Russians and Austrians, between Generals Russky and Brussilov on the one hand, and Generals von Auffenberg and Dankl on the other. The Russian commanders proved superior. Lemberg fell, Przemyśl was invested, and by the early days of December Russian troops were almost knocking on the gates of Cracow. There was a fair prospect that next spring or summer would see the Tsar's forces in Budapest.

Russian
Successes
against
Austria.

The stupid Austrians (as the Emperor William II. called them) had started a vast European war by their obstinate and bungling efforts to give a lesson to Serbia. And now, although they proved themselves to be tough fighters in the field, governing officials (who had plunged them into the war) had little hope or enthusiasm. The heir to the Austrian throne, the Archduke Charles, was an amiable young officer. The Court historian tells how Charles, on a brief visit from the front, was struck with the lack of confidence which he found in the Emperor's circle. As he was leaving he stood irresolutely for a few minutes, and spoke:

Austrian
Pessimism.

'The further you get from the front the less confidence do you find. You've got to be at the front to realise that we shall and must win.'

The Archduke seemed to look round for some approving comment. None was forthcoming. It was the end of November 1914. Bitterly disappointed, he made for the door, and said as he turned the handle:

'Courage is what is wanted!'

As he disappeared, Baron von Bolfras shook his head and remarked:

'It's easy to talk! There's plenty of courage, but

there's one thing we need far more, and that's *luck*. The question is: will he bring it?'¹

Nearly every one, perhaps every one, who was in the battle-line had fear, and every one, or nearly every one, conquered it and had courage. How much of this courage was due to the individual will of each man, wrestling with doubt in the chambers of his mind, and how much to select characters (like Osborne in *Journey's End*) who displayed at its finest the unquenchable spirit of man? 'What was divine was the bearing of those few whose souls rose above the battle, and gave of their strength to others, so that bravery ran through the ranks like an electric current.'²

¹ Margutti, *The Emperor Francis Joseph and his Times* (trans.), p. 340.

² F. Yeats-Brown, *Bengal Lancer* (1930), p. 162.

CHAPTER XXVII

1914: THE RACE FOR THE CHANNEL PORTS

THE war of movement did not come to an end when the Germans dug themselves into the ground behind the Aisne (see p. 282). Every commander avoids a frontal attack if he can. Each side was daily becoming more strongly entrenched on the Aisne; so the natural thing alike for the Franco-British and the German forces to do was to try to outflank each other; and as the country presented less difficulties to military movement on the north-west than on the south-east, the outflanking efforts were all made in the north-west, on the German right flank and the Allied left—that is to say, towards the English Channel.

As each side tried to outflank the other, the lines were extended laterally. These were not peaceful operations; there were attacks and counter-attacks; the main object, however, was not to defeat the enemy by direct fighting, but to go round him.

The Aisne-Line stabilised.

The 'Race for the Channel.'

So, as every outflanking movement on one side was countered by another outflanking movement on the other, the lines spread out in corresponding lengths until they reached the sea simultaneously. A similar movement, or rather a series of similar movements, more prolonged and more spasmodic, resulted in the extension of the lines eastward and southward until they reached the neutral bastion of Switzerland. The German General Staff confidently relied upon the French observing Swiss neutrality, and therefore not invading Germany on the south; although, on the other hand, they would not allow the neutral position

of Belgium to prevent Germany from invading France at the other end of the line, on the north.

The Belgians held the line at the extreme north end. They had been grimly fighting for months. On the occupa-

tion of Brussels on August 20, the Belgian army
 Antwerp. had retired within the perimeter of the forts of

Antwerp. Large German forces 'masked' Antwerp while the main armies of the Germans were engaged in the great thrust at Paris. The vigorous sortie which the Belgian army made from Antwerp helped considerably to relieve the pressure on the French and British troops in the agonising days before and during the battle of the Marne. Antwerp, however, was doomed. The Scheldt, by international law, was not open to warships; yet, even if it had been open, no help could have been sent by the French and very little by the British. Indeed, such help as was possible was given through the energy of Mr. W. S. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, who sent over the half-equipped 'Naval Division,' consisting wholly of volunteers, young men (like Rupert Brooke¹) of whom many were only just learning to handle a rifle. Mr. Churchill himself went over (Ostend was the port of disembarkation) and by his exhilarating and decisive presence prolonged the defence for a week. Then all was over; but the Belgian army escaped (October 7-10) by land to fight for four more years on the line of the Yser.

The Germans are a people with a passionate enthusiasm for their country. They went into the war as one man,

German believing that it was a great national struggle
 Restraint. for German ideals and for German security.

And now the success of their armies (although marred by the defeat of the Marne) was fulfilling their fondest dreams. Liège, Brussels, Antwerp—the great fortresses, the capital—had fallen before the German army. The news of the capture of Antwerp was announced during a perform-

¹ See Brooke's description of his experiences at Antwerp, in *Collected Poems*, Memoir (1929), p. cxxvi.

ance in one of the theatres at Berlin. The audience rose and cheered, intoxicated with the glory of conquest. But a man, one of the actors, came forward to the front of the stage, and sang a verse of an old song, *Nicht zu laut*, which spoke of the slain, rather than of the victory (*The Times*, October 17, 1914).

When the Belgians retired to the Yser the race for the Channel ports was over. There was no longer any flank to be turned; the great armies, from hastily dug and still wholly temporary entrenchments, faced each other across a swaying front. Throughout October there were three grand battles in progress: Arras, the Yser, and Ypres, where the Germans made titanic efforts to break through the French, the Belgian, and the British lines.

Arras was General Maud'huy's big battle. Lille fell, undefended, to the Germans on October 13; Maubeuge, which was regarded as a great fortress, had The Battle already fallen on September 7. The area of Arras. between these two places, the neighbourhood of Arras, the coal-fields around Lens (which itself fell into the hands of the Germans), proved difficult country for the invaders. The intense period of the battle of Arras was from October 20 to 24. The Germans never reached the city. Although severely bombarded, Arras remained an inhabited city to the end of the war. The German line was established about 1700 yards away; yet with the dangers and surprises of war so near them, some citizens contrived to go about their business; and throughout the war years the Hôtel du Commerce did a brisk trade in hot meals for soldiers going up to their battle positions.

During the tensest period of the battle of Arras, the German General Staff found sufficient men to make a grand attack upon the Belgians, away up at the The Battles northern end of the front. First, the German of the Yser. troops tried to creep round by the seashore, but monitors of the British navy came close inshore and stopped that route by bombardment. Then the German forces drew a

little way inland, and with wonderful tenacity and valour delivered fourteen assaults on the Belgian troops ; but these, too, held firm. Like their Low Country ancestors of the sixteenth century, the Belgians opened the sluices of the Yser up-stream at Dixmude, while they dammed the stream near its mouth by Nieuport. Gradually the waters rose and covered the flat lands on either side. Henceforward the Belgians held flooded lines from positions on mounds and low ridges, in many places communicating with neighbouring posts by boat. But the big fights between October 20 and 25 left a terrific mark on Belgian manhood. There are still many mutilated men to be seen in Brussels ; and in hotels and large shops the one-armed man who works the elevator will inform you, if you question him, that he is a *vétéran de l'Yser*.

The battle of Ypres was the inevitable result of the bold advance of the British in the race for the Channel ports. Although the race was really over by the middle of October, Sir John French decided to push onward, and to occupy Ypres. The place itself was of no great strategical importance. It was famous, and it was in Belgium ; if it could be held, this fact would be a great encouragement not merely to the Belgians, but to the French and British. Moreover, an advanced point is an advanced point ; it may be a step to further advances. So the British entered Ypres when they had the chance, and being there, they held it doggedly. For ten days (October 21 to 31) the Germans assaulted Ypres with frontal attacks of great violence. The British were not in much strength ; and retirement would not have meant a serious defeat. But all available forces went into the line at Ypres—not merely all the regular ' rifle strength ' of the battalions, but the whole ' ration strength,' servants, cooks, drivers, every one. The line held, and the attacks died down when November, with its rain and its mud, arrived. North and south the German trenches nearly surrounded Ypres. It remained to the end of the war years a great

The First
Battle of
Ypres.

bulge in the Allies' Western lines, a 'salient' which, however expensive to hold, was never abandoned, never captured.

1914: THE SEA

The growth of the German High Seas Fleet between 1900 and 1914 had been one of the chief causes of tension in the relations of Germany and Great Britain.

The British Government had several times proposed that money and bad feeling should be saved to both sides by a relaxation of the speed of shipbuilding—assuring the German Government that whatever tonnage they built, the British would always keep the relative strengths of the two navies at 60:40. But the Germans would not diminish their programme: so, although the relative strengths of the navies remained the same, expenditure was enormously increased on both sides and feeling ran high. Yet when war came, the big battle-fleet was of no use to Germany.

Anglo-Ger-
man Naval
Rivalry.

The German High Seas Fleet was on a cruise in the Norwegian Fiords when the war crisis developed. It was recalled, on July 26, 1914, to the mouth of the Elbe and the Kiel Canal. For most of the period of the war its chief task was to be the maintenance of its efficiency over long years of inactivity. It is a significant fact that the German revolution which broke out at the end of the war started in the fleet, among sailors who refused to put to sea. Yet before this happened there were some glorious pages in the history of the German navy.

The Spirit of
the German
Fleet.

The British people had complete confidence in their navy. They never feared invasion; and although invasion had constantly to be guarded against, the British naval command of the sea was so complete that the Germans never attempted to transport

The British
Navy mobil-
ised.

troops by water. In British military organisation, in which enormous and unexpected expansion was taking place,

improvisation was the order of the day ; but at the Admiralty everything seemed to have been thought out in time of peace. About midsummer there had taken place the usual annual concentration of ships and calling up of reserves ; and, as a war crisis seemed to be developing, the Admiralty kept the men and ships together. When the war broke out there was no need for further mobilisation of the fleet. The tall ships collected off Portland Bill simply disappeared into the grey mist and proceeded to their war-stations on the Scottish coast.

A visit to any part of the east coast of Great Britain would have shown that the public confidence in the navy was well founded. Every mile of coast was
The Naval patrolled on land. Along the flat grassy tops of
Airmen. the cliffs there was, like an endless thread, a path made by coastguards and marked with white-washed stones. Here the look-out men maintained their ceaseless patrol. Out at sea the sail of an occasional fishing-boat could be seen, or the smoke-stack of a tramp steamer, but no sign of naval armament except hydroplanes, whose 'whirring' sound was seldom absent. Any day, at almost any moment, at any of the numerous temporary naval land-stations, a passer-by could stop to watch a naval airman, clad in blue, buttoning his gloves as he walked towards his plane, which stood on a movable wheeled carriage. He would step inside, and half a dozen mechanics would push the hydroplane across the beach and into the water. The propeller would now be revolving rapidly, the plane would leave its carriage, would glide with a swishing noise along the surface of the waves on its attached boats, and then with a final dying swish-h, like a sigh of relief, would leave the water and ascend into the air like a bird. And as it flew up and along and disappeared into the distance, another hydroplane would be seen like a seagull on the horizon, coming back to its base. Where had the intrepid airman come from ? He had finished his trip, whatever it was, and had now nothing to do but to fly comfortably home.

Close to the beach he would swoop down on to the waves, come swishing along on his boats for a few yards, and be received by a squad of half a dozen orderlies, who would draw the plane on to its land carriage. Stepping ashore, quite tidy and debonair, the airman would draw off his gloves, light a cigarette, and stroll off towards the hangar.

The German navy could do nothing outside the limits of the Heligoland Bight except destroy some of the commerce of the Western Allies. Later in the war this work was only possible for submarines; but for the first month or two there were still a few

German
Commerce-
Destroyers.

German cruisers out at sea. These doomed ships—for they could not hope for long to escape the British navy—made the most of their opportunities. The chief of the commerce-destroyers was the *Emden*, whose energetic Captain Müller spread havoc in the Indian Ocean until the ship was sunk by the gunfire of H.M.A.S. *Sydney* (November 10). This happened off the Cocos Islands. Most of the *Emden*'s men who survived the *Sydney*'s gunfire were saved, including Captain Müller, who proved to be a not unfriendly guest with the British officers. He was retained as a prisoner, at the end of the war returned to Germany, and died in 1923. Another German cruiser, the *Geier*, did some execution among British shipping in the Pacific, until the sea became too unsafe for her; then she ran into Honolulu and was interned according to the Law of Nations by the United States authorities.

In the Mediterranean the Austrian navy at first dominated the Adriatic, but elsewhere made no attempt to fulfil its rôle of stopping troop-transports from French North Africa to France. The only pressing danger came from two German warships, the *Goeben* (battleship) and the *Breslau* (cruiser). Their position was known correctly by the British Admiralty, and orders were given to the British commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean station to shadow the two ships. The British ultimatum to the German Government demanding

The *Goeben*
and the
Breslau.

the evacuation of Belgium within twelve hours was delivered in Berlin at twelve o'clock noon on August 4. While the twelve hours were running out, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, which were steaming hard for the safety of Italian territorial waters, could have been blown out of the sea by the shadowing British warships. But the British Cabinet would not authorise the First Lord of the Admiralty to give the order. An attack by British ships would not have been against the existing Law of Nations relative to the opening of hostilities; but the British Cabinet, loth to go into war without satisfying every scruple, decided to let the ultimatum period peacefully run out; and when this happened, the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were safe—for the time being—in the Strait of Messina. The Law of Nations, as defined by the Hague Convention of 1907, allowed twenty-four hours to belligerent ships to stay in neutral waters without being interned. When the hands of the clock came round again, the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had to go out to sea. How they were allowed to slip away to Constantinople has never been completely explained. One British ship of the Mediterranean squadron, H.M.S. *Gloucester*, engaged them single-handed; but the commanders of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were not going to stop and fight, even for the satisfaction of sinking a British warship. They made off to Constantinople, where the Turkish Government, with many protests to the world that it would do its duty as a neutral, received the belligerent ships and left them free.

Far off in the Pacific a grim tragedy was being played. Admiral Cradock was of the regular type of indomitable naval officer. He had never seen war, but he was not perturbed by it. He knew the strength of the German Pacific Squadron, and he knew that Admiral von Spee was an energetic and resourceful sailor. The British squadron was inferior in strength, but H.M.S. *Canopus* was on its way to join Cradock's ships; could he wait, could he avoid the German concentration until

Battle of
Coronel.

the *Canopus* should arrive? He decided to give battle. Admiral von Spee met him off the coast of Chile, off Cape Coronel, on the sky-line, silhouetted against the setting sun, and sank the two fine cruisers, the *Monmouth* and the *Good Hope*, with Cradock and 1650 officers and men (November 1).

The British Admiralty could not remain passive under such a blow. It would be easy enough to detach an overwhelming force to seek out von Spee and sink him. But to send too many ships was a needless waste of strength; and their passage would be more difficult to conceal. The force detailed to Rear-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee was just strong enough, if handled without an error, to sink the German Pacific Squadron; but any mistake on Sturdee's part would destroy his margin of superiority. The expedition proceeded without a hitch. Towards the end of the year Admiral von Spee had rounded Cape Horn. On December 8 he approached Port Stanley in the weather-beaten Falkland Islands. Sturdee's squadron came bearing out to sea. The gallant German saw that his fate was nigh upon him. He turned to the north-east and fought the British ships which followed, through the short December afternoon. Before darkness came, all but one of the German ships were sunk. Spee, with both his sons, naval officers on the *Scharnhorst*, went down with their ship.

Battle of the
Falkland
Islands.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ACTION-FRONT

AFTER the battles of Ypres and Arras and the Yser, the lines of opposing troops in the Western theatre of war became more and more stable, until a new thing appeared clearly in military history—an action-front of about 400 miles which was simply a succession of siege-works. Troops within rifle range or artillery range of each other naturally dug trenches for shelter. At first hastily devised for the needs of the moment, the trenches were gradually improved, deepened, extended, until, except for certain hilly and rocky regions of Alsace, they formed a continuous line or rather a series of roughly parallel lines from the North Sea to the frontier of Switzerland.

These vast siege-works did not spring up in a night, but the industry of some four or five million men (counting Germans, French, British, and Belgians), working under the pressure of continual danger of death from missiles, procured the completion of the vast excavation in a surprisingly short time. Even in the abnormal circumstances of war the Germans showed themselves to be methodical workers. Under the ghostly moonlight, while the trenches were still just deep enough to conceal a bending man, picks could be seen rising, falling, rising, falling, with mechanical regularity. No sign of a human being appeared above the parapet of the German trench, but only the head of the pick as it rose and fell, or the blade of a spade which jerked earth on to the parapet and was then withdrawn.

The opposing front-line trenches were in many places quite near to each other—thirty yards, forty yards, a hundred yards. Between these front lines was 'no man's land,' churned into mud by men's feet, with gaping, ragged holes or pits made by exploding

shells. The trenches themselves were about six feet broad and six feet deep, with a ledge or fire-step about four feet six from the top on which a man could stand for shooting or observing. The excavated earth, strengthened with sand-bags, was heaped in front and behind to form parapets. The trench was not a straight line; at intervals of about 10 yards there was a 'traverse,' or buttress of earth. The effect of an enemy shell exploding in the trench was thus limited by the traverses which blocked either end. The bottom of the trench, was, except in the driest seasons, damp, wet, or simply liquid mud. Men's feet could not be kept dry for a minute, and as a man walked along the sloppy and irregular bottom he hit the mud wall on either side, so that in a few hours his uniform was thick with mud too. By-and-by 'duck-boards' were laid along the bottom of the trenches, and this improved the footing somewhat. To prevent the sides of the trenches falling in, cross-beams or triangular frames were inserted. Crumbling walls of trenches were faced with upright planks; in places, caves or chambers called dug-outs were excavated and lined with planks, or even, in the later stages of the war, with concrete. In the dug-outs men could lie down (in their uniform and boots) on benches and snatch some sleep; but many preferred to sleep out in the narrow trench, where they at least could see the sky, and where there was slightly less chance of being buried alive as the result of a direct hit by a shell.

Reliefs were supplied as often as possible, but battalions were often kept two weeks, even three weeks, in the front-line trenches. The usual proportion was one rifle to every seven yards of line. Half the men were on duty at a time, for four hours. Of those on duty about one-third of the number was detailed for look-out posts; the rest of the men on duty improved the trench with spade-work, or formed fatigue parties to clean wash-places and latrines. The greatest care was taken to prevent infection. A wonderful system of cleansing and

Daily Work
in the
Trenches.

sanitation kept down poisonous germs, but it could not prevent the presence of flies, nor yet of rats, which scuttled about the dug-outs and ran over the sleeping men. Carefully screened braziers, burning charcoal, coke, or simply wood, provided some warmth ; yet for all the winter and most of the spring in France the men were wet and cold. Food came up fairly regularly through communication-trenches to the front line. There was no variety in it at all ; bread, bully-beef (corned beef), and jam were the chief constituents of the rations. The official scale of rations looked liberal on paper, but of bread at least there was never enough in the front line. Tins of bully beef could not easily waste away in transit, but the loaves of bread which came up from the military bakehouses in sacks were largely reduced to heaps of crumbs by the time they arrived in the front line, and nobody could ever feel satisfied with handfuls of crumbs.

Danger, of course, was never absent, although often for weeks many 'sectors' of the front line would be 'quiet.'

The Spirit of Man. Hostile aeroplanes might drop a few bombs ; in the night-time a raiding party might go out (or an enemy raiding party come in) to take some prisoners, chiefly in order to obtain information. Even on the quietest sector it was usually considered to be the duty of the artillery to make a surprise bombardment at least once a day—called by the British soldiers the 'daily hate.' At any moment the unseen death might come, bury a group of men, blast their bodies to atoms, or tear off a limb ; yet in spite of muttered curses and grumbings, in spite of ill nourishment, of continual wet, cold, dirt, and fatigue, the men remained cheerful, hopeful—it is possible to say even happy. Nobody was ever comfortable ; pain was often present ; sheer physical worry frequently enveloped men like a cloud ; the picture of home and family would suddenly rise up in a man's mind and make him all but faint : then he would turn to his pick, or feel the butt of his rifle, run his finger along the edge of the bayonet, light

a cigarette or exchange some jocular grumble with his companion.

This is how the men came up to the line. The officer was a youth of nineteen or twenty years of age. He had probably been gently nurtured, had been to a public school, and had spent perhaps a year at the University before the war came. Then he threw aside all his hopes and ambitions, but quite naturally and without regarding himself as a tragic figure; he laughed away the anxious scruples of his parents. He went off to his battalion as a second lieutenant ('subaltern'), looking extremely boyish and chivalrous. It was a new battalion, one of the many units in the new armies which Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, was raising. The men in the company to which he was attached were of any age up to forty or even forty-five, although the regulations were supposed to forbid recruitment of the older men. They were all tough and strong—farm labourers, commercial clerks, shop assistants, and some professional men like lawyers and stockbrokers, clergymen even, although the professional men usually rose rapidly out of the ranks and became officers.

For months the battalion was in training in one of the vast temporary camps established on Salisbury Plain. The subaltern slept in a wooden hut with two or three others; and all the officers of the battalion had a cheerful Mess in the evening, after long and exhausting route-marches, tedious hours at the rifle-range, lectures on the science of war. The men were trained to a fine point and were as hard as nails.

One day he was told that he was to take a draft to France, and could have five days' leave. He went home, and enjoyed clean sheets, and pleasant meals, and the society of his family, who were quiet and cheerful, although occasionally they looked a little pathetic. At the end of his 'leave' the young subaltern went back to camp, and found twenty men, not of his company, per-

haps not of his battalion, appointed for the draft which he had to take. They had just been on leave too, and some were quiet and sad, but mostly they were cheerful and inclined to be even boisterous. The subaltern marched them off to the railway station, heavily laden with pack and rifle and all the paraphernalia of infantrymen of the line. In the train he read a novel or looked out of the window. At Southampton he mustered his men on the railway platform, and marched them to the docks. An embarkation officer received them and showed them their steamer. On board everybody put on a lifebelt.

The passage to Havre took about five hours. The subaltern looked curiously at the noble prospect—the great quays, the well-built town, the flanking cliffs. The troops disembarked. A British officer received him, and told him how to go to the railway station. The men were buying food and beer in a canteen. Then they marched to the railway station. Havre was 'quiet,' but there were a fair number of people in the streets, who took little notice of them as the subaltern headed his draft, marching over the cobble-stones. At the railway station a British transport officer received them, showed them the great train waiting to take them and other drafts, and pointed out the coaches in which they were to go. A longish journey, with many unintelligible halts, took the draft for about forty or fifty miles through a peaceful country of cultivated fields and villages. The only signs of war were heavy motor lorries and the light horse-driven General Service wagons, which were seen fairly commonly on the roads.

When the journey came to an end, the draft jumped out of the trucks, formed in company by the railway line.

Railhead. There were British soldiers everywhere—nothing but khaki—no sign of French horizon blue. They were in the British lines. The station yard was piled with boxes and baggage; a long hospital train was ready to leave; men in untidy khaki were unloading trucks; on

the road there was a ceaseless coming and going of motor lorries and General Service wagons. There was a noise like distant thunder-claps in the air. The subaltern had heard this before in his period of training, but somehow it seemed more real now. The 'town-major,' who was a hearty British captain, gave the subaltern a list of the billets for his men. The night was spent in these, which turned out to be fairly comfortable lodgings in the houses of small French shopkeepers.

Next morning a motor lorry was ready for the draft. For about ten miles they hustled and bumped over a road which was full of ruts and holes. The booming of guns became louder, and now could be heard Behind the Lines. the rapid barking of machine-guns. Still, there were no trenches; there were some ruined cottages, but other cottages were standing unscathed, and old peasants and women were even working in the fields. But large areas were given up to temporary huts or piles of stores, or were marked off in large squares by barbed wire. These squares were the 'cages' into which prisoners were shepherded for temporary detention and for counting. Individual soldiers and small groups were a common sight, but no men in the mass. The subaltern saw two or three informal games of football in progress, and some young officers shooting rats, with the help of a terrier. Presently they stopped at a plain sort of house which had once been a farm. Half of it was demolished; the rest appeared uninhabited. Actually it was the battalion headquarters.

The subaltern went into the colonel's office. A tired man with an energetic expression, and clad in a worn but tidy uniform, talked with him a few minutes Up to the Line. and gave him a map of the front line. The men fixed bayonets and loaded their rifles. The subaltern had only an ash stick and a revolver. It was a quiet sector of the front: they could go up without further preparation. So the subaltern and his men, who even yet had not seen any real warfare, marched off towards the firing line; he

went quite alone with his men—nobody troubled to come with him. The men were still joking—a little spasmodically, perhaps; the subaltern was serious and just a trifle nervous. However, the way was quite easy to find, the sketch-map was excellent; so they marched on. Presently there was a whirring sound, and a shell fell and exploded about thirty yards away. The men looked curiously at it; the subaltern unconsciously, with a little jerk, stiffened himself and walked straight on as if nothing had happened. The countryside, although not absolutely without houses or tillage, was now very untidy—half-ruined buildings, irregularly-cultivated patches, muddy, trampled fields, holes, pools, heaps of rubbish. The barking of machine-guns was very distinct; and there were one or two aeroplanes always in sight.

Thus, through ugly and rather sordid surroundings, the draft approached the firing-line. Some companies were coming back, looking extraordinarily dirty and tired. They marched without any sort of order; their officers glanced curiously at the subaltern, but did not smile at his spick-and-span uniform; the weary men aroused themselves to throw a jest at the upcoming draft. Presently they came to a series of mounds and trenches. The subaltern had seen this sort of thing before, on Salisbury Plain. He found the proper entrance according to his map, and stepped down into the communication trench; his men followed in single file, a sergeant bringing up the rear. They tramped along over the squashy mud for about two hundred yards, not seeing a soul; and then suddenly, and as it were naturally, they issued into a trench which ran crossways. One or two uninterested-looking soldiers were standing with their rifle-butts grounded; others were sitting on boxes, talking idly; one man was reading a book. This was the terrible front, reached by so easy stages.¹

¹ Impressive accounts of life at the front will be found in *War Letters of Fallen Englishmen*, edited by L. Housman (1930).

CHAPTER XXIX

THE BATTLES OF 1915

As the winter of 1914-15 passed in the monotonous siege-warfare in France, the prospect of an early end to the struggle became remote. Lord Kitchener had been turning over in his mind a question: Turkey in the War. Would a diversion in some other theatre of war be possible? The theatre which Lord Kitchener had in mind was Turkey—the Dardanelles or Syria. For the Turks, after playing the game of duplicity over the *Goeben* and *Breslau* with perfect skill and effrontery for nearly three months, had joined the Germans and Austrians in the war on October 29, 1914.

On the whole, however, the difficulties in the way of a 'Dardanelles' project—difficulties of geography and of the supply of men and material—seemed at the time too great. Lord Kitchener therefore gave up, for the time at least, the design of turning the German flank by an attack upon Turkey. The only thing, therefore, which seemed possible, if a decision was to be reached, was *the fight*, that is, the direct attack, on the Western front. For if you beat the enemy where all their strength is concentrated, you have won the war. All the German strength was in their vast armies in the West, therefore these Western armies must be overthrown. But these had no flank; the Franco-British armies could not march through Switzerland, nor land on the coast of Belgium, made impregnable by German fortifications. Therefore the only way left was to go straight ahead, the infantry attacking the German trenches, rushing forward, broken wave after broken wave, until at last one wave would rush into the enemy line and occupy it.

The Western
Front and a
Military
Decision.

'Governments and individuals conformed to the rhythm of the tragedy, and swayed and staggered forward in helpless violence, slaughtering and squandering on ever-

increasing scales, till injuries were wrought to the structure of human society which a century will not efface. . . .

'Two, and even three, British or French lives were repeatedly paid for the killing of one enemy, and grim calculations were made to prove that in the end the Allies would still have a balance of a few millions to spare. It will appear not only horrible but incredible to future generations that such doctrines should have been imposed by the military profession upon the ardent and heroic populations who yielded themselves to their orders.'¹

This criticism is justified. Yet could anything else have been done?

The first great battle of 1915 was fought at Neuve Chapelle in the British sector on March 10. The object of the British attack was to gain the Aubers Ridge and so to command Lille. A terrific bombardment blasted away much of the Germans' wire entanglements and obliterated whole sections of their trenches. Each battalion commander, each company commander, had his instructions. It is impossible perfectly to synchronise everything when masses of men are handled in the face of enemies whose actions cannot be completely foreseen. The attack at Neuve Chapelle began punctually enough. At grey dawn the infantry of the front line had a ration of rum to warm themselves a little. Then the awful moment came: 'Forward!' The officers led; the men, burdened with their heavy equipment, hastily clambered up the firing-steps and over the parapet of the trenches and rushed forward in long, irregular, swaying lines. As they ran, amid wreckage 'leaping with flame' and amid maddening crashes of noise,² men would suddenly collapse backward, knocked over by a bullet from a machine-gun or the fragment of a shell. Suddenly all the survivors would lie flat on the ground, breathing heavily, sheltering behind little uneven bits of ground.

¹ Churchill, *The World Crisis*, 1915, pp. 17-18.

² Blunden, *Undertones of War* (1930), p. 100.

Then with a 'Come on, men!' the surviving officers would rise and run forward, amid exploding shells towards the frightful rattle of the German machine-guns. Another rest—fewer survivors this time—another rush, and in a waste of holes and mounds a few Germans with perspiring, muddy faces and strained expressions are found working a machine-gun. They are bayoneted or taken prisoner. The surviving British officer casts his eye over his men, says 'Whew! that was hot work,' and waits for reliefs to come up. A hundred or two hundred yards behind, the doctors and stretcher-bearers are beginning to busy themselves with the wounded; dead men, half-dead men, are lying around; it seems impossible to preserve sanity amid the sickening pandemonium; but life persists. Men take a pull at their water-bottles; some even have a bite of their ration. Nobody really expected to have come through the enemy fire to their objective, yet here they are—some of them—and they will have to do the same sort of thing several times before they are killed or wounded.

The result of the battle of Neuve Chapelle was the capture of an enemy sector three miles long, one mile deep, at the cost of 13,000 killed or wounded. The French attacks in the Woëvre and Alsace had similar results. But the Western Allies at any rate had the 'initiative'; and the populations at home consoled themselves by believing that more Germans were being killed than British or French. As a matter of fact, the losses of the Western Allies were greater down to April 1917.

The strongest ray of hope came from Russia. With the spring, the Tsar's armies had reassumed their offensive operations in Galicia. Przemyśl fell on March 22. Nearly all Galicia was in Russian occupation, and now the Grand Duke Nicolas, commander-in-chief, was breasting the Carpathians, and Russian troops were on the high passes, preparing to debouch into the Hungarian plain. At this moment the German blow fell. The Great General Staff had been able,

Russian
Advance
against
Austria.

while safeguarding the West, to concentrate a powerful army in support of the Austrians in the Galician theatre ; and on April 28, Feldmarschal von Mackensen attacked the long Russian flanking-line on the River Dunajec. The

Mackensen attacks on the Dunajec. eager Russian generals had advanced further than their resources warranted. They had men, but they had not enough munitions nor

guns—not even sufficient rifles. The German bombardment blasted away the Russian defences, and the German infantry, properly armed, fed, and disciplined, rushed on the enemy lines and rolled the Russians back in hopeless rout. This was the greatest collapse in the war. Somehow the Russian General Staff retained control, and piloted the broken forces back to one line of defence after another. Galicia is cut by parallel rivers from north to south, at each of which the Russians tried to make a stand ; but everywhere the troops were pushed back, leaving heaps of dead and masses of prisoners. At last the long agony of dead and masses of prisoners. At last the long agony Russians lose Poland. was over when in September a line behind the Pripet marshes was reached. But by this time the German troops had spread out to the north. Warsaw fell on August 4. All Poland was in German hands, and the Kaiser's Eastern lines now stretched from Kovno in Lithuania to the Austrian Bukovina. The Russian armies had lost about two million men. From this fatal campaign of spring 1915, Tsarist Russia never really recovered.

The only blink of sunshine for the Western Allies, the only obvious disappointment to the Central Powers of Intervention of Italy. Germany and Austria, was the intervention of Italy. This country had denounced the Triple

Alliance and ardently thrown in her lot with the West, in May 1915 ; but she met an unexpectedly stiff Austrian resistance along the Venetian Alps. Still, Italy was a Great Power, which in time must help to weigh down the

The Lusitania. balance against the Germans. Moreover, the United States was being slowly attracted into the European circle of fire. On May 7 the Cunard liner *Lusitania*

was torpedoed by a German submarine off the south coast of Ireland; eleven hundred men, women, and children, including American citizens, were drowned. The State Department sent a warning to the German Government. If such a thing happened again, the United States would almost certainly go to war.

The active support of Italy and the sympathy which was manifested fairly widely in the United States heartened the Western Powers and strengthened their idealism, for they could see that the greater part of civilised mankind was for them. This feeling was strengthened by the introduction of gas, which the Germans suddenly employed as an engine of warfare on April 22, 1915, on the Ypres salient. As always in the Great War, the element of surprise gave a great initial advantage to the user. In this case the slow-moving cloud of chlorine quietly made a gap between the French and the British lines. Cautiously, in ghostly stillness (for there had purposely been no warning bombardment), the German infantry advanced, careful not to run into the deathly cloud. In the trenches they found gasping and dead asphyxiated men. As the cloud dissipated itself in the upper air, Canadian troops dashed into the gap, and held it. Renewed attacks by the Germans failed to bend further back the British line. This was the Second Battle of Ypres.

Gas and the
Second
Battle of
Ypres.

The Germans had failed to move the British and Belgian forces from the fragment of Belgian territory which the Allies still held. For the next three and a half years the Germans held all the rest of Belgium in a firm and remorseless grip. Belgian factories were used to make German munitions; Belgian workmen were deported to Germany to work in factories. The feeding of the Belgian people was maintained by committees of Belgian and American citizens. A widespread secret organisation existed for helping Allied prisoners to escape. For taking part in this, the Englishwoman, Nurse Cavell, was shot after trial by court-martial, on October 12, 1915.

Nurse Cavell.

CHAPTER XXX

1914-1915 : THE WAR WITH TURKEY

THE Central Powers gained an enormous accession of strength when Turkey joined itself with them on October 29, 1914. For although Turkey had the appearance of a somewhat derelict empire, yet it had much fighting strength, provided only that it could obtain munitions and money ; and, for a long time at least, Germany could provide these things.

The advantages which the Turks brought to the Central Powers were chiefly three. Firstly, they were able to close the Dardanelles and so to complete the blockade of Russia on every side except that of the White Sea. Secondly, they were conveniently placed to strike at the vital link in the communications of the British Empire, namely, the Suez Canal and Egypt. Thirdly, the adhesion of the Turks to the Central Powers went far to decide the attitude of Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who was determined to be on the winning side.

Two Turkish expeditionary forces attempted to invade Egypt from Syria in November 1914 and January 1915 ; they were repulsed. But if the British Empire had vulnerable places, so had Turkey. In November 1914 a small Indian force was landed at Basra, probably in the first instance chiefly to protect the indispensable oil-stores of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. This was not the first event of India's remarkable military effort in the War, for already a division of 20,000 Indian troops were in the line in France, where Ghurkhas and Sikhs served amid, to them, incredibly uncongenial conditions. The Basra expedition was to grow into the great Mesopotamian undertaking of the Indian army.

There will never be any means now of deciding whether the great campaigns in Mesopotamia were or were not the most economical way of employing the great resources of India in the War. The effort was begun as a small venture. It achieved local success. The newspapers naturally made the most of this success, for the winter of 1914-15 was otherwise a black time for the Western Powers. The expeditionary force pushed onwards between the Euphrates and the Tigris. Its success grew. More troops were brought in. The Cabinet in Great Britain were pleased. Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, called attention in Parliament to this cheerful if minor theatre of war. By the end of September 1915 the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force had cleared the country of Turkish troops as far as Kut-el-Amara.

Meanwhile the great rout of the Russian armies was in progress in Eastern Europe. Those vast armies could be replenished with men, but could they be re-^{Russia and Munitions.} munitioned? M. Paléologue, French ambassador, was walking across the Champ de Mars (February 20, 1915) in Petrograd with M. Sazonov, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A squad of recruits was being drilled in the snow. 'These men,' said M. Sazonov, 'are not conscripts who are being straightened up; they are trained soldiers who, in a few days, will depart for the front—and see, *not one rifle (pas un fusil)*.' Since then the state of affairs had enormously worsened, for the Germans had captured huge supplies of Russian munitions in Galicia. Archangel was used as a port of entry, but in winter it was ice-bound. A small port was found at Murmansk, which was ice-free all the year round, and a railway was constructed to connect this place and Petrograd; but this was only a slender means of export and import. The British Cabinet decided upon a great effort to open Russia on the south-east. If something were not done, Russia might even be driven by the Germans to make peace; for although the Great Allies had made a pact (September 1914) not to make a separate peace but only to negotiate in common, the Tsarist bureau-

cracy was obviously beginning to totter under the strain of the war.

It has been said that the failure of the Dardanelles expedition was due to a Staff Memorandum of Sir John French of December 1914 (written when Lord Kitchener first thought of the scheme).¹ This had pointed out clearly that only a large expeditionary force had any chance of forcing the Dardanelles, and that a large force thus employed would probably involve a weakening of the Allies' resources on the Western front, where the main struggle must always be. So the British Cabinet decided then not to attack the Dardanelles. Yet if troops had been landed at that time on Gallipoli in the numbers that later were furnished, they would almost certainly have taken Constantinople.

The next event in the tragic tale was the attack made by ships of the British and French navies in February and March 1915. The First Lord of the Admiralty still hankered after an attack on the Straits. He had seen the war on the Western front become something like a gigantic mediæval siege, when fortresses could be held for years, indeed for just as long as food lasted; now, in place of castles were trenches, strengthened by barbed wire and machine-guns, but they were equally impregnable. Unlike mediæval castles, trenches could not be turned: there was no way round them, for they extended continuously from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier. The only way to capture them was to send living men straight at them in sufficient quantities for some of them—say ten per cent. at least—to reach their objective. This was the bankruptcy of the military art; there was no more skill or science in frontal attacks on trenches than there had been in sending a host of men with scaling-ladders against a walled and strongly-garrisoned town; not more than when masses of dervishes made rushes at a British square in the Sudan and sometimes reached it. Mr. Churchill, always looking for

¹ See above, p. 307.

a better way, adopted the Dardanelles plan with ardour. Here was a flank of the Central Powers to be turned. When the Cabinet decided against the proposal to send a military expedition, he could not ^{A way} round. himself abandon the idea. A result of the naval attack was the loss of three superb battleships, which struck Turkish mines. Nothing followed but a futile naval bombardment which went on intermittently for six weeks.

Then, when the Russian collapse became obvious, the expedition to Gallipoli in full force was decided upon. By this time the Turks had taken warning. Still, it takes time to make really strong defences; and the British Expeditionary Force might have been landed two weeks earlier than actually happened had some faults not been found in the internal arrangements of some of the transports, which had to be unloaded and then reloaded. No big operation in war is ever done to time. When the ships cast anchor off Cape Helles on Gallipoli on April 25, 1915, the coast and heights were elaborately defended with barbed wire and cunningly-placed machine-guns; Turkish infantrymen held the high places in strength.

It is one of the wonders of history that the troops ever landed on Gallipoli at all; nor indeed is it possible to conceive the intrepid and self-sacrificing spirit of the men (120,000 against 200,000 Turks), mostly ^{Gallipoli.} Australians, New Zealanders, and raw English territorials, who had never been in action before. A narrow strip of sand, then steep, rocky hills and ridges, broken up by innumerable gullies—such is Gallipoli. On to this unknown formidable *terrain*, troops had somehow to land in face of a numerous, skilful, and determined enemy; behind them the sea, in front of them wounds and death—the pitiless scorching sun above, the unknown all around.

The Expeditionary Force had no modern maps of the Gallipoli peninsula. Probably the most detailed map was one made by the French military engineers when, in alliance with Turkey, they fortified Gallipoli in the


Crimean War. When the ships cast anchor on that April day in 1915, the sparkling blue Aegean and the sandy beach and gorse-clad heights of the peninsula looked peaceful and lovely. At night, in order to obtain some information, Bernard Cyril Freyberg of the New Zealand contingent stripped and swam off, for two hours, through pitch darkness, to land. He made one of the beaches unobserved, crawled up to a Turkish post and saw its strength and equipment, lit some decoys in order to mislead the Turks as to the probable landings, then crawled back among the rocks and gorse to the sand, and made the long swim back to the ships. J. M. Barrie has described this exploit in his essay on *Courage*.

The high command thus learned the formidable (indeed it might have been said the impossible) task in front of the Expeditionary Force. The men were embarked in launches and small boats, which were run on to the beaches. As soon as they approached, the Turkish artillery opened fire. Boats sank. Some reached a beach, and the soldiers leapt out on to barbed wire, and were shot down by concealed machine-guns from every side. Some struggled through the dreadful hail, across the sand, and took shelter behind rocks or bushes. Turkish infantry attacks had then to be met. The naval ships covered the landing as well as they could by gunfire. A transport called the *River Clyde*, of relatively shallow draught, was driven ashore with all the men inside it; they then swarmed down the gangways and ran over the beach to the covering rocks. At a cove known later as Anzac (from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) Australian and New Zealand troops, with magnificent *élan*, rushed over the beach and up the heights beyond, and took positions which they could hold. Thus a precarious foothold was obtained on the peninsula. Most of the forces were British, although the French sent a contingent (mainly Senegalese), and the Russians were represented by a regiment.

For the rest of the year this, perhaps the most amazing military expedition in history, was maintained. There


The DARDANELLES

Scale of Miles




Limits of Advances

- 1="S" Beach
- 2="V" "
- 3="W" "
- 4="X" "
- 5="Y" "
- 6="A" "
- 7="B" "
- 8="C" "



Scale of Miles



Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

was no land behind the attacking force ; holding on to the edge of the long peninsula, it had no ground where it might retreat—only the sea and the ships. On the Peninsula. Western front battalions in the trenches could be relieved, and brought to rest miles behind the line ; but on Gallipoli there was nothing but front line, and the whole force that was landed was at no place outside the range of light artillery or machine-guns. The peninsula is almost waterless ; the Expeditionary Force relied on tank-ships. Wounded men could not be treated on land ; they must be taken off (under Turkish gunfire) to hospital-ships. When rations were served out and men began to eat, a cloud of flies at once settled on the food. Dysentery became appallingly common. Nevertheless, the men fought, ate, slept, and played. When off duty they bathed off these sunny beaches and kicked a football, with occasionally a Turkish shot burying itself in the sand or sending up spray from the water. The headquarters of the commander-in-chief were at first at Lemnos, later on the island of Imbros, about fourteen miles west of the Dardanelles. When a great attack was in progress, it was controlled by wireless from these insular headquarters.

There were many great attacks, but they failed to dislodge the Turks except in a few places. A very promising attempt to seize the neck of the peninsula by a fresh landing of troops on Suvla Bay, on August 6, 1915, failed also. Suvla Bay was taken, but the heights above it could not be held.

Meanwhile the British army in France could just hold its own. The great campaign on Gallipoli was consuming all the surplus men and munitions ; indeed, the Dardanelles campaign, if there had been no other, would have ranked as a great war, and would have taxed deeply the military and naval resources of the British Empire. The maintenance of the Expeditionary Force's communications by sea through the Mediterranean was frightfully costly, for the ships ran the gauntlet of enemy submarines all the way. The troops on the peninsula wasted continually and rapidly

from gunshot and dysentery; few men lasted more than three or four weeks. Yet the prize in view was of incalculable value; the pressure maintained so steadily and valiantly upon the Turks might result at any moment in a break-through to Constantinople—and the end of the whole war would be in sight. Could the Expeditionary Force hold on? Could the War Office maintain supplies of men and munitions? Could the Navy guarantee communications? On the other hand, if the Expedition were abandoned, would the harassed Allied Governments and the war-weary peoples be able to bear up under the disappointment and sense of defeat? What would be the effect of such a great Turkish victory upon India?—and, still more, upon the morale of the Germans and Austrians?

In war nobody is defeated until he believes that he is defeated. Therefore, to acknowledge defeat at any point is a very dangerous thing. No statesman would like to take such a responsibility, few would have sufficient confidence in their judgment. Lord Milner took the responsibility. He was not at that time a member of the Government. He said in a speech in the House of Lords, on October 15, 1915, that the Government must face the abandonment of this Expedition, 'the successful conclusion of which is now hopeless.'¹

A successful evacuation seemed also impossible. The commander-in-chief, Sir Ian Hamilton, was recalled to London 'to make a report,' as the *communiqué* expressed it; and General Sir Charles Monro was put in his place. On December 18-19, 1915, all the forces at Suvla and Anzac were taken off at night with the loss of one man. The Turks having been hoodwinked once, every one said that it could not be done again; but on January 7-8, 1916, the troops at Cape Helles were withdrawn equally successfully. These two brilliant and unexpected achievements took away the whole sense of failure

¹ Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*.

from the Dardanelles campaign itself. Prestige is a curious thing. The British people came to the conclusion that in evacuating they had shown their superiority after all ; and even the German Press seemed to have an uncomfortable suspicion to the same effect. Nevertheless, the Dardanelles Expedition had cost 120,000 British lives.

Many people believed, and it has often since been said, that had the Dardanelles campaign been prosecuted, at whatever cost, for a few more weeks, the way to Constantinople would have been opened : that the Turkish resistance, so valiantly maintained, was on the point of collapsing. The publication after the War of the study of the Turkish General Staff on the Dardanelles effort has proved that this was not so ; they were never in very serious anxiety. The competent and soberly-written memoir (*Fünf Jahre Türkei*) of Liman von Sanders, the German general in charge of the Turkish defence, corroborates the conclusions of the Turkish General Staff.

The failure of the Allies in Gallipoli was fatal to General Townshend in Mesopotamia. He had advanced to The Siege of Ctesiphon (twenty-four miles from Bagdad) Kut. and had defeated a Turkish army there (November 12, 1915) ; but he had outrun his resources, and was compelled to retire to Kut-el-Amara, where the Turks blockaded him. Starved out, he surrendered with 13,309 British and Indian troops on April 29, 1916. The British people, however, and the Government had already foreseen and discounted this loss when their pressure on Gallipoli was given up. The tragedy of Kut was not in the surrender, but in the subsequent fate of the troops. The Turks gave the officers reasonably satisfactory treatment, but they marched off the men in droves to distant internment camps, scarcely feeding them or sheltering them on the way. No medical attention was provided ; stricken with dysentery, the men were left as they fell to die in their own dung.¹

¹ A. T. Wilson, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia* (1930), pp. 99, 132.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE TRAGEDY OF SERBIA

THE Second Balkan War could not fail to leave Bulgaria extremely dissatisfied. She had to cede the Southern Dobruja to Rumania; and she had not gained, ^{Discontent} as the result of her victories in the First Balkan ^{of Bulgaria.} War, as much of Macedonia or Thrace as she expected (see p. 241). In the World War she might reasonably expect some territorial increase, as a reward for intervention on one side or the other, or even for neutrality. The possession of Adrianople, which the Turks had recovered in 1913 when the Bulgars were in difficulties against the Rumanians, Greeks, and Serbs, was a cause of just grievance against Italy; and with the defeat of the Turks in the World War, Adrianople would have been returned even to a neutral Bulgaria. The animosity of King Ferdinand was, however, all directed against the Serbs; and his sympathies, although he was half a Bourbon, were all on the side of the Central Powers. Before the World War was really started he had made a treaty of alliance with Germany. The French Government, although strictly republican, asked the Duc de Guise, the head (after his cousin, the Duke of Orleans) of the French Bourbons, to visit his relative. The Duc patriotically undertook the mission to Sofia, but it had no effect.

Serbia and Greece, by a military convention of 1913, were bound to support each other if one or other were attacked by a third party. M. Venizelos, Prime Minister ^{Constantine} of Greece in 1914, was determined to honour ^{of Greece.} the obligations of this convention. He was, in fact, and

remained throughout the War, a convinced and consistent supporter of the Entente Powers. But King Constantine, whose wife was a sister of the Emperor William II. of Germany, was against intervention. He may have sympathised with Germany; he seems also to have feared that his country, if engaged in the War, would suffer the fate of Belgium. The unhappy man dismissed Venizelos, the greatest modern Greek statesman, dissolved the parliament, allowed himself to be surrounded by pro-German counsellors, and ruled contrary to the law of the Constitution.

Nevertheless, though denied Greek help, the Serbs maintained themselves against the Austrians, who could not, The Salonika Expedition. owing to their Russian front, concentrate all their forces in the Balkans. In the summer of 1915, however, the prospect became ominous. The Gallipoli campaign was failing. The Russian armies had been expelled from Galicia in hopeless rout. Any doubts in Ferdinand's mind were removed, and he made ready to engage in hostilities for the Central Powers. A Franco-British expeditionary force was hastily organised and despatched to Salonika, which was Greek territory, near the southern frontier of Serbia. It began to land there on October 5, 1915. This disregard of Greek neutrality was perhaps technically justified by the suspension of the Greek Constitution by King Constantine; for Russia, France, and Great Britain were, under the Treaties of 1830, 1832, and 1864, the Protecting Powers of Greece. The Salonika Expeditionary Force was not in sufficient strength to save The Serbian Collapse. Serbia. On October 12, 1915, Ferdinand of Bulgaria threw off the mask. His army struck at the Serbian flank; unable to fight on two exposed fronts, the Serbian forces collapsed. The Bulgarian troops on the east cut off the routes to Salonika; the Austrians pressed hard from the north; the only way open to the Serbs was westward over the mountains of Albania to the Adriatic. To the horrors of that retreat or rout only the pen of a

Dante could do justice. The broken Serbian army reached Durazzo, after terrible losses, and was taken off to Corfu in Allied ships.

Montenegro collapsed about the same time. This little kingdom had thrown in its lot with the kindred Serbs from the beginning of the Great War. On January 10, 1916, the Austrians captured Mount Lovchen, which dominated Antivari; after this, they occupied the whole of Montenegro.

Serbia also was occupied by the Austrians. Most of the women and children and aged men remained there under Austrian military rule. A number of the inhabitants escaped with the Serbian army to the Adriatic, and were ultimately taken to France and England. For the Serbian refugees in England hospitality was provided by public subscription and also privately. Temporary schools were organised, and some Serbs of university age whose health did not enable them to fight were entered as students at Oxford, Cambridge, and the other universities.

At Corfu the Serbian Government maintained with King Peter and Premier Pashitch the framework of a Government. They formed a state without a territory, like the Belgian Government, which had its seat in the 'Hôtellerie,' a building outside Havre, put at its disposal by the French Government. Like the Belgians, too, the Serbs, though they had lost their territory, had an army which was soon refitted with British and French arms and equipment, and was able to join the Allied Expeditionary Force at Salonika.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE CRUISE OF A SUBMARINE

THE Declaration of Paris, 1856, declared that a maritime blockade to be legal must be effective, that is to say, must be maintained with a sufficient number of ships really to stop access to the enemy's coast. The British Government never declared a blockade against Germany; what it did was to give notice that no contraband of war would be permitted to enter German ports; and by successive Orders in Council the Government gradually extended its list of contraband until practically everything that could possibly be used for the making of munitions was included.

The great struggle took place in regard to cotton, which was an important article of export of the United States.

Tremendous pressure was put by the War Office upon Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to gain his consent to the proclamation of cotton as contraband. On the other hand, as Mr. Page, the United States Ambassador (who was wholly sympathetic to the Allies) warned him, American business circles, at least in the south, would be bitterly aggrieved if the British placed an embargo on cotton. Sir Edward Grey was determined, if possible, that nothing should be done to estrange the United States. He held out against the War Office; and cotton was not declared contraband until April 20, 1916. And then, as Lord Grey tells in his *Twenty-five Years*, the Germans discovered a substitute, equally good for making munitions, so all the friction over the question of an embargo was unnecessary.

A more serious difficulty arose when an American citizen of German extraction bought a German ship, loaded it with copper, hoisted the United States flag, and sent the ship off to Germany. If this ship, ^{The Dacia.} the *Dacia*, was allowed to go through to German waters, then all other German ships which had been swinging at anchor in American harbours since the beginning of the war, would be placed on the American registry and chartered to sail to German ports.

Sir Edward Grey (January 1915) had the most serious interview of his life with Mr. Page, ambassador of the United States, at London. However anxious Grey was to prevent a breach with the United ^{Mr. Page.} States (and no one realised better the awful consequences of this), he could not consent to letting the *Dacia* pass. Yet Page could do nothing to stop German ships being sold to Americans. And anyhow, the *Dacia* was now on its way. Shortly afterwards, however, Page strolled into Grey's room in the Foreign Office, as he sometimes did, even in those tense days, just for an apparently idle chat. The following conversation took place.

'Have you ever heard of the British fleet, Sir Edward?' he asked. Grey admitted that he had, though the question obviously puzzled him. 'Yes,' Page went on musingly, 'we've all heard of the British fleet. . . . Don't you think it's had too much advertising?'

Grey, who was probably terribly tired and worried, failed at the moment to see Page's drift.

'France has a fleet, too, I believe,' Page went on. 'Don't you think that the French fleet ought to have a little advertising?'

Grey soon saw what Page was suggesting—namely, that the United States, always sensitive about the British fleet's restrictions on neutral commerce, would not feel the same about any action of the fleet of France; for there were ancient ties of gratitude with France and the French

navy never claimed to rule the seas. Page's suggestion was promptly taken. A French cruiser went out and seized the *Dacia*, which was taken and condemned in a French Admiralty court. 'The proceeding did not even cause a ripple of hostility.'¹

The officials of the Foreign Office and Admiralty had to tread very delicately in their efforts to use the British command of the sea for the stopping of contra-German blockades. band of war. The Germans were more thorough in their methods. They believed in a clean cut—in sinking all British ships, and stopping even neutrals from sailing to British ports. Although unable 'effectively' to blockade the British Isles, the German Government did declare the waters round Great Britain to be a war-zone, on February 18, 1915. This meant that Allied ships would and neutral ships could be sunk. Unrestricted blockade which brought the United States into the war was not declared by Germany until January 31, 1917.

The submarine was the success of the German navy. The rest of the famous battle fleet, the construction of which had made so much trouble with Britain before the war, had no effect on the course of the war at all, although it fought very well at the battle of Jutland. But the submarines sailed far and wide, and became a very real menace to the Allies' maritime communications. The object of the German submarine policy was the starvation of the British Isles. And certainly the submarines made havoc in British shipping, and in the later stages of the war, in neutral shipping. The figures for Allied and neutral merchant ships sunk by submarines are :

1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
3	396	964	2439	1035 ²

The crews of the submarines were brave men. Many

¹ Hendrick, *The Life and Letters of W. H. Page* (ed. 1924), i. 394-6.

² See Tables in *The Encyclopædia Britannica* (New Volumes, 1922), vol. 32, p. 610.

went out to sea and few returned ; for the British navy maintained a ceaseless hunt for German submarines and developed many brilliant devices for dealing with them. On one submarine which was fortunate enough to return to its base after a long cruise, photographs were taken of the whole voyage. A cinematograph film was made of the photographs, to be used for propaganda, but for some reason or other the German authorities did not exhibit the film during the war—probably because the film explained too much. The film was kept secreted in storage in a German Government Office. The British Intelligence Service is stated to have had the film extracted from its place, photographed, and returned without the knowledge of the German authorities. After the war it was exhibited occasionally in Great Britain and the United States.

The film began with a German naval officer, erect, spruce, clean-shaven, returning a salute as he stepped into a dinghy in Pola harbour ; he was going to be rowed to his submarine. Next, there was shown the submarine, its neat interior, no space wasted, its smart crew. Later it is seen speeding along on the surface of the sea, then it dives and proceeds under water, or it takes to the surface, just as it pleases. A steamship is sighted. The submarine dives. In a little while it comes up again, a torpedo slides out of its tube and strikes the steamship, which almost at once is seen to begin to sink. Then come the tense moments, perhaps minutes, when the ship, settling down by the stern, finally turns its bows straight up into the air and subsides beneath the gurgling water.

The cruise continues. The submarine surges right through the Mediterranean ; eleven ships in succession are met and sunk ; the film re-enacts those sickening moments when the doomed ship either inverts its bows to heaven or careens over sideways and is swallowed up under the waves.

A submarine cruise was not a particularly chivalrous

affair. It was not directed against combatants; the victims of its torpedoes were usually unarmoured steamers and civilian crews, many not of enemy nationality. *Spurlos versenkt.* The policy was horrible, and, once begun, it could only become worse; for, as the submarine campaign proceeded, inevitably the German authorities put pressure on the crews to make it succeed. As the British Admiralty and its Allies steadily countered the submarine campaign, the Germans reacted against them with more stringency. It became more and more important to keep every action secret; therefore at last, in 1917, there are found the Germans at Buenos Aires sending out in cold words a message advocating the policy, 'sinking without leaving trace'—the crews of torpedoed ships were not to be given opportunity to take to the boats. American wireless officers intercepted the message and decoded the words which were: *spurlos versenkt.*¹

The Western Allies always prided themselves on a superior morality in their method of waging the war. First it was atrocities in Belgium, later it was the German submarine campaign against merchant ships which were held up to reprobation. The Allies' navies towed suspected ships into port for trial in an Admiralty Court. The German submarines could not do this; for the Allies were supreme on the surface of the sea. Was it immoral to wage a submarine war against merchant ships? It is not possible wholly to condemn it, although nobody would now attempt to justify the policy of *spurlos versenkt*. For the treatment of Captain Fryatt no excuse can be made; the most rudimentary conception of chivalry would have allowed him at least the right to defend his own ship from the submarine that was going to sink it.

Fryatt was skipper of a Great Eastern Railway Company's steamer which plied between Harwich and Rotterdam. The service was maintained throughout the war. When the German submarine campaign was intensified, Fryatt's

¹ Hendrick, *The Life and Letters of W. H. Page*, iii. (1925), p. 338.

ship seemed to be an easy mark, but he went on his way untroubled, and when a submarine showed itself he drove his ship straight at it. The submarine saved ^{Captain} itself from being crushed like a cockleshell by ^{Fryatt.} diving. This was too much for the Germans to bear: if British merchant-skipper did not stop their ships when summoned, put their men into boats (if given time), and then quietly watch their ships being torpedoed, the German submarine campaign would not work out according to plan. The Germans might have said, 'in that case we won't warn ships which are to be sunk—we will simply sink them at sight, for we cannot be expected to wait to be rammed.' This would have been a reasonable reply: for war is war. What they did do was, when Fryatt's ship was captured, to give him a so-called 'trial,' and then to shoot him (July 28, 1916). Fryatt despised his judges and scorned their sentence. Every British sailor knew that the Germans would never win the war this way. In the Great Eastern railway station at Liverpool Street a fine bronze plaque commemorates the hero's constancy.

CHAPTER XXXIII

1916: VERDUN AND THE SOMME

THE German General Staff, like the British and French, were 'Westerners,' that is, they believed that the war would be decided on the Western front in France where the great armies were. The sectors chosen for a grand attack were not the flat lands near Belgium, which were now so heavily fortified that they were no easier to assault than hilly land. Verdun was the place chosen—a first-class fortress, on the direct road to Paris—its capture would be a stunning blow, both against French resources and French morale.

In a war of grand events and great surprises, the long episode of Verdun was perhaps the most remarkable. It was most noteworthy, not because of the bravery, devotion and constancy with which the German infantry advanced daily through a hail of lead and steel towards the barbed wire and concealed trenches of the great Meuse fortress. Admirable as these qualities were, immeasurably above the ordinary merits of civil life, the German troops had continuously proved themselves to possess them during the last two years of awful struggle. The surprise was in the grimness, the fortitude and the coolness of the French defence. Europe, by the military histories of three centuries, had been educated to believe that the French could make attacks, that they were magnificent in advance, that the military qualities of French troops consisted in what historians liked to call their *élan*; this, it was said, was the discovery of the Grand Condé; this had made Napoleon's outstand-

ing victories ; but for a grim and ungrateful and hopeless defence a less imaginative and more stubborn people were required, like the British or the Germans. Actually there was never a grimmer nor more constantly maintained defence than Verdun, maintained far beyond the point at which, as a rule, men's nerves snap and despair destroys their will.

The massed attacks upon Verdun began on February 21. As always in assaults begun after a prolonged and intense bombardment, notable progress was made in the first day or two ; for the French front-line entanglements were, partially at least, blasted into ruin by the bombardment, and their defenders killed. The advance made by the Germans was so remarkable that the Allied Press, in Great Britain at least, began to prepare the mind of the public for the loss of Verdun ; as a distinct fortress, it was said, Verdun was of little use ; it was just part of the great system of trench-fortifications which extended from Nieuport to Switzerland. If Verdun were lost, the system of entrenchments would only be bent backwards so to speak ; the continuous line would be maintained. While these explanations were being given in the Press, Verdun remained untaken. The French defence, having been ^{slow} beaten back about three miles, unexpectedly ^{Advance.} stiffened. Fort Douaumont, which was about four miles from the actual citadel of Verdun, was obliterated by shell-fire ; its heroic defenders worked their guns to the last ; but the Germans scored no other particular success. The Prussian Minister of War stated publicly that he considered every yard gained as a step to victory, and that the blasted ground thus won was more valuable than spectacular successes. But the fact remained clear that the Germans were aiming at a spectacular conquest of Verdun itself ; and that at the rate of progress maintained after the capture of Fort Douaumont, the citadel would be reached in perhaps a year, at the cost of half a million German lives ; and then the citadel would not be worth having. Yet, having begun an attack, with the eyes of all the world upon it, the

German High Command could not, apparently, break it off. The daily carnage had to go on, the devoted battalions advancing, to wither away in face of the French *mitrailleuses*.

Not that the French position was easy. A terrific strain was put on French resources—a strain that the French High Command calmly met. At one stage in Joffre's Decision. the defence it was necessary if a particular sector was to be saved, that a great park of French artillery should be kept on the right side of the river Meuse; if the sector nevertheless fell, the artillery could never be brought safely back to the left bank again. France could not spare the loss of all this artillery and munitions. Joffre's chief-of-staff pointed out the awful risk involved in such a decision. 'I have taken many others,' said Joffre, as he tranquilly signed the order.¹

Everything depended on maintaining the supply of munitions of war for the hungry mouths of the French cannon and machine-guns. Somehow this was done. Over the long road from the depots at Bar-le-Duc to the lines of Verdun, an endless file of motor lorries, without lights, the front of one almost touching the tail of another, were driven steadily all through the long nights of winter and spring. No bombardment from hostile artillery or aeroplane could stop this steady stream of munition-wagons. If one was hit, it was hastily pushed out of the way and once more in the darkness the drivers resumed their route. This road became known as the *Voie Sacrée*. At the end of the road at Verdun, on ruined walls and houses, was chalked by soldiers' hands: '*ils ne passeront pas*'—the Germans were not to get through.

The defence of Verdun imposed an enormous strain upon France. For Germany, too, the effort of the prolonged attacks was terribly exhausting; but Germany had not, like France, lost 300,000 men in the first month of the war.

¹ General Mangin in *Battles of Verdun*, and *Ency. Brit.*, vol. 32 (1923), p. 922.

France, with a population of about thirty-six millions, was holding 300 miles out of a total line of 350 miles. For over four months the overwhelming burden of ^{The Strain} the Verdun defence was borne by this Atlas; ^{upon France.} but if the French spirit was invincible, the physical resources of France had a limit. It was necessary to do something to relieve the pressure. The whole world had been watching at first with surprise as well as admiration, and later with almost perplexed wonder, the magnificent defence; but the British High Command was more methodically employed in arranging for a grand attack which would draw the German masses from Verdun.

The preparation of a general attack was an affair of months. First of all, careful reviews must be made of the geography of every sector of the British front, ^{Preparing an} and every scrap of information about the enemy ^{Attack.} lines must be compared and co-ordinated. When a particular sector had been fixed upon for the scene of the great assault, sufficient quantities of munitions had to be accumulated. This involved a programme of supplies to be ordered in advance, so that other 'fronts' might not be starved. Each sector had only communications for the transporting of a normal supply of munitions. Therefore extra roads and even railway lines had to be constructed behind the sector chosen for the scene of attack. The casualties of 'normal' warfare were nothing compared with the casualties of a grand attack. Therefore more field-hospitals had to be made, more dressing-stations near the front-line. More troops than ever must be massed in the chosen sector, and because they would be quickly consumed, provision must be made for supplying reserves and reliefs, indeed for supplying the equivalent of several fresh armies, without unduly weakening other sectors. Finally, the most careful studies and calculations at the headquarters staff of the Commander-in-Chief in the field must be made, so that all the operations-orders might be issued to the various units—infantry battalions, artillery companies,

aviation squadrons, trainmen, and the rest—each with its times and places exactly defined, so that everything should synchronise and take place at the proper moment, for a mistake might mean the loss of half a million lives. But as nothing in large-scale warfare ever can be made to happen at all the arranged times, as orders are miscarried, telephone-wires are cut, troops move faster or slower than they ought, as errors or mischances are bound to occur, the Staff has to try and make allowance for these things. And when all the plans and arrangements are perfected, the mapmakers, printers, and typists have to be employed and supervised—every line has to be scanned to see that not the slightest error has crept in, and every precaution has to be taken that the complete plan is known to nobody but the High Command.

There is no such thing as surprise in a grand attack. Enemy aviators can scarcely fail to detect the growing activity behind the lines—the extra trains and lorries and service wagons, the piling up of supplies. Then before the infantry are launched to the assault, there must be a prolonged bombardment—for at least two or three days. The only things about which the enemy is uncertain are, when the bombardment will commence, at what moment in the bombardment the infantry attack will be launched, and at which points on the bombarded sector or sectors the chief ‘pushes’ will be made; naturally certain parts or sectors are bombarded and attacked merely to divert the enemy’s attention.

The point chosen, in collaboration with the French General Staff, for the great assault which was to relieve Verdun was the Somme sector, where the British joined the French line; the British were to do most of the attacking, on a twenty-mile front, but the French undertook a serious share of fighting on the next-door sector.

The great battle began on July 1. A terrific bombardment, lasting for six days, obliterated most of the German

The Franco-British Junction-Point.

front-line trenches. Under this torrent of high explosive not much could escape. At dawn the British infantry went over the parapets of their trenches. As they advanced over the torn and ripped ground of no-^{The Daily Death.} man's land, the artillery behind maintained a barrage of fire which fell in front of them. The barrage helped to clear away such defenders as were still left in the German front-line trenches; it could not, however, prevent the counter-battery work of the Germans, which caused heavy losses in the waves of advancing British troops. But the German front-line trenches were occupied without extraordinary losses. Then came the deadly time. The British infantrymen had taken possession of ruined trenches, where the barbed wire had been torn up by the bombardment, the parapets demolished, the trenches themselves largely filled in. In these ruined defences the infantry had to try and live in the face, first, of German artillery bombardment, and then of fierce and incessant counter-attacks of the German shock-troops—the picked corps of a valorous army. In sustaining those counter-attacks the British suffered enormous losses. In the night they worked hard to 'consolidate' their gains, by deepening the trenches, heaping up new parapets, making machine-gun posts. At dawn, if not relieved by fresh troops, they must go onward again, rushing over shell-swept ground towards the next line of German trenches which were indicated on their war-maps. So day after day these devoted troops, the recent schoolboys, the clerks, the tradesmen, the rich, the poor, the fathers of families, went forward to the attack, martyrs for a cause which they deemed to be just. The British nation died daily. They died at the noblest possible moment in a man's life, in a complete act of abnegation, when he is spending himself wholly for others.

The British attacks and the German counter-attacks were continued on the Somme throughout the summer months. On September 15 a surprise was—^{Tanks.} perhaps injudiciously—released with great effect against

the Germans. This was the tanks, armoured motor cars of a 'caterpillar' type, the pair of wheels on each side being bound together by an endless chain. The invention of these machines had for many months been the secret of the technical advisers of the French Staff and of the British War Office and Admiralty; only one or two men in the Cabinet knew of it. Elaborate experiments and the most careful studies were brought to success, but not before the Somme campaign was well advanced. Was it worth while releasing the tank at this stage? Mr. Churchill went specially to the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, to beseech him not to let the tanks go out this year. Nevertheless, the decision to use them was taken. On September 15 the huge, horrid mechanical monsters, filled with men and machine-guns, rapidly advanced, over the uneven ground, followed by the infantry, enthusiastic in the possession of a new weapon of war. The effect on the Germans was terrific. Lines of enemy trenches were occupied by the British; and next day they were ready to go on with renewed ardour behind the tanks. The new machines were undoubtedly a great help to the infantryman in his awful journey from his own parapet to the enemy trenches; they were a moral screen between him and enemy fire, and actually they were a material help, for they could, partially, at least, clear out the enemy machine-gun posts before the infantry came up. But the grand effect of the first surprise attack of the tanks could never be repeated; and their use in September 1916 could not convert the Somme operations, which had by this time become almost a stationary battle, into a German rout. The Germans captured a British tank, and soon were making tanks for themselves.

The attacks on the Somme, after all, had already done their chief work. They had drawn away the German pressure from Verdun, and were enabling the French even to regain the ground there that they had lost. On October 24 the French stormed Fort Douaumont. On the Somme

the attacks were continued and, had they been favoured by a dry autumn, might have at last effected a real break in the German lines. But the mud of late October brought a stop to the sacrifices of the tireless and devoted infantry. By November 3 the attacks died down. They had cost the lives of some 400,000 British and 200,000 French killed and wounded ; the German losses on the Somme were estimated at about 600,000.

In spite of appalling losses, the weight of numbers seemed to be on the side of the Entente. An accession in 1916 was Roumania which, in August, denounced its treaty with the Triple Alliance Powers, and ^{Roumania.} joined the Entente in the war. A brief and brilliant invasion of Hungary (Transylvania) followed. But the German General Staff felt sufficiently safe in the West—in spite of the tremendous Franco-British attacks on the Somme—to send General von Falkenhayn to the new Transylvanian front. This German general was magnificent. Falkenhayn rolled back the Roumanian army, first over the Carpathian passes, then across one Wallachian river after another, where the Roumanians vainly tried to stand fast ; Craiova was captured by the Germans, then Bucharest itself. The tide of war rushed on into Moldavia. Finally, General Averescu of Roumania established his armies in a strong line on the Sereth river, and so saved the greater part of Moldavia, and its capital Jassy. In the next year (1917) the Roumanian army on the line of the Sereth in Moldavia became, under General Averescu, an efficient and formidable fighting force.

CHAPTER XXXIV

JUTLAND

NAVIES could not win the war but they could lose it. The Germans could only be beaten on land. On the other hand, unless sea-communications were kept open over all the oceans, the supply of munitions from the United States would be cut off; the food-supply of the British Isles—and to a large extent the food-supply of the Allied armies—would come to an end; the foreign trade of Great Britain would disappear, and with it the ability of Great Britain to provide money and credit for herself and her Allies—in a word, the war would stop, with all Europe and the British Empire at the feet of the Germans.

By far the chief share of this burden of ocean-defence fell to the British navy, which was so much the largest among the Allied fleets. The chief tasks of the navy were : first, to fight and sink the German High Seas Fleet if it came out from the mouth of the Elbe, or (in other words) to prevent the invasion by sea of the British Isles or any other Allied territory. This first duty was the affair of the Grand Fleet, the huge armada of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and all manner of auxiliary war-craft which was lying, ever ready to steam out, in the waters of Scapa Flow.

The second duty was mine-sweeping. The resourceful and intrepid German Admiralty found means to sow mines in the North Sea and Mediterranean all through the war. The task of patrolling the sea for mines fell to requisitioned fishing-trawlers and similar steamboats; their dangerous

task had to be pursued unceasingly in every sort of weather and at every season of the year.

The third task was to counter the German submarine campaign. This task was never finished. Like some terrible pest, the submarines could be kept *down*, their ravages restricted, but on the least relaxation of the British effort, the submarines would spread out again, doing havoc among Allied and neutral shipping. The task of countering the submarine campaign, a task which seemed beyond human ingenuity, fell chiefly to destroyers (aided by aircraft), that is to say, small surface-ships; for one submarine is no check to another.

The fourth task of the navy was to provide convoys, chiefly for troopships. Merchant ships were left largely to take their chance alone. These convoys consisted for the most part of destroyers, perpetually scouting around the troopships, on the lookout for submarines. The efficiency of the convoys is shown, for instance, by the fact that in all the voyages made by ships in bringing the American armies to France in 1917-18 not one ship was lost.

The fifth task fell to the British and Allied submarines. They were of little use except as offensive weapons; therefore as if the depths of the ocean alone were not dangerous enough, they sought out the enclosed seas where the Central Powers still had ships afloat—the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, and the Baltic. The Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus were protected at their entrances by booms and steel nets. But the dauntless submarines dived under boom and net and made havoc in Turkish shipping, especially during the Dardanelles campaign.

The last of the great duties (in addition to innumerable other indispensable work) was raiding. Ceaselessly feeling for weak spots in the German defence, or at least for places, however strong, where attacks might be made, the navy was always ready to furnish a party for any daring adventure. The unassuming spirit of self-sacrifice of the sailors was only equalled by the amazing ingenuity and

fertility of resource in the executive officers and the scientific staff.

But what is to be said of the Merchant Marine, of the men whether British, Allied, or neutral, who followed their peaceful vocation, put to sea, braved the German submarines, brought their cargoes home, turned the ship around and went out again to die, torpedoed in the icy waves? These crews, like the endless roll of battalions that went forward to the massed attacks in France, are the simple heroes of the war. The task was plain and unattractive, and fraught with pain and death. They took it as their daily work, dimly conscious, if at all, of the grandeur of their achievement, in this world unrewarded.

Except for a few daring raids in the early months of the war, the German navy put forth little effort in any direction except submarine activity. The Austrian navy, which had some powerful battleships, never contested the Allied command of the Adriatic; but here, too, and elsewhere in the Mediterranean, Austrian, along with German, submarines were daring and active. The Eastern Mediterranean, with its many bays and islands, was particularly favourable to the creation of submarine bases; and the doubtful neutrality of the Government of King Constantine of Greece seems to have been not unfavourable to the anti-Allied submarine effort. This was the chief reason for the Allies definitely adopting the cause of the Constitutionalist Venizelos, and demanding the abdication of King Constantine on June 11, 1917. The success of this move enabled the Allies to keep a stricter watch for submarines around the Greek coasts. Their patrol of the Mediterranean also was immensely improved by the arrival of Japanese destroyers in April, 1917; just as the Allied patrol of the Atlantic and North Sea was enormously eased in 1917 by the arrival of United States flotillas. In 1918 Greece was fighting on the side of the Allies.

The German High Seas Fleet only came out in full strength once, and then it fought against the British Grand Fleet a great naval battle, indecisive in that it left the relative strength of the two fleets unimpaired, decisive in so far as it deterred the Germans from fighting another great sea-battle.

The fires of controversy regarding the battle of Jutland seem never likely to die down. The British navy considers that it gained a victory; the Germans deny that they were defeated. One in- Jutland. contestable assertion can be made, that whereas the German fleet came out and fought a battle on May 31, 1916, it retired after that and never contested command of the sea again.

The British Grand Fleet spent most of the war in Scapa Flow, but from time to time it came out, whenever there seemed to be any likelihood of meeting the enemy. It was on one such occasion that Beatty. Admiral Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet, preceded by Admiral Beatty's battle-cruiser squadron, came over the North Sea in a southerly direction. Beatty's ships came within range of the German Fleet at 3.48 P.M. Firing ensued at a distance of about 14,000 yards. The German gunnery was admirable; two British ships, the *Indefatigable* and the *Queen Mary*, were hit and sunk. A signalman sprang on to the *Lion's* bridge with the words: '*Princess Royal* blown up, sir.' Beatty turned to his flag-captain: 'Chatfield, there seems something wrong with our damned ships to-day; turn two points to port' (i.e. nearer to the enemy).¹ So the diminished force moved towards what seemed certain destruction. Actually the fighting continued on what seemed more like equal terms.

Meanwhile the Grand Fleet was coming up. At 5.40 P.M. it came into action, but at very long range. At 6.14 P.M. Admiral Jellicoe found his ships Jellicoe. at an unsatisfactory angle towards the German fleet, and

¹ Churchill, *The World Crisis*, iii. 129.

it became necessary to deploy or partially turn the whole line of the Grand Fleet.

‘Jellicoe conceived himself limited to two alternatives : either he could let his right-hand column nearest the enemy go ahead and make the others follow it, or he could let his left-hand column farthest from the enemy take the lead. If he chose the former, he ran the risk of the enemy concentrating their fire on his leading ships while the rest of the Fleet could not reply. If he chose the latter, he drew out his line of battle 10,000 yards farther away from the enemy.’¹

The second course was the safer ; and Jellicoe, who had about a minute in which to make up his mind on a question which involved the existence perhaps of the whole Grand Fleet, and of the whole British Empire, chose this course ; he deployed to port. ‘No one can say that on the facts as known to him at the moment it was a wrong decision.’ This is the guarded criticism of Mr. Churchill.

Contact, however, was not lost, and by 7.12 P.M. German ships emerging from the mist were struck by gunfire and were sunk or disabled. Admiral Scheer ordered his ‘gasp-ing cruisers’ and torpedo-boats to attack the Grand Fleet at all costs, in order to cover his retreat. ‘Once more Jellicoe, obedient to his method, turned away from the torpedo stream.’

This practically ended the battle of Jutland. The Germans claimed a victory. The losses on both sides were about equal. Nevertheless command of the sea was and remained with the British fleet. Admiral Scheer did actually once and once only again put to sea, on August 18, but no decisive action resulted.

¹ Churchill, *op. cit.*, iii. 147.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR

THE fourth year of the war seemed to bring the combatants no nearer to the end. The Germans had a splendid 'war-map.' Their Government was able to issue a ^{The Germans} map of Europe and part of Asia with broad ^{winning.} coloured lines defining the *Schlachtfeld*—the 'slaughter-field'—or theatres of war. They were able to show the vast continuous area of land in possession of the Central Power or their Allies, beginning in Asia, at a point south of Bagdad, and stretching over the Bosphorus, through the Balkans, Central Europe, and far into France. Great capital cities of their enemies were now in occupation of the Central Powers — Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, Brussels, in addition to the great commercial cities, Antwerp, Lille, Lodz. The powerful system of field fortifications which the Germans and their Allies had constructed in front of these territorial gains had defied all efforts of the Entente States to break through them. Therefore it seemed that the Central Powers had only to sit grimly behind their field-works and sooner or later—even if they could advance no farther—they must be bought off and induced to make peace by very heavy payments on the part of the Entente. In fact, the Germans seemed to be winning the war. Moreover, although the Entente peoples were not aware of it, the General Staffs in France, Great Britain, and Russia must have known that even the famous 'attrition' was working not for but against the Entente. That is to say, it was (if figures prove anything) not the Central Powers that were being gradually worn down, but

the Entente States ; for the British and French were losing about four men killed for every three Germans killed. This ratio of loss persisted throughout the year 1917.

It is not surprising therefore that there was a good deal of gloom among the Entente peoples. The men and women who were not fighting had, in Great Britain at least (for the French Government did not publish casualty lists), to read daily the sickening lists of killed and wounded—column after column of names of young men cut off before their prime, and the names of many older men too, who had gone to the front. The sight of vast military hospitals extemporised in every town, and of crippled soldiers in hospital-uniform hobbling about in every park and public garden, tended further and inevitably to depress the public's morale.

Yet in the very places where, it might be expected, morale would have been lowest, namely, in the deathly front and in the painful hospitals, it was actually at the highest. It is true that the soldiers continually grumbled. Occasionally some even talked thoughtlessly of mutiny, as when in disgust a man would say to his mate: 'if some one would only chuck the whole thing, I would do so too.' But the few men who talked this way never really meant it. There were mutinies in the French army in 1917, but they all arose behind the line. The men in the line remained cheerful, made jokes, felt hungry, and enjoyed their food ; and when they came back on brief spells of leave their unforced cheerfulness, their poise, their sense of proportion, the absence of strain, were in marked contrast to the nervousness of the people at home. This, of course, is true only of soldiers whose constitutions stood the privations of life at the front ; those who returned with shell-shock were not normal in their outlook.

In the hospitals there was continual jollity and 'chaffing.' But most marked of all was the confidence among the prisoners of war in German detention camps. The British

who were prisoners never doubted that their country would win the war. It is difficult to see what grounds they had for holding this view; they merely held it without argument.

The turning of the tide in favour of the Entente States was marked by the entrance of the United States into the war on April 5, 1917. This occurred in a quite natural sequence of events. President Wilson had steadily warned the German Government that there was a definite limit to the peacefulness of the United States. Citizens of the United States had been sunk with the *Lusitania* (May 7, 1915: one hundred American citizens drowned); and with the *Arabic* (August 19, 1915). After this the German Admiralty was a little more careful not to offend the United States. Yet awkward instances continued to occur. In September 1915, Dr. Dumba, Austrian ambassador at Washington, was discovered to be fomenting strikes in the United States. He was accordingly given his passports and sent home to Vienna.

Towards the end of the year 1916 the German Admiralty intensified its submarine activity. Americans began to feel that an incident might occur which would make their participation in the war practically inevitable: unreal as the ghastly struggle appeared to people on the Western side of the Atlantic, they were now beginning to look squarely at the war. Then the Germans made war certain when they decided on 'unrestricted' submarine hostilities: that is to say, when they decided, so far as they could, to torpedo every ship (neutral or not) which came to the British Isles. The Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, knew the fatefulness of this decision. He was present at the Council of Pless on January 9, 1917, where the Emperor, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Tirpitz also were; they insisted that unrestricted submarine activity would bring down the power of the British Empire and this would enable Germany to win the war. Bethmann came back from the Council wring-

The Decision
for Unre-
stricted Sub-
marine War-
fare.

Bethmann-
Hollweg and
Unrestricted
Submarine
Warfare.

ing his hands. 'Why don't you resign rather than allow this decision?' said a friend. 'My resignation would only damage the Government,' he answered. The truth is that, wise man though he was, he had not the strength to stand up for his opinion in this case, just as he had failed in regard to the violation of Belgium.

The unrestricted submarine campaign was to begin on February 1, 1917. The decision was communicated to the United States through Count Bernstorff, German ambassador at Washington, on January 31. Soon after, Mr. Balfour, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, asked Mr. Page, United States ambassador at London, to come and see him. Page came and was given a copy of a telegram (dated January 16, 1917) sent by Herr von Zimmermann, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Eckhardt, German minister to Mexico. The telegram was as follows:

The Zimmermann Telegram.

'We intend to begin on the 1st of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavour in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. You will inform President Carranza of the above . . . and add the suggestion that he should on his own initiative invite Japan to immediate adherence. . . .'

How had the Foreign Office obtained access to this message? Simply enough, by intercepting and decoding German wireless communications. All through the war the British Military and Naval Intelligence services had been able to decode the German wireless messages. Herr von Zimmermann had sent his famous telegram by four different routes: the British tapped every one of them.

The Zimmermann telegram and the beginning of un-

restricted warfare completed the passage of the United States into action. On February 3, the United States steamship *Housatonic* had been torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. President Wilson still proceeded deliberately, but he told his friend, Colonel House, privately, that Germany was acting as 'a madman that should be curbed.' On April 5 the United States Congress, on the proposal of President Wilson, declared a state of war with Germany.

United
States enters
the War.

CHAPTER XXXVI

LIFE AMONG THE CENTRAL POWERS

‘SOCIETY knows not, and cannot know, the mental treasures which slumber in her bosom, till necessity and opportunity call forth the statesman and the soldier from the shades of lowly life.’ So wrote Sir Walter Scott in *Peveril of the Peak*. The idea should be developed further; war calls forth unexpected qualities not merely from men with the capacity for greatness, but from the plain men too. It is the nation or nations which produce the greatest number not merely of eminent statesmen and of eminent soldiers, but of plain men with sterling qualities, which will win a war.

The peoples of the Central Powers certainly showed grand qualities of courage and endurance for four years of hostilities. The pivot of the war on this side was Germany: the rest were only powerful auxiliaries. In Great Britain and France it had been believed, in the early stage of the war, that German economy would collapse; that money or food or both would give out within a few months. Nevertheless, though suffering, Germany was never starved out.

‘Although not strong financially, Germany is very strong economically,’ wrote a critic in the *Morning Post*, early in the war. The statement was justified. German Economic Strength. many could not have financed vast and continuous purchases of food and munitions from abroad, as Great Britain did. But as the British navy stopped the greater part of the foreign trade of Germany, there were comparatively few foreign payments to be made.

Payments inside Germany and to the German armies could be made in paper money, so long as the German people continued to entrust the Government with their savings and subscribed the successive war loans. These war loans were very large, for the Germans, like the French (who, however, had a good excuse because their best industrial territory was in German occupation) paid for practically none of the war-expenses by taxation.

The German Government was gambling upon victory ; only indemnities to be paid by the enemy could enable it to meet the tremendous liabilities of its war loans. As a matter of fact, being ultimately defeated, the German Government repudiated its war loans by inflating the currency and depreciating the mark, until the whole debt of *nominally* £8,000,000,000 (at twenty marks to the £ sterling) value was in 1924 worth *actually* only a few hundreds (at twenty million marks to the £).

The German people are highly patriotic. Once the war was begun, they supported their Government unflinchingly. At first there was a moment's doubt concerning the attitude which the great Social Democratic Party would adopt—the party of the Socialist working men. The majority of the party stood staunchly by the Government ; these were called the Majority Socialists. Their leaders were Herr Friedrich Ebert, originally a saddler, a prominent trade unionist, who ultimately lost two sons in the war ; and Herr Philip Scheidemann.

A small number of the Social Democrats refused to support the Government in the war. These were known as the Minority Socialists. Their leaders were two Communists, Dr. Liebknecht and Frau Rosa Luxemburg, two persons of undoubted sincerity, but fanatical in their views and actions. Communists live in a world of their own, and it is not a real world, for they refuse all appeals to reason, except their own reason.

A critic who solidly grounded himself on facts was a German of liberal political views and keen critical power.

He lived in Zurich and wrote a series of books, attacking the foreign policy of the German Government and its motives and actions in entering into the war.

J'Accuse.

The first of these remarkable works was entitled *J'Accuse*. The indictment of Germany is written in powerful, indeed in passionate, language, in close, logical argument, with a wealth of quotation from authentic documents. *J'Accuse*, with its following work—*The Crime*—is perhaps the most telling indictment of the Germans produced by critics or historians in any country.

On the other hand, if Germany had serious critics among her own people, she had one or two strong champions among strangers. One was Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a member of the well-known English family, who had married a daughter of Wagner and settled in Dresden. He had, long before the war, written (in German) a large and learned book (*The Foundations of Modern Europe*) on the influence of the Teutonic people in history; and during the war he wrote strongly in the German favour, and became a German citizen.

Another convinced champion of the German cause was a citizen of the United States, who had become a professor in a South German university. This brave man joined the German army, although middle-aged, was gazetted a lieutenant, and died fighting with his regiment on the Western front.

An American
in the Ger-
man Army.

Bread was not so good in Germany during the war as it was in the British Isles. The Germans had to do the best they could with what they grew themselves and with what was grown in Hungary. These supplies had to meet the needs not merely of Germany but of the Austrian Empire. In the British Isles the bread was excellent, although it was (or perhaps because it was) coarser than in peace time—the husk of the wheat was ground up in the flour. In Germany, rye, potatoes, and other vegetable matter were mixed with the wheaten flour; as the war went on, the bread became 'sad' and 'sadder.'

Meat was fairly plentiful, and beet sugar was common enough, but butter and all sorts of fats became in the long run extremely scarce. Very early a rationing system was instituted both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, but it did not function well. The famous German bureaucracy proved too cumbrous or too inelastic ; in Austria the rationing system failed entirely to maintain an equal distribution of supplies.

German and
Austrian
Rationing.

Colonial produce disappeared off the markets of the Central Powers, but the scientists and inventors accomplished much by way of substitution. If nitrates for agricultural fertilisers could not be imported, nitrate could be extracted from the air. Rubber could be done without ; ' we are not going to make peace for want of a few rubber bands,' said Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in one of his speeches.

Substitutes.

Cafés, restaurants, and hotels, except those requisitioned for military purposes, remained open in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Newspapers appeared regularly, and were furnished with very good war *communiqués* by the German and Austrian Governments. After the United States came into the war, the American

The Press in
War.

Intelligence Service reported that the German *communiqués* had proved ' absolutely reliable.' They did not tell the whole truth, but they seem to have told more than the *communiqués* of the Entente Powers. Naturally, newspapers were strictly censored, and the Liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* was on one occasion subjected to trial and fine. The Entente Powers were equally strict with their newspapers. The newspaper press of the Central Powers was considered to provide sufficient frank information to be carefully summarised ; the summary was published by the British War Office in a journal called *The Daily Review of the Foreign Press*—an excellent journal of which complete volumes were after the war deposited in various public libraries in Britain.

Life was quite tolerable in Germany during the war,

but less so in Austria. The Viennese bureaucracy failed to grapple with the multitude of tasks which fell to it.

Exhaustion in Austria. Food became extremely scarce; and by the autumn of 1917 high Austrian authorities held that the country could not maintain the population through another winter. Count Czernin reported to the Emperor in this sense in April 1917: 'It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an end; . . . after the close of the summer Germany must not reckon on us any longer.' Austria did just manage to survive the winter of 1917-18 and was lucky enough to be able to make peace with Roumania on May 7, 1918, and thus to obtain at least the possibility of gaining supplies from Moldavia. The Austrians called this 'the Bread-Peace.'

Bulgaria, a peasant-state, could supply itself with food, but Turkey was in terrible straits. The population steadily Bulgaria and Turkey. diminished; but as it was long habituated to misery before the war, the feelings of the Turkish people did not count in the question of the continuance of the war. So long as Germany could send munitions and some rations, the Turkish War Office would go on pressing the hardy and fatalistic Anatolian peasants into the army until the supply gave out.

CHAPTER XXXVII

1917

THE advent of the United States in the war cheered the Allied peoples, and confirmed their conviction of ultimate victory. The good faith, the sense of honour, which is the permanent note of United States policy, was a reassurance to the Allied statesmen who in the prolonged agony of the struggle were being tempted to falter. The lofty speeches of President Wilson, a Prophet, expressed the noblest views of the Entente Powers and at once and permanently braced their sagging idealism. But the advent of the United States did more than all this; it was naturally of enormous help, for it at once cleared away all financial obstacles from the path of the Entente. By March 1917, said Mr. Bonar Law, Great Britain had sold or mortgaged all the securities held by British subjects in companies which operated on the American continent. Thus Great Britain was in the utmost difficulties in procuring dollars for the purchase of food and munitions; and if Great Britain was unable to procure dollars none of the other Entente Powers could do so. After April 5, 1917, the United States provided all the dollars that were needed, itself procuring them by the issue of 'Liberty Bonds' to its own people, and then handing over the proceeds, on loan, to the Entente Powers. Such is the origin and explanation of the War Debts owed by European countries to the United States. The American War Debts.

In a military way the United States could not help much until it had time to train large armies; the existing army in March 1917 only numbered about 85,000 men. In a naval way, however, the United States could provide

immediate and powerful assistance; the addition of the numerous United States destroyers with their very enterprising crews and commanders, to the Entente The United States Navy. flotillas, was a swift and decisive step towards the solution of the Entente's anti-submarine problem.

In what used to be called the Middle East a cleft was made in the hitherto immovable defences of the Central Powers; for, on March 11, 1917, General Sir Stanley Maude, with an army of British and Indian troops, drove the Turks out of Bagdad. The Capture of Bagdad. heroic Maude died on November 18 (1917), from cholera; he had begun the long drive against Turkey which was to end with the surrender at Mudros.

The war in France showed no decision one way or the other. The tranquil and imperturbable Joffre had been relieved of his command by the French Government (December 13, 1916). Since the battle of the Marne he had achieved no big success; but indeed a big success was scarcely possible. On giving up his command, he accepted a mission on behalf of the French Government to the United States where his fame, his impressive presence, and his massive common sense captivated the American public.¹ Retirement of Joffre.

In place of Joffre the French Government appointed as their Commander-in-Chief in the field General Nivelle, a man of much energy and resourcefulness. The great frontal attacks had failed to roll back the German armies of occupation; they were not even wearing out the Germans, for the French and British soldiers suffered greater losses in the attacks than did the German defenders. All the military men and statesmen were reflecting on this *impasse* on the Western front, and were trying to find a way out. Deadlock in the West. Mr. Lloyd George had a plan for a great thrust from the Italian front against the Austrian lines, with a view to the invasion of the Tyrol and ultimately to an advance towards Vienna. Others still believed that

¹ Joffre died at Paris on January 3, 1931.

Turkey would be found to be the joint in the armour of the Central Powers; and that the invasion which would end the war would come by way of Mesopotamia, Syria, Asia Minor, Constantinople, Bulgaria and, finally, Austria.

General Nivelle was an advocate of the theory of the 'limited offensive,' on the Western front, where the strength of the German armies was, and where a 'break-through,' a *percée*, might be achieved. If the attack was made along only a mile or two of the enemy's line, a surprise could be achieved. This surprise would certainly result in a real advance by the attacking troops, at small cost, and it might lead to a 'break-through'; in any case the gains made in the first instance, even if not pushed further, could

Nivelle's
Limited
Offensive
Theory.

be held and consolidated. Nivelle, having persuaded his own Government, came to London. The British War Cabinet was so impressed with a soldier who could explain his theories neatly, clearly, decisively, that they adopted his plan with enthusiasm. Here was a man who 'saw clear'; who had a plan, not grandiose, but limited, effective, and achievable without colossal slaughter. Unfortunately the Germans, in a trench-raid, captured, on March 3, a memorandum of Nivelle, which had been distributed to the French officers in the line. The Germans were thus warned of the coming attack and its methods.

On Monday, April 16, 1917, the attacks of the French infantry were launched on the River Aisne, of which the French held then only the south bank. The lines attacked were of about six miles' length.

Nivelle's
Failure.

The chief objective was the slope and ridge of the Chemin des Dames. Considerable advances were achieved, but the Chemin des Dames was not itself gained, and casualties in killed and wounded were suffered to the extent of about 100,000.

These gigantic losses, coming after nearly three years of terrible drain on the manhood of France, struck the French Government with consternation. They decided to stop

the attacks, in spite of the appeals of Mr. Lloyd George, who went to France (May 4) and made perhaps his best speech—a short but moving address in the Allied War Council, in which he advocated unswerving continuance of a sound plan once it had been begun. ‘If we stop the offensive . . . the Germans will say the Allies are beaten.’ Thus the Germans would gain and the Allies would lose their moral impetus. But the French Government was not moved. Nivelle was recalled from the chief command and Pétain was put in his place; but Nivelle’s abilities were not lost, for he remained at the front as an army commander. In July, Pétain captured the Chemin des Dames.

France was at the nadir. The failure of Nivelle’s attack, from which so much had been hoped, the enormous loss of men, sustained by a nation already drained to the uttermost, seemed to complete the deterioration of the French morale. Mutinies took place in the French armies—not in the fighting-line but (where mutinies only take place) behind the lines, chiefly among the second-rate formations of troops which had never been to the front and never expected to go there. Instead of *ils ne passeront pas*, which had been chalked on huts and carriages in the neighbourhood of Verdun in 1916, now these same objects were surreptitiously marked *à la boucherie*—‘to the butchery.’ But the mutinies were quelled, with little resort to capital punishment (although the French artillery had to fire on some of its own troops); only about twenty men, it is said, being shot afterwards. The paternalism of French military life was called into action; Pétain told the officers to talk over the men’s difficulties with the men themselves, and to disarm the spirit of mutiny by sympathy and kindness. Somehow, it was done.

Shortly before the Nivelle offensive, the British on the Arras sectors had carried out a series of operations which, in spite of the persistent and often successful counter-attacks of the Germans, achieved noteworthy results. The

element of surprise—as far as surprises could be made in the complex movements of great bodies of troops—was employed to the full. The vast cellars of Arras ^{The British} and the adjacent quarries were used for the ^{at Arras.} concentration of concealed bodies of troops, who, when ready, were quickly launched against the German front line which was less than 2000 yards away. The outstanding and enduring success was the capture of the Vimy Ridge by General Sir Julian Byng and the Canadian troops (April 9, 1917).

The great British effort of the year 1917 was the long series of battles in Flanders, known by the collective name of Passchendaele. It was perhaps necessary to undertake this costly and sorrowful effort in order to relieve the pressure on the French, who were suffering from dejection and exhaustion. The actual military objects of the Passchendaele attacks were to take the coast of Flanders from the Germans; this would be a great moral gain, and a material gain too, insomuch as it would remove submarine bases, Ostend and Zeebrugge, from the control of the Germans. The attacks, which were made from the Ypres salient as a centre, began at the end of July (1917), and were carried out, amid rain, mud, and unceasing carnage, down to November 6. Some advance (about ^{Passchen-} four miles) was made; the slight undulations of ^{daele.} ground about Passchendaele were captured, but there was no break-through in the German defence—the lines were merely bent back. As the British troops went forward, over the gently rising ground which was not steep enough to provide shelter even from machine-gun fire, they stopped from time to time and lived by companies not in trenches but just in great shell-holes. In these inadequate shelters they recruited their exhausted energies, and then manfully went forward. Some companies, with perhaps just a young subaltern in command, spent whole days in shell-holes; next, they plodded forward over the mud and were killed. The Passchendaele battles accomplished almost nothing.

Away to the south, in Artois, General Byng brought off a brilliant limited offensive by suddenly taking a stretch of German line in front of Cambrai. (November 20); but almost before the joy-bells (which were actually rung in England) had ceased pealing, the Germans concentrated for a counter-attack with unexampled speed, and retook about half of the ground that had been gained.

Finally, in the year 1917, one Great Entente Power wholly collapsed—Russia, with the Bolshevik revolution of November 7. Another Great Power, Italy, sustained a tremendous blow. The effects of the Russian collapse were not felt until the following year; the Italian disaster, on the other hand, was repaired almost at once.

Since Italy entered the war in May 1915, she had set herself to invade Istria and to take the great Austrian city and seaport, Trieste. But the Austrians had prepared themselves for the Italian war, and opposed a very stout resistance all along the semicircle of mountains which walls off the Tyrol and Istria from Venetia and Lombardy. Heavy frontal attacks had advanced the Italian lines in places, but no decisive steps had been gained. The fighting on these high Alpine heights, the recurring glories and mysteries of dawn and sunset, seen over the glistening snowpeaks, are described in the published letters of Enzo Valentino, a young Italian volunteer soldier from Perugia, who was killed in the war.

The Austro-Hungarian defence was conducted with great skill by General Boroevitch. On the Italian side the commander in the field was General Cadorna, a scientific soldier and a straightforward gentleman. Cadorna has related in a recently published book how, when the war broke out in 1914, it was his duty to prepare plans in case the Italian Government resolved to co-operate with the Central Powers. Accordingly he had worked out a scheme for the despatch of Italian divisions

to the Rhine for a sharp thrust against France. Fortunately for the Entente Powers the Italian Government decided to fight on the side of France, so Cadorna turned his talents to perfecting schemes for the conquest of Austrian dominions. ^{Cadorna.} Actually, however, after over two years of fighting, the Italians had not achieved many strategical gains, although their repeated hammering at the Austrian defences contributed gradually but powerfully to the exhaustion of the Habsburg Empire.

Suddenly, on October 24, 1917, the Entente Powers were staggered and the Central Powers were thrilled to hear that there had been a real 'break-through' at last in this long-drawn-out war of siege operations. ^{Caporetto.}

A whole Italian army (the Second) had given way, struck by a battering-ram of German troops who had been brought to the help of the Austrians. This is the rout of Caporetto. It subsequently transpired that one of the Italian armies had been systematically demoralised by Socialist and 'defeatist' propaganda; and when attacked, the men, for the most part, simply fled.

Retreats of this sort are the supreme tests of courage and will-power. On the Western front there was a risk of collapse between the time of the battle of Charleroi and the battle of the Marne. ^{Retreats and Routs.} The Russians had experienced rout from May to July, 1915; the Roumanians in the summer of 1916. Despair can never infect an attacking force; but a routed army is the natural vehicle for despair which will easily infect the whole higher command and the nation behind the lines; and where despair comes, defeat is certain. It is one of the grand facts to be learned from the history of the Great War that every rout can be stopped if people, high and low, only keep their heads and do not despair.

The Italians behaved nobly. When the Second Army gave way at Caporetto the others stood firm, fought, and only retreated so far as to conform to the movements of the defeated force. The Italian Government never thought of

yielding. All available reserves were swiftly brought up to the line; and very stringent orders were given to all dispersed soldiers of the beaten army to return to their regiments. French and British high statesmen (Mr. Lloyd George and General Smuts for Great Britain) took the train at once for Italy. They met Cadorna and the Italian Prime Minister at Rapallo. The Italians were depressed and nervous; they knew that the French and British were hard pressed to find men for their own lines. 'How many men do you require?' asked the French and British delegation. 'So many divisions of infantry.' 'Well, you can have them. Guns?' 'So many batteries of artillery.' 'Well, you can have them.' The Italians were impressed. The Franco-British delegation was quiet, resolute, ready to meet all emergencies and all calls. The Italians returned to their own forces, which were now making an excellent fight on the line of the Piave river.

Unfortunately for the Austro-German forces rain fell and the waters of the Piave rose. Gradually the Italian line became rigid. French and British forces arrived and all danger of defeat was at an end. The galvanic energy of the Germans had done something striking; and the Austrian forces had followed the German lead with vigour and ability; but the smashing blow delivered at Caporetto was the last thrust of which the Habsburg Empire was capable.

French and
British Rein-
forcements.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE COLLAPSE OF RUSSIA AND THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK

REVOLUTIONS had threatened to break out in Russia at different times in the half-century before the war. In 1905, towards the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Unrest in Russia. there was a real revolution, but the authorities

—Tsarist-Bureaucratic-Military—managed to suppress it. Then the Tsar granted a Constitution to Russia: a Parliament or Duma was established, but it did not control the ministers, who were simply chosen by the Tsar out of the Civil Service.

It cannot be denied that the Russian *ancien régime* did its duty in the Great War. No writer has done justice to the last effort of Tsardom. The bureaucracy, The Effort of Tsarist Russia. corrupt and stupid as it was, put its grandest and most sustained effort into carrying out the obligations of Russia on the various fronts. It drained the population of men; it raised drafts of eleven million soldiers; and it sent them up to the battle-lines with whatever equipment could be obtained. When the dreadful reverses of summer 1915 took place, the bureaucracy girded itself to repair the losses; the cadres of troops were refilled; immense stores of munitions were accumulated; the great armies were made ready for the field. Brussilov's magnificent campaign on the Galician front in July 1916 had for result the taking prisoner about a million of Austrians. In 1917, however, the bow snapped; the Russian people, which was reputed to be lethargic and dogged, was found to have less staying-power than the French, reputed to be nervous, highly strung, unstable.

Something like rot had set in, from top to bottom, in Russia. The high Russian society paid the price for its *An Unwhole-* luxury and immorality. There was an unsome Court. wholesome 'Byzantinism' in Court life. Jaded women of the high nobility gave themselves up to delusions and exotic religious fancies. An ignorant, profligate monk called Rasputin, established a strange ascendancy over the Tsarina and her circle. The Tsar Nicholas II., an honest and upright man, never faltered in his determination to fight and win the war, but in the glittering Court circles of dissipated noblemen and deluded women, he was out of touch with reality; and yet when he made himself Commander-in-Chief and went to the front (September 1915), things went no better, for the poison only worked more freely behind in the capital. Although some grand dukes murdered Rasputin (December 29, 1916), his baleful influence had done its fatal work.

Early in March 1917 the Guards at Petrograd mutinied. Workmen rioted because bread was scarce. A number of *The Liberal* Liberal politicians, who doubtless had plans *Revolution.* ready for some time, took advantage of the discontent which the long war had engendered, and of the enfeeblement of the bureaucracy, to bring about a revolution. The Tsar abdicated (March 15, 1917), and a Liberal Government under a great nobleman, Prince Lvov, was established. The purpose of the revolutionaries was to have a constitutional monarchy under the son of the Tsar or some other member of the Romanoff family. Moderate men begin revolutions, but later, extremists seize the power. In May the Liberal Government of Prince Lvov had to give way to a moderate Socialist régime under *A Socialist* Alexander Kerensky. This stirring orator, like *Government.* the Liberals who preceded him, was loyal to Russia's obligations, and was resolute in carrying on the war. But, as an advanced politician, he felt impelled, with his colleagues, to take a measure often advocated by humanitarians. He abolished the death penalty in the

army. A grand attack was organised and took place against the Austrians in Galicia on June 29 (1917) and was at first successful, General Kornilov especially distinguishing himself. This momentum, however, was soon spent. By the end of the summer, the war-weary Russian soldiers were simply melting away in face of the Germans. The Russian army, for the most part, became a mob. The infantry officers, with magnificent devotion, put themselves at the head of failing troops and were shot down. The heroic 'Kornilov offensive' of June 1917 was the last flash of the spirit of the old Russian army.

Russia's
Military
Collapse.

The German Government was, naturally, watching with great interest the Russian Revolution, and the marked slackening of the Russian military effort. From the very first they had taken steps to undermine the fabric of the Liberal Revolutionary Government; they had arranged that the Communist Lenin, a Russian exile in Switzerland, should (in spite of the state of war existing between Germany and Russia) have a safe passage, with a few more Communists, to the Russian frontier (April 1917). The truth is that the Germans, though they had suffered no big defeat since the Battle of the Marne, were not in a good state; the terrific drain upon their resources and the incessant strain of war on two frontiers were telling on them severely. Ludendorff writes in his book:

Germany and
the Russian
Revolution.

'I could not doubt that the disintegration of the Russian army and nation involved an extraordinary risk for Germany and for Austria-Hungary. . . . By sending Lenin to Russia our Government had assumed a great responsibility. From a military point of view his journey was justified. But our Government should have seen to it that we were not involved in her fall.'

The return of Lenin and other Communists to Russia in April 1917 had for its result, six months later, the Bolshevik revolution of November 7, 1917.

The Bolsheviks were that section of the Russian Socialists which aimed at the 'Maximum' programme, that is, at the attainment of complete Communism, as distinct from the moderate Socialists who would be content with achieving a part of the Socialist ideal. The word Bolshevik in Russian means, to use a French word for which there is no English equivalent, *Maximalist*.

As soon as the Bolsheviks had seized power in Petrograd and Moscow they further secured their position by allowing the peasants to seize the estates of the landlords without compensation. Next, making a great parade of freedom and tolerance, they proclaimed that they recognised the right of all the races of the former Russian Empire to 'self-determination,' even if this involved actual separation from Russia. The Finns, Poles, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians took advantage of this declaration to assert independence; so did also the races of the Caucasus, the Georgians, Tartars, and Armenians, although their independence proved to be only a temporary affair.

Thirdly, the Bolshevik Government, by a very simple act, relieved Russia from the heavy public debt which the Tsardom had contracted partly for the war and partly, long before the war, for making Russia's great railway system; the Bolsheviks merely repudiated all liability for this debt: £3,000,000,000 of obligations were wiped off the account.

Bolshevism is a kind of religion, although not a particularly noble one, because it is based, partly, at any rate, on the appropriation of other people's goods, and it makes its way by means of stirring up hatred and strife. Its supreme object is the achievement of a world-revolution which will destroy all private capitalists and which will put everything under International Communist control. Accordingly, having secured their position in Russia, the next step of the Bolsheviks was to rid themselves of the Great War, in which

Bolshevism.

The
Bolshevik
Revolution.Bolshevism
and World-
Revolution.

Russia was still a participant. They therefore publicly proposed peace without indemnities and without annexations; and as all the Entente Powers were bound together by treaty (the Pact of London, September 5, 1914) to make peace only in common, they invited the Allies of Russia to come to a general peace conference. The invitation was refused. A Bolshevik peace delegation then went to Brest-Litovsk in the part of Poland occupied by the Central Powers. After about three months of negotiation the Treaty of Peace of Brest-Litovsk was made with Austria and Germany (and also with Bulgaria and Turkey), on March 3, 1918. Thus the Germans gained complete relief from war on the Eastern front. There is a description, both vivid and thoughtful, of the last months of the German-Russian war in *The Case of Sergeant Grischa*, a novel by Arnold Zweig.

At the same time Roumania was compelled, by the complete cessation of Russian support, to make peace likewise (Peace of Bucharest, May 7, 1918).

Peace of
Brest-
Litovsk.

Roumania
makes Peace.

CHAPTER XXXIX

1918: DEFEAT

THE break on the Western front, which all the world had been for four years expecting to occur, came at last ; it was the Entente front that broke.

Circumstances were favourable to a great German offensive movement. The cessation of hostilities on the Russian front had enabled the German General Staff to transfer about a million men to the Western theatre of war. The huge armies which the United States was training were still in America. The French and British had very few reserve troops left ; nor indeed had the Germans, but they had a sufficient number to support one tremendous drive, to fill up the losses which every great attack involves, and to maintain the pressure for at any rate several weeks.

The Entente Powers surmised accurately that a grand assault was coming. A British visitor at Field-Marshal Haig's Headquarters in France, early in 1918, heard Haig at dinner remark : ' I believe that the Germans mean to make a great attack. We are ready for them. I hope it will come soon.'

It came on March 21. The Germans, after the usual long and devastating bombardment, sent their picked ' shock troops ' forward against the British line at St. Quentin. The Vth Army was rolled back with tremendous losses ; and the Germans went on like a torrent.

Elsewhere troops either broke or gave way in order

to conform with the retreat already begun. It was a desperate time. Having succeeded against the British, Ludendorff, without relaxing pressure along the line of the first attack, organised a great assault in another sector, against the French. Some British battalions, which had been sent to the quiet French sector of the Chemin des Dames 'for a rest,' were suddenly ordered into the line. The French had been attacked and were hard pressed. The officers of the British battalions had to make their way to the line, over ground where they had never been before, and to find their battle-positions merely by studying the maps with which they had been supplied. They threaded their way through a maze of strange trenches and a stunning bombardment on a swaying and tottering line. Within a few hours the German assaults had carried the Chemin des Dames, and had taken masses of French and British prisoners. After four years of painful and sustained effort the Entente armies had lost the best part of their gains, and the Germans were pushing rapidly ahead.

Some British prisoners were taken into the German communications and were brought before the Emperor, who was following hot upon the heels of his successful troops. A captured British officer was presented to him. The Emperor was amiable. He spoke perfect English. 'Our soldiers are doing very well,' he said. 'Yes, Your Majesty,' replied the British officer, 'but they will soon be held up.' 'Yes, I dare say,' said the Emperor, 'the British fight very well.' Then he suddenly asked: 'Do they want peace in England?' 'Yes, sir, when the time is ready for it.' 'That's what we wish too,' said the Emperor.

William II.
and a British
Prisoner.

Meanwhile the great German attacks proceeded. Along about ninety miles of front, from Arras (which the British held) to Rheims (which the Germans held) the Franco-British had to retire. There was desperate fighting for every furlong of ground, and fearful losses of men and

material were sustained on both sides. Would the Germans at last go through, at first to Amiens, and soon to Paris? Nobody thought of surrender.

On April 11, Field-Marshal Haig issued an Order of the Day to his troops; a facsimile is given in Churchill's book 'Backs to the Wall.' of the original Order, as drafted by Haig's hand in firm, bold handwriting. The Order, after pointing out that the Germans had failed in their aims, which were to take the Channel ports and to destroy the British army, continued:

'There is no other course open to us but to fight it out! Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end. The safety of our Homes and the Freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment.'¹

A message was flashed from London across the Atlantic to Washington—an urgent plea for help. President Wilson's reply was heartening: as many American troops would come as were required—eight million if necessary; it was only a question of time. The only question for Western Europe was: could the French and British hold out until the Americans arrived? If they could, the Germans were doomed. The vast, confident mass of the United States armies would slowly descend upon them and then, like an avalanche, would sweep them away. Meanwhile all the scanty British reserves must be brought to France. The boys of eighteen who had been drafted for a year's training voluntarily held. Flanders unteered at once for the front. Up in Flanders, the Ypres salient was held impregably. The Germans captured Mount Kemmel (April 25) but made no further progress. On one point of the Ypres sector where the

¹ *World Crisis*, iv. 434.

Germans had pushed forward, a train full of Australians was driven right into the fighting Germans; the tall, lithe Australians leapt from the trucks and, with the peculiar swift recklessness which marked their fighting, dashed at the enemy and drove them back with the bayonet.

On March 26 a fateful council of Allied statesmen and soldiers was held at Doullens. M. Clemenceau, the French premier, was conferring with Lord Milner, who was British Secretary of State for War. Field-Marshal Haig was also present with Generals Foch and Pétain and General Pershing of the United States. The only thing that could save the Western front would be the strategic direction of one mind over all the armies—not The 'United Command.' to direct their tactical operations on the fields of battle, but to decide where the chief resistance should be made and the chief attacks delivered, and to what points such reserves as were available should be moved. General Foch was entrusted with the strategical direction of all the Allied armies in France and Italy, the individual commanders-in-chief being still left, however, with the tactical direction of their troops. This 'compromise' obviously contained dangers of dissension and confusion, but actually proved to be smooth-working and effective, owing to the tact and loyalty of the 'generalissimo,' Foch, and of the Allied commanders-in-chief. Thus was a measure of united command established.

American troops were rapidly accumulating. 'The proof that we did our part,' wrote Mr. Mellon at a later date, 'is that when the troops were wanted, they were The American Effort. there.' The figures of shipments of troops from the United States to France are as follows: April 1918, 120,000; May, 220,000; June, 275,000.¹ After this they continued to pour into Saint-Nazaire, their port of disembarkation in the west of France.

The German submarine campaign, although it took a

¹ Pollard, *A Short History of the Great War* (1920), p. 335.

very heavy toll of Allied and neutral merchant shipping, quite failed against the carefully convoyed transports; nor was submarine destructiveness against merchant ships able to keep down the supply of food and munitions for troops, or of food for civilians.

CHAPTER XL

1918 : VICTORY

By the end of May the German attacks on Amiens had failed; the fluid front was once more becoming solid and rigid. In the particularly dangerous sectors towards Paris, 'suddenly the roads . . . began to be filled with endless streams of Americans. The impression made upon the hard-pressed French by this seemingly inexhaustible flood of gleaming youth in its first maturity of health and vigour was prodigious.'¹

Now was the moment when the German Government should have asked for peace. For, in spite of its brilliant war-map, Germany was defeated. Down to the opening of the grand offensive of March 21, 1918, the Germans had been losing less men than the Entente armies. The continual maintenance of the initiative by the French and British had cost three Entente soldiers for two Germans. Moreover, the German lines had been proved to be practically impregnable. Therefore, had the German General Staff simply maintained a careful and stubborn defence, and had it at the same time offered reasonable terms (the cession of Alsace and Lorraine and the evacuation of Belgium), the Entente Powers in view of their enormous and continuing losses would have been bound to accept. But the German General Staff could not bring itself to abandon the prospect of permanent territorial gains; and its influence over the civil Government was such that no minister dared to suggest peace without gain; even as

Entente and
German
Losses.

A Failure of
Statesman-
ship.

¹ Churchill, *op. cit.*, iv. 454.

regards Belgium, they could not even promise complete evacuation.

When Ludendorff started his offensive of March 21 the German losses in killed and wounded at once began to be greater than those of the Entente. Still, important ground was being taken, and losses could be borne if Paris was to be gained. But when by the end of May it became clear that even Amiens could not be taken, Ludendorff should have stopped. Nevertheless, the furious military gambler went on trying for other successes, feeling with costly thrusts for weak spots in the Entente sectors. On June 18, when Ludendorff's troops were over the Marne, fighting their way towards Paris, Foch struck hard. This was the Second Battle of the Marne.

It was a veritable Battle of the Nations. On the one hand were the Germans; on the other were United States divisions of troops, troops from the British Isles, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, indeed from every British possession, troops from France, and coloured French colonial troops from Morocco, Algiers, and Senegal. By June 30 the Germans were in retreat although not in rout.

The rest of the war in France was a breathless summer campaign conducted with brilliant precision by Haig, Pétain, and Pershing under the strategical direction of Foch. The hardest fighting fell to the United States. The chief sectors allotted to them were in the forest region of the Vosges mountains. In particular, in the wooded *massif* of the Argonne the Americans slowly worked their way over stubbornly contested ground. It was a wonderful army—tall, powerful men, the pick of a vigorous population of one hundred and twenty million people. The German line never broke; but the German troops withdrew from one position to another, leaving many miles of trenches and many thousands of prisoners in the hands of the Americans. On September 12, St. Mihiel, which had withstood the

The Second
Marne.

Foch's
Summer
Campaign.

pressure of the Entente troops since 1914, was taken by the Americans.

The 'Allied and Associated Powers,' as the opponents of Germany were now called, advanced rapidly over the battlefields of the last four years. The armies of the United States formed the right wing; the French were the centre; the British were the left. The armies advanced in *échelon*, making a figure like a staircase. From right to left first one army drove forward against the Germans until the inevitable pause came, when combinations would be re-formed and fresh supplies brought up; as one army paused the next on the left took up the tale, and drove forward upon the retreating Germans; then a pause, and the neighbouring army would go forward with a bound.

Nobody can now realise the exhilaration of those days. The wine of victory was in the veins of the Entente and American soldiery. Every day brought its new advance, with the capture of enormous numbers of German prisoners. The German guns still took their toll of lives, but the horror of death had passed away, for a sure hope was in every breast, and the certainty that right was triumphing. St. Quentin, Lille, Cambrai came into Allied hands; the troops passed between lines of cheering people who offered garlands of flowers.

There was no collapse of the German armies. They received blows with bewildering rapidity, but they withstood stubbornly this sudden reverse of fortune, and fought hard as they retreated. At Great Headquarters, however, panic was appearing; Hindenburg never quailed, but Ludendorff, the vital spirit of the General Staff, had lost his self-command. He told the Emperor that a collapse might come in twenty-four hours; it was essential to ask for an armistice. The German Government was hastily taking steps to make itself 'constitutional'; the Liberal Prince Max of Baden was appointed Chancellor; he was to be responsible to the elected Reichstag, not

to the Emperor. 'The office of Kaiser is still useful to the German people,' said a somewhat pathetic proclamation of William II. (October 28, 1918).

A revolution might break out at any moment in the overstrained and ill-nourished population of Germany. Ludendorff himself looked like breaking down. 'I
The Kaiser's Throne. must appoint Gröner in his place,' the Emperor said to the new Chancellor. Prince Max thought that the only chance of avoiding revolution at home, and of obtaining anything like acceptable terms abroad, was by the abdication of the Kaiser and the appointment of himself as Regent; but before this could be more than suggested, the sands had run out.

CHAPTER XLI

SURRENDER

PROBABLY historians will never agree about the place where the 'break' came in the fighting-lines of the Central Powers. There were vital spots everywhere. Even the submarines, the enduring hope of Germany, were gradually being overcome by the marvellous watchfulness, vigour, and enterprise, chiefly of the British and United States navies. The number and tonnage of British merchant ships sunk by German submarines in the first half of the year 1917 rose from 49 ships with a total of 153,666 tons in January to 169 ships with a total of 545,282 tons in April. The German submarines sank about one British homeward-bound merchant ship in five or six throughout these months. After April 1917 the United States navy, especially the destroyers, came to the help of the Allies; and with this help the British navy was able to keep down the losses of merchant ships to a figure which made starvation in the islands unlikely; but the population had to be very carefully rationed in food by the Government. This rationing system was instituted in January 1918, and was worked very successfully for the rest of the war-period.

In April 1918 the British made an attack on the great submarine lair, Zeebrugge, and blocked at any rate one main exit. This was the most dramatic, the most thrilling, of all the naval raids. Most careful preparation and timing was required. There was no difficulty in finding volunteers. On the night of April 22-23, the cruiser *Vindictive* and some destroyers, submarines and small ships

Success and
Failure of the
Submarine.

Zeebrugge.

carrying concrete sailed into Zeebrugge harbour. For half an hour, amid a rain of shot and shell from the German batteries, the British sailors fought on the Mole of Zeebrugge and placed in the channels the ships which carried concrete. These were then sunk. At 12.30 A.M. the *Vindictive* and her companion ships withdrew, leaving, however, many dead officers and men on the Mole. The viaduct connecting the Mole with the land was blown up and the mouth of the Zeebrugge-Bruges canal was blocked.


The land in occupation of Germany had thus actually been invaded from the sea. The land campaign in Artois was still progressing when the Zeebrugge Raid took place ; Germany's hope was in her army ; by September, however, this hope had vanished too.

There were three 'Fronts' which collapsed within a month. The first was the Bulgarian. After three years of obstinate resistance in Macedonia, the Bulgarian authorities requested an armistice on September 25, 1918, and obtained it on October 30, on terms which ensured, among other things, the use of the Bulgarian railways for Allied troops. Thus the Austro-Hungarian frontier on the Danube was menaced with an invasion of the Allies. Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicated and fled from the people whom he had misled, leaving his son Boris as king.

In Mesopotamia, General Marshall, the successor to Maude, maintained a steady if slow advance up the Tigris, in face of the stubborn resistance of the Turks. By the end of May he had reached the Lesser Zab river, about 150 miles north of Bagdad. Then came a pause. In October, however, Marshall crossed the Lesser Zab, and after a long battle forced the Turkish army opposing him to surrender, on October 28, at Kalat Sherghat.

Away to the west General Allenby with an army partly of native Indian troops was prosecuting a daring campaign in Palestine. On December 11, 1917, he entered Jerusalem.

THE BALKAN FRONT



Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

In the first six months of 1918 the Palestine front was 'quiet.' In July, however, heavy fighting began again. An Arab army led by the Emir Faisal, who was advised by Colonel Lawrence, was co-operating with Allenby. On September 19, Allenby's cavalry made a brilliant advance on the plain of Esdraelon. British aviators located a mass of Turkish soldiers in a confined valley and bombed them hotly. A pilot came up to Allenby and reported heavy casualties inflicted on the Turks in the valley. Turkey beaten. The pilot was excited. 'It is just bloody butchery,' he said. 'You carry on,' said the general sharply; 'I'll tell you when it is bloody butchery.'¹ The military commander is the only real autocrat. Allenby was right; the sharper the Turkish defeat that day, the sooner the war would end and life be saved. On October 25 Allenby's troops captured Aleppo. On October 30, Turkey surrendered by the Armistice of Mudros, on the island of Lemnos, which throughout the war had been held by the British navy.

The Supreme Military Council of the Allies at Versailles had already drafted model Armistice terms—terms not just for a cessation of hostilities, but for such a surrender of territory and materials as would make a resumption of the war impossible. This acceptance of the Armistice terms by the enemy implied necessarily the future acceptance of whatever Peace terms the Allied and Associated Powers should choose to impose.

The third of these dramatic collapses was that of Austria. This crumbling empire had vainly tried to make peace on several occasions in the previous two years, but had never been able to bring its desire into effect owing to its fear of its German ally. Since the famous victory at Caporetto the Austrian army had accomplished nothing. By the middle of the summer of 1918 the army was demoralised. On the night of October 23-24 the last assault was opened by the 10th Italian army

The Down-
fall of
Austria.

¹ *Letters of Sir Walter Raleigh*, ii. 538.

(two divisions of British troops and two of Italian), under the command of the British General Lord Cavan. By October 25 the Piave was crossed and the Austrian lines occupied. The Austrians were beaten, their troops streaming back in rout. On the same day the Austrian Government asked for an Armistice.

Things were going no better with the Germans. 'Deserted by their Allies in the fifth year of the War,' as an open German wireless message stated, the German Government (with its own army now definitely beaten) had no alternative but to ask for an Armistice.

CHAPTER XLII

THE ARMISTICE

THROUGHOUT October 1918 the German Government had been in communication with Mr. Wilson, President of the United States, who, among all the notable statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers, stood forth as the most notable in the eyes of all the world. The replies of Mr. Wilson, which were published, along with the German messages, were very sharp: he could only offer terms in concert with the Powers associated with the United States, and only such terms as would preserve 'their existing military preponderance over the Central Powers.' The Germans asked for terms consistent with the 'Fourteen Points' of January 8, 1918, and subsequent speeches of Mr. Wilson. When communicated to the British and French cabinets this request was assented to (November 5), subject to two exceptions: (1) the question of the 'freedom of the seas'—on this subject the Allies would not commit themselves before they entered the Peace Conference; (2) compensation must be made by Germany 'for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies.'

Germany
and Mr.
Wilson.

The Allies'
Reserva-
tions.

Considering this Note as satisfactory, or at any rate the best that they could obtain, the German Government signified their readiness to accept the Allied and Associated Powers' Armistice terms. As hostilities were still in progress and could not, for obvious military reasons, be suspended until the terms had been definitely accepted and signed, great care had to be taken in arranging the route of the German emissaries. A road was indicated on the

military maps, and the artillerymen and airmen of both sides had to be cautioned not to fire upon this road. The emissaries who came in three motor cars from Spa, the German Headquarters, were met on the La Capelle road and taken in a covered motor car with the blinds down, through the Allied lines to the village of Rethondes. Marshal Foch was in the railway train on which he lived and travelled behind the lines of the Allied armies. With him, seated in the dining-car which still stands in Rethondes railway station, were Admiral Wemyss of the British navy, and Admiral Sims of the American navy. The German Deputies, Herr Erzberger, Major-General Winterfeld, and two others were admitted, serious, agitated, wondering how they would be received. The prepared terms were then read aloud by Foch. The Germans seemed staggered. This was not an armistice, it was a surrender. Well, this was the offer of the Allied and Associated Powers; the choice, to accept or reject, lay with the Germans (November 10). They were allowed time to send a courier back to Spa; he went, gave his message and returned. At 5 A.M. on November 11 the German delegates signed the Armistice agreement. Behind them, beyond the lines of French, British, and American troops, the Germans were still defending themselves with rifle, machine-gun, and artillery, but the roads were beginning to be blocked with retreating troops. Another few days would have given the Allied and Associated Powers—certainly at a heavy cost to both sides—another resounding victory. 'But one only makes war for results,' said the humane Foch; and the Armistice surrender was so complete that the victors would have the means of securing when they came to make the final treaty all the objects for which the war was being fought.

The most important Armistice terms were that the German armies should evacuate all the territory which they had invaded and occupied in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Roumania, and Russia,

The Meeting
at Reth-
ondes.

Armistice
Terms.

and also their own territory on the left bank of the Rhine ; that they should surrender to the Allies 5000 guns, 25,000 machine-guns, 1700 aeroplanes ; and that the German navy should surrender all its submarines, 5 battle-cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, and 50 destroyers.

These Armistice terms thus involved much more than a suspension of hostilities. They made a resumption of the war on the part of Germany practically impossible, and placed Germany at the mercy of the victors, except in so

far as they were bound to give her terms consistent with President Wilson's Fourteen Points.

Losses.

The killed and missing during the World War were :—

British Empire	. . .	946,023
France	1,393,388
Belgium	38,172
Italy	460,000
Portugal	7,222
Roumania	335,706
Russia	4,000,000 (estimate)
Serbia	127,535
United States	115,660
Germany	2,050,466
Austria-Hungary	1,200,000
Bulgaria	101,224
Turkey	300,000

The wounded were more than double the number of the killed. Plague and starvation also made havoc among civilian populations. Perhaps altogether some twenty million people died from causes directly attributable to the war. The prestige of the white races, hitherto the unchallenged leaders of civilisation, suffered in the eyes of all the other races, as the result of this fratricidal struggle.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE PEACE TREATIES

BEFORE the Armistice was made the German navy at Kiel had mutinied. On November 10 the Kaiser, William II., fled from his army headquarters, Spa, into Holland. 'Soviets,' or councils of workmen and soldiers, were now being formed in Berlin and other cities. Fortunately both for Germany and the rest of Europe, a strong and public-spirited man, Friedrich Ebert, and five men of his party (the Social Democrats) seized the reins of Government, and proclaimed Germany a constitutional republic. Ebert became the first President; it was his Government which had to negotiate the peace treaty between Germany and the Allies and Associated Powers. At the same time as Germany had her revolution, Austria also had a revolution and became a republic.

The Allied Governments, in their Note to Mr. Wilson, dated November 5, 1918, had agreed to make peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, subject to two reservations concerning the freedom of the seas and compensation to be given by Germany to Allied civilians for damage caused by German aggression. The Germans call this the *Pre-Armistice Agreement*; and it cannot reasonably be doubted that the Allies were bound by it.

The Fourteen Points were: (1) open covenants of peace must be openly arrived at; (2) absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters; (3) the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers, and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions; (4) re-

duction of armaments ; (5) impartial adjustment of colonial claims ; (6) evacuation of Russian territory ; (7) restoration of Belgium ; (8) the wrong done to France by Prussia in Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted ; (9) readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along clearly recognisable lines of nationality ; (10) opportunity of autonomous development for the peoples of Austria-Hungary ; (11) Serbia to have free access to the sea ; guarantees of the political and economic independence of the Balkan States ; (12) the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire to be assured a secure sovereignty ; (13) an independent Polish State to be erected ; (14) a general association of nations must be formed.

The great Peace Conference was held at Paris in the first six months of 1919. The peace treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany was signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, the anniversary of the murders at Sarajevo.

Part I. of the Treaty is the Covenant of the League of Nations—the constitution establishing the association of States, the Secretariat at Geneva, and the Council and Assembly of the League. Another section of the Treaty established the International Labour Office which is under the League. All the States which took part in the war became, either in 1919 or in the next few years, members of the League of Nations, with the exception of the United States, Russia, and Turkey. The statesmen most active in founding the League of Nations were President Wilson of the United States, Léon Bourgeois of France, Lord Cecil of Great Britain, and General Smuts of South Africa.

Germany, which from 1871 to 1914 had been the most powerful and influential state in Europe, ceded large territories—Alsace-Lorraine in the west, and all her large Polish districts in the east. The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France was a much-

needed settlement of a region which had been a 'danger-spot' of Europe for nearly fifty years. The separation of the Polish districts from Germany, and similar separations of territory from Austria and Russia, enabled old Poland (suppressed by the Partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795) to be re-established. This likewise eased the situation in one of Europe's danger-spots. Poland was given a small coast on the Baltic by means of a 'corridor' or wide strip of land which runs down to the sea between west and east Prussia. Danzig was made a Free City. ✓ The Saar, formerly Prussian and Bavarian territory, was placed under the League of Nations for fifteen years, after which a plebiscite was to decide whether it should belong to the League, to France, or to Germany.

Articles 231 and 232 of the Treaty of Versailles imposed upon Germany the obligation of paying for the damage done by her acts of war to the civilians of the Allied States. The chief items in the list of ^{Reparations.} damages were the cost of restoration of the Belgian and French devastated areas, and the cost of the war-pensions of Allied civilians who served in the war. The sum actually to be paid was to be fixed by a Reparation Commission of the Allies. It was not until 1921 that the German liability was assessed at £6,000,000,000 sterling; but in the following years Germany was not able to pay this amount.

A very important military section of the Treaty of Versailles enacted that the German army must be reduced to 100,000 long-service men, recruited for twelve years (article 160). The Treaty stated that Germany accepted this restriction 'in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations.' In German territory on the left bank of the Rhine and on the right bank for a breadth of 50 kilometres (30 miles), no movements of troops may take place and no military works be maintained (article 42).

A revolution had taken place in the Austrian Empire at the time of the Armistice. The Emperor Karl, who

succeeded to Francis Joseph in 1916, had to leave the country. A republic was established. Peace was made between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Republic of Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, September 10, 1919. Austria lost all her seaboard, and was reduced to her German-speaking portions. By the Treaty of the Trianon, June 4, 1920, Hungary was reduced to the area of her Magyar population. Bohemia was restored as the independent state of Czechoslovakia. Roumania was enormously increased in territory at the expense of Hungary. Serbia, under the name of Yugoslavia, was enormously increased at the expense of Austria and Hungary.

The Bolshevik Government which came into power in Russia in November 1917 acknowledged a claim or right of self-determination on the part of the peoples of the former Russian Empire. At the end of the war Poland had come again into existence as a republic, made out of the Polish portions of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had also established themselves as independent states, having availed themselves of the Bolshevik acknowledgment of the claim of self-determination.

Mazzini, the Italian patriot and European philosopher, was of opinion that peace would reign in Europe when all the nations had freed themselves from alien rule. As the result of the Great War the suppressed or divided nations in Europe were, for the most part, united to their kin, or made into independent states. It was impossible, indeed, to make the new frontiers exactly correspond with lines of nationality. Some national minorities—Germans in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Magyars in Roumania—had to be left as subjects in states of other races. For their protection, 'Minority Treaties' were entered into between the Allies and certain states who included in their annexed territories alien minorities.

These treaties guaranteed to the minorities the free exercise of their national religion, speech, and culture, and put them under the protection of the League of Nations.

Imperialism or the policy of acquiring colonial possessions and markets had from time to time tended to disturb the relations of the Great Powers with each other. ^{Mandated}
By the time the Great War started, nearly all ^{Territories.}
the world had been claimed and owned. A result of the war was that the victorious Powers took from Germany all her colonies.

The war, however, had not been waged for Imperialism but to end German military ascendancy and to complete national freedom in Europe. Therefore, contrary to what happened after previous great wars (Spanish Succession, Seven Years' War, Napoleonic War), the Peace Treaties at the end of the World War did not annex any colonies to the victors. Germany, it is true, lost all her colonies; and large territories were also detached from Turkey. These colonies and territories were placed under the trusteeship of one or other of the victor Powers, who were made responsible for their trusteeship to the League of Nations.

The principle according to which the Allies acted in establishing the mandatory system was that the peoples of the former German colonies and certain Turkish territories were 'not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world'; and that 'the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation.' It was therefore enacted that 'the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations.'

The 'mandates' were divided into three classes, generally known as A, B, and C.

'A mandates' concerned certain communities formerly belonging to Turkey which had by 1919 already 'reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a

mandatory until such time as they can stand alone.' Such mandates are those for Syria (entrusted to France), and Mesopotamia (or Iraq) and Palestine (entrusted to Great Britain). ✓

'B mandates' concern backward peoples who cannot administer themselves. The mandatory in this case is responsible for the whole administration, under conditions which guarantee freedom of religion, the prohibition of the trade in slaves, arms, and liquor, and the securing of equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League. Such a mandate is established for Tanganyika Territory (formerly German East Africa), entrusted to Great Britain.

'C mandates' concern territories which, for various reasons, chiefly geographical, 'can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory.' Such mandates exist for the former German colonies of South-West Africa (entrusted to the Union of South Africa) and German New Guinea (entrusted to Australia).

A Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations receives annual reports from each mandatory State, and advises the Council of the League on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

The establishing of the League of Nations with its permanent Secretariat at Geneva, its rules for conciliation and arbitration, its responsibility for national minorities, and its supervision of colonial mandates, implied a definite aim on the part of the Powers to prevent the recurrence of causes which had brought about the World War in 1914.

The Pros-
pects of
Peace.

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